JUDGMENT : D. H. Shukla, J. The appellant, Harijan Palji Govind, was bee Accused No. 1 in Sessions Case No. 11 of 1982 in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Bhavnagar, wherein he was charged along with one Harijan Khoda Kesha, for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Harijan Khoda Kesha, the Accused No. 2, was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as the learned trial Judge found that there was nothing to show that lie was present at the relevant time, or that he played any part in the commission of the offence, The Appellant-Accused No. 1 was, however, convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. Having been aggrieved and dissatisfied with the conviction judgment of the trial Judge, dated 29-3-1982, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 2. The prosecution case, shortly stated, is as under: 3. The appellant was the father of deceased Bai Vali, and the original Accused No. 2 happened to be the nephew of the appellant. Bai Vali was a divorcee and was staying with her father. It is alleged that during her stay with her father, she developed illicit relations with one Khoda Nanu (P.W. 13, Exhibit 34). The appellant came to know about her relations with Khoda Nanu and he disapproved of them. It is also said that Bai Vali and Khoda Nanu were to marry. One Mohmad Satar (P.W. 9, Exhibit 29), a neighbour of the appellant, informed him that Bai Vali had developed illicit relations with Khoda Nanu. The prosecution alleged that on the day of the incident (21-11-81) at about 10.00 p.m., the appellant had told Mohmad Satar that his help was required to do away with his daughter, Bai Vali. Mohmed Satar, however, refused to help him. The further prosecution case is that on 22-11-81 the appellant went to the Police Station and informed P.S.O. Devshi Karsanbhai (P.W. 8, Exhibit 26) that during the previous night while he was out of his house, his daughter was burnt and was lying there. This information was reported at about 8-30 a.m. The P.S.O. registered an entry about the accidental death and he handed over the inquiry to P.S.I. Mr. Hingrajiya of ‘B' Division Police Station. This information was reported at about 8-30 a.m. The P.S.O. registered an entry about the accidental death and he handed over the inquiry to P.S.I. Mr. Hingrajiya of ‘B' Division Police Station. Mr. Hingrajiya went to the place of the incident and prepared an inquest report. He also sent the dead body for the post-mortem examination. He got the panchnama of the place of the incident drawn in the presence of witnesses. He suspected that this was a case of murder rather than of accidental death. He sought the opinion of the Medical Officer and found that there were three injuries on the person of the deceased. He himself thereafter lodged the First Information Report with ‘B’ Division. Police Station, Bhavnagar. He inquired into the matter and found that the deceased had illicit relations with Khoda Nanu, which illicit relations the appellant did not approve. He carried out the investigation after filing the First Information Report and on completion of the same he filed the charge-sheet against both the accused in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, who committed both the accused for the sessions trial. 4. The trial Judge found that Bai Vali had died a homicidal death. He also found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that at the relevant time and place both the accused had the common intention of killing Bai Vali. Consequently, lie acquitted the original Accused No. 2 from the charge of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, but so far as the appellant (original Accused No. 1) is concerned, he found the charges proved by the prosecution. 5. Since the trial Judge found the appellant guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to imprisonment for life, we have examined the question meticulously and from diverse angles. We found that the trial Judge was very much impressed by the fact that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the motive on the part of the appellant to kill his own daughter as well as by the fact that while the appellant informed the Police in the morning of 22nd November, 1981 about the death of his daughter by burns, he had suppressed the injuries suffered by the deceased on her person and by the further fact that the appellant had suffered burns on his left hand. These broad aspects of the matter impressed the trial Judge and relying on them to a great extent, he convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated above. This is indisputably a case based on circumstantial evidence and it is a settled legal position that the prosecution must prove every link which points in the direction of the conviction of the accused. The trial Judge, with respect, has emphasised those links which point to the guilt of the appellant, but has not weighed with equal weight those circumstances which do not go to prove his guilt. We have, therefore, to consider and balance the different aspects of circumstantial evidence all of which do not point in the same direction. In the case of Deonandan Mishra v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1955 Supreme Court, 801, Jagannadhadas, J., speaking for the Bench, observed as under : “Where there is no eye-witness to the murder and the case against the accused depends entirely on circumstantial evidence, the standard of proof required