Judgment :- 1. Tenants in rent control petitions 31 and 32 of 1976, on the file of the rent control court, Kayamkulam, are the revision petitioners. The same landlord was the petitioner in both the cases. His only asset on earth, as found by the courts below, is four cents of land having a building consisting of three rooms separated by temporary wooden partition. In the middle room, he is conducting a Press and residing with family. The northern room was let out to respondents 1 and 2 in R. C. P. 31 of 1976 and they are conducting a tea shop. The southern room was let out to the first respondent in R.C.P. 32 of 1976 and he is running a pan shop The second respondent is alleged to be the sub-tenant of the first respondent. 2. Though other grounds were also alleged by the landlord for getting eviction, we are now concerned only with the bona fide need for own occupation relied on by the landlord as well as the protection claimed by the tenants under the second proviso to S.11(3) of Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 3. The rent control court, appellate authority as well as the revisional court unanimously found, and in my opinion correctly, on the basis of the evidence, that the landlord is having only the above said land and building, the middle room of which is used by him for the Press as well as residence with family. So also, the courts below found the bona fide need for the other two rooms to be genuine. The bona fide need of the landlord to have the northern room is for the purpose of being used as his residence with family. The southern and central rooms are alleged to be necessary for the conduct of the Press. Those claims were also found to be genuine. Those findings do not require any interference at all. 4. The tenant in both the cases claimed protection under second proviso to S.11(3) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Those provisions may be extracted here with advantage. "11(3). Those claims were also found to be genuine. Those findings do not require any interference at all. 4. The tenant in both the cases claimed protection under second proviso to S.11(3) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Those provisions may be extracted here with advantage. "11(3). A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of this building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him: Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 5. On the evidence, the rent control court found that the tenants in R. C. P. 32 of 1976 are having properties and other income. No definite finding under the first part of the second proviso was entered by the rent control court, on the claim of the tenants in R. C. P. 31 of 1976. In both the cases, the finding of the rent control court is that alternate accommodation is available in the locality for the tenants. The appellate authority found that the tenants in both the cases are having landed properties and income, but they are depending for their livelihood mainly on the income derived from the business in the schedule rooms. It was further found by the appellate authority that from the evidence of the tenants and their witnesses, it is clear that they have not cared to ascertain whether alternate accommodation is available and hence they have not discharged their burden in proving both the ingredients of the second proviso as laid down in the decision reported in Kochappan Pillai v. Chellappan (1976 KLT.1). The revisional authority agreed in these findings with the rent control court and the appellate authority. So also, on the basis of the evidence tendered by the landlord, all the courts found that alternate accommodation is available for the tenants. These findings are concluded. 6. The revisional authority agreed in these findings with the rent control court and the appellate authority. So also, on the basis of the evidence tendered by the landlord, all the courts found that alternate accommodation is available for the tenants. These findings are concluded. 6. For the first time in revision before this Court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the tenants raised the contention that actually eviction was sought under S.11(8) and the courts below wrongly applied the provisions of S.11(3) and the second proviso. Therefore, the request was for a remand in order to prove the comparative hardship as envisaged by the first proviso to S.11(10) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In order to appreciate this contention, it may be better to quote the provisions of S.11(8),11(10) and the first proviso to S.11(10). "11(8). A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if be requires additional accommodation for his personal use." "11(10). The Rent Control Court shall, if it is satisfied that the claim of the landlord under sub-sections (3), (4), (7) or sub-section (8) is bonafide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent Control Court, and if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that, in the case of an application made under sub-section (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord: X X X X" 7. What is required to be proved by the landlord under S.11(3) is the bona fide need for occupation. What is intended under S 11(8) is the requirement of additional accommodation. In an identical case reported in Lakshmana Naikan v. Gopalakrishna Pillai (1981 KLT.167) it was found that the test of bona fide need under S.11(3) would be more rigorous than the test under S.11(8) so far as the claim of the landlord for eviction is concerned. What is intended under S 11(8) is the requirement of additional accommodation. In an identical case reported in Lakshmana Naikan v. Gopalakrishna Pillai (1981 KLT.167) it was found that the test of bona fide need under S.11(3) would be more rigorous than the test under S.11(8) so far as the claim of the landlord for eviction is concerned. In these cases, the landlord was able to withstand the test successfully before all the courts below I think that it may not be necessary or fair to ask him to stand for a second test by a remand of the case, after 9 years of the filing of the petitions. 