JUDGMENT : S.D. AGARWALA, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The property in dispute is the upper portion of the house No. 39-B, Beli Road New Katra, Allahabad. Smt. Hardevi, Respondent No. 2 is the landlady and the Petitioner is the occupant of the premises in dispute. On 26th February, 1981 the landlady filed an application u/s 16 of the Act before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer alleging that the Petitioner was initially permitted to occupy two rooms on the upper floor in respect of which a release order has been passed and now subsequently, he has forcibly occupied four more rooms on the same floor and consequently, the Petitioner is in unauthorised occupation of the accommodation in dispute and as such the accommodation in dispute should be deemed to be vacant in the eye of law and since the applicant is in personal need of the accommodation, the property in dispute be released in her favour. This application was contested by the Petitioner it was alleged by the Petitioner that, in fact, the property in dispute was let out to him in the year 1973 at the monthly rent of Rs. 85/- per mensum. It was alleged in defence that, in fact, the entire upper portion of the house was let out to the Petitioner and that the case set up by the landlady that the Petitioner has forcibly occupied the four rooms is absolutely a false case. The application came up for hearing before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad who by his judgment dated 4-11-1981 held that there was no vacancy and as such the question of release did not arise and rejected the application. In this order it was held by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the landlady had not filed any agreement indicating how much portion was let out by her to the Petitioner. It was also held that there is no satisfactory evidence to prove that the landlady had let out only two rooms. In any case, he further held that even if the occupation of the Petitioner is that of a trespasser, it creates no vacancy. With these findings the application was dismissed. 3. It was also held that there is no satisfactory evidence to prove that the landlady had let out only two rooms. In any case, he further held that even if the occupation of the Petitioner is that of a trespasser, it creates no vacancy. With these findings the application was dismissed. 3. Aggrieved by the order dated 4-11-1981 the landlady filed a revision before the District Judge, Allahabad u/s 18 of the Act. This revision came up for hearing before the 1st Additional District Judge who by his judgment dated February 6, 1984 allowed the revision, set aside the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and further allowed the release application, and directed the Petitioner to vacate the entire upper portion of the house in dispute The District Judge treating the application moved by the landlady to be an application u/s 21 of the Act and after considering the need of the parties allowed the release application. The District Judge agreed with the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the forcible occupation by a tenant of any room not in his tenancy did not create a vacancy in the eye of law. But treating the Petitioner to be in occupation of the entire upper floor considered the application for release. 4. The Petitioner being aggrieved by the order of the District Judge allowing the release application has filed the present petition in this Court. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to treat the application u/s 16 of the Act to be an application u/s 21 of the Act and further that since there was no finding that the property should be deemed to be vacant, the property could not have been released u/s 16 of the Act. 7. Learned Counsel for the landlady, however, vehemently urged that since the building in question is being occupied by the Petitioner without any allotment order in his favour, the property should be deemed to be vacant in the eye of law and the District Judge was right in releasing the accommodation in favour of the landlady. 8. 7. Learned Counsel for the landlady, however, vehemently urged that since the building in question is being occupied by the Petitioner without any allotment order in his favour, the property should be deemed to be vacant in the eye of law and the District Judge was right in releasing the accommodation in favour of the landlady. 8. u/s 16 of the Act, the landlord is empowered to move an application for release of the whole or any part of the building which was in the tenancy if the building in question has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, This application has to be moved before the Rent (control and Eviction Officer and a revision against an order passed u/s 16 of the Act lies before the District Judge u/s 18 of the Act. 9. Section 21 of the "Act, however, contemplates a different situation. An application u/s 21 of the Act is maintainable where the tenant is in occupation of the building in question If the tenant is in occupation of the building, the legislature has given a right to the landlord u/s 21 of the Act to move an application for release of the accommodation provided that the building is bonafide required by him for use as mentioned u/s 21 of the Act. This application lies before the prescribed authority. 