JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is defendant's revision arising from a suit for ejectment from premises and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation. The suit has been decreed by the court below ex parte against the applicant. He has, accordingly, approached this court through the instant revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit alleging that he was the landlord of the accommodation and an agreement of lease had been executed between him and the defendant on 1361978 whereunder the defendant agreed to pay for the premises in dispute, rent at the rate of Rs. 900/ per month which rent was to remain in force for a period of two years and thereafter the rent was to be payable at the rate of Rs. 1000/ per month. It was asserted that at the rate of Rs, 900/ the defendant paid rent upto July, 1980 and thereafter he did not pay any rent whereupon a composite notice of demand of rent and termination of tenancy was issued on 1491981 and the same was served upon the defendantapplicant on 2891981; despite service of this notice neither rent was paid nor the premises was vacated. In the suit, apart from claiming ejectment from the premises, a decree for Rs. 14000/ was claimed on account of rent and for Rs. 14000/ on account of damages for use and occupation. 3. In his writtenstatement the defendant did not deny the fact that he was tenant of the property in dispute having taken the same under leasedeed dated 1361978, He also did not dispute the fact that in the leasedeed the rate of rent was stated to be Rs, 900/. He however, pleaded that at the time the leasedeed was executed, there was no godown, boundary wall and gate and before the execution of the lease deed the plaintiff had orally assured the defendant that before delivery of possession of the premises to the defendant he will construct a boundary wall, gate and godown and only then the rent would be payable at the rate of Rs. 900/, otherwise it will be payable at the rate of Rs. 300/ per month. The plaintiff found himself unable to carry out the constructions mentioned hereinbefore and for this reason he reaped from the defendant a sum of Rs. 900/, otherwise it will be payable at the rate of Rs. 300/ per month. The plaintiff found himself unable to carry out the constructions mentioned hereinbefore and for this reason he reaped from the defendant a sum of Rs. 4337/ by way of advance. According to the defendant, even after taking this advance the plaintiff could not carry out the construction and ultimately on 15111979 he gave possession to the defendant with this oral statement that the defendant may carry out the constructions himself at his own costs and submit bill to him and that the amount incurred in the constructions will be adjusted against the rent. The defendant claims that in view of the fact that he was in dire need of accommodation he took possession of the premises on 15111979 although the plaintiff had not got the constructions made. According to the defendant, after taking possession of the premises he made the constructions and submitted bill to the plaintiff but he did not make payment thereof. The defendant avers that the plaintiff asked him to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 900/ per month for six months on the assurance that he would construct the godown. The defendant claims that he paid rent upto September, 1980 as a result of the temptation given to him by the plaintiff. It is also the defendant's case that on 2711982 the plaintiff took forcible possession of a portion of the tenement and then disputes arose between the parties. According to the defendant, in view of the fact that the plaintiff did not carry out the obligations, he is not entitled to receive rent at a rate beyond Rs. 300/ per month. It is also pleaded that since the lease was in respect of industrial purposes the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 are not applicable to the premises in question. In the end it is stated that the defendant is entitled to adjustment for Rs, 13,308/ and Rs. 4,437/ against rent payable by him for which he has filed suit against the plaintiff. The jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes was challenged on the ground that machinery had been fixed to earth in the premises in question and this machinery, therefore, became immovable and consequently the Court of Small Causes did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. The jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes was challenged on the ground that machinery had been fixed to earth in the premises in question and this machinery, therefore, became immovable and consequently the Court of Small Causes did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. The above pleas were raised through writtenstatement filed on 1531983. On 1931983 the plaintiff moved an application before the trial court for striking off the defendant's defence as he had failed to deposit the amounts referred to in Order 15, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. On 241983 the defendant filed his objection against this application. In this objection, it appears, he disclaimed his liability to make the deposits under Order 15, Rule 5 on the ground