This case relates to theft of Government money amounting to Rs. 1,20,736.30, which was put inside two steel trunks to carry the same under the escort of Ceatral Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel to the office of the Extra-Assistant Commi­ssioner, Tuting (in Arunachal Pradesh) for distribution to staff, This was on 20.1.78. It was a part of regular monthly prac­tice, since Tuting is about 6/7 day foot march from the last road head Yingkiong. After the normal checking of boxes, their locks and seal were completed, and these were carried to the CRPF Quarter Guard situated at a distance of about 300 metres from the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Along PW 3 was the Guard Commander under whom were three Constables including accused petitioner Golam Hussain. The boxes had been carried to the Quarter Guard by about 4.30 PM. After about an hour accused Ram Lal, Ganga Singh and Golam Hussain (All CRPF personnel) met at the C. R. P. F Camp and plo­tted to take out cash from the said steel trunks that very night. In pursuance of this conspiracy, accused Golam Hussain. who was on duty at the said Quarter Guard from road-night of 20th to 2 A. M. of 21st, woke up accused Ram Lal a little after min-night who in his turn, got accused Ganga Singh up. The barrack in which Ram Lal and Ganga were sleeping was close to the Quarter Guard. Accused Golam Hussain remained on guard duty while accu­sed Ram Lal raised the lower portion of the bamboo door of the Quarter Guard and Ganga Singh entered inside through the gap. Reaching inside, Ganga Singh opened the steel trunk by manipulating the hasp and staple (" kunda '') with a bar of plied and took out five bundles of currency notes, a the meantime accused Ram Lal brought two pieces of gunny bag with one piece of stone which was kept inside the steel trunk in such a way that it might not appear latter on that any­thing was removed from the box. Ganga Singh after doing this exercise, replaced the hasp and staple in the original posi­tion. After completing his job Ganga Singh came out of the Quarter Guard by the way through which he went in. Coming out Ganga Singh handed over four bundles to accused Ram Lal keeping the fifth with him. Ganga Singh after doing this exercise, replaced the hasp and staple in the original posi­tion. After completing his job Ganga Singh came out of the Quarter Guard by the way through which he went in. Coming out Ganga Singh handed over four bundles to accused Ram Lal keeping the fifth with him. Ram Lal went out of the C.SL P F. premises with the money and buried it in the ground un­der the rostrum of the field which is across the road. The of money kept by accused Ganga Singh bad contained Rs. 7,717.36, of which he gave Rs. 2,000/- to Ram Lal and kept Rs. 5,000/- under some dry leaves outside the fencing of the C. R. P. F. premises which was later on found out by a sweeper on 27th January. Ram Lal offered Rs. 1,000/- to Golam Hussain who did not accept it then and stated that he would do so latter on. On 31st January accused Ram Lal met accused Bishen Singh (of B.S.F.) and stated to the later that as the C.R.P.F. Company was shortly to leave Along, the former proposed to keep some of his baggage's with Bishen Singh. On the latter agreeing to it, a steel trunk was given to him for kee­ping the same in his residence. The money which had been kept below the rostrum by Ram Lal was put inside the trunk. 2. In the meantime on 21st January, the Political Interpre­ter, Along with 3. C.R.P.F. escorts took out the steel trunks flora the Quarter Guard and carried it to Yinkiong. On opening the trunk there, it was found that five bundles of cash were missi­ng from the box and instead two pieces of gunny bag and about half-a-kg of shone were found in its place. The matter was bro­ught to the notice of D. C., Along and O. C. of the C.R.P.F.. investigation of the case started and police recovered in a pit latrine on 1.2.78 the statement showing details of Rs. 7,71735 which was with the cash on 5.2.78, accused Ram Lal confessed before police and led it to the house of accused Bishen Singh wherein Rs. 1,12,924.3U along with a steel trunk was seized by police. Judicial confession of all the accused persons were also recorded on 11.2.78 by learned Magistrate Shri Harbans Singh; and police seized the next day a sum of Rs. 1,12,924.3U along with a steel trunk was seized by police. Judicial confession of all the accused persons were also recorded on 11.2.78 by learned Magistrate Shri Harbans Singh; and police seized the next day a sum of Rs. 1.370/- from accused Ram Lal and Rs. 200/- from accused Ganga Singh. 