JUDGMENT B. N. Katju, J. 1. The applicant was convicted on two counts under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur by his judgment dated 3-4-1981 passed in case No. 1197 of 1979 for selling adulterated milk and for contravening rule 50 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules (hereinafter referred to as the rules) and was sentenced to six months' R. I. and a fine of Rs. 1000/- or in default to undergo further RI for six months for selling adulterated milk and three months' RI and a fine of Rs. 500/- or in default to undergo further RI for three months for contravening Rule 50 of the Rules. He filed criminal appeal No. 104 of 1981, which was dismissed by III Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur by his judgment dated 2-5-81. 2. The applicant thereafter filed this revision in this Court, which was originally heard by a Single Judge. It was contended before the Single Judge that the prosecution of the applicant was illegal in view of Section 20 of the Act as the sanction was not valid. The Chief Medical Officer, who was the sanctioning authority, bad accorded sanction by signing the printed form Ext. ka-6, in which the name of the applicant, his residence and the offence committed by him had been typed, from which it could not be inferred that he had applied his mind. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the applicant relied on a Single Judge decision of this Court in criminal revision no. 114 of 1980, Ayub Ahmad v. State of U. P. In which It has been held :- "Courts notice was drawn to Ext. ka-6, the alleged sanction, proved by the prosecution. It is apparent that no details at all regarding the nature of the offence, the nature of the sample of fond taken, the nature of the adulteration etc. was mentioned in the sanction. It is a printed form in which only the name of the accused and his address was filled in and the sanctioning authority merely appended his signature. It doss not show that the sanctioning authority applied his mind. " 3. was mentioned in the sanction. It is a printed form in which only the name of the accused and his address was filled in and the sanctioning authority merely appended his signature. It doss not show that the sanctioning authority applied his mind. " 3. A contrary view has, however, been taken in Mast Ram v. State of U. P., 1982 ACrR 35 in which it was held by at learned Single Judge of this Court : "It is first contended that there was no proper sanction. The sanction appears to have been given without applying one's mind. Initially it may be pointed out that this objection was neither raised in the trial court nor before the appellate Court. I was not inclined to allow appellants' learned counsel to raise this plea but as it is only a technical point, I have heard him. Exhibit Ka-8 Is the sanction given by Chief Medical Officer, Gonda. The learned counsel says that it is on a cyclostyled proforma and only the blank have been filled up perhaps by some one else and so the Chief Medical Officer does not appear to have applied his mind to the fact of this case. No such presumption can, however, bet raised. If a document is signed by certain person the presumption is rather to the contrary and it would be presumed that he signed it after understanding its application. It is only when certain facts are brought on record which militate against this presumption that something can be said but no such facts have been brought on record. The mere fact of document being cyclostyled does not lead to the presumption that he had not applied his mind. There are generally numerous cases in which sanction has to be given and as normally speaking the form of sanction is common so if the same is got cyclostyled and then details are filled up according to the special facts of each case it cannot be said that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind while sanctioning prosecution. " 4. In these circumstances, this application was referred to a Division Bench by the learned Single Judge for decision. That is how it has come up before us. " 4. In these circumstances, this application was referred to a Division Bench by the learned Single Judge for decision. That is how it has come up before us. It has been held in Gokulchand Dwarkadas Moraka v. King, AIR 1948 PC 82- ".........In their Lordships' view, in order to comply with the provisions of clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential, since clause 23 does not require the sanction to be tin any particular form, nor even to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. " 5. In Madan Mohan Singh v. State of U. P., AIR 1954 SO 637 it was held :- "As the Privy Council pointed out in the case of Gokul Chand Dwarkadas v. King, AIR 1948 PC 82 at p. 84 (a), the burden of proving that the requisite sanction has been obtained rests on the prosecution, and such burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given the sanction in reference to the facts on which the proposed prosecution was to be based ; and these facts might appear on the face of the sanction car might be proved by extraneous evidence. 