JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the IV Additional District Judge, Aligarh dated December 20, 1980 and the order of the Munsif Hathras dated September 23, 1978. 2. The dispute relates to a shop situate in Mursan Tahsil, Hathras, district Aligarh. On September 20, 1941, the respondent no. 3 along with his father Jyoti Prasad created a mortgage in respect of this shop besides other property in favour of Durga Das deceased. Possession was delivered to the mortgagee. The respondent no. 4 is the son of mortgagee respondents 5 to 9 are the descendants of Babu Lal deceased-brother of respondent no. 4. Respondent no. 3 brought a suit in the civil Court for redemption of the mortgage. Preliminary decree was passed on May, 12, 1976. This was followed by the final decree dated 5th February, 1977. The respondent no. 3 decree-holder put the decree to execution which was registered as Execution Case No. 72 of 1977 in the Court of the Munsif, Hathras. An application was made by the respondent no. 3 in the execution proceeding for actual possession over the shop in question being delivered to him as against the petitioner. The petitioner raised objection contending that he had been tenant since the time of the respondent's father on rent at the rate of Rs. 3/- per month. According to him the shop had been taken on rent by his grand father from Jyoti Prasad and the tenancy had ever since continued intact despite the mortgage. The contention of the respondent no. 3 was on the contrary that the petitioner had been admitted as tenant by the mortgagee Durga Das on October 5, 1952. The objection raised by the petitioner was dismissed by the execution court on September 23, 1978 against which he preferred an appeal. The appeal was dismissed on December 20, 1980 with the finding that the petitioner had been admitted as tenant by the mortgagee and hence on the redemption of the mortgage his right to retain possession extinguished and the decree-holder was entitled to obtain possession. 3. From the narration of the relevant facts made above, it would appear that the proceeding against the petitioner was instituted by the respondent no. 3. From the narration of the relevant facts made above, it would appear that the proceeding against the petitioner was instituted by the respondent no. 3 in the form of an application made on November 18, 1977 vide Annexure I to the writ petition. The respondent no. 3 had obtained decree against the respondent no. 4. besides the respondents 5 to 9 in the suit for redemption. Preliminary decree was passed on May 12, 1976. Final decree was passed on 5th February, 1977 and it is this decree which had been put to execution. The respondent no. 3 claimed delivery of actual possession against the petitioner and to this the petitioner preferred objection in writing dated 18th March, 1978 vide Annexure II to the writ petition. The objection raised by the petitioner was to the effect that he had been tenant of the shop for and on behalf of the mortgagee ever since the life time of Jyoti Prasad - the father of the respondent no. 3. It is true that this objection of the petitioner is described as being under Order 21, Rule 58, Code of Civil Procedure but this was clearly a mis-description the reason being that Order 21 Rule 58, Code of Civil Procedure applies where the objection is against the attachment. There was no question of any attachment having taken place in the present case. The reference to Order 21 Rule 58 Code of Civil Procedure in the objection raised is, however, of no consequence provided it is established that he objection could otherwise lie through under some other provision of the Code. Section 47 Code of Civil Procedure is equally inapplicable. The reason is that though the petitioner claimed interest in the shop through the respondent no. 3. this was not directed against any of the respondents 4 to 9. The petitioner was not a party to that suit giving rise to the decree under execution. The question which his objection gave rise was not between the parties to the suit meaning thereby the respondents no. 3 or a person claiming through him on the one hand and the respondents 4 to 9 on the other. The dispute raised by the petitioner is directed against the respondent no. 3 the decree-holder himself and there is nothing in this which concerns the respondents 4 to 9 who are the judgment-debtors. 3 or a person claiming through him on the one hand and the respondents 4 to 9 on the other. The dispute raised by the petitioner is directed against the respondent no. 3 the decree-holder himself and there is nothing in this which concerns the respondents 4 to 9 who are the judgment-debtors. Upon analysis it is clear that the application made by the respondent no. 3 is to be deemed as being under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking actual possession against the petitioner. The objection raised by the petitioner was directed against this application of the decree-holder. The adjudication by the execution court is covered under Order 21 Rule 100/101 of Code of Civil Procedure. According to Rule 103 of Order 21, where an application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 93 or 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same condition as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were decree. The order made by the Munsif, Hathras dated September 23, 1978, therefore, amounts to a decree against which the appeal could lie as provided under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Upon merit, the courts below have recorded concurrent finding to the effect that the petitioner was admitted as tenant by Durga Das mortgagee over the shop in question on October 5, 1952. This was also the case set up by the respondent no. 3-a mortgagor. The theory of the petitioner to the effect that his grand father had been the tenant for and on behalf of Jyoti Prasad-father of the respondent no. 3 and the tenancy had continued ever since then has been discarded. This clearly is a question of fact. Nothing is shown to reject the finding point of fact recorded by the courts below. 5. The question is whether upon this finding alone the respondent no. 3 could be declared entitled to obtain actual possession against the petitioner. Section 111(c), Transfer of Property Act envisages that a lease of immoveable property determines where the interest of the lessor terminates. The interest of the mortgagee Durga Das - the lessor terminated in this case upon the decree for redemption being passed and having become final. 