JUDGMENT U. C. Srivastava, J. - With an assertion that the petitioner is senior to the opposite parties he filed the instant .writ petition, praying for a writ of quo warranto to respondents 3 to 15 to show under what authority they are holding their respective offices. Writ of mandamus has also been prayed commanding respondents 1 and 2 to revert the respondents 3 to 15 to their substantive posts of Senior Cane Development Inspectors/Cane Protection Inspectors and for commanding respondents 3 to 15 not to occupy the respective offices which they held in an ad hoc capacity and to work only on their substantive posts and commanding respondents 1 and 2 to prepare a seniority list of District Cane Officers, Assistant Cane Commissioners and Deputy Cane Commissioners. 2. Opposite parties 3 to 15 were confirmed as Senior Cane Development Inspectors in the Department and they were promoted on the ad hoc posts of Assistant Cane Commissioners. They were so promoted between the years 1968 to 1970. Out of them opposite parties 5, 6, 7, 9 and 15 have retired from service while opposite parties 3 and 10 have expired. Out of the remaining opposite parties, opposite parties 13 and 14 were working on the posts of District Cane Officers, while others are working as Assistant Cane Commissioners which post has now been upgraded to that of the Deputy Cane Commissioner and opposite parties 10 and 11 are working on the post of Deputy Cane Commissioner from before the upgradation. Till before the year 1979 there was no statutory Rule regarding appointment and promotion in the came department and in the year 1979 for the first time statutory Rules were framed known as U.P. Cane (Gazetted) Service Rules, 1979. Under the said Rules 50% posts of the District Cane Officers are to be filled through direct recruitment and 50% have been reserved for promotion from the lower cadre. It appears that prior to the framing of these Rules the practice of direct appointment as well as by promotion from the lower cadre was prevalent in the Department for appointment or promotion to the higher post including that of the District CaneOfficers. 3. In response to the advertisement dated 20th September, 1969, for various provincial services the petitioner also appeared in the said examination and was selected by the U. P. Public Service Commission as District Cane Officer. 3. In response to the advertisement dated 20th September, 1969, for various provincial services the petitioner also appeared in the said examination and was selected by the U. P. Public Service Commission as District Cane Officer. After resigning his previous service he joined the post of District Cane Officer on 1673. The petitioner made representation to the Department alleging himself to be senior and in the year 1977 he was promoted to the excadre post of Assistant Cane Commissioner. The grievance of the petitioner is that the opposite parties whose substantive post is that of the Cane Inspectors are continuing on the higher post on ad hoc post for the last so many years. 4. Under Regulation 6(b) of U. P. Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions) Regulations, 1954 it is necessary that the Public Service Commission be consulted in case of promotion from a lower to the higher grade for the post within the same service. Direct recruitment to the higher post is also to be made after consulting the Commission. Before Us the learned standing counsel made a statement that die cases of the opposite parties have been referred to the Public Service Commission for some four years back, but still no reply from the Commission has been received. The facts thus make it abundantly clear that the opposite parties were appointed on ad hoc basis as District Cane Officers some four years prior to the appointment of the petitioner directly. 5. Some of the opposite parties, 8, 10 and 11, one of whom, No. 10, is already dead, have filed counteraffidavit and asserted that they were appointed to the post of District Cane Officer in class II in the State Cane Service in quota of the promotion post. It is not in dispute that out of 26 permanent posts of District Cane Officers in Class II, U. P. Cane Service only 12 are working in confirmed capacity and the opposite parties were appointed against the remaining posts though on ad hoc basis and they have claimed seniority over the petitioner and according to them they were appointed substantively in the Department prior to the petitioner who was junior to them, as such the petitioner cannot claim seniority and priority over them more so when their appointment falls within 50% posts, i. e., the posts which were meant for promotion. The petitioner's sole case is that as he was directly appointed to the post of District Cane Officer through Public Service Commission he will be senior to opposite' parties, their substantive post being that of Cane Inspector. 6. The case of the opposite parties was referred to the Public Service Commission after considerable delay by the State Government and the same is still pending before it. They being not responsible for this delay and they cannot be made to suffer for the same. In this connection reference was made to the case of Ambika Singh and others v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1980 SC 1447 ). In the said case noncadre officer officiated for more than six months in the cadre of Indian Police Service. The State Government failed to report to the Central Government reasons for it and to consult the Union Public Service Commission in compliance with Rule 9 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954. The Court held that the same was not fatal to the period of officiation as the failure was an administrative lapse and not the officers' error and no officer senior to him suffered by the officiation. The Court further held that senior held an excadre post and the same would not make his officiation irregular in the absence of anything to suggest that this was done to facilitate the officiating officer. Continuance in the cadre post hence benefits if continuous officiation was available to him. 7. The ratio of the said case goes to help the case of opposite parties that they are not to suffer for the lapse of Government in not referring their case to Public Service Commission within one year or soon thereafter and they are entitled to get benefit of continuous period of officiation. 