JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal acquitting the Respondent of the charge u/s 436, I.P.C. 2. Stated in brief, the prosecution case was that on account of previous ill-feeling between Upendra Maharana (P.W. 5) and his daughter Pramila (P.W. 6), the Respondent at about 3 a.m. on 27-1-1980 set fire to their house, as a result of which it was completely burnt and house-hold articles, paddy and cash of Rs. 4,020/- were destroyed. P.W. 5 lodged F.I.R. (Ext. 2/1) at the police out post at Kankadahad on 28-1-1980 at 5 p.m. whereupon investigation ensued and after close thereof, charge-sheet was submitted against the Respondent. 3. The Respondent denied the charge and pleaded innocence at the trial. 4. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge on a thorough scrutiny of the prosecution evidence, particularly, those of P.Ws. 5 and 6 disbelieved the prosecution case and as already referred to above, acquitted the Respondent. 5. The learned Additional Standing Counsel placed the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly, the evidence of Pramila (P.W. 6) supposed to be an eye-witness to the occurrence and that of P.W. 5, her father who saw the Respondent running away from the place of occurrence. From the evidence of Pramila (P.W. 6), it appears that she got up to answer call of nature and saw the Respondent setting fire to the thatch of the house by a match-stick and thereafter ran away, She chased him and as a matter of fact caught hold of him, but, the latter gave a push, extricated himself and vanished. This version was not disclosed by her when she made a statement before the investigating officer (P.W. 3). It also appears improbable that being a young village girl, she chased the culprit alone who set fire to the house. The evidence of her father (P.W. 5) is still worse. According to him, hearing the shout of his daughter, he got up and saw the Respondent running away from a distance of about 30 cubits. It does not appear probable that he saw the Respondent and could identify him from behind at night from a distance of about 30 cubits. The above apart as admitted by both P.Ws. According to him, hearing the shout of his daughter, he got up and saw the Respondent running away from a distance of about 30 cubits. It does not appear probable that he saw the Respondent and could identify him from behind at night from a distance of about 30 cubits. The above apart as admitted by both P.Ws. 5 and 6 there was previous ill-feeling between them and the Respondent on account of the fact that the latter had earlier made some advances towards P.W. 6. In such circumstances in order to believe the evidence of highly interested witnesses, such as, P.Ws. 5 and 6 some independent corroboration was necessary. But there was no independent corroboration to their version. Added to this, no explanation was furnished for delay in lodging the F.I.R. (Ext. 2/1). In view or the state of evidence which was not only discrepant but also improbable, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge recorded the fallowing finding: Reviewing the prosecution case as a whole I find there is no case established beyond all reasonable doubt that it was the accused who set fire to the house of the informant and none else. P.Ws. 5 and 6 are interested witnesses and their evidence is such upon which implicit reliance cannot he placed. The motion for the occurrence has also not been proved by satisfactory evidence. If the pieces of evidence on which the prosecution rests its case are so brittle that they crumble when they are subjected to close and critical examination the whole of super structure built, on such insecured foundation, colapses. There is no credible evidence on record which would entitle the Court to hold conclusively that the accused was the author of the crime. Suspicion however grave cannot be a satisfactory basis for convicting the accused. 6. By a series of decisions law has been settled that a judgment of acquittal should not be interfered with unless the assessment of evidence and conclusion dawn by the trial court are unreasonable, erroneous and perverse. Reversal of a judgment of acquittal will not be justified merely on the ground that the appellate court's view on the evidence on record is different from that of the trial court or on the same set of evidence two views are reasonably possible see State of Orissa v. Trinath Dash and Ors. Reversal of a judgment of acquittal will not be justified merely on the ground that the appellate court's view on the evidence on record is different from that of the trial court or on the same set of evidence two views are reasonably possible see State of Orissa v. Trinath Dash and Ors. 54 (1982) C.L.T. 83, Charuprava Dei v. Duryodhan Mohanty and 7 Ors. 1983 C.L.R. (Crl.) 9, The State of Orissa v. Arjuna Das 1983 C.L.R. (Crl.) 207 and Smt. Dhara Dei Vs. Prafulla Swain and Others. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge took a view on assessment of the prosecution evidence which cannot, be said to be unreasonable, erroneous or perverse. Even if on the same set of evidence, it is possible for this Court to take a different view, even then interference with the order of acquittal would be unwarranted. 7. For the foregoing reasons. I hold, in agreement with the learned Assistant Sessions Judge that the order of acquittal was justified and so the appeal is without any merit. It is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed