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1985 DIGILAW 58 (KAR)

NARASIMHAIAH v. ASST. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER-CUM ENTERTAINMENT TAX OFFICER, RAMANAGARAM

1985-02-08

K.S.PUTTASWAMY

body1985
K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) AS common questions of law arise for determination in these cases, I purpose to dispose of them by a common order. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are engaged in the business of bperating touring cinema theaters in aecordance with the terms and conditions touring cinema licences issued in their favour at the places licensed under the Karnataka Cinemas regulation Act of 1964 and the Rules framed thereunder. As exhibitors of films they are eligible to payment of taxes under the Karnataka Entertainment tax Act of 1958 (Karnataka At 30 of 1958) ('the Act' ). ( 3 ) THE Act as originally enacted did not empower the authorities to regulate escaped assessments under the act. But, the Karnataka Entertainments tax (Amendment) Act of 1966 (Karnataka act 14 of 1966) (Amending Act) introduced Section 6b of the Act empowering the regulation of escaped assessments under the Act. Section 6b introduced by the Amending Act that came into force on 16-5-1966 with certain minor amendments thereafter, that is material reads thus :"6-B. Payment for admission, etc. , escaping assessment - (1) where, for any reason. (i) any complimentary ticket of any payment for admission to any entertainment has escaped assessment to tax under Section 3 or Section 3-A; or (ii) any cinematograph show has escaped assessment to tax under section 4 or 4a; or (iii) such ticket, payment or show has been assessed as a rate lower than the rate at which it is assessable under section 3 or section 3-A or section 4 or section 4-A. the authority prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 6a may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and at any time within such period as may be prescribed, assess or re-as e s, to the best of its judgment, the rate due on such ticket, payment or show under section 3 or section 3a or section 4 or section 4a as the case may be, after service of notice on the proprietor and after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary". Sub-section of this section and Section 18 of the Act empowered Government to prescribe the period within which escaped assessments should be reopened. Sub-section of this section and Section 18 of the Act empowered Government to prescribe the period within which escaped assessments should be reopened. But, for reasons, with which this Court is concerned, Government did not prescribe the period within which the escaped assessments can be regulated till 30-11-1976 on which day Government in notification No. FD 194 CEX 76 dated 30-11-1976 framed Rule 29-F for the said purpose. The said Rule that is material reads thus :"29-F. The time within which the power under Section 6b is exercisable shall be five years from the close of the period to which the assessment in question relates". This rule published in the Gazette dated 30-11-1976 has come into force from that day (vide sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of that Rule ). On the basis of this rule, assessments completed against the petitioners under the Act prior to 30-11-1976 are sought to be exercised by the assessing authorities with which in some cases the appellate and revisional authorities have declined to interfere. In these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitut:on, the petitioners have challenged those proceedings on the ground that the same are impermissible and illegal. ( 4 ) IN their returns, the respondents have resisted these petitions and have sought to support the actions of the assessing, appellate and revisional authorities. ( 5 ) SRI B. V. Katageri, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that for periods prior to the framing of Rule 29-F, the authorities cannot exercise the power of escaped assessment conferred by Section 6b of the Act. In support of his contention, Sri Katageri has strongly relies on a Division Bench ruling of the high Court of Madras in M. Royappa gounder and Another v. The Commercial tax Officer, Erode and Another ( AIR 1968 mad. 274 ). ( 6 ) SRI H. L. Dattu, learned High court Government Pleader appearing for the respondents in refuting the contention of Sri Katageri, contends that the substantive power conferred by Section 6b of the Act can be exercised even before Government framed Rule 29-F on 30-11-1976. 274 ). ( 6 ) SRI H. L. Dattu, learned High court Government Pleader appearing for the respondents in refuting the contention of Sri Katageri, contends that the substantive power conferred by Section 6b of the Act can be exercised even before Government framed Rule 29-F on 30-11-1976. In support of his contention sri Dattu relies on the ruling of the supreme Court in the appeal filed by the state of Tamilnadu in Royappa gounder's case since reported as State of tamilnadu and Another v M. Royappa gounder (AIR 1971 Supreme Court 231) and two other rulings of the Supreme court in Ramesh Prasad Singh v State of bihar and others (AIR 1978 Supreme Court 327) and Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam and Another v K. I. Abraham (20 STC 367) and a ruling of the Madras High Court in N. K. C. Syed Mohammed Ravoother v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, tirukoilur (9 STC 1 ). ( 7 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of Section 6b of the Act stipulates that cases of escaped assessment to be exercised at any time within such period as may be prescribed by Government. The word 'prescribed' has been defined as prescribed by Rules made by Gover ment under the Act. On the very language of Section 6b, power of escaped assessment is subject to Government framing an enabling rule stipulating period within which such power should be exercised. As to why Government did not frame a rule for nearly 10 years is not a matter with which this court is concerned. The exercise of power under Section 6b of the Act is subject to Government framing an enabling Rule prescribing the period within which that power can be exercised. Before Government frames the enabling rule, the power conferred by Section 6b of the Act, which is made subject to Rules made by Government, cannot be exercised. From this it follows that the claim made by the petititioners is unassailable. ( 8 ) IN accepting a similar contention under the corresponding enactment prevailing in the State of Tamilnadu in royappa Gounder's case a Division bench of the High Court of Madras expressed thus :"where power is given by a legislative provision in terms that it can be exercised only within the time to be prescribed, it clearly follows, in our opinion, that, unless the limits of time are drawn, the power itself cannot be exercised. This is because the intention of the Legislature is that the power is not available for exercise at any time but only within the prescribed time. In the absence of prescription by rules, therefore, the intention of the Legislature is not fully effectuated, and the power is incomplete and cannot be exercised. The necessary consequence of this is that when the impugned re-assessments were made, they were without jurisdiction, and, therefore, without authority. "the decision in Royappa Gounder's case was challenged by the State Government before the Supreme Court and the decision of the latter thereon is since reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 231. But, in that appeal this view expressed by the High Court of Madras was neither approved nor disapproved and the decision was affirmed on another ground viz. , retrospectivity of the legislation. Without any doubt, it would be wrong to hold that the supreme Court has disapproved the above principle in the appeal filed by the state of Madras as urged by Sri Dattu. In this view, the question is whether this principle should commend itself for the acceptance of this Court. In my view, this principle enunciated by the high Court of Madras in unexceptionable and is in accord with what I have earlier expressed. I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with these views. ( 9 ) THE ruling of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Prasad Singh's case dealing with the power of the executive to make appointment before the Rules are made under Article 309 of the Constitution does not really bear on the point. So also the principles enunciated by the supreme Court in Abraham's case and also the High Court of Madras in Syed mohammed Ravoother's case do not really bear on the point and assist SRI Dattu. ( 10 ) ON the above conclusion, it follows that it is not open to the authorities to exercise the power conferred by Section 6b of the Act regulating escaped assessments prior to 30-11-1976 under the Act and in all these cases the same calls for interference of this Court on that ground without examining all other grounds. I, therefore, quash the orders and notices impugned in all these cases. ( 11 ) RULE issued is made absolute in all these cases. But, in the circumstances of the cases, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .