JUDGMENT S. Sagiiir Ahmad, J. - The petitioners, in this ground of petitions, have questioned the realisation of market fee by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti under the provisions of U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam as also the realisation of additional market fee under the said Adhiniyam read with U. P Ordinance No. 40 of 1983. Their contentions are that (i) Mandi Samiti does nut render any service and there bring no quid pro quo, it cannot realise any fee from the petitioners (ii) the levy of additional market fee by U. P. Ordinance No. 40 of 1983 was illegal and no additional market fee can be realised, (iii) they purchase paddy, convert it into rice and sell it. Since the Mandi fee has already been paid by them at the time of purchase of paddy, no Mandi fee is liable to be paid on the sale of rice obtained from the said paddy. 2. So far as the question of quid pro quo is concerned, the petitioners cannot contend that because the Samiti was not rendering actual service, the petitioners are not liable to pay any fee as this contention has already been negatived by the Supreme Court. In Sreeniwase General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 , it was obscene that the traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea change in the subsequent decisions. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as part of common burden, while a fee is for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in public interest. It was also pointed out by the Supreme Court in that decision that there was no generic difference between a tax and a fee. It was observed that both were compulsory ex actions of money by public authorities and that a levy in the nature of a fee did not cease to be of that character merely because there was an element of compulsion or coercive ness present in it now was it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual, who obtains the benefit of the service. The Supreme Court also drew attention to the increasing realisation that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense was not always sue quo non for fee. Nor was the element of quid pro quo necessarily absent in every tax. 3 It may be pointed out that in Sreenivas case (supra) the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider its own Judgment in Kewal Krishna Puri v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1980 SC 1008 and laid down that an insistence upon a good and substantial portion of an amount collected account of fee, say in the neighbourhood of two thirds of the fourths, being shown with reasonable certainty as having been spent for rendering services in the market to the payer of fee could not be a rule of universal application and that it was a rule which had necessarily to be confined to the special facts of Kewal Krishna Puri's case AIR 1980 SC 1008 . Otherwise, it was further observed, it would affect the validity of marketing legislation undertaken throughout the country. 4. The question of quid pro quo again came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Aniarnath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218 and on a review of the entire case law including all its previous decisions, the judgment rendered by Honble Sen, in Sreenware General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1S83 SC 1246 (Supra) was upheld In view of the above Supreme Court decisions, this contention of the petitioners has to be rejected. Their further contention that because they cam on then business oi that the transaction of sale takes place outside the market area, they are not liable to pay market fee has also it be rejected in view of the Supreme Court decision in Sreenware General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1246 (Supra) particularly as sufficient provisions have been made under the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam for the establishment of Markets, market yards and market samite's and rendering of service. 5. So far as the question of realisation of additional market fee is concerned, the question stands decided by the decision of this Court in M/s. Sudhir Trading Co. 5. So far as the question of realisation of additional market fee is concerned, the question stands decided by the decision of this Court in M/s. Sudhir Trading Co. v. State of U. P. and others, Writ Petition No. 2077 of 1584 decided on 6-5-1985 and U. P. Khandsari Manufacturers' Association and another v. State of U. P. and others, Writ Petition No. 10 of 1984 decided on 29-4-1985. 6. The last contention of the petitioners can also not be accepted. In M/s. Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar and Co. v. State, 1980 ALJ 490 (SC): AR 1980 SC 1124, it has been laid down that if paddy is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller and the sang paddy is converted into rice and sold (hen the rice miller will be liable to pay market fee on his purchase of paddy from the agriculturist producer under sub-clause (2) of Section 17 (iii) (b). He cannot be asked to pay market fee over again under sub-clause (j) in relation to transaction of rice. Nor it will be open to choose between either of two, market fee has to be levied and collected in relation to the transaction of paddy alone. It has been further laid down that if paddy is brought by the rice miller from another market area, then the market committee of the area where the paddy is converted into rice and sold will be entitled to charge market fee on the transaction of sale in accordance with sub-clause (3). 7. In the instant cases although the petitioners have stated that they purchase paddy and convert it into rice, it has not been pleased nor established by any document that it was the rice obtained from the same paddy which was being sold and on which market fee was being realised. This was a question of fact which had to be established. Since it is not established that rice sold by them was produced out of the same paddy which was produced and purchased in the market area concerned on which fee has already been paid, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. 8. In view of the above, the petitions fail and are hereby dismissed but without ' any order as to costs.