JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - This is defendants second appeal against the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below in a suit for cancellation of the sale deed. According to the plaintiff the defendants who are his own sister and her husband, taking advantage of his physical infirmities and active confidence reposed in them, played fraud upon him and obtained a sale deed of his properties. The defence was denial of the allegations and also a plea of limitation had been raised. 2. It may be recalled that initially the suit was filed in forma pauperis, but the application having been refused the amendment in valuation was made and the necessary court-fee paid as directed by the trial court, whereafter the suit proceeded in the usual course. 3. Sri. G.N. Verma learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, amongst several other pleas, urged that the suit was barred by limitation as the impugned sale deed was dated 6-5-1965 and the plaint along with an application for permission to sue as pauper was moved on 1-4-1968. This application was rejected and time up to 25-3-1969 was granted to pay the court-fee which the plaintiff did. The plaint was registered on 26-3-1969. It is urged that since the plaintiff had not acted in good faith, the suit should be deemed to have been filed on 26-3-1969 and was, therefore, barred by time. According to him, benefit of Section 13 of the Limitation Act could be taken by the plaintiff only on proof of the fact that the plaintiff had been prosecuting the application for leave to sue as a pauper in good faith. Section 2(h) of the Act defines 'good faith' and according to it, nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. Section 3 of the Limitation Act is also relevant in this connection and its relevant portion may be extracted as under:- 3 "Bar of Limitation. (1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) for the purposes of this Act - (a) a suit is instituted- (i) .................. (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made." 4. (2) for the purposes of this Act - (a) a suit is instituted- (i) .................. (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made." 4. Thus in the case of a suit filed as a pauper, the suit shall be deemed to have been filed on the date when the application for leave to sue as a pauper is made which was done in this case on 1-4-1969 i.e. well within limitation. this, however, would be subject to the provisions contained n Sections 4 to 24. Since Section 13 requires existence of good faith while prosecuting the application for leave to sue as a pauper, it is urged that unless good faith is shown, the plaintiff cannot take the benefit of Section 13 read with Section 3 despite the fact that the plea of limitation may not have been taken by the defendant. It is urged that in this case, the plea of limitation had been taken and the suit was, therefore, clearly barred. 5. It is true that the plaintiff must establish his good faith if he desires to take the benefit of Section 13 of the Limitation Act for the period spent by him when his application for leave to sue as a pauper was pending, yet mere bald plea in the written statement about limitation cannot suffice. It was necessary for the defendant to have specifically pleaded that the plaintiff had not acted in food (good?) faith and, therefore, he was not entitled to claim the benefit of S. 13. It however, appears in this case that the court considered the application for leave to sue as pauper and while rejecting it had given certain time for paying the court-fee which the plaintiff did. the court has not stated anywhere that the plaintiff had not acted in good faith. Even from the judgment of the trial court it does not appear that a plea of this kind had been ever raised before it. in the grounds of appeal before the lower appellate court as well as before this court, this ground has not been mentioned. It is rather too late for the defendant to urge this question now. Even from the judgment of the trial court it does not appear that a plea of this kind had been ever raised before it. in the grounds of appeal before the lower appellate court as well as before this court, this ground has not been mentioned. It is rather too late for the defendant to urge this question now. There is a clear finding by the trial court that the suit was within time as the plaint had been filed on 1-4-1968 well within time and mere dismissal of the application to sue as a pauper, would not go to establish that the plaintiff had not acted in good faith. 6. It was next urged by Sri Verma that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief as consolidation proceedings had taken place in the village an on the basis of the sale deed, his rights have been finally determined and the appellant has been allotted a chak over which possession had already been delivered and the village has since been denotified. It would be relevant here to note that the trial court decided the suit on 4-12-1972 and the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal on 5-12-1974. While this second Appeal was pending, a notification under Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation Holdings Act in respect of the village in question was issued on 31-5-1975. The village was denotified on 3-5-1980. 7. It is contended that on account of the failure of the plaintiff to agitate the matter before the consolidation authorities, the appellant's rights have become final and cannot be subject of any decision by this court. The argument is counted by Sri Radha Krishan on two grounds - firstly, that an objection in fact had been filed under Section 9A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act and the matter is stayed and secondly that on cancellation of the sale deed, the plaintiff has stepped into the shoes of the appellant and whatever land has been allotted to him will be deemed to have been allotted to the plaintiff if the suit is ultimately decided in plaintiff's favour. 8. In this connection, the first point to be looked into is whether the consolidation courts had jurisdiction where the cancellation of the sale deed was involved. 8. In this connection, the first point to be looked into is whether the consolidation courts had jurisdiction where the cancellation of the sale deed was involved. There is no dispute that if an instrument of the decree is void, it can be ignored and the consolidation courts can proceed to decide the rest of the case. However, if the document is merely voidable, the question arises whether the jurisdiction will lie in the civil court or in the revenue court. The suit had been filed long before the consolidation proceedings had even started and no plea was taken that the suit was not maintainable in the civil court. What is being challenged here is the very sale deed on the basis of fraud for which only civil courts are competent to adjudicate. Consolidation courts have only limited jurisdiction in respect of voidable documents. Reference was made to Smt. Glaichi v. Bhola Shanker, 1982 All WC 748 (2) , but that case was about a void decree, so also the case Sheopal v. Smt. Lakhpata, 1979 All WC 524 and Chathoo v. Khedu, 1979 Rev Dec 66 . All these cases relate to void document and such document can always be ignored by the Court and rights can be adjudicated before the competent court. Reliance was also placed on the case Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhia, 1979 Rev Dec 212 , where a learned single Judge of this Court was dealing with a voidable document. However, it appears, that reference was not made to a Full Bench decision of this court in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, 1976 Rev Dec 220 in which Gorakh Nath v. H.N. Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 was discussed and explained. In Ram Bharose Lal v. Sikhdei, AIR 1975 All 90 the ratio of Gorakh Nath v. H.N. Singh (supra) was considered and it was found that voidable transfer could only be avoided in a civil suit and not in consolidation proceedings. This view endorses the earlier view of this court in Udai Bhan Singh v. Borad of Revenue, U.P., AIR 1974 All 202 (FB). Thus,m it is obvious that voidable documents can be cancelled or declared as void only by the civil Court and not by consolidation courts. This view endorses the earlier view of this court in Udai Bhan Singh v. Borad of Revenue, U.P., AIR 1974 All 202 (FB). Thus,m it is obvious that voidable documents can be cancelled or declared as void only by the civil Court and not by consolidation courts. That being the position, even if any proceeding and been taken during the consolidation, it is without jurisdiction and cannot adversely affect the rights of the parties as determined by the civil court. 9. Apart form the above, documents have been placed on record in appeal here by way of annexures to the affidavit which go to show that an objection under Section 9A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act was in fact taken by the plaintiff before the appropriate authorities. Another application was also field praying for staying the proceedings alleging that consolidation courts have no jurisdiction in the matter and must await the decision of the civil court. This plea was accepted and further proceedings were stayed there. In view of this, it cannot be said that the intervention of consolidation proceedings during the pendency of the appeal in this court would in any way affect the rights of the parties. 10. It was next urged that the property which was subject matter of sale deed no longer exists and entirely new plots from part of the chak which has been allotted. It is submitted that during consolidation operation all the properties are valued and put in a hotch potch and thereafter a different property is allowed equivalent in value to the one which the person possessed before consolidation. The argument was that what has been given after the formation of he chak is an entirely different and distinct property and has no connection with the property which was subject of the sale deed. Some cases have been cited but they all relate to specific performance of contracts. The position is quite different in the case of cancellation of a sale deed. When an agreement to sell is to be enforced, there is no vested right of a person in the property which is the subject of agreement and it is only after the sale deed had been executed in pursuance thereof that a person acquires any interest therein. The position in the case of cancellation of a sale deed is different. When an agreement to sell is to be enforced, there is no vested right of a person in the property which is the subject of agreement and it is only after the sale deed had been executed in pursuance thereof that a person acquires any interest therein. The position in the case of cancellation of a sale deed is different. Here admittedly the plaintiff was the owner of the property and had title thereto but for the impugned sale deed. If the impugned sale deed is cancelled, his right and title in the property retrospectively revives. In fact it has never been lost to the original owner and the transferee under the sale deed constitutes merely an inter meddler with no title thereto. When the sale deed is cancelled, any cloud on the right of the alleged vendor vanishes and gets resurrected to the original real owner. 11. It is also not possible to agree to the submission that an entirely new property is carved out after consolidation. All the tenure holders contribute their mite which is converted into money terms for distribution after consolidation. Section 30 provides for the extinction of rights of the parties in the original holdings and vesting of these rights in the land which is allotted to them after consolidation. This is again a device by which the original property is returned to the original holder after making adjustment for contributions required to be made for different purposes etc. The rights of the original tenure holders do not become extinct at any stage. They only remain in a state of suspended animation for a short time when old plots are obliterated and new chaks are prepared. Even then the tenure holders continue to remain in possession over the land till the chaks have been finally carved out. It is at that stage that only transfer of possession takes place to effectuate cessation of the rights in the original plots and vesting of rights in the new land in lieu thereof. These rights are neither new nor granted for the first time. They are, really speaking the very same old rights which existed in another plot of land which became vested in the new plots on consolidation of the village. These rights are neither new nor granted for the first time. They are, really speaking the very same old rights which existed in another plot of land which became vested in the new plots on consolidation of the village. The argument that the old plot was not in existing now and the cancellation of the sale deed would be a futile exercise, therefore, cannot be accepted. It is sought to be urged that possession has been delivered to the appellant after consolidation and the plaintiff is not in possession thereof and as such the plaintiff has no right left. In fact there is nothing on the record to show that possession has been delivered over the land to the appellant. The two courts below have recorded a finding that the plaintiff was in possession till the date of the suit. Being a finding of fact, it has not been seriously challenged and I think rightly so. 12. In the end, a faint attempt was made to assail the findings about the grounds on which the sale deed has been cancelled. In spite of vigorous efforts by the learned counsel. I find that he has not been able to show any illegality or infirmity in the findings recorded by courts below on this point. These are all findings of fact and I find nothing therein which may require any interference in Second Appeal. 13. It was also urged that during the pendency of the appeal in the court below, the present respondents were brought on record as legal representatives on the basis of a will alleged to have been executed in their favour. An attempt has been made to question this and to leave this question open for decision at a later date. However, I find from the record that the lower appellate court had taken pains to frame issues on this question and gave adequate opportunity to the parties to lead their evidence and on a careful consideration of the entire evidence, it has recorded a clear finding that the will was validly executed and the respondents were legal representatives of the plaintiff. In spite of argument, I do not find that the aforesaid findings are in any way vitiated and nothing specific could be pointed out by the learned counsel. 14. In spite of argument, I do not find that the aforesaid findings are in any way vitiated and nothing specific could be pointed out by the learned counsel. 14. Thus in view of all that I have said above, the appeal has no force and is accordingly dismissed with costs.