3. On completion of investigation, the four above named accused persons were sent up for trial. A charge under section 414 I.P.C. was framed against accused Bishen Singh; and under sections 457 and 330 read with section 34 against the three other accused persons. On these charges being explained they pleaded guilty. However, the learned trial Court instead of convicting them on their pleading guilty, proceeded with trial, in the course of which 16 witnesses were examined who unfolded the aforesaid prosecution story. On being satisfied about the guilt of the accused on the basis of the evidence recorded in the case as well as title confessional statements made by them coupled with aforesaid recoveries, the learned trial Court found the accused guilty of the charges framed against them and sentenced accused Ganga Singh, Ram Lal and Golarn Hussain to imprisonment for three years for their offence under sections 457/34 and for two years under section 380. These sentences were ordered to run concurren­tly. Accused Bishen Singh was found guilty under section 414 and was sentenced to undergo R. I. for one year. 4. An appeal was preferred against the conviction and sen­tence before the learned Deputy Commissioner, Along, who main­tained the conviction, but reduced the sentence to the period under­gone. The present revision has been filed only by Golam Hussain, Ganga Singh and Ram Lal. Though, the petitioners have served out the sentences in the meantime, their conviction remains which has stigmatized them, and hence the revision has been pressed for decision. 5. In assailing the conviction, Shri Das has advanced three submissions only before me. He first contends that the entire trial by the learned Assistant Commissioner-cum Magistrate 1st Class was without jurisdiction in as much as three was no direction by the prescribed authority to the effect that offences may be tried by an ordinary criminal court of competent jurisdiction. Such a direction is required according to the learned counsel, under the Proviso to section 16(2) of the C. R. P. F. Act, 1949 (hereinafter, the Act). Such a direction is required according to the learned counsel, under the Proviso to section 16(2) of the C. R. P. F. Act, 1949 (hereinafter, the Act). Secondly, the trial was in any case vitia­ted because of non-providing of legal aid to the petitioners; and finally, the confessional statements could not have been pre­ssed into service because the same cannot be regarded as volun­tary, as the accused had been sent to the Quarter Guard (for reflec­tion) which cannot be equated with judicial custody. 6. The first submission of Shri Das deserves to be dealt with first as it is connected with the very jurisdiction of the trial Co­urt. The contention is principally founded on the proviso to section 16(2) of the Act. We may read this sub-section : "16 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), the Central Government may invest the Commandant or an Assistant Commandant with the powers of a Magistrate of any class for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence committed by a member of the Force and punished under this Act or any offence committed by a member of the Force against the person or property of another member; provided that : (i) when the offender is on leave or absent from duty : or (ii) when the offence is not connected with the offender's duties as an embers of the Force; or (iii) when it is a petty offence, even if connected with the offender's duties as a member of the Force; the offence may, if the prescribed authority within the limits of whose jurisdiction the offence has been committed, so directs, be inquired into or tried by an ordinary criminal court having jurisdiction in the matter." Shri Das submits that the present case attracted clause (ii)-of the proviso which required a direction from the prescribed authority to enable the ordinary criminal court to take up the trial. Shri Goswami, on the other hand, submits that the proviso feast no application at all in the present casein as much as the present was not an offence either punishable under the Act or committed by a member of the Force against the person or pro­perty of other member. Shri Goswami, on the other hand, submits that the proviso feast no application at all in the present casein as much as the present was not an offence either punishable under the Act or committed by a member of the Force against the person or pro­perty of other member. To put it differently, according to lear­ned Standing Counsel, the proviso has not laid down any subs­tantive provision, and has to be read along with the main part of sub-section (2). Shri Das, on the other hand, would contend that the proviso has embodied a provision independent of the main section. The learned Standing Counsel advanced an alter native submission also - the same being the satisfaction of the requirement of direction visualised by the proviso in as much as the O. C. of the concerned company of the C.R.P.F. had brought She matter to the notice