JUDGMENT Om Prakash, J. - These are two second appeals' against a common judgment dated 30-5-1974 of learned District Judge, Deoria. Involving a common issue, both the second appeals are disposed of together by a common order as they were disposed of together by the learned District Judge. 2. One Munsarim Khan obtained a decree in Suit No. 1061 of 1966 from the court of Munsif, Deoria against the two sets of appellants in the instant appeals for specific performance of an agreement for sale pertaining to agricultural plots. The operative portion of the judgment dated 22-5-1971 of the trial court was as reproduced below:- "Suit of the plaintiff for specific performance and declaration is decreed against the defendants with costs and it is hereby declared that the agreement deed dated 10-8-64 is binding against the defendants and that sale deed dated 5-3-66 is invalid and ineffective as against the plaintiff so far as it relates to plot No. 1594/.42. Defendants Ist set are ordered to execute a sale deed with regard to plot Nos. 1581/.5, 15810.11, 15930.46, 15950.5, 1599/.30 and 1666/.55 and defendants IInd set are ordered to execute the sale deed with regard to plot Nos. 1594/.16 and 1594/.26 in favour of the plaintiff within a period of three months after receiving a sum of Rs. 1415.00 only from the plaintiff. In default plaintiff can get the sale deed executed through the court. The costs of execution and registration shall be borne by the plaintiff. He shall deposit the amount of expenses in 3 months." 3. Having obtained aforesaid decree, the decree-holder initiated execution proceedings being execution case No. 69 of 1973 on 10-7-1973. Both the sets of judgment-debtors filed objection under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C. in short) having raised identical pleas. However, the objection that was pressed before the executing court was that the decree-holder having failed to deposit the expenses within the time allowed by the decree, the execution was barred by time. It is manifest from the above reproduced operative portion of the judgment dated 22-5-1971 that the decree-holder was to deposit a sum of Rs. 1415/- within a period of three months from the date of the judgment. It is manifest from the above reproduced operative portion of the judgment dated 22-5-1971 that the decree-holder was to deposit a sum of Rs. 1415/- within a period of three months from the date of the judgment. The decree- holder having failed to make the deposit within three months moved to the executing court to extend the time for making deposit and then the executing court extended that time by one month and rejected the two sets of objections under section 47 C.P.C. filed by the two sets of judgment-debtors. Against the rejection of the objections, under Section 47, C.P.C. by the executing court, the judgment-debtors filed appeals which were dismissed by the District Judge, Deoria by a common judgment dated 30-5-1974. It is against this judgment, the instant appellants (the two sets of judgment-debtors) filed the instant appeals. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, at some length. 4. Sri R. S. Dubey. learned counsel for the appellants argued before me that the executing court was wholly incompetent to go behind the decree and, therefore, its order extending the time for depositing the money by one month was wholly invalid. In short, the argument was that the decree-holder having failed to comply with the terms of the judgment dated 22-5-1971 i.e. to deposit the amount within three months from the date of the judgment of the trial court, rendered himself incompetent to execute the decree. So the question for consideration is whether it can be said that the executing court has gone behind the decree by having extended the time for depositing the amount by one month and whether the right of the decree-holder to execute the decree was extinguished when he failed to deposit the amount within three months from the date of the order of the trial court. Whether or not time to deposit the amount can be extended in the decree for specific performance this question came up for consideration before Lucknow Bench of this Court in the case of Someshwar Dayal v. Widow of Laxman Shah, AIR 1958 All 488 and then the Lucknow Bench observed in para as under : "Section 148, Civil P.C. cannot strictly apply to a decree for specific performance which fixes a time within which the sale consideration is to be deposited. The Code does not prescribe any particular form for the drawing up of a decree for specific performance as it does in the case of some other decrees nor does the Code indicate the contents of such a decree as it does in the case of a decree in a preemption suit as provided for by O. 20, R. 14 of the Code. All that a decree for specific performance can properly contain is an adjudication to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled to the enforcement of the contract which the defendant had entered into with him for the sale of a certain property for a certain specified sum. The power of the Court to fix a period for the deposit of the sale consideration is not provided for specifically, either in the Civil Procedure Code or in the Specific Relief Act." 5. This Court further observed in para 10 as follows : "The decree which is made in a suit for specific performance is not a final decree of the character that completely debars the Court from extending the period fixed by it, for the decree in such a suit partakes of the nature of a contract and unless it is rescinded or performed it subsists and therefore the right of the Court to make the extension of time for payment also subsists." 