3 could be declared entitled to obtain actual possession against the petitioner. Section 111(c), Transfer of Property Act envisages that a lease of immoveable property determines where the interest of the lessor terminates. The interest of the mortgagee Durga Das - the lessor terminated in this case upon the decree for redemption being passed and having become final. As a general rule, therefore, the right of the petitioner to retain possession on the redemption of the usufructuary mortgage would come to an end when the mortgage has extinguished. To this general rule, however, there is exception incorporated in Section 76(a) of Transfer of property Act. According to this provision the mortgagee who taken possession of the mortgaged property is enjoined to manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage if it were his own. On the footing of clause (a) of Section 76, Transfer of property Act, it has been held that where the mortgagee is shown to have admitted a tenant in the course of ordinary prudent management of the property in his possession, the tenant retains the right to possess even subsequent to the redemption of the mortgage The mortgagor in such a case may obtain symbolic possession against him and the tenant would be entitled to benefit under the Rent Control Act provided the benefit thereof otherwise extends to the area. The attention of the courts below was not drawn to the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Tajammul Hussain v. Mir. Khan and others, (1974 AIR Allahabad, 234). It was held in that case that:- "The general rule, therefore, is that a lease executed by a mortgagee in possession would come to an end and the rights of the person holding under the same would get extinguished on the redemption of the mortgage. This rule, is, however, subject to one exception which is incorporated in Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. The exception is that if during the subsistence of the mortgage, the mortgagee, like an ordinary prudent man, lets out the mortgaged premises and enters into a bona fide transaction in connection therewith, in that event the rights of such a person admitted to tenancy would not get automatically extinguished on redemption of the mortgage. The person, so let in, would be entitled to continue in occupation of the premises as a tenant of the mortgagor after redemption. The person, so let in, would be entitled to continue in occupation of the premises as a tenant of the mortgagor after redemption. The principle, behind Section 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, appears to be based on the hypothesis that in case a mortgage had not been executed and the mortgagor as owner had remained in possession, he would have also similarly let out the premises and, therefore, if instead of the mortgagor, the mortgagee, who came in this place, did the same, it would be considered as binding on the mortgagor as well. The rights acquired by a tenant as a result of such letting to continue in possession would not lapse with the redemption of the mortgage. 6. It was also observed that the provisions of Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act apply equally to urban properties and that there is no basis in this respect for distinction as between the immovable property situate in urban areas on the one hand and the agricultural land on the other. Reliance in support of this proposition was placed by the Full Bench upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh ( AIR 1952 S.C. 205 ) ; Harihar Prasad Singh v. Deonarain Prasad (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 305) ; Asa Ram v. Smt. Ram Kali (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 183) ; Prabhu v. Ram Deo (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1721) ; All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Sri Raja Gyan Nath ( (1969) 3 S.C.C. 79 ) and Sachalmal Parasram v. Ratnabai (A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 637). A different view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court recently in Deokinandan and another v. Roshan Lal (A.I.R. 1985 Rajasthan, 11) (Full Bench). Too I am bound by the unanimous decision of the Full Bench of our Court which, it is submitted, accords with the view of the Supreme Court also. A different view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court recently in Deokinandan and another v. Roshan Lal (A.I.R. 1985 Rajasthan, 11) (Full Bench). Too I am bound by the unanimous decision of the Full Bench of our Court which, it is submitted, accords with the view of the Supreme Court also. In an different context where the owner of the property in dispute had executed usufructuary mortgage deed in favour of the tenant of the property and the legal representatives of the mortgagor obtained decree for redemption of the mortgage, it was held that upon redemption the right of the tenant to retain possession in capacity as such revived provided there was no indication to the contrary exhibited from the terms and conditions of the mortgage transaction in the light of the surrounding circumstances of the case (vide ; (1984) 4 S.C.C. 382 Gambangi Applaswamy Naidu and others v. Beharas Venkataramanaya Patro and others). 7. It was incumbent, therefore, on the part of the appellate court in the instant case to scrutinise if the letting out to the petitioner by the mortgagee Durga Das of the shop in question was prudent act in the course of ordinary management. This it had to decide in the light of Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. It assumes importance considering that the rent payable according to the petitioner has been Rs. 3/- per month only whereas the respondent no. 3 has been contending that the shop may be let out on rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- Rs. 200/-. per month. The prevailing market rate of rent at the time when the tenancy was created, may be a relevant consideration. The theory that the tenancy came into existence in the hoary past in the life time of the petitioner's grand father already stands rejected by both the Courts below. Since the appellate court has not adverted to this aspect of the matter and proceeded straight away an abstract assumption that consequent upon the redemption of the mortgage the tenant admitted as such by the mortgagee must also vacate, it becomes necessary to direct reconsideration taking this view into account. 8. The petition, consequently, succeeds in part and is allowed accordingly. 8. The petition, consequently, succeeds in part and is allowed accordingly. The order dated December 20, 1980 passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Aligarh which is Annexure VI to the writ petition, is set aside. The respondent no. 1 is directed to re-decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained herein after hearing the parties and giving such opportunity to them as is reasonable to produce additional evidence, if any, on the point of alleged ordinary and prudent management on the part of the mortgagee as contemplated under Section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. There will be no order as to costs.