that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial court did not agree with the submission of the defendant and allowed the plaintiff's application by order dated 1351983. Against this order the defendant preferred Civil Revision No. 92 of 1983 in this Court which was allowed on 1211984. This Court directed the trial court to first, decide the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. By order dated 18121984 the trial court decided the question of jurisdiction against the defendant. Thereafter it fixed 1811985 for final hearing of the suit. On this date the case was got adjourned by the defendantapplicant. The next date fixed was 1521985. On this date the plaintiff and his counsel were present before the court below when the case was called out but neither the defendant appeared before the court nor his counsel. From the ordersheet of that date it appears that the case was called out repeatedly but the defendant did not appear even till 2.30 p. m., when the court decided to proceed ex parte against the defendant. After deciding to proceed ex parte against the defendant, it recorded the statement of plaintiff's witness Suraj Kumar. After the deposition of Suraj Kumar had been recorded, the court heard arguments in respect of the suit as wellas in respect of application concerning strikingoff of the defence under Order 15, Rule 5 of the Code. 1621985 was fixed for pronouncement of judgment. After the deposition of Suraj Kumar had been recorded, the court heard arguments in respect of the suit as wellas in respect of application concerning strikingoff of the defence under Order 15, Rule 5 of the Code. 1621985 was fixed for pronouncement of judgment. On 1621985 the defendant moved an application before the trial court for staying further proceedings in the suit as his revision against the order dated 19121984 was pending in this Court and an application for interim relief had been filed therein on which interim orders had not been passed till then. On this date no application was made on behalf of the defendantapplicant for recalling the order dated 1521985. This application was rejected but as the judgment was not ready, 1821985 was fixed for pronouncement of judgment. 1721985 was Sunday. On 1821985 the defendant moved an application for recalling the order dated 1521985 whereby the court had decided to proceed ex parte against the defendant. Another application was made on the same day for engaging another counsel. By order of that date the defendant was permitted to engage another counsel. The application for recall of the order dated 1521985 was rejected with the observation that the defendant's absence on 1521985 was deliberate and he was merely interested in adjournment of the suit. This order was passed on 2021985. By order of that date defendant's counsel was permitted to make his submissions on 2121985. After hearing arguments on 2121985, the trial court passed two orders on 2221985. By the first order it allowed the plaintiff's application for striking off of the defendant's defence under Order 15, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by the second order it decreed the plaintiff's suit. By the impugned judgment and decree the plaintiff's suit was decreed for ejectment as well as for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 18,000/. A decree for pendente lite and future damages was also passed in favour of the plaintiff subject to payment of additional court fee on the execution side. The finding on preliminary issue of jurisdiction was made part of the judgment. 5. The learned counsel for the defendantapplicant has submitted that after ordering, on 1521985, to proceed ex parte against the applicant, the trial court could not proceed to record ex parte evidence on that very date. The finding on preliminary issue of jurisdiction was made part of the judgment. 5. The learned counsel for the defendantapplicant has submitted that after ordering, on 1521985, to proceed ex parte against the applicant, the trial court could not proceed to record ex parte evidence on that very date. According to the learned counsel the court had an obligation to fix another date for recording ex parte evidence. For making this submission the learned counsel has relied upon the provisions of Rules 6 and 7 of Order 9. Relevant portion of Rule 6, order 9 reads as follows : Rule 6 : Procedure when only plaintiff appears (1) Where the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing then. (a) if it is proved that the summons was duly served, .the court may make an order that the suit be heard ex parte. Rule 7 reads thus : Procedure where defendant appears on day of adjourned hearing and assigns good cause for previous nonappearance. Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte and the defendant, at or before such hearing, appears and assigns good cause for his previous nonappearance, he may, upon such terms as the court directs as to costs or otherwise, be heard in answer to the suit as if he appeared on the day fixed for his appearance. The learned counsel submitted that under Rule 7 it is open to a defendant to apply for setting aside the order passed under Rule 6 but this opportunity can be availed of only if the ex parte evidence is recorded on a day subsequent to the date on which the order under Rule 6 is passed. