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Allahabad High Court · body

1985 DIGILAW 592 (ALL)

Ram Das v. V Additional District Judge

1985-05-21

A.N.DIKSHITA

body1985
JUDGMENT : A.N. DIKSHITA, J. 1. By the instant petition the Petitioner has prayed for quashing the judgment and order dated 11-7-1980 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) and the order dated 20-11-1978 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) passed by Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. 2. The Petitioner filed a suit in the court of Judge Small Causes, Azamgarh, Respondent No. 2, against Respondent No. 3 for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation of the accommodation. The suit was filed by the Petitioner on the allegations that Respondent No. 3 was the tenant of the accommodation on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- besides water and electricity charges. The Respondent No. 3 despite notice dated 11-11-1975 did not pay the rent with effect from 1-6-1975 to 28-12-1975 and was thus liable to ejectment u/s 20(2)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 3. The suit was contested by Respondent No. 3 asserting that on the failure of the Petitioner to accept the rent, money orders were sent to the Petitioner which he refused to accept and the Respondent No. 3 compellingly deposited an amount of Rs. 450/- being rent with effect from 1-6-1975 to 28-12-1975 in the court of Munsif City, Azamgarh, u/s 30(1) of the Act on two different dates (i.e. Rs. 350/- was deposited on 5-2-1976 and Rs. 100/- was deposited on 3-3-1976 in the said court). Respondent No. 3 had also deposited a sum of Rs. 445/- in the court of Respondent No. 2 on the first date of hearing, i.e. 5-3-1976. The Respondent No. 3 claimed that in view of the deposit having been made within the postulates of Section 20(4) of the said Act, he was thus absolved of his liability to ejectment. 4. The Respondent No. 2 dismissed the suit vide judgment and order dated 20-11-1978 so far as the relief of the ejectment of Respondent No. 1 was concerned. The reliefs in respect of arrears and future rent which included water charges besides the electricity charges were decreed. The Petitioner was also permitted to withdraw the amount deposited in the court of Respondent No. 2 as well the amount deposited u/s 30(1) of the Act. 5. The reliefs in respect of arrears and future rent which included water charges besides the electricity charges were decreed. The Petitioner was also permitted to withdraw the amount deposited in the court of Respondent No. 2 as well the amount deposited u/s 30(1) of the Act. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 20-11-1978 passed by Respondent No. 2 a revision was preferred to the court of District Judge, Azamgarh, which was transferred to the court of V Additional District Judge, Azamgarh, Respondent No. 1 for disposal according to law. This revision was also dismissed by the judgment and order dated 11-7-1980 with costs with an observation that the landlord applicant (Petitioner) would be entitled to the amount deposited u/s 30(1) of the Act as well as the amount deposited in the court of Respondent No. 2. 6. The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed against the said two judgments and orders mentioned above passed by the Respondents Nos. 2 and 1 respectively. 7. Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that the deposit u/s 30(1) of the Act would not ensure for the benefit of Respondent No. 3 inasmuch as the Petitioner could not have withdrawn the amount till the said application was allowed. It has further been contended by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the application u/s 30(1) was dismissed for want of prosecution on 14-4-1976 and as such the amount would not be deemed to be a valid deposit so as to entitle the Respondent No. 3 to claim the benefit so far as the ejectment was concerned. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has further urged that there had been no compliance of Order XV Rule 5 CPC as Respondent No. 3 had failed to deposit the rent each month after the first date of hearing i.e. 5-3-1976 and as such the defence of the Respondent No. 3 was liable to be struck off. 8. No counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3 though he was represented during the hearing. 9. Counsel for the parties were heard at some length. For a fair appraisal of the controversy it would be expedient to consider the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act which are reproduced herein below: (4). 8. No counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondent No. 3 though he was represented during the hearing. 9. Counsel for the parties were heard at some length. For a fair appraisal of the controversy it would be expedient to consider the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act which are reproduced herein below: (4). In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or (tenders to the landlord or deposits in court) the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under Sub-section (1) of Section 30 the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. Provided that nothing in Sub-section shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has vacated after acquisition any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. With the foregoing provisions it has now to be ascertained as to whether the Respondent No. 3 stood relieved of his liability to eviction as held by the courts below (Respondents Nos. 2 and 1). Admittedly taking the amount of deposit u/s 30(1) as well as the amount deposited in the court of Respondent No. 2 it would be deemed that on the first date of hearing i.e. 5-3-1976 an amount in excess to the amount liable to be paid by Respondent No. 3 had already been deposited. The only contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the deposit u/s 30(1) would not be deemed to be a valid deposit and as such the Respondent No. 2 erred in absolving Respondent No. 3 of his liability to ejectment. The only contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the deposit u/s 30(1) would not be deemed to be a valid deposit and as such the Respondent No. 2 erred in absolving Respondent No. 3 of his liability to ejectment. Provisions of Section 30(1) of the Act are recited herein below: 30(1)--If any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it. Section 30(1) of the Act extracted above clearly shows that on the refusal of the landlord to accept the rent it would be competent for the tenant to deposit the rent in the court as provided in the said Section. The enactment of this Statute which is a piece of social Legislation is meant mainly to protect the tenants from frivolous evictions. The settled principle while construing such provision is that the court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction. Such construction should be preferred which fulfills the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to the person in whose interest the Act has been enacted. There is nothing to disentitle the landlord to withdraw the amount in the event of the deposit having been made u/s 30(1) of the