of the D.C., Along vide Ext. P(1) dated 24.1.78. Shri Das would submit that this exhibit does not at all satisfy the call of law. 7. The law relating to proviso, though said to be "well settled and well understood" (see, Subash Chandra infra), app­ears to be really tricky in as much as many functions have been assigned to a proviso as observed in paragraph 17 of Dwarka Prasad vs. Dwarka Das, AIR 1975 SC 175 S. As stated therein to ascertain the clear meaning of proviso in a particular case, we; lobe selective, having regard to the text and context of statute. I am desisting from making extensive references to luminous classics or supportive case law, as the law in this re­gard was said to be trite in paragraph 18 where it was also ob­served that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to principal matter to which it is a proviso, it being not a separate or independent enactment. The golden rule in this regard was stated to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such a manner that they mutually throw right on each other and result in a harmonious construction. The golden rule in this regard was stated to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such a manner that they mutually throw right on each other and result in a harmonious construction. In S.B.K. Oil Mill vs. Subash Chandra, AIR 1961 SC 1596 it had been stated earlier by a Full Bench of the Supreme Court that as a general rule a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify and create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. But it was added that proviso are often added not as exceptions or qualifica­tions to the main enactment, but as saving clauses also in which cases they will not be construed as controlled by the section. 8. I would refer to only a few other decisions to high­light the role of a proviso. It was stated in Governor General in Council vs. Madura Municipality, AIR 1947PC 39 that if the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which are said to occur in it, those provisions cannot be derived by implication from a proviso. According to Ram Narayan Sons Ltd. vs. Assistant Sales Tax Commissioner AIR 1955 SC 765 it is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. The same view was expressed in CI.T vs. I.M. Bank Ltd. AIR 1959 SC 713 by stating that the proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and by tak­ing out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which but for the proviso, would fall within the main enactment. It was further pointed out that ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with subject which is foreign to the main enactment. 9. The view taken in C.I.T. vs. P. Krishna, AIR 1965 SC 59 however is that it is not a inflexible rule of construction that a proviso in a statute should always be read as limitation up on the effect of the main enactment. 9. The view taken in C.I.T. vs. P. Krishna, AIR 1965 SC 59 however is that it is not a inflexible rule of construction that a proviso in a statute should always be read as limitation up on the effect of the main enactment. There may be cases where the clear language of the substantive provision as well as the proviso may lead to the conclusion that the proviso is not a qualifying clause but is in itself a substantive, provision. 10. So what has to be done to find out the width and scope of the proviso is to look to the text and context in which it has appeared in section 16(2) and then to decipher if it is an independent provision, a saving clause, or an exception or qua­lification to this main provision. Reference to the proviso makes it clear that "the offender" or "the offense" of which mention has been made in three of its clauses mast refer back to the principal section. This would be clear from clause (i) of the proviso inasmuch as on the language of this clause there can­not beamy doubt that the offender of which mention has been made in it must be one who has committed the offences mentio­ned in the parent part of the provision dehors the main provi­sion, the expression "the offender'' would not carry any signi­ficant meaning-adjective "the'5 makes the petition still clearer. 11. Clause (ii) of the proviso would also support the above view inasmuch as it also speaks of "the offence" (emphasis supplied) and "the offender's duties". A reference to the main part of sub-section (2) makes it clear that some of the offences which have been enumerated therein may not have connection with the duties of the offender as a member of the Force, say commission of theft of property of another member. Similarly, clause (iii) cannot be given meaning read in isolation, as, when it speaks of '-a petty offence" the offence which is contemplated must be one which be one under the main part of sub-section (2). 