JUDGMENT I.P. Singh, J. - Mahesh Chandra, the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the detenu) has moved this writ of Habeas Corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order dated 20-6-1984, passed by District Magistrate, Moradabad under section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (No. 65 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) detaining the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 2. In purusance of the above order dated 29-6-1984 the detenu was arrested on 4-7-1984. The ground of detention (Annexure 2 to the writ petition) was served upon him in Jail on 6-7-1984. It contains only one ground of detention which translated in English reads as follows : "On 12-6-1984 at 5.15 p.m. Sri K. S. Agarwal, Deputy Collector and Revenue Officer, Moradabad was on his way from Courts Moradabad to his house when the detenu arrived to the side of Zila Parishad, attacked him, threatened to shoot him and used abusive words against him." 3. It was also mentioned in the said ground that the detenu's above activity to attack a responsible officer of the State Government had created feeling of anger and fear (Rosh Evam Bhai) and disturbed the public order. 4. In the petition the said detention order has been challenged on the following three grounds. 1. That the ground of detention only related to a problem of law and order and not public order. 2. That there was unreasonable delay in placing the representation of the detenu before the Advisory Board. 3. That there was unreasonable and unexplained delay on the part of the State Government in disposing of the representation of the detenu. 5. There is a long string of decisions on the question of discrimination between law and order and public order. To quote a few, they are cases of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 , Ram Ranjan Chatterji v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 609 , Wasi Uddin Ahmad v. District Magistrate Aligarh, U.P., AIR 1981 SC 2166 : Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 : and Ajai Dixit v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 18 . 6. We need not quote in extenso observations of their Lordships in the above mentioned decisions. 6. We need not quote in extenso observations of their Lordships in the above mentioned decisions. Suffice it to say that from the above discussions the law on the point becomes well settled that there is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another in discriminating between 'Law and order' and "public order". The act by itself is not determinative of its gravity. It is the potentiality and its reach upon the society that matters. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps distinguishing it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The impact of the detenu's activities upon the local community is to be seen as to whether it has any effect on the normal flow of life of the community in the locality. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of 'law and order' or 'public order'. 7. Annexure 3 is the report of Shri K. L. Agarwal, Revenue Officer, Moradabad, dated 12-6-84 made to the District Magistrate. Its copy was served on the detenu. In brief he reported that when at about 5.15 p.m. after finishing the Court work he was going to his house on a Rickshaw then in the collectorate compound at the bend of Zila Parishad somebody threw something at his head and then swiftly ran away. When his Rikshaw reached the slope of the court compound, then the said man threatened him that he would shoot him. Saying so he made good his escape. He was able to note his features and could immediately recollect that the said man was a party to a case under Section 145, Cr. P.C. decided by him. Later on he could satisfy himself that the said man was the detenu. In the end the officer submitted that due to happening of the said incident he felt insulted and lowered in prestige (Apmanita evam Manhinta). He also added that if no action was taken against such a person then the Government officers, especially those on the side of judiciary. In the end the officer submitted that due to happening of the said incident he felt insulted and lowered in prestige (Apmanita evam Manhinta). He also added that if no action was taken against such a person then the Government officers, especially those on the side of judiciary. would feel demoralised. 8. Annexure 4 is the report of the Deputy S. P., Moradabad to the District Magistrate, (copy served on detenu) Moradabad in which referring to the above incident he submitted that it had created panic, fear and discontentment in the officers and employees of the courts and there was every possibility of the employees adopting a violent attitude. 9. It was on the basis of the above material that the District Magistrate arrived at a subjective satisfaction that the activity of the detenu was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and it was necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from acting in any such manner in future. 10. Learned counsel for the detenu has argued that the only activity on the part of the detenu is said to be that he threw something at the head of the officer concerned and then threatened him to shoot him and abused him when he was going on a Rickshaw in the evening after court hours in the court compound. According to him it created only the problem of law and order and not of public order inasmuch as the said activity by itself did not have the potentiality to disturb the even tempo of life of the community. It could not and did not unleash any terror wave. It was further argued that it is not clear what thing had hit at the head of the officer concerned and it is admitted in the counter affidavit of the District Magistrate that the officer concerned had not received any head injury and had not got himself medically examined. It is also mentioned in the counter affidavit of the District Magistrate that no F.I.R. was lodged of the incident. It is further pointed out that there is no material on record to indicate that the said activities were carried out in the view and hearing of other persons and there was any immediate reaction of the public to the said activity of the detenu. 