to convict the accused on such evidence is that the circumstances relied upon, must be fully established and the chain of evidence furnished by these circumstances should be so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.” It is further observed therein as under : “It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established, but the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. But in a case where the various links have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the accused as the probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he offers no explanation, which if accepted, though not proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case consistent with his innocence, such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the chain.” We have kept before us the valuable guideline provided by the above observations of the Supreme Court. 6. We shall first examine the motive aspect of the matter. 6. We shall first examine the motive aspect of the matter. In a case which depends on circumstantial evidence, the existence or non-existence of a motive on die part of the culprit plays an important part in pointing in the direction of guilt or otherwise of the culprit. In the present case, the prosecution case is that the deceased was a divorce. She was residing with her father, the appellant. It is the further prosecution case, as pointed out above, that the appellant came to know about the illicit relations between his daughter and one Khoda Nanu, and out of enragement he committed her murder by burning her. This is the motive attributed to the appellant in killing his daughter. In order to prove this part of the prosecution case, the prosecution has examined two important witnesses, namely, Mohmed Satar (P.W. 9, Exh. 29) and Khodidas Nanabhai (P.W. 13, Exh. 34). We must say at the outset that the said two witnesses have not impressed us so satisfactorily that we can put implicit reliance on them. 7. We may first consider Mohmed Satar. It may be noted at the outset that Mohmed Satar is only 22 years old, whereas the appellant is 40 years, of age. Mohmed Satar stated in his evidence that about 3½ months prior to the occurrence of the incident, the appellant had met him at the Dheddhar Bus Stand, when he had told the appellant that his daughter was keeping illicit relations with Khodabhai. It is pertinent to note that in the very next sentence he states that he had told about these relations of the deceased to the appellant seven or eight days prior to the date of the incident. He has further deposed that on the day of the incident at about 9.00 p.m., the appellant had met him and had told him, “Come along with me, I want to kill my daughter today.” He refused to help him and went away. Now, this part of the evidence, in our opinion, is very unnatural. It is extremely difficult to swallow that about an hour or so prior to the incident the appellant met this witness and asked him in plain terms to accompany him as he wanted to kill his daughter. We have borne in mind, as noted above, the difference of about 18 years in age between the appellant and the witness. It is extremely difficult to swallow that about an hour or so prior to the incident the appellant met this witness and asked him in plain terms to accompany him as he wanted to kill his daughter. We have borne in mind, as noted above, the difference of about 18 years in age between the appellant and the witness. The whole set of facts appears to us to be improbable and unnatural. Now, if we peruse the cross-examination of this witness, he has admitted that he did not state in his police statement that the appellant went to him on the day of the incident and told him to go along with him as the appellant wanted to kill his daughter. This serious omission on the part of the appellant confirms our suspicion that this witness is out to tell an extremely improbable story. The omission on the part of this witness, as pointed out above, completely destroys the evidence of this witness. It is also pertinent to note that this witness has further stated in cross-examination that he had not disclosed to any other person the talk which had transpired between the appellant and himself. The result, therefore, is that this alleged crucial talk about the appellant having told him that he wanted to kill his daughter is being told for the first time in his deposition. We cannot rely on this witness. The trial Judge appears to have failed to notice the serious infirmity in the evidence of this witness, and comments, “The evidence of this witness has not been shaken to the extent that one can say that he does not tell the complete truth and is a got up witness.” We must observe, with respect, that the trial Judge has not correctly evaluated the creditworthiness of this witness. 8. We might now consider the evidence of Khodidas Nanabhai (P.W. 13, Exh. 34). He is the alleged paramour of the; deceased. Khodidas has deposed that he is an employee of the State Transport Corporation, but at the relevant time he was engaged in plying rickshaw. He has deposed that his wife was suffering from T.B. and that she expired about two months before his deposition. He has deposed that deceased Valiben was going for work in salt research. He used to carry her in his rickshaw upto the Salt Research. He has deposed that his wife was suffering from T.B. and that she expired about two months before his deposition. He has deposed that deceased Valiben was going for work in salt research. He used to carry her in his rickshaw upto the Salt Research. In his very examination-in-chief he stated that he had physical relations with the deceased and that the appellant knew about it. He has also stated that when the appellant came to know about these relations, he had beaten the deceased. Now, this witness on -whom such reliance is placed by the prosecution and the trial Judge, states in his cross-examination, “Now I say that I had no physical relations with Bai Vali.” In one breath the witness had categorically denied that he had physical relations with the deceased and in the next breath in cross-examination he stated, again as emphatically, that he had no physical relations with Bai Vali. The allegation of having physical relations with a woman who is not one’s wife is indeed a very serious allegation. A person who makes reckless allegation in this regard can hardly be considered a gentleman whose words we can accept without a pinch of salt. In cross-examination, he also states that it would not be true to say that his wife was not unhappy on account of his relations with the deceased. The trial Judge has accepted the evidence of this witness. He has observed, “This witness has stated that he had physical relations with Bai Vali. But it appears that thereafter he denied the say. For the present purpose, we are not concerned whether this witness had any sexual relation with Bai Vali or had developed such relationship, but from his evidence it can be said that this witness was quite friendly with Bai Vali and Bai Vali was about to marry him.” The trial Judge, with respect, is in error in evaluating the credibility of this witness when he states that he was not concerned whether this witness had any sexual relations with Bai Vali. The question is not whether he had sexual relations with Bai Vali (of course it is an important matter from a different angle), but the question is if a witness makes two inconsistent statements in regard to his conduct with Bai Vali on such an important matter, can this witness be believed? The question is not whether he had sexual relations with Bai Vali (of course it is an important matter from a different angle), but the question is if a witness makes two inconsistent statements in regard to his conduct with Bai Vali on such an important matter, can this witness be believed? In our opinion, if lie makes such an inconsistent statement, he cannot be taken as a trustworthy witness. 9. Now, on the question of motive, we might also examine the evidence of Laxmidas Jerajbhai Hingrajiya, P.S.I., (P.W. 7, Exh. 23). His case is that after the appellant had given information about the death of his daughter, he was entrusted with the investigation of the incident and he had approached the scene of occurrence at 9-00 a.m. on 22-11-1981. He found the incident to be suspicious and therefore he started making inquiries to the persons residing in the vicinity and he came to know that the deceased Bai Vali had illicit relations with Khoda Nanu and that on account of these relations the appellant was disturbed. Now, it is pertinent to note that this witness who must be considered to be a responsible witness as he was an investigating officer, has not given the names of the persons from whom he had made inquiries and who had told him about the alleged illicit relationship between the deceased and Khoda Nanu. Not only he has not disclosed the names of the persons who had given to him this piece of information but he also did not take down in writing what was exactly the information which he had received from these neighbours. Can we believe the existence of the alleged motive on the basis of an unfounded statement of the investigating officer ? 10. We found only the afore stated evidence produced by the prosecution to prove motive. For the reasons pointed out above, we are not prepared to swallow the evidence of Mohmed Satar, Khoda Nanu and Laxmidas Hingrajiya. There is indeed a doubt, and we presume that it is a reasonable doubt, in the matter so far as proof of motive is concerned. 11. Thus, we find that one important link in the prosecution evidence is missing. 12. Another prosecution evidence in any prosecution case would normally be the scene of occurrence. The prosecution has sought to prove the scene of occurrence by drawing a Panchnama (Exh. 11. Thus, we find that one important link in the prosecution evidence is missing. 12. Another prosecution evidence in any prosecution case would normally be the scene of occurrence. The prosecution has sought to prove the scene of occurrence by drawing a Panchnama (Exh. 21) in the presence of two witnesses, namely Bahadursinh Gam-bhirsinh Chudasama (P.W. 5, Exh. 20) and Shantilal Vashrambhai (P.W. 6, Exh. 22). Bahadursinh has stated in his evidence that lie was called as a witness at 11-15 a.m. on 22-11-1981. In unmistakable terms, this witness deposed at paragraph 2 of his deposition that he and the other Panch were taken to the hut wherein the incident occurred and he found the dead body of a woman lying in the verandah in a burnt condition. He does not remember whether blood was spilt there or not. 13. The second Panch, Shantilal Vashrambhai, has in equally unmistakable terms stated at paragraph 4 of his deposition that when they were taken to the verandah, he did not find any dead-body lying there. These two Panchas stated about an important condition, namely, the presence or otherwise of the dead body of the woman in a manner absolutely contradictory to each other. We may also note here that Bahadursinh stated in his cross-examination that he did not remember as to when was the Panchnama drawn. We dare say that this statement of his would make his presence at the time of the drawing of the Panchnama doubtful. Further, both the Panch witnesses were present at the same time and at the same place, being a small place like a hut, and one states that he saw the dead body of a woman there and the other says that he did not. We have to remember that we have to give benefit of every reasonable doubt to the appellant-accused. This has shaken our faith in these two witnesses who have proved a Panchnama of the scene of occurrence (Exh. 21). This aspect of the matter has not been appreciated at all by the trial Judge. He has not considered the question from this angle, namely that if the testimony of the two Panch witnesses, who are called to I prove a Panchnama, becomes suspicions on account of discrepancy between their evidence, is not an important link in the present case missing? He has not considered the question from this angle, namely that if the testimony of the two Panch witnesses, who are called to I prove a Panchnama, becomes suspicions on account of discrepancy between their evidence, is not an important link in the present case missing? If the motive is not proved, as pointed out above, and the very place of occurrence becomes doubtful, should we not realise that the prosecution case is a great deal weakened and other links are then required to be considered with greatest possible care, and we must warn ourselves that we do not draw any hasty conclusion from the links which do create suspicion against the appellant-accused. 14. Before we part with the Panchnama we might note an important content therein. Assuming that the Panchnama is reliable, there is something in it which must at once draw our notice. It is stated in the Panchnama that in the verandah situated in the northern direction, there was the dead body of a woman lying on the stomach. It is also stated in the Panchnama that the inspection disclosed that there were burnt clothes lying there. It is further observed, Vernacular Matter ” We do not understand that if this was a case of downright murder, how could the Panchas find burnt potatoes lying helter-skelter at the scene of occurrence. The perusal of the Panchnama must also be made with minute care because even a small suggestion may prove a revealing one. The trial Judge, with respect, has not bestowed as much care on the perusal of the Panchnama as the Panchnama deserves. 15. Now, we may examine the prosecution case so far as the discovery is concerned. Jagdevsinh Bhavansinh Chauhan (P.W. 14, Exh. 35) has stated that he drew the Panchnama of the stick with which the deceased was beaten, the blood-stained clothes of the appellant and a receptacle containing kerosene as discovered by the appellant. This would indeed be an important link in the prosecution case. However, the Panchnama is not proved and therefore we will have to discard this evidence as not proved by the prosecution. One of the Panchas to this Panchnama is one Dilubha Rupsinh (P.W. 4, Exh. 17). He is a witness to the Panchanama drawn about the physical condition of the appellant. He is also a witness to the discovery Panchnama. However, the Panchnama is not proved and therefore we will have to discard this evidence as not proved by the prosecution. One of the Panchas to this Panchnama is one Dilubha Rupsinh (P.W. 4, Exh. 17). He is a witness to the Panchanama drawn about the physical condition of the appellant. He is also a witness to the discovery Panchnama. Although this witness Dilubha is examined by the prosecution in connection with the Panchnama of the physical condition of the appellant, not a single question is asked to him about the discovery. 16. It is a basic condition for the prosecution to prove in this case that the appellant was present at the time when the incident occurred. In order to prove his presence, the prosecution has sought reliance on two pieces of evidence. One is the evidence of Dilubha Rupsinh, who was a witness to the Panchnama about the physical condition of the appellant as was found when he was taken in custody (Panchanama (Exh. 18) ). Dilubha has stated that the appellant was found burnt on the dorsal aspect of his left hand. The Panchanama (Exh. 18) thus stands corroborated. Now, this part of the injury is also corroborated by Dr. Bharatkumar Jethalal Somani (P.W. 1, Exh. 9), who has stated, in his deposition at paragraph 4 that he has examined the appellant at 6-25 p.m. on 22-11-1981 and the appellant had given history of burns at 9-30 p.m. on 21-11-1981 on left hand. On examination, he had found superficial burn on dorsal aspect of left-hand near root of left little finger and left ring linger. Hairs were not present at the site. It was heavily pressed before us that the burns on the left hand go definitely in the direction of involving the appellant in the distardly crime of murder of his daughter by him. This is indeed an adverse circumstance against the appellant. When he was confronted with this adverse circumstance in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he replied that he was warming on the street on the relevant night and he got burnt. We may or may not accept his explanation. The question is, arc we justified in convicting the appellant on the basis of