JUDGMENT M. Wahajuddin, J. - The plaintiff-appellant brought the suit for possession over the disputed property and for damages at Rs. 10/- per month. According to the plaintiff the entire house including the portion in suit originally belonged to Ibrahim and Sabir, who were real brothers, and on 18-1-1965 there was a partition between them and according to such partition the disputed portion was allotted to Sabir towards his share, and thereafter Sabir and Ibrahim continued in exclusive possession and occupation of their respective portion. The plaintiff is a transferee from Sabir under a sale deed dated 28-10-1965. It was, further, alleged that on 7-11-1965 defendant secretly demolished the partition wall between the two portions of the entire house and illegally and forcibly took possession over the disputed property. Defendants 2 to 8 being the sons and daughters of defendant No. 1 and defendant 9 being the vendor of defendant 1 were also impleaded. 2. The contesting defendants, inter alia, pleaded that one Najjan was the initial owner of the entire house. He had four sons, Babbu, Nabban, Ibrahim and Abrar and executed a sale deed in respect of th share of his house in favour of his aforesaid four sons. Thereafter he executed another sale deed with respect to 31/2 Anna share in the entire house in favour of Smt. Amna, wife of Sabir. He also made an oral gift with regard to another 31/2 Anna Share in respect of Smt. Akhtari, wife of Abrar alias Sabir, According to the defendant only three sons namely, Babbu, Ibrahim and Abrar alias Sabir survived Najjan and entered into possession of the house. Babbu later migrated to Pakistan in 1949 and his share vested in the custodian and the Custodian General U.P. property is a necessary party. The alleged partition between Ibrahim and Sabir was denied and it was maintained that the property remained in joint possession of co-sharers and neither Sabir, nor the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed portion of the house exclusively. 3. The Additional Civil Judge framed six issues in the case. Issue No. 5 related to valuation and the court is no more concerned with the matter. Issue No. 6 was general concerning relief. On issue No. 3, the Additional Civil Judge held that the Custodian Evacuee property is not a necessary party. 3. The Additional Civil Judge framed six issues in the case. Issue No. 5 related to valuation and the court is no more concerned with the matter. Issue No. 6 was general concerning relief. On issue No. 3, the Additional Civil Judge held that the Custodian Evacuee property is not a necessary party. On issue No. 4 it found that Sabir along with his wife Smt. Amna happened to be exclusive owner in possession of the disputed property. On issue No. 2 it held that the plaintiff being vendee from Sabir and Amna is the exclusive owner of the disputed property. On issue No. 1 it found that the disputed portion was allotted to Sabir along with his wife Smt. Amna in a private partition, which took place between Sabir and Ibrahim and the portion in question was exclusively enjoyed by Sabir and Smt. Amna. The suit was, accordingly, decreed. 4. In First Appeal the Additional District Judge held that the partition-deed relied upon by the plaintiff (Ext. 2) is genuine. It, however, further found that though such a partition- deed was duly executed, there was no actual partition at the spot by metes and bounds and there was no delivery of possession in pursuance to such deed. It further found that there was only allotment of shares by the aforesaid deed, but it was not acted upon thereafter and the plaintiffs case that the plaintiff predecessor in title had obtained possession over the property in suit is incorrect. It, further, came to the conclusion that mere execution of the partition-deed is not enough, when actual division of the property by metes and bounds has not taken place, and to effect a partition there should be an actual division by metes and bounds and possession over separate portion. The other lacuna pointed out by the first appellate court in the partition- deed is that it does not state the specific shares belonging to Ibrahim and Sabir. It simply recites that together they are absolute owner of the house, which is not correct, as Babu has also a share therein. It, further, found that even in absence of Babu shares can be determined. It also held that the vendee could claim by a general partition of the entire property as to enforce the interest acquired by him against the share of his vendors. It, further, found that even in absence of Babu shares can be determined. It also held that the vendee could claim by a general partition of the entire property as to enforce the interest acquired by him against the share of his vendors. The first appellate court, therefore, allowed the appeal and has set aside the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge and dismissed the suit giving a liberty to the plaintiff either to seek a general partition, or enforce his right of warranty of the title or any other remedy, which may be open to him by law in separate proceedings. The finding of the first appellate court is challenged in the second appeal. 5. The finding of the first appellate court that though a registered deed was executed inter se between Ibrahim and Sabir allotting separate shares, it was never acted upon by separating the two portions by metes and bounds is a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence and this Court cannot, in second appeal, disturb it or interfere with it. Under the Mohammedan Law neither a partial partition is permissible, nor mere allotment of shares can serve the purpose and I fully agree with the findings of the first appellate court that there has to be a division by metes and bounds. As regards the registered document of partition is concerned, it is evident from the circumstances of the case that the deed was executed to defeat the right, title and interest of Babu. It would be found from the evidence on record that Babu was in India when Najjan died. He, therefore, definitely inherited some share in the property and when he was not a party to the partition-deed, obviously the partition alleged to have been effected will be a partial partition. While under Muslim Law a partial partition is not permissible. The suit as brought was defective. The plaintiff could have well brought a partition suit claiming the share of Sabir and Smt. Amna in the property and seeking its division by metes and bounds. This the plaintiff has avoided. On the contrary, the suit has been brought giving a colour that Ibrahim and Sabir were exclusively full owner of the property and partitioned it inter se, which is not correct. This the plaintiff has avoided. On the contrary, the suit has been brought giving a colour that Ibrahim and Sabir were exclusively full owner of the property and partitioned it inter se, which is not correct. As it is not a partition suit, it will be needless to enter into the determination of share of the individual concerned. The crux of the matter is whether without bringing a partition suit as such, the plaintiff as vendee of Sabir and Amna can claim exclusive possession over any specific portion. 6. Reliance was placed upon AIR 1927 PC 227 . AIR 1971 SC 807 at p. 822 (sic) and AIR 1950 All 320 , but these pronouncements are not directly on the point, as they do not lay down that any partial partition between some of the co-owners is permissible. The Additional District Judge has referred to the case of Abdul Rahman v. Hamid Ali Shah, AIR 1959 Madh.Pra. 190. It was held in that case that no one co-owner can alienate one specific item of the property before the same has been allotted to his share in a general partition effected through a court or privately. In that case the equities were also laid down and the 1st Additional District Judge has rightly followed the guide lines in that case. When the very alleged partition is not complete in the sense that one of the co-sharers was not a party to it, nor the matter of share of that co-sharer is explained away in the alleged partition-deed, the deed as such cannot be enforced. By this I do not mean that the vendees from Sabir and Amna have no remedy. They can well bring a suit for partition and in such partition suit they can claim such portion of the property to which their vendors would be entitled, but in absence of any partition by metes and bounds, a suit for possession of any specific portion as such would not be maintainable. 7. I, therefore, do not find any force in this second appeal. However, considering the entire circumstances of this case I feel that justice would be better served by directing that the parties to this second appeal should bear their own costs. The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs of this second appeals.