8. 7. The ratio of the said case goes to help the case of opposite parties that they are not to suffer for the lapse of Government in not referring their case to Public Service Commission within one year or soon thereafter and they are entitled to get benefit of continuous period of officiation. 8. In the case of T. N. Saxena and others v. State of U. P. and others (1982) 2 SCG 319 it was held that normal rule is that seniority should be treasured by the length of continuous officiating service unless a contrary intention appears from the Rules and the quota and rota rules must be applied in a practical fashion so as not to cause injustice to any employee and promotees regularly appointed during a particular period in excess of their quota for want of direct recruits can claim their whole length of service for seniority even against direct recruits who may turn up in succeeding period, but the promotees who had exceeded their quota would have to be pushed down to accommodate direct recruits coming after their appointment. This case is not directly applicable to the facts of this case. 9. In Paramjit Singh Sandhu and others v. Ram Rakha Mal and others (AIR 1983 SG 314) the recruitment of service was from two sources, with if. view to integrating recruits from both sources after recruitment. It was held that inter se seniority is to be determined with reference to the date of entry in the cadre i. e. the date of continuous officiation except where there has been a substantial violation of quota giving undeserved advantage to one or the other source. 10. In A. Janardhana v. Union of India (AIR 1983 SG 769) it was held that when recruitment is from two independent sources subject to prescribed quota, but the power is conferred on the Government to make recruitment in relaxation of the rules, but any recruitment made contrary to quota rule would not be invalid unless it is shown that the power of relaxation Was exercised malafide. It was further held in the said case that if a direct recruit who comes into service after the promotee .was already unconditionally and without reservation promoted and whose promotion is not shown to be invalid or illegal according to relevant statutory or nonstatutory rules should not be permitted by any principle of seniority to score a march over a promotee because that itself being arbitrary would be violative of Articles 14 and 16. The Court held that there was no justification for redrawing the seniority list affecting persons recruited or promoted prior to 1969 when the rules acquired statutory character and therefore 1974 seniority list was quashed and the earlier seniority list of 1963 and 1967 was held to be valid. This case is distinguishable as the promotees were appointed unconditionally and without reservation. 11. This question of seniority engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in the case of G. P. Doval and others v. Chief Secretary, Government of V. P., and others ( AIR 1984 SC 1527 ) which was a case of seniority amongst the Khandsari Inspectors. It was held that where officiating appointment is followed by confirmation unless a contrary rule is shown, the service rendered as officiating appointment cannot be ignored for reckoning length of continuous officiation for determining the place in the seniority list and there being no binding rule of seniority when the stopgap appointments of Khandsari Inspectors had been subsequently confirmed by the Service Commission their past service could not be ignored in. determining their seniority. The case of G. P. Doval (supra) touches the point in issue in this case and supports the case of opposite parties who were promoted several years before the induction of petitioner in the department and several permanent posts more than the number of opposite parties are lying unfilled in the Department. If approval is given to the promotion of opposite parties by the U. P. Public Service Commission their seniority cannot be ignored and their substantive appointment to the post would date back from the date of their promotion against the posts which obviously were permanent or subsequently became permanent. Even otherwise they having been promoted earlier and there being no rule giving seniority to the direct appointees on temporary basis on a later date who subsequently became permanent the seniority of promotees cannot be pushed downward. Even otherwise they having been promoted earlier and there being no rule giving seniority to the direct appointees on temporary basis on a later date who subsequently became permanent the seniority of promotees cannot be pushed downward. Merely because the State was at fault in not referring the matter to Public Service Commission, their appointment could not be termed to be illegal and invalid, 12. In view of the fact that the appointment of opposite parties to the post of Assistant Cane Commissioner is neither illegal nor invalid no writ of quo warranto as prayed could b 2 issued. As the posts are available and even though they have not yet been approved for no fault of theirs by the Public Service Commission and their promotion is not against any statutory rule or order or instructions having force of law, the question of issuing mandamus directing the opposite parties 1 and 2 reverting them does not arise. So far as seniority list is concerned there appears to be no question why the opposite parties 1 and 2 would not prepare a seniority list if the same has not been prepared. It is expected that they will do so without delay in accordance with law. The petitioner has not claimed any relief for himself, as such, question of any declaration in his favour does not arise. 13. With the above observations as to preparation of seniority list the writ petition which otherwise has no merits is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. (Petition dismissed.)