6. It was held in P. C. Joshi v. State of U. P., AIR 1961 SC 387 - " If the facts which constitute the charge do not appear on the face of the sanction, it must be established by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the authority competent to grant the sanction and that the authority applied his mind to those facts before giving sanction. " It is thus settled law that either the facts constituting the offence charged should be mentioned in the sanction itself or it must be proved by the prosecution by extraneous evidence that the facts constituting the offence were placed before the sanctioning authority. If both these are absent, then the sanction is invalid. 7. In the present case, the sanction (Ext. If both these are absent, then the sanction is invalid. 7. In the present case, the sanction (Ext. ka 6) is as follows ;- "Karyalaya Mukhya Chikitsa Adhikari, Rampur, Patrank Food/74-50 Dinank 26-9-1979 Uttar Pradesh Sarkar ke Notification Sankhya 6001/XVI-X-722-55 Dinank September 18, 1976 men Uttar Pradesh Gazete Dinank 13 November 1976 bhag 1 ka Pristha 3655 par Prakashit ke anusar mujhe Mukhya Chikitsa Adhikari Zila Rampur ki haisiyat se diye gaye Adhikaranusar Evam Case se sambandhit tatthya tatha samagri jo ki yahan par uplabdh hai ki purn janch karke is parinam par pahunch kar P. F. A. Act 1954 ki Dhara 20 ke antargat svikriti deta hun ki t (1) Sri Shahzade Putra Mohammad Hussaia Niwasi Gram Mansoorpur Thana Civil Lines Zila Rampur. (2) Sri X Putra X Niwasi X Ka P. F. A?t 1954 ki Dhara wa Rules Vim 50 Dhara 7/16 ke antargat chalan kar diya jaye. Main Dr. D. K. Nanda Mukhya Chikitsa Adhikari Rampur Sri P. K. Saxena Khadyanirikshak Kshettra Nagar Palika Zila Rampur ko Chief Judiciai Magistrate Pratham shreni ki adalat men uprokt case ko dayar karne evam pairvi karne ki svikriti pradan karta hun. Sd/Iliegible Ex. Ka. 6 26-9-79 23-2-80 Mukhya Chikitsa Adhikari Rampur (U. P.)" 8. It was stated by the Food Inspector P., K. Saxena (PW 1) that after, receiving the report of the Public Analyst, from which it appeared that the milk purchased by him from the applicant was adulterated, he submitted report (Ext. ka 3) to the Chief Medical Officer, Rampur for obtaining his consent for the prosecution of the applicant as required by Section 20 of the Act. Along with bis report (Ext. ka 5), he also submitted the memo relating to the taking of sample of milk from the applicant (Ext. ka 1), the receipt of payment of the price of the sample (Ext. ka 2), the letter of the Food Inspsctor sending the sample for analysis to the Public Analyst (Ext. ka 3), and the report of the Public Analyst (Ext;. ka 4) to the Chief Medical Officer, Rampur, who consented to the prosecution of the applicant after perusing the aforesaid documents. He proved the signature of the Chief Medical Officer on Ext. ka 6, It was, however,, admitted by him in cross examination that the Chief Medical Officer had not signed Ext. ka 6 in his presence. Report Ext. ka 4) to the Chief Medical Officer, Rampur, who consented to the prosecution of the applicant after perusing the aforesaid documents. He proved the signature of the Chief Medical Officer on Ext. ka 6, It was, however,, admitted by him in cross examination that the Chief Medical Officer had not signed Ext. ka 6 in his presence. Report Ext. ka 5 coupled with the documents Exts. ka 1 to ka 4 clearly mention the facts constituting the offence for which the applicant was charged The sanction (Ext ka 6) mentions that the documents rpgarding the case against the applicant were perused by the Chief Medical Officer before he accorded sanction for the prosecution of the applicant. It is true that sanction Ext. ka 6 is on a printed form, the blanks in which have been filled by typing the name and residence of the applicant and the offence for which he was charged, but from this it cannot be inferred that the facts mentioned therein were not correct. In fact, once it is held that the Chief Medical Officer had signed Ext. ka 6, it must be presumed that the facts stated in Ext. ka 6 are correct. The evidence of the Food Inspector coupled with the sanction (Ext. ka 6) thus establishes that the facts constituting the offence for which the applicant was charged were placed before the sanctioning authority. It cannot, therefore be held that the sanction was invalid. There does not appear to be any error or illegality in the judgment of the trial court and the lower appellate court. 9. Coming to the question of sentence, we are of the opinion that the sentences of six months' RI and three months' RI awarded to the applicant should be made concurrent. 10. This revision is accordingly dismissed with the modification that the conviction of the applicant under Section 7/16 of the Act on two counts and the sentence of six months' RI and a fine of Rs. 1000/-, or in default to undergo further RI for six months, and three months' Rl and a fine of Rs. 500/- or in default to undergo further RI for three months, are maintained, but the sentences of six months' RI and three months' KI shall run concurrently. Revision dismissed.