11. It is further pointed out that there is no material on record to indicate that the said activities were carried out in the view and hearing of other persons and there was any immediate reaction of the public to the said activity of the detenu. 11. To our mind the said activity of the detenu though highly undesirable and reprehensible and as well may be insulting and humiliating to the officer concerned and may deserve condemnation yet certainly the said activity was not germane to the disturbance of public order. At best it could only pose a problem of law and order. The said activity has no potentiality to disturb the even tempo of life of the community. When the said activity of the detenu could not prejudice the maintenance of public order, the ground for passing the detention order became non-existent and as such rendered the detention order invalid. 12. The learned counsel for the detenu has then challenged the continued detention of the detenu on the ground that the representation of the detenu was not placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention of the detenu with the result that section 10 of the Act was not complied with and it rendered the continued detention of the detenu illegal. 13. Date of detention was 4-7-1984. Three weeks expired on 25-7-1984. The affidavit shows that the detenu had put in his representation before the jail authority on 16-7-1984. It had reached the District Magistrate on 17-7-84 and he had sent the same direct to the Advisory Board -on the same day and it had reached the Advisory Board on 18-7-84, within three weeks of the date of detention of the detenu. This point has no force. 14. It is next argued by the learned counsel of the detenu that the representation of the detenu was not disposed of by the State Government expeditiously and this fact alone rendered the continued detention of the detenu illegal. This point has no force. 14. It is next argued by the learned counsel of the detenu that the representation of the detenu was not disposed of by the State Government expeditiously and this fact alone rendered the continued detention of the detenu illegal. For this proposition the learned counsel has referred to the case of Pabitra N. Rana v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 798 in which it was held "The constitutional right to file a representation to the Government carries with it impliedly a right that the representation must be disposed of as quickly as possible and any unexplained delay would amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee contained in Article 22(5). The obligation of the appropriate detaining authority to take a decision on the representation filed by the detenu is quite apart and distinct from its obligation to constitute a Board and to send the representation to it. The detaining authority is not entitled to wait for the opinion of the Board but has to take its (own) decision without the least possible delay." 15. In the case of Mumtaz Hussain v. Superintendent, District Jail, Moradabad (1983) 2 Crimes 67 : 1983 All LJ 902, it was held (at pp. 904-5): "Central Government cannot delegate its power conferred upon it under section 11 of the National Security Act, to the State Government. The right to make a representation is a fundamental right and such a representation should be considered expeditiously by the Government to whom it has been made. "In the instant case (it was sent by Central Govt. to State Govt. for disposal) it is clear that without applying mind to the facts stated in the representation the officers concerned have sent the same to the State Govt. for necessary action in routine and casual manner. The Constitution does not permit such casual indifference mindless insensibility, routine red-tapism while dealing with the representations against the orders of preventive detentions because no freedom is higher than personal freedom, and no duty as higher than to maintain it unimpaired. In the result the non- determination of the petitioners' representations sent to the President of India and Prime Minister, vitiates the continuous detention of the petitioner and the petitioner shall be allowed on that ground alone." 16. In the present case, the detenu had made his representation on 16-7-1984. It was received by the District. In the result the non- determination of the petitioners' representations sent to the President of India and Prime Minister, vitiates the continuous detention of the petitioner and the petitioner shall be allowed on that ground alone." 16. In the present case, the detenu had made his representation on 16-7-1984. It was received by the District. Magistrate on 17-7- 84. He sent his report along with the representation on 31-7-84 (after a gap of 14 days) as averred in the counter affidavit of Sri Chandra Pal Singh filed on behalf of the State Government. The District Magistrate in his counter affidavit has not submitted any explanation for this delay. District Magistrate, who in the present case was also the detaining authority in exercise of the delegated power of the State Government vide section 3(3) of the Act, is an important limb of the State Government and as such he too was required under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to act expeditiously in dealing with the said representation. Unexplained delay of 14 days on the part of the District Magistrate in forwarding the said representation with his report to the State Government vitiates the continued detention of the detenu. 17. As a result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed not to detain Mahesh Chandra detenu (petitioner) any more in pursuance of the detention order dated 29-6-84 passed by the District Magistrate, Moradabad. It is made clear that this order would not entitle the detenu to be released if he is wanted in any other matter or can be lawfully detained otherwise.