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel. Rule 7 gives right to the defendant to make an application where the court had adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte. Where the hearing of the suit ex parte had not been adjourned, Rule 7 will not come into play. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court did not commit any error when it proceeded to record ex parte evidence on 1521985 itself. 6. Where the hearing of the suit ex parte had not been adjourned, Rule 7 will not come into play. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the trial court did not commit any error when it proceeded to record ex parte evidence on 1521985 itself. 6. It was next submitted that the court below was incorrect in observing that the defendantapplicant was merely interested in delaying the disposal of the suit as 1521985 was the first date of hearing and prior to that no adjournment had been sought on behalf of the defendantapplicant. In Paragraph 7 of the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiffoppositeparties it has been stated that prior to 1521985 the suit was fixed for hearing on 1811985 and the hearing was adjourned at the instance of the defendantapplicant. This averment has not been controverted on behalf of the applicant. In the circumstances the argument is based on incorrect facts and is accordingly liable to be rejected. 7. It was next submitted that Order 9 Rule 7 was to be liberally applied in favour of affording opportunity to the party and it should not be so interpreted as to shut opportunity of hearing. The learned counsel for the plaintiffoppositeparties submitted that after ex parte evidence had already been recorded, the defendantapplicant had no right to make application under Order 9 Rule 7 and, therefore, the said application was misconceived and had been rightly rejected by the court below. For making this submission that the application, at the stage at which it was moved, was not maintainable, the learned counsel has relied upon Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others ( AIR 1964 SC 993 ). In this case it was held by their Lordships that if the entirety of the hearing had been completed and only judgment remained to be pronounced, Order 9 Rule 7 was not applicable. The opening sentence of Rule 7 is : Where the Court has adjourned the hearing of the suit ex parte. Obviously this rule would apply where the hearing of the suit ex parte has been adjourned. Where the hearing has not been adjourned, this rule will not be attracted. Pronouncement of judgment is not a part of the hearing of the suit. In the present case the entire hearing had concluded on 1521985 and only judgment remained to be pronounced. Obviously this rule would apply where the hearing of the suit ex parte has been adjourned. Where the hearing has not been adjourned, this rule will not be attracted. Pronouncement of judgment is not a part of the hearing of the suit. In the present case the entire hearing had concluded on 1521985 and only judgment remained to be pronounced. As such, the defendant's application under Order 9 Rule 7 was misconceived and was rightly rejected by the court below. Once it is held that the application was not maintainable, the question of its being liberally dealt with does not arise at all. However, the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for submitting that the application should be liberally dealt with and the discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing may be noticed. The first authority relied upon in this behalf is Ramji Dass v. Mohan Singh (1978 Allahabad Rent Cases 496). This was a case under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel is The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty (AIR 1959 Supreme Court 429). The learned counsel did not invite my attention to any particular portion of this judgment. This was a case under the Land Acquisition Act and the propositions laid down by their Lordships primarily concerned the assessment of compensation. Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Singh and others ( AIR 1964 SC 993 ) is of no assistance to the applicant; rather it is against him. Itwas held in this case by their Lordships that inherent power of the court cannot override the express provisions of the statute and that Order 9 Rule 7 and Order 9 Rule 13 exhaust the whole gamut of situations that might arise owing to nonappearance of defendant during the course of trial. In this very case it is also laid down by their Lordships that where the hearing has been completed and the case has been fixed for pronouncement of judgment, Order 9 Rule 7 is not attracted. The applicant did not apply under Order 9 Rule 13 after the ex parte decree had been passed. In the circumstances, in view of the observations made by their Lordships the applicant had no right to claim setting aside of ex parte order. The applicant did not apply under Order 9 Rule 13 after the ex parte decree had been passed. In the circumstances, in view of the observations made by their Lordships the applicant had no right to claim setting aside of ex parte order. Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (AIR 1978 Supreme Court 597) has no application to the facts of the present case. In this case Smt. Maneka Gandhi's passport was impounded without giving her opportunity of hearing. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the proceeding for impounding the passport was quasijudicial in nature and before impounding the passport, opportunity of hearing was required to be given. In case on hand the applicant was served with the summons and he had put in appearance. He had notice of the date fixed for hearing and yet he failed to appear before the court. It is not a case where opportunity of hearing was not given to th applicant. The opportunity of hearing was given but he did not avail of the same. In Savitri Amma Seethamma v. Artha Karihy and others ( AIR 1983 SC 318 ) it was held that the nonappearance of a counsel at the time of hearing on account of being busy elsewhere was a sufficient cause to entitle a party for restoration of the proceedings. This judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. In Shankar Baksh Singh and another v. Maheshwar Dayal (AIR 1931 Oudh 159) a Division Bench of the Oudh Chief Court held that the discretion conferred under Order 9'Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be liberally exercised. However, this authority could be of assistance to the applicant only if application under Order 9 Rule 7 was maintainable. As held herein above, the application of the applicant was not maintainable. Accordingly, this authority is of no assistance to the applicant. 8. It was next submitted that the court below had no jurisdiction to strike off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure after ex parte evidence had been recorded. In support of the plea, the learned counsel relied upon Sewn Ram v. Misrimal and others (AIR 1952 Rajasthan 12). 8. It was next submitted that the court below had no jurisdiction to strike off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure after ex parte evidence had been recorded. In support of the plea, the learned counsel relied upon Sewn Ram v. Misrimal and others (AIR 1952 Rajasthan 12). The learned counsel for the plaintiffoppositeparty has rightly submitted that even if the order striking off of the defence' is found to be suffering from infirmities that will not affect the validity of the ex parte' decree. In the circumstances the applicant derives no benefit from the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court. Blmal Chand v. Gopal Agarwal (AIR 1981 SC 1687) was relied upon for submitting that while striking of the defence it is incumbent upon the court to consider the defendant's representation. Rameshwar Dayal v. Distt. Judge, Allahabad (AIR 1981 Allahabad 147) was relied upon for submitting that where the tenant does not admit that any amount of rent is due from him, he is not required to make any deposit under order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the defence cannot be struck off for failure to deposit the rent. Surendra Nath v. Shakuntala Devi (AIR 1980 Allahabad 136) was relied upon for submitting that admission of rent due is the sine qua non of exercise of jurisdiction under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the fact that I am of the opinion that the validity of the order striking off the defence under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code is not required to be gone into in the present case because the ex parte decree does not suffer from any infirmity, it is not necessary to make a detailed examination of these authorities. 9. Lastly it was submitted that even while passing ex parte decree the court below was required to consider the defendant's defence. According to the learned counsel it was incumbent upon the court below to record a finding on the defendant's plea that no arrears were outstanding against him. In the present case it was not the defendant's plea that he had paid arrears. His plea was that the amount payable to him from the plaintiff was required to be adjusted against the rent and if this adjustment is allowed, no rent is payable. In the present case it was not the defendant's plea that he had paid arrears. His plea was that the amount payable to him from the plaintiff was required to be adjusted against the rent and if this adjustment is allowed, no rent is payable. Before the defendant could claim adjustment against the rent due, he had to prove that he actually carried out the repairs and that the amount spent thereon was as stated by him. Similarly he also had to prove that amount had been advanced by him to the plaintiff. In regard to these two matters, there was no evidence on behalf of the defendantapplicant. The plaintiffs did not accept that they had authorised the defendantapplicant to carry out repairs at his own costs and adjust the said costs against the rent payable to them. In the circumstances there was nothing before the court which was required to be considered. 10. In view of the above, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed with costs to the opposite parties. Interim order, if any, shall stand discharged. The applicant has not indicated the valuation of the revision and, therefore, I fix the opposite party's costs at Rs. 500/. (Revision dismissed.)