Act. There is nothing on the record which may also show any prejudice having been caused to the Petitioner in not receiving the amount deposited in the court. It is not borne out that the Petitioner even attempted to withdraw the amount or that he was denied such withdrawal. The only contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the deposit u/s 30 will not be deemed to be a valid one. This contention appears to be misconceived and is not acceptable. On a plain reading of the language of the said provision, it clearly reveals that such deposit would be deemed to be for the benefit of the landlord who on an application is entitled to withdraw the same. This contention appears to be misconceived and is not acceptable. On a plain reading of the language of the said provision, it clearly reveals that such deposit would be deemed to be for the benefit of the landlord who on an application is entitled to withdraw the same. There is no dispute about the deposit of the amount in the court. The Respondent No. 2 on the basis of the facts has come to the conclusion that the deposit has been made entitling the respondent No. 3 of the benefit in relieving him of his liability against ejectment. When such a right for depositing the amount has been conferred by the Act on the tenant, the landlord as per the provisions of the Act is also deprived of his valuable right to claim eviction by a simple determination of tenancy u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. There was no illegality committed by Respondent No. 2 and such finding of fact cannot be assailed to the detriment of the Respondent No. 3 in the writ jurisdiction. The Respondent No. 1 also rightly came to the conclusion that there was no illegality committed and as such upheld the decision of the Respondent No. 2. The court deciding the revision u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act has only to satisfy itself that the trial court decree or order is according to Jaw. This is not the case of the Petitioner that there was no material before Respondent No. 1 to sustain a finding particularly when findings of facts do not require the revisional court to reassess the evidence as the scope of revision is so narrow confining itself only to a question of law alone. The Respondent No. 1 found that the findings recorded by the Respondent No. 2 are not vitiated by any error of law. It has been held in the case of Ram Gopal v. Hari Shankar 1982 AWC 210 that the deposit made by the tenant in the Court would entitle him to be absolved of his liability to eviction. In the case of Ram Gopal v. Hari Shankar (Supra) it was further held that even if the deposits were illegal even then the same were not required to be deposited again and were adjustable. The tenant was entitled to claim the benefit of such deposit. The Respondents Nos. In the case of Ram Gopal v. Hari Shankar (Supra) it was further held that even if the deposits were illegal even then the same were not required to be deposited again and were adjustable. The tenant was entitled to claim the benefit of such deposit. The Respondents Nos. 2 and 1 have finally concluded that the Petitioner is entitled to receive the amount deposited in the court. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 committed a manifest error of law has no force and is thus rejected. 10. Counsel for the Petitioner then urged that in view of the noncompliance of Order XV Rule 5 of the CPC in not depositing the rent each month as provided in the said Section, the defence of the Respondent No. 3 was liable to be struck off and Respondents No. 2 and 1 acted illegally in not doing so. The provisions as contained in Order XV Rule 5 of the said Code are reproduced below: 5. Striking off defence on failure to deposit admitted rent, etc. (1). In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the Defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent urn per annum and whether or cot be admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the court may subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), strike off his defence. Explanation 1.--The expression 'first hearing' means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 1.--The expression 'first hearing' means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. Explanation 2.--The expression 'entire amount admitted by him to be due' means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, deposited in any court u/s 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Explanation 3.--The expression 'monthly amount' due means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deductions except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account. (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the court may consider any representation made by the Defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days of the first hearing or of the expiry of the week referred to in Sub-section (1), as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the Plaintiff: Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the Plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited: Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any account, the court may require the Plaintiff to furnish security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same. This submission again is of no avail as on the first date of hearing the rent and other amount due to the Petitioner and liable to be deposited was found to be in deposit by the Respondent No. 2 as well as Respondent No. 1. This submission again is of no avail as on the first date of hearing the rent and other amount due to the Petitioner and liable to be deposited was found to be in deposit by the Respondent No. 2 as well as Respondent No. 1. Even if the defence was to be struck off it could have proved to be of no avail to the Petitioner so far the relief of ejectment was concerned as on the first date of hearing there was sufficient compliance of Section 20(4) of the Act relieving Respondent No. 3 of his liability to ejectment as held by Respondents Nos. 2 and 1. The Respondent No. 2 has already decreed the future rent and the amount of electricity charges. Assuming that except depositing the amount as provided in the law and due to the landlord the tenant may not have filed written statement even then he was relieved of his liability of ejectment though his liability to pay the future rent and other dues continued. However, the Petitioner did not make any application for striking off the defence. 11. The Respondent No. 2 had also dismissed the suit holding that the notice sent u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid. No grievance has been made against such finding cither with the Respondent No. 1 or before me. It is not permissible for the Petitioner to claim the relief of ejectment of Respondent No. 3 on the basis of an invalid notice. 12. In view of the above discussions it cannot be said that the Respondents Nos. 2 and 1 had committed any illegality so as to entitle the Petitioner to claim interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition has no force and deserves to be dismissed. 13. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.