8. It is true that the landlord filed the petitions describing it to be under S.11 without specifying the exact sub-section relied on by him. There are many sub-sections to S.11, each one of which indicates relief to be granted under different circumstances. It is possible that claims under S.11(3) and 11(8) may be wrongly identified as held in Lakshmana Naikan's case (1981 KLT.167): "Whether it be a claim for eviction under S.11(3) or under S.11(8) there is something in common, viz., occupation by the landlord. If the case of the landlord is that he is residing in a part of a building and he requires another part of the building in the occupation of the tenant for his occupation so as to have additional accommodation and not to transplant himself from the portion he is residing to the new portion then the case squarely falls within S.11(8). If on the other hand a person is occupying a portion of a building, another portion of the building is in the possession of the tenant and he wants that portion as he prefers to occupy that portion of the building and not the one he had been occupying so far it will be a claim that falls under S.11(3)." 9. Applying that test, the claim in R. C. P. 31 of 1976 would only be under S.11(3) and not under S.11(8). The landlord is now having his Press and residence in the middle room. In R. C. P. No. 31 of 1976 he wanted the northern room alone for his residence. Applying that test, the claim in R. C. P. 31 of 1976 would only be under S.11(3) and not under S.11(8). The landlord is now having his Press and residence in the middle room. In R. C. P. No. 31 of 1976 he wanted the northern room alone for his residence. That means he does not want the middle room for his residence and be wants to shift from that room to the northern room, which is in the possession of the tenant. That is why I said that the claim in that case comes only under S.11(3). The central room now used by him for the Press as well as residence is wanted by him to be converted exclusively for the purpose of the Press along with the southern room. At the same time, the requirement in R. C. P. 32 of 1976 evidently comes under S.11(8) because the landlord wants the southern room also, for accommodating the Press. Definitely the requirement of the southern room is for additional accommodation for the Press. 10. The tenants understood the claims in both the cases as coming within the purview of S 11(3) Therefore, in their objections, they claimed benefits under the second proviso to S.11(3). Under the second proviso to S.11(3), the tenants are expected to prove that they are depending for their livelihood mainly from the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for them to carry on such trade or business. On the other hand, for getting an order of eviction under S.11 (8), what is required under the first proviso to S.11 (10) is proof of comparative hardship to the tenant and the advantage to the landlord. The landlord will be entitled to get an order of eviction under S.11(8), only if the advantage he is likely to derive outweigh the hardship to which the tenant is put on account of eviction. 11. As held in Lakshmana Naikan's case (1981 KLT.167), the requirement under S.11(3) and the second proviso are more rigorous than those of S.11(8) and the proviso to S.11 (10). With knowledge of the standard of proof required under S.11(3) and the second proviso, both sides let in evidence in these cases. 11. As held in Lakshmana Naikan's case (1981 KLT.167), the requirement under S.11(3) and the second proviso are more rigorous than those of S.11(8) and the proviso to S.11 (10). With knowledge of the standard of proof required under S.11(3) and the second proviso, both sides let in evidence in these cases. It goes without saying that evidence required under S.11(3) and the second proviso will, in the ordinary course, cover the grounds necessary to be proved under the first proviso to S.11(10) also. 12. From the evidence, it is seen that the landlord, though he was originally occupying his brother's building, was forced to vacate the same since his brother returned from abroad. He has no other land or building, except the 4 cents in which the disputed building is standing. In one room be is having his Press as well as residence with family. All the three courts found that his need is not only bona fide but also pressing. Even the total length of the three rooms taken together is only 40 ft. The landlord is having his wife and two children aged 19 and 15 to be accommodated along with him. In addition, he has to conduct a Press also. Really, his need is pressing. So also, it was found by all the courts below that though the tenants are depending on the income from the trade conducted in the shops mainly for "their livelihood, they are having in addition other lands and income also. Non-availability of alternate accommodation was not proved by them. In discharging that burden, they were negligent From the evidence of the landlord, it is abundantly clear that alternate accommodations are available. From such evidence, it is clear that serious hardship is not likely to the tenants. So also, it is evident that the advantage to the landlord on account of eviction will outweigh the hardship, if any, that will be caused to tenants by the eviction. 13. Further, the appellate authority in Para.8 of its judgment found: "The appellants in R C. A. 15/77 are in possession of 7 cents of land even on their showing and the appellant in R C.A.16/ 77 is in possession of 20 cents of land. On the other hand the landlord is in possession of just 4 cents of land in which the building in question stands. On the other hand the landlord is in possession of just 4 cents of land in which the building in question stands. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting the order of eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In spite of such a finding no ground under the first proviso to S.11(10) was taken up by the tenants before the District Court in revision. Hence, I am not satisfied that a case for remand is made out. 14. In the decision reported in Lakshmana Naikari's case (1981 KLT.167), remand was ordered under the following circumstances: "Unfortunately the courts were not able to make up their mind as to what provision should be applied. The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority treated the petition asunder S.11(3) and applied the tests for a petition under S.11(3). Of course the test of bonafide need under S.11(3) would be more rigorous than the test under S.11(8). Judged by such standard the petitioner lost. It appears from the judgment of the Appellate Authority that the landlord attempted to base his case upon S.11(8) before the Appellate Authority, but he did not have a sympathetic treatment from that Authority. The Revisional Court considered the claim as under S.11(8), but it applied the standard applicable to a petition under S.11(3). It considered whether the landlord could somehow manage without the rooms rented out." Here