12. Similarly, clause (iii) cannot be given meaning read in isolation, as, when it speaks of '-a petty offence" the offence which is contemplated must be one which be one under the main part of sub-section (2). 12. The relevant provisions of CRPF Rules, 1955 (the Rules, for short) reinforces this conclusion A. reference to the rules finding place in Chapter VI-A dealing with "Place of trial and adjustment of jurisdiction of ordinary court'' show that the trial by a Magistrate (meaning thereby ordinary criminal court) is visu­alised only of the offences referred to in the main paragraph of sub-section (2) of section 16; and Rules 36E onwards of this Chap­ter have provided as to how the overlapping jurisdiction of the Magistrate and the Commandant shall be adjusted. If the proviso were to have independent existence, it would take within its fold offences not covered by sub-section (2), in which case also conflict of jurisdiction would arise, and the Rules ought to have sor­ted out this as well. The silence suggests that according to the rule making authority the proviso does not deal with cases not co­vered by sub-section (2). 13. I am, therefore, of the view that the proviso in the pre­sent case has only carved out an exception from the general rule mentioned in sub section (2); and it has no independent existence of its own. It may be pointed out that sub-section(2) is an enabling provision allowing Central Government to invest the Comman­dant or an Assistant Commandant with the powers of a Magis­trate to authorise him to try offences mentioned in the sub-sec­tion. It may, however, be that it was felt that the ordinary cri­minal court may try the cases which are of the nature mentioned in the three clauses of the proviso on being so directed by the prescribed authority. It cannot, however, be held that the pro­viso has sought to bring within its gamut the offences not even covered by sub-section (.2) for reasons already alluded. 14. In this view of the matter, and as the present case does not fall within the main para of sub-section (2), I do not think if any direction of the prescribed authority was necessary to ena­ble the learned Assistant Commissioner, who had taken up the case for trial, to do so. I am therefore not examining the ques­tion if Ext. In this view of the matter, and as the present case does not fall within the main para of sub-section (2), I do not think if any direction of the prescribed authority was necessary to ena­ble the learned Assistant Commissioner, who had taken up the case for trial, to do so. I am therefore not examining the ques­tion if Ext. P(1) can be held to be a direction visualised by the proviso. Let it also be said that as the offence admittedly does not attract the main provision of section 16(2) no question of violation of Rule 36E of the Rules arises, as it as interdicted a Magistrate to try that offence only which is "referred to in this main paragraph of sub-section (2) of section 16”. 15. Shri Das had still another submission to make relating to the irregularity in the trial. This is connected with section 475 of the Cr. P C. 1973 whose parallel provision in the old Code was section 549. As to the applicability of that section, it is submitted by Shri Das that the present case would come within the fold of the expression "any other law, relating to the Armed: Forces of the Union,'' in as much as has been held by the Sup­reme Court in Akhlesh Prasad vs. Union Territory of Mizoram (1981)2 SCC150 that Central Reserve Police Force falls within the expression "Armed Forces of the Union". It is also urged by the learned counsel by referring to Delhi Special Police vs. S. K. Loraiya, (1972)2 SCC 692 that provisions contained in section. 549 (old) are mandatory. My attention is also invited to Expla­nation (b) to section 475 of the new Code where it has been sta­ted that the expression "court-martial" used in the section inclu­des any tribunal with the powers similar to those of a Court-mar­tial constituted under the relevant law applicable to the Armed Forces of the Union. 16. Despite provisions of section 475 being mandatory and being applicable to persons like the petitioners as they are members of the Armed Forces of the Union, the same has no cutting edge in so far as the case at hand is concerned inasm­uch as all that section 475 contemplates is making of rates by the Central Government as to cases in which persons mentioned in the section are to be tried by a Court to which Cr. P.C. applies or by a Court-martial. That section further visualises that when any person charged with an offence for which he is liable to be tried either by the ordinary criminal Court or Court-martial is brought before a Magistrate, such officer shall have regard to the rules of the Central Governm­ent, and in proper cases deliver the person together with the statement of the offence of which he is accused to the Comm­anding Officer of the that to which he belongs for the purpose of being tried by a Court-martial. A reference to the Rules made by the Central Government under old section 549(1) Cr P.C. the same being "Criminal Courts and Court-martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1952'" shows that the same deals with the adjustment of jurisdiction in those cases which are liable to be tried by a Court-martial. Nothing has howe­ver been brought to my notice by Shri Das to show that in the present case the accused persons were liable to be tried by a 'Court-martial' even within the extended meaning given to this expression by the Explanation. 