this adverse circumstance? We may or may not accept his explanation. The question is, arc we justified in convicting the appellant on the basis of this adverse circumstance? Even if we agree that it is an important circumstance against the appellant, we must bear in mind that this adverse circumstance is required to be appreciated in the perspective of the whole case. We must weigh this adverse circumstance vis-a-vis the other circumstances of the case, some of which we have considered above, as per example the failure of the prosecution to prove motive, the failure of the prosecution to prove the Panchanama of the scene of offence and the failure of the prosecution to prove the discovery allegedly made by the appellant. We may take support to our approach horn the observations found in the case of Jagta v. State of Haryana, AIR 1974 Supreme Court, 1545. Khanna, J., speaking for the Bench, observed therein as under : “Lastly, we have the evidence about the injuries which were found on the person of the accused. The explanation of the accused is that those injuries were caused to him by the police. Assuming that the explanation of the accused with regard to those injuries is not trustworthy, this circumstance as well as the circumstance about his being present in his fields at 1 p.m. on the day of occurrence and about his going at sunset time on a pucca road towards his village are hardly sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused in a serious offence entailing death penalty. It is well established that circumstantial evidence in order to warrant conviction should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.” it is found further observed therein as under : “. .. . The presence of injuries on the person of the accused does create a suspicion regarding his complicity but that suspicion by itself and in the absence of other incriminating evidence would not warrant his conviction. The matter in any case is not free from reasonable doubt and the accused must necessarily have the benefit thereof.” It was strongly argued by Mr. K. J. Vaidya, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that the appellant has taken a plea of alibi and in that case the burden is heavy on him to prove it. The matter in any case is not free from reasonable doubt and the accused must necessarily have the benefit thereof.” It was strongly argued by Mr. K. J. Vaidya, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that the appellant has taken a plea of alibi and in that case the burden is heavy on him to prove it. This indeed is an attractive argument, and it does appear to us that the appellant has not made any attempt to prove the plea of alibi. We have, however, taken care not to fall in the trap of this argument. The principle of appreciating the evidence when alibi is pleaded is that the court must first accept the prosecution case as it is, at least to the extent of its prima facie credibility. If this stage is reached, then the Court examines whether the appellant has proved the plea of alibi. However, it is possible in cases such as the present one that the matter does not reach the second stage. The prosecution fails to prove its case as pleaded, and it does not become necessary to examine whether the plea of alibi is proved by the accused. We are fortified in the view which we are taking by the following observation of Fazl Ali, J. in Gajendra Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1975, Supreme Court, 1703 : “Where the High Court in appeal against conviction proceeds to deal with the defence case even before giving its finding on the truth or otherwise of the prosecution case against the accused, the High Court has made a completely wrong approach to the case.” So, even if we agree with the prosecution that the burns on the left hand of the appellant-accused do point in the direction of his guilt, that circumstance by itself would not, in our opinion, be sufficient to hold him guilty since other vital links pleaded by the prosecution have not been proved. 17. Now, let us examine the second prong of the prosecution which takes into account the statement made by the appellant on the morning of 22-11-81. The entry was made on the basis of the statement made by the appellant which is at Exh. 28. 17. Now, let us examine the second prong of the prosecution which takes into account the statement made by the appellant on the morning of 22-11-81. The entry was made on the basis of the statement made by the appellant which is at Exh. 28. Now, the submission of the prosecution is that although the appellant had suo motu proceeded to inform the police about the incident of his daughter’s death, in that information he suppressed the visible injuries which were suffered by her. The injuries arc described at length by Dr. Bharatkumar Somani in his deposition at Exhibi 9. In the light of the infirmities of the prosecution case, we would not have held even this omission serious enough to enable us to convict the appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, punishable with death. But even this circumstance fails to aid the prosecution inasmuch as the trial Judge has not put this aspect of the matter as an adverse circumstance affecting the appellant, in the statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. No explanation whatever is taken from the appellant and therefore this submission must obviously fail to prove the prosecution case against the appellant. 