6. In para 11 it was further observed by this Court that since the fixation of the time by the Court did not in this particular case at any rate partake of a nature of a decree, the Court's power to extend time was in no manner affected by the provisions of O. 20, R. 3 of the C.P.C. The aforesaid view having been taken by a Division Bench of this Court with which I fully agree otherwise, the question for decision as formulated above has to be decided against the appellants and in favour of the decree- holder, unless the learned counsel for the appellants is able to show a contrary view either of some larger bench of this court or of the Supreme Court. Sri Dubey relied on a case of Sulleh Singh v. Sohan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 1957 referring to the provisions of Order 20 Rule 14, C.P.C. The Supreme Court in the said case held that the pre-emptor is bound to comply with the directions of the trial court which are mandatory under Order 21 Rule 14 C.P.C. and that the lower appellate court was wrong in extending the time for payment because the failure of the plaintiffs-respondents to deposit the amount in terms of the trial court's decree would result in pre-emptor's suit standing dismissed by reason of their default in not depositing the pre-emption price. In the case of Someshwar Dayal ( AIR 1958 All 488 ) (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has already held that a case of specific performance decree is not comparable with a decree granted in pre-emption suit, as provided for by order 20 Rule 14, C.P.C. The Supreme Court took the view that the directions given by the trial court in a decree granted in a pre-emption suit are mandatory under Order 20 Rule 14, C.P.C. But the question is whether same is the position with regard to the directions given by the trial court for depositing the money in a decree for specific performance. This question was specifically considered by the Division Bench in Lucknow Bench of this Court in the case of Someshwar Dayal (supra) and it was clearly held that the direction while passing the decree for specific performance with regard to the depositing the amount is merely for convenience sake and this is not a mandatory direction, as it is in the case of a decree covered by Order 20 Rule 14, C.P.C. Therefore, the decision in the case of Sulleh Singh (supra) rendered by the Supreme Court has no application to and cannot be relied on by the appellants in the instant appeals. Sri Dubey also relied on a case of Pandurang v. Saraswatibai, AIR 1976 Bom 369 . In the said case the appeal arose from a suit filed to enforce a preferential right to acquire property as contemplated by section 22 of Hindu Succession Act 1956 and then the Bombay High Court said that the same is similar to one for exercise of a right by way of pre-emption and the provisions of Order 20 Rule 14, C.P.C. will be attracted. This authority is clearly distinguishable as it related to a decree which in the opinion of the Bombay High Court, was governed by provisions of Order 20, Rule 14 C.P.C. As the decree of specific performance is not governed by Order 20, Rule 14, C.P.C., no authority relating to those provisions can be pressed into service in the instant appeals. I, therefore, hold that the direction of the trial court to deposit the amount in the instant decree within three months from the date of the judgment of the trial court was merely for convenience sake and was not mandatory in any way and, therefore, the executing court was right in extending the time by one month. For reasons as given in the case of Someshwar Dayal (supra) by a Division Bench of this Court, I also do not agree with Sri Dubey that by extending the time by one month to make the deposit, the executing court had gone beyond the decree. 7. Also Sri Dube relied on the case of M. Shakuntala Devi v. Sakuntala, AIR 1978 Andh Pra 337. In this authority a suit was filed for the specific performance of an agreement of reconveyance. In a compromise between the parties a decree was passed in terms of the compromise. It provided that on the plaintiff depositing certain amount by a certain date, the defendants were to execute a sale deed for the property in question. The plaintiff deposited the amount subsequent to such date and filed an execution petition seeking to execute the decree. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that in contract for purchase of immovable property time is to be considered to be of essence and relief cannot be granted in equity to the defaulting purchaser. It must follow that where a Court grants a decree for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey immovable property and stipulates a time for payment of purchase money, such time cannot later be extended. In my opinion, this authority is fully distinguishable for the simple reason that in this case the decree was based on a compromise which can be varied only by the consent of the parties. In my opinion, this authority is fully distinguishable for the simple reason that in this case the decree was based on a compromise which can be varied only by the consent of the parties. The Andhra Pradesh High Court also expressed the same view in para 7 of its judgment that an equally difficult hurdle in the way of the plaintiff was the circumstance that the decree was a compromise decree and it cannot be varied except by consent. In the cases which are in hand, there was no compromise decree, and, therefore, the decree can be varied by extending the time sought for by the decree holder, by the Court. Then Sri Dubey drew my attention to the case of Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra, AIR 1972 SC 1826 . Relying on this authority Sri Dube urges that it is only the court which passed the decree, retain control over the decree and not the executing court and, therefore, the time could not have been extended by the executing court. No such rule has been laid down by the Supreme Court in this authority. 8. For the reasons, I hold that there is no illegality in the impugned judgment dated 30-5-1974 of the District Judge, who also relied on the case of Someshwar Dayal ( AIR 1958 All 488 ) (supra). 9. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed with costs.