17. One other submission of Shri Das on this aspect remains to be dealt with. The same is relatable to Rule 36J of the Rules, which requires that the Commandant has to deliver the accused to the Magistrate after giving him written notice, when the offence, in the opinion of the Commandant is to be tried by a Magistrate according to the law in force. I am not satisfied about the applicability of the Rule inasmuch as it springs into action only when a specific opinion is formed by the Commandant that a person subject to the Act has committed lunch an offence which, according to him should be tried by a Magistrate in accordance with the law in force. In such a situation he is required to act as stated in the rule. The condition precedent for the rule to operate, namely, formation of opinion by the Commandant for trial by a Magis­trate is itself lacking in the case; so the question of non-compliance of the rule relating to giving of notice to the Magistrate and delivery of the person to him does not arise. 18. This takes us to the second submission of Shri Das which is about non-providing of legal aid to the petitioners. 18. This takes us to the second submission of Shri Das which is about non-providing of legal aid to the petitioners. When this contention was advanced before the learned appellate court he did not accept the same by observing that the accused had not been prevented at any stage from engaging any counsel, and as they must have been getting subsistence allowance, they were at liberty to engage any counsel because there should not have been any difficulty of money with them. Shri Das submits that merely because the petitioners were getting subsistence allowance, it cannot be held that they were sufficiently well off to engage a counsel. There is sufficient force in this submission. In court had occasion to examine the effect of non-providing of legal aid to an accused in Pratap Chandra vs. State (1983) I G.L.R. 80 (to which I was a party) where it was held, after noting the various decisions of the Apex Court including Khatri and others vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 928 which has been specifically mentioned by Shri Das, (which decisions I do not propose to recapitulate as that would merely burden the judgment) that the trial without providing legal assistance would not always be honest in the eye of law; and the effect must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It was further pointed out that if a trial has to be regarded as vitiated in a particular case because of non-providing of legal aid, the accused may have to be asked in appropriate cases to face the trial de now, 19. I have given my serious consideration to this facet of the case, as the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 21 and promise of free legal aid embodied in Article 39 A come into play in this arena. May I say that so far as the facts of the case are concerned, they have pulled me in different direc­tions. The charge is undoubtedly serious as section 380 I.P.C. contemplates punishment up to 7 years, and section 457 lays down sentence up to 14 years if the offence intended to be committed is-theft, as in the case at hand. The facts are complicated. The law involved is beyond the ken of layman. The petitioners were after all ordinary constables of CRPF. During relevant time they were under suspension. The facts are complicated. The law involved is beyond the ken of layman. The petitioners were after all ordinary constables of CRPF. During relevant time they were under suspension. The amount of subsistence allowance does not at times allow an incumbent even to make out a living. The recent case of Chandrabban, AIR 1983 SC 803 bringing to light grant of Re. 1/- as subsistence allowance per month is a pointer. Even if the allowance is adequate for subsisting, engag­ing of counsel to conduct the whole hog of a criminal trial may not be possible with the pittance. Article 39A has to come to rescue of such persons. 20. There is however a countervailing circumstance. The same is the admission of the guilt by the petitioners, and twice-first, when the charge was explained to them when they owned the confe­ssional statements made by them; and secondly, when they were questioned after close of the trial when they pleaded for mercy, The purpose of providing legal aid has to see that a innocent person does not earn the wrath of law. A counsel also helps the innocent persons by soliciting truth by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and by giving proper legal advice to the accused. If a person thinks. that he is guilty and is pre­pared to admit his fault in open court, would it be any part of legal practice to desist him from owning his guilt ? It may, however, be that realizing the legal position that in our accusatorial system of criminal jurisprudence, the burden of establishing the guilt in a case like one in hand lies on the prosecu­tion. Silence, rather than speech, could have been advised. 21. On this broad spectrum can it be said that the trial of the petitioners was vitiated due to non-providing of legal aid ? The scale seems evenly balanced. The learned Standing Counsel wants to tilt the scale in his favour by referring to Ranjan Dwivedi, AIR 1983 SC 624 which bas held that no mandamus can be given in this regard; what has rather to be done is to apply before the trial Court (which happened to be Sessions Court in teat easel making out a case for grant of legal aid; and the Court being satisfied about the fulfillment of require­ments of section 304(1) Cr. P. C. would pass necessary directions in that behalf. P. C. would pass necessary directions in that behalf. Question is what would happen if the trial of a case were to be (as here) not in a Court of Session, but before other Courts, and there be no direction of the State Government visualised by sub-section (3) of Section 304 Cr. P. C. I do not think if ratio of Ranjan Dwivedi would stand in the way of the trial Court from giving effect to the social ob­jective of equal justice and free legal aid embodied in Article 39A in view of what has been stated inter alia in Hocked, AIR.1978 SC 1548 : Hussainzra cases, AIR 1979 SCI369 and 1371; and Khatri. AIR 1981 SC 928 - Nor would Ranjan Dwivedi stand in the way of the higher Courts in declaring any particular trial as having stood vitiated due to non-providing of legal aid. 22. Another aspect of the case has also to be borne in mind while examining the ramifications of the absence of legal aid in the present case. Before that is done, let it be stated that the fact that the petitioners did not ask for the aid, as urged by the learned Standing Counsel, has no relevancy, after what has been sta­ted in Khatri is noted, where it was held that "it would be mockery of legal aid if it were to be left to the poor, ignorant and illiterate accused to ask for free legal services''. To buttress the contention, the learned Standing Counsel, refers to Regula­tion 56(2) of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, which states, inter-alia, that "(n) pleader shall be allowed to appear in the Courts of the Deputy Commissio­ner or Assistant Commissioner, except with the Deputy Commi­ssioner's permission.'' This provision has no application to a cri­minal trial, as it finds place in Chapter IV dealing with "Civil Proceedings". The Regulation making authority in its wisdom did not place any embargo on lawyer representation in a crimi­nal matter even for the tribal. This will show, when the par­tial ban in Regulation 56(2) is kept in mind, that the Regula­tion indeed visualises probable appearance of pleaders in a cri­minal trial. This will be more so when non-tribal like the petitioners are called upon to face a serious charge not before -village authorities, but before Assistant Deputy Commissioner. 23. This will show, when the par­tial ban in Regulation 56(2) is kept in mind, that the Regula­tion indeed visualises probable appearance of pleaders in a cri­minal trial. This will be more so when non-tribal like the petitioners are called upon to face a serious charge not before -village authorities, but before Assistant Deputy Commissioner. 23. The aspect which I have in mind is related to the ques­tion of petitioners service as CRPF constables; or to put it differ­ently with their livelihood. For the case at hand I do not pro­pose to enter into the long question whether livelihood can be regarded as part of 'life' spoken of in Article 21. I would re­main content by referring to Dilip Kumar, AIR 1983 SC 109 where some pertinent observations were made in this regard while dea­ling with the question of lawyer representation in a disciplinary proceeding. Dilip Kumar first noted that the expression 'life' does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery thro­ugh life, but has a much wider meaning. This was also the view expressed in Francis Cora lie, AIR 1981 SC 746 and Peoples Union for Democratic Rights AIR 1982 SC 1473 . It was then stated in Dilip Kumar that as the outcome of the enquiry was likely to adversely affect the reputation or livelihood of the person, some of finer graces of human civilization which makes life worth living would be jeopardized, and the same could be done only by a law which inheres fair procedure. Denial of lawyer representation was held as violative of principles of natural justice on the facts of the case, which vitiated the enquiry, according to the Hon'ble Court. This would apply, proportion vigor, to a criminal trial. Indeed it was stated in Hoskot, AIR 1978 SC 1548 that in crimi­nal trial where prosecution is in the hand of public prosecutor, the accused, for adequate representation, must have legal aid at State cost. (See P. 112 of Dilip Kumar). 24. In the case at hand, the conviction of the petitioners is sure to affect their livelihood (indeed, it bas so done as stated from the Bar), and before depriving them of the same they must not have the grievance that they have been hit below the belt, or the trial which found them guilty did not give them adequate oppor­tunity of defending themselves. May it be stated that in cases where an incumbent is dismissed, following his conviction without holding any enquiry, the rationale behind the same is that in the trial which saw his conviction, he bad got reasonable opportunity of having his say. To punish a person without giving him legal aid where the same is needed, and then to dismiss him from services on the basis of his conviction, is being doubly unfair, and a court of law has to desist from being a party to such un­fairness. This double jeopardy has ultimately drawn me closer to the petitioners' contention on this score. The promise of “opportunity'', about which too Article 39A speaks, has also prevailed with me in this regard, as I have not been able to con­vince in myself that the petitioners, in the facts and circumstances of the case, got an opportunity equal to those who can themselves afford to be defended by lawyers trained in the art of cross-examination etc. A perusal of the record shows that out of 16 P. Ws. examined in the case, only one, namely P. W. 13, was asked one question in cross-examination. The deposition of others, running into several pages in case of some, went absolutely un­challenged. Let guilty be punished, and dealt with severely where they so deserve, but only after the suspect had reasonable opportunity of defending themselves. Anything else will cause serious dent to the rule of law which prevails in this country. 25. At the end of the day, therefore, I am accepting the se­cond submission of Shri Das. As I have come to this conclusion which results in vitiating the trial, I am not expressing any opi­nion on the third grievance relating to confessional statement, as any observation by this Court may prejudice either side in the retrial of the petitioners which has to take place denovo. I have spoken about retrial, because the case being related to theft of the amount of Government money (Rs. 1,20,736.30), the cul­prits have to be detected and punished. Though the occurrence had taken place in 1978, 1 think that ends of justice and need of crime prevention to require a proper trial of the aforesaid case even at this stage. I have spoken about retrial, because the case being related to theft of the amount of Government money (Rs. 1,20,736.30), the cul­prits have to be detected and punished. Though the occurrence had taken place in 1978, 1 think that ends of justice and need of crime prevention to require a proper trial of the aforesaid case even at this stage. As observed in Pratap Chandra (1983) 1 G.L.R. 80 an accused cannot always have best of both the words in such case - "obliteration of his guilt due to violation of procedural safe­guard, and escape from further proceeding with full safeguard'', Keeping in view the seriousness of the offence, a retrial with full safeguard has been felt incumbent by me. 26. The result is that the conviction of the petitioners is set aside and the learned trial Court, about whose jurisdiction to take up the matter I am satisfied, is directed to start a de novo trial from the stage of framing of charge, after providing proper legal aid to the petitioners at State cost. The earlier evidence will remain on record, but witnesses will be made available for cross-examination. As the matter has already become old, the trial would be taken up most expeditiously, and would be finished, as far as possible, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of records, which would be transmitted urgently. The petitioners would appear before the learned trial Court on 10th April, 1985 to obtain its orders regarding the progress of the trial. This date has been fixed to enable Shri Das to contact the peti­tioners. 27. The petition stands allowed as aforesaid.