'Prescribed authority' has been defined in Section 3(e) of the Act. It means a Civil Judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under the Act. In accordance with the definition of the 'prescribed authority' given under the Act, the prescribed authority is a Civil judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge. He is Judicial Officer and is different from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who is an executive officer of the State. An appeal lies against the decision of the prescribed authority u/s 21 of the Act. This appeal has been provided in Section 22 of the Act. The appeal lies to the District Judge. 10. On an analysis of the above two remedies available to a landlord, it is clear that these two remedies are available to a landlord in different circumstances. This appeal has been provided in Section 22 of the Act. The appeal lies to the District Judge. 10. On an analysis of the above two remedies available to a landlord, it is clear that these two remedies are available to a landlord in different circumstances. The remedy u/s 16 of the Act is available where the property is deemed to be vacant in the eye of law, while; the remedy u/s 21 of the Act is available when the tenant is in occupation of the building. The jurisdiction of the District Judge in both these cases is also different In the case of a proceeding u/s 16 of the Act, the District Judge has only been given limited powers of revision, while in the case of proceeding u/s 21 of the Act the District Judge has been constituted as an appellate authority having extensive power. Under the scheme of the Act, therefore, an application u/s 16 of the Act could not possibly be treated to be an application u/s 21 of the Act. The District Judge while acting as a revisional court u/s 18 of the Act could not treat the application u/s 16 of the Act to be an application u/s 21 of the Act and thereafter consider the question of release. The order in the instant case passed by the District Judge treating the application u/s 16 of the Act to be an application u/s 21 of the Act is an order wholly without jurisdiction. The submission made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in my opinion is well founded. 11. In regard to the submission made on behalf of the landlady, learned Counsel for the landlady has for the purposes of argument divided the upper portion of the house in dispute into two parts. His submission is that two rooms were given to the Petitioner on rent after 25th of June, 1977. There was no allotment order in favour of the Petitioner. In regard to the four other rooms on the upper portion, it was alleged that on 3-1-1981 the Petitioner had broken the locks of these rooms and had. taken forcible possession from the landlady. These allegations have been emphatically denied by the Petitioner. His case is that the entire upper portion of house in question was let out to him in the year 1973 on a monthly rent of Rs. 85/-. taken forcible possession from the landlady. These allegations have been emphatically denied by the Petitioner. His case is that the entire upper portion of house in question was let out to him in the year 1973 on a monthly rent of Rs. 85/-. The basis of the submission made on behalf of the landlady is dependent on the facts which are themselves disputed. The District Judge has not actually determined in the impugned order, the date on which two rooms were let out to the Petitioner and as to whether the four rooms were forcibly occupied by the Petitioner in the year 1981. The District Judge has also not recorded any finding on the case setup by the Petitioner that in fact the entire upper portion of the house in question was let out to the Petitioner in the year 1973 All these are questions of fact which cannot be determined in the present petition as they are disputed. 12. Learned Counsel for the landlady cited authorities before me to show that if property is let out to a tenant after coming into force of the Act, without allotment order the tenancy in favour of the tenant would be void and that property should be deemed to be vacant in the eye of law. On the other hand, counsel for the Petitioner tenant has brought to my notice the provisions of Section 14 of the Act which provides that the tenant in occupation of the building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1976, shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or a tenant of such building. In view of this provision the date of tenancy has become very relevant. In case the property was let out to the Petitioner in 1973 as alleged by him, then the Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act. On the other hand, if the property was let out to the Petitioner after 1977 as in the case of the landlady, then the Petitioner will not get the benefit of Section 14 of the Act. On the other hand, if the property was let out to the Petitioner after 1977 as in the case of the landlady, then the Petitioner will not get the benefit of Section 14 of the Act. in view of the above disputed questions of fact on which the rig tits of the parties are dependant, it is not possible to take a final view in regard to the submission made by the landlady Respondent and it is necessary in the interest of justice that the matter may be remanded to the District Judge for determination of the question as to when the property was let out to the Petitioner, what was the extent of the property let out and as to whether the four rooms in occupation of the Petitioner have been occupied by the Petitioner by force. 13. In view of the fact that the Petitioners' contention is well founded, I allow the petition, quash the order passed by the District Judge dated February 6, 1984 and remand the case to the District Judge, Allahabad for decision afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observation made above. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.