the position is entirely different. In these cases, the landlord was able to successfully withstand the harder test under S.11(3) and the proviso. It is true that under the second proviso to S.11(3), as held in Kochappan Pillai's case (1976 KLT.1), the burden of proving the two ingredients is heavily on the tenants. In the decision rendered in P.B. Desai v. C.M. Patel (AIR. 1974 SC. It is true that under the second proviso to S.11(3), as held in Kochappan Pillai's case (1976 KLT.1), the burden of proving the two ingredients is heavily on the tenants. In the decision rendered in P.B. Desai v. C.M. Patel (AIR. 1974 SC. 1059), while dealing with the relevant provision under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, it was held: "So far as the finding on the question of greater hardship is concerned the District Judge decided against the respondents on the view that as the landlord establishes that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own use and occupation, the burden of proving that greater hardship would be caused by passing a decree for eviction that by refusing to pass it is on the tenant and if the tenant fails to discharge this burden by producing proper evidence, a decree for eviction must go against him. This view in regard to the burden of proof, no doubt, prevailed at one time in various High Courts on the basis of the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Kelly v. Goodwin (1957) 1 All ER. 810 but it can no longer be regarded as correct after the decision of this Court in M/s. Central Tobacco Co. v. Chandra Prakash, Civil Appeal No. 1175 of 1969 D/-23-4-1969: (reported in AIR. 1969 NSC. 88). This Court speaking through Mitter, J., pointed out in that case, while discussing S.21(4) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, and what was said there must apply equally in relation to S.13(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, which is in identical terms: "We do not find ourselves able to accept the broad proposition that as soon as the landlord establishes his need for additional accommodation he is relieved of all further obligation under S.21 sub-section (4) and that once the landlord's need is accepted by the Court all further evidence roust be adduced by the tenant if he claims protection under the Act. Each party must adduce evidence to show what hardship would be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the decree and it will be for the court to determine whether the suffering of the tenant, incase a decree was made, would be more than that of the landlord by its refusal. Each party must adduce evidence to show what hardship would be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the decree and it will be for the court to determine whether the suffering of the tenant, incase a decree was made, would be more than that of the landlord by its refusal. The whole object of the Act is to provide for the control of rents and evictions for the leasing of buildings etc. and S.21 specifically enumerates the grounds which alone will entitle a landlord to evict his tenant. Cl. (h) of S.21 contains one of such grounds, namely, that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself. The onus of proof of this is certainly on the landlord. We see no sufficient reason for holding that once that onus is discharged by the landlord it shifts to the tenant making it obligatory on him to show that greater hardship would be caused to him by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. In our opinion both sides must adduce all relevant evidence before the Court; the landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect. It is only after shifting such evidence that the court must form its conclusion on consideration of all the circumstances of the case as to whether greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing it." 15. It is therefore clear that in order to take a decision under the first proviso to S.11(10), there must be evidence on either side. There must be evidence on the side of the landlord proving grounds for granting the relief on the basis of the requirement pleaded by him. Equally, there must be evidence on the side of the tenant regarding the hardship, that he is likely to suffer by an order for eviction. Ss 11 (8),11(10) and the first proviso to S.11(10) do not by themselves specify as to what are the ingredients to be established for the purpose of proving the hardship that is likely to be caused to the tenant by an order for eviction. In the ordinary course, the hardships must be those provided under the second proviso to S.11 (3). In the ordinary course, the hardships must be those provided under the second proviso to S.11 (3). What is to be done by the court for ordering eviction under S 11(8) is only to evaluate the evidence relating to the need and hardship adduced by the respective parties. It is only then that the court will be able to assess whether the advantage to the landlord or the hardship to the tenant is greater. That may be the reason why it is considered that there is no specific burden of proof on either side and that it is only a question of evaluating the entire evidence on record. 16. In this case, both sides have let in evidence on the relevant aspects, even though the courts below, except the appellate authority, did not consider the evidence in the light of the first proviso to S.11 (10). No other evidence remains to be adduced by the concerned parties. These old petitions, which were filed as early as in 1976 need not be dragged further for that purpose. 17. A perusal of the evidence on record is sufficient to show that even though the tenants are depending mainly on the income derived from the business conducted in the shops for their livelihood, there are suitable alternate accommodation in the locality and the tenants did not even care to enquire and ascertain the availability of such accommodation. So also it is clear from the evidence that if eviction is not ordered, the landlord will be put to very serious hardship and inconvenience and the advantage to him by eviction is very great. He has no other building on earth and he is using one room for his residence as well as conducting the Press. Two rooms are evidently required for the Press and the remaining one room will only be hardly sufficient for his residence with family. Therefore, the advantage due to the landlord definitely outweighs the hardship, if any, to the tenants. Order for eviction must, therefore, stand and the revision petitions are accordingly dismissed, in the circumstances, without costs.