18. The third aspect of the matter is that the appellant had put on a bush-shirt which was found to be blood-stained at the time when the appellant was taken in custody. This adverse circumstance had been put to the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hut the appellant has only denied the allegation and has not stated anything further in the explanation in that regard. We have, therefore, to examine the evidentiary value of this find on the bush-shirt pul on by the appellant. This aspect of the matter has no importance since the prosecution failed to prove that the blood-group on the said bush-shirt tallied with that of the deceased. The trial Judge himself has observed in his judgment at paragraph 11, “Hence the finding on bush-shirt and pant and connecting them with the accused does not advance the prosecution case any further.” 19. In passing, we may note that the prosecution has not elicited from the medical witness as to what was the age of the injuries found on the person of the deceased. In passing, we may note that the prosecution has not elicited from the medical witness as to what was the age of the injuries found on the person of the deceased. It would be relevant inasmuch as it is difficult to rule out a possibility that the personal injuries suffered by the deceased may have been earlier in point of time to her burning. This becomes all the more important as the prosecution could not establish the discovery of a stick with which she was allegedly beaten and which was allegedly discovered by the appellant. 20. We must further observe that in order to prove the presence of the appellant at the scene of occurrence at the relevant time, the prosecution could have examined the second son of the decease who was present there and then. In the information which the appellant gave in the morning of 22nd November 1981 (Exh. 27) he has stated that he had gone to see the picture in the night of 21st and the entire night he had remained outside the house. His daughter, Valiben, his elder son Gandalal and younger son Vinu Palji were present at the house. He was informed by his son Gandalal about the burning of the deceased. It also appears that the police did record the statement of Vinu, the younger son of the appellant. The examination of Vinu would have gone a long way in showing whether the appellant was present at the scene of offence or not. But Vinu is not examined. Mr. Vaidya submitted that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine all the witnesses whose statements have been recorded and who have been shown in the charge-sheet. This argument may be true in certain circumstances and may not be true in other circumstances. However, in a case like this, the examination of a material witness is necessary and omission to do so may raise a reasonable suspicion against the acceptability of the prosecution case. We find the following observation in the case of Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Supreme Court, 51, head-note (a): “It is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine a material witness, particularly when no allegation has been made that, if produced, he would not speak the truth. We find the following observation in the case of Habeeb Mohammad v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Supreme Court, 51, head-note (a): “It is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine a material witness, particularly when no allegation has been made that, if produced, he would not speak the truth. Not only does an adverse inference arise against the prosecution case from his non-production as a witness in view of illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, but the circumstances of his being withheld from the court casts a serious reflection on the fairness of the trial. (Emphasis supplied) In discussing the above-quoted proposition, Mahajan J., referred to the old decision reported in AIR 1915 Calcutta, 545, wherein Jenkins, C.J. observed as under: “that the purpose of a criminal trial is not to support at all costs a theory but to investigate the offence and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and the duty of a public prosecutor is to represent not the police but the Crown, and this duty should be discharged fairly and fearlessly with a full sense of the responsibility attaching to his position and that he should in a capital case place before the court the testimony of all the available eye-witnesses, though brought to the court by the defence and though they give different accounts, and that the rule is not a technical one, but founded on common sense and humanity.” The non-examination of Vinu without any explanation by the prosecution is thus one of those circumstances which call for criticism at our hands. 21. We have discussed the prosecution case from diverse angles. The trial Judge has missed some of the salient infirmities in the prosecution case as pointed out above by us. As a result of the discussion, we may only state that the prosecution has failed to satisfy us beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of murder of his daughter, Bai Vali. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence of the appellant-accused passed by the trial Judge is hereby set aside and the appellant-accused is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. The appellant-accused shall be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in connection with any other offence. Appeal allowed.