JUDGMENT : B.L. YADAV, J. 1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 13-12-74 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Varanasi. The Petitioner has prayed for a writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 13-12-74. 2. The facts of the case are few and simple. In the basic year plot Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 617 were in dispute. These plots were entered in the basic year in the name of the Petitioners. Father of Respondent Nos. 8 to 13 Ambika Prasad and father of Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 Mahavir were entered in Column 7 of the Khatauni, which obviously means as mortgagee. 3. The Petitioners filed an objection u/s 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with the allegations that the entries in the name of Respondents were incorrect and fictitious, hence they may be expunged. Respondents denied the claim of the Petitioners and alleged that they were bhumidhars and the plots were mortgaged with their ancestors and the ancestors of the Petitioners did not file a suit for redemption of the mortgage within sixty years. Hence their rights came to an end and the Respondents acquired bhumidhari rights and they prayed to be recorded as Bhumidhars. 4. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 3-1-66 decided the case in favour of the Respondents and the Settlement Officer Consolidation by his order dated 25-10-68 allowed the appeal of the Petitioners. The revision of the Respondents u/s 48 of the Act was allowed by order dated 15-5-70. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed. 5. This petition was listed before me for final hearing. I have heard Sri R.N. Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioners and Sri O.P. Bhargava, Senior Advocate for the Respondents. It was urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the impugn order deserved to be quashed as based on the plea that within 60 years limitation no suit for redemption was filed and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has committed error apparent on the face of record in holding that the rights of the Petitioners came to an end. It was also urged that the mortgage was not proved. He relied upon Shiv Shanker Singh v. Board of Revenue 1975 AWC 522 and Shyam Rathi v. Khalil 1973 ALJ 381. 6. It was also urged that the mortgage was not proved. He relied upon Shiv Shanker Singh v. Board of Revenue 1975 AWC 522 and Shyam Rathi v. Khalil 1973 ALJ 381. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the impugned order and other orders including the evidence on record. 7. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by the impugned order, after considering the entire evidence on record, held that the mortgage was executed in 1884 A.D. Whether the mortgage was executed or not, that is a question of fact and the same involves no question of law. Hence the same cannot be Investigated by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Refusal to pay the mortgage money on the date specified in the mortgage deed, under Article 148 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, 60 years limitation has been provided for redemption of the mortgage. If within that 60 years no suit for redemption of the mortgage has been filed the rights of the mortgagor would become time barred. Since 1884 till 1965 more than 60 years elapsed from the date for payment of mortgage money hence the rights of the Petitioner became time barred. 8. Shiv Shankar Singh v. Board of Revenue (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has no relevance to the facts of the present case. In that case the question was whether the mortgagee of an occupancy tenant would mature rights by adverse possession against the mortgagor and whether a suit for the purpose would lie in the Civil Court or not. The facts of the present case are, however, entirely different from the aforesaid case. 9. Similarly in Shyam Rathi v. Khalil (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the facts are entirely different from the facts of the present case. Hence the Petitioner cannot derive any benefit out of that case. 10. It has also been urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the Petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the UP ZA and LR Act and hence the 60 years limitation would not apply against the Petitioners. 11. This argument of the Petitioner's counsel is also not accepted. The law of limitation is procedural law. 10. It has also been urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the Petitioners are entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the UP ZA and LR Act and hence the 60 years limitation would not apply against the Petitioners. 11. This argument of the Petitioner's counsel is also not accepted. The law of limitation is procedural law. The limitation is fixed from the date when the suit is filed and it has nothing to do with the cause of action. The law of limitation is not to create new rights but it is with the purpose as to 'within which limitation a particular suit is to be filed or a particular proceeding could be initiated. After the lapse of a prescribed period the rights of a person becomes time barred. In other words the light subsists but remedy is lost. 12. In case under the old law some rights of a person comes to an end, in that event even after the enforcement of a subsequent law the old rights cannot be revived nor the same could be created. As the rights of the Petitioners came to an end much prior to the enforcement of the UP ZA and LR Act on 1-7-52 by virtue of law of limitation of 60 years, hence the Petitioners cannot be held to be entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the UP ZA and LR Act. 13. However, there is another aspect of the matter. The Petitioners have laid no foundation for availing the benefit of Section 14 of the UP ZA and LR Act. If a particular fact has not been stated nor the foundation has been laid in the first court the same point would not be permitted to be urged for the first time before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India particularly when it requires investigation in the questions of fact. See C. Beepathuma v. Velasari Shankara-Narayana Kadambolithaya AIR 1965 SC 241 , Mosque known as AIR 1940 116 (Privy Council) (on page 121) and S.S. Gadgil, Income Tax Officer, Bombay Vs. Lal and Company, AIR 1965 SC 171 . In view of the dictum laid down in these cases the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is not acceptable. 14. No other point has been urged before me and the writ petition is devoid of substance. 15. Lal and Company, AIR 1965 SC 171 . In view of the dictum laid down in these cases the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is not acceptable. 14. No other point has been urged before me and the writ petition is devoid of substance. 15. In view of the discussions made above the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.