A. M. BHATTACHARJEE ACTG. C. J. ( 1 ) THE accused-petitioner having been convicted under section 447 and section 379 of the Indian Penal Code in two criminal cases instituted on complaint, moved the Court of Session in revision under section. 435, Code of Criminal Procedure and the learned Sessions Judge has reported the cases to this Court under section 438 of the Code with his recommendation that the impugned orders of conviction passed therein be set aside. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Advocate-General for the State. We have no doubt that we must accept the two revisions and set aside the impugned orders of conviction and sentence. ( 2 ) THE learned Advocate-General appearing for the State has, however, contended that the revisional applications before the Court of Session were beyond time and, therefore, the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in reporting the cases to this Court in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction on such time-barred applications. The Limitation Act of 1963 having been extended to this State with effect from 1. 9. 1984 only and the revisional applications before the Sessions Judge, resulting in these proceedings before this Court, having been preferred on 11. 5. 1984, the revisions can not in view of section 31 of the Limitation Act, and even without it, be governed by the provisions of the said Act. The Sikkim Law of Limitation, like the law in the rest of India prior to the Limitation Act of 1963, has not prescribed any period of limitation for civil or criminal revision. But in tune with the law laid down by the other High Courts in the rest of India under the earlier law, this High Court also has ruled rejection of criminal revision instituted after the period prescribed for criminal appeals, including the time taken for obtaining the copy of the impugned order, at will appear from the decisions in Kinzang Dahdu/ v. Ransu/ Kharga1, O. P. Singhi v. State of Sikkim2 and Jasman Rai v. Sonamaya Rai3. The impugned orders were passed on 2. 3. 1984 and from the certified copies thereof filed it appears that only one day could be excluded from the time taken in obtaining the same as these were made really and delivered on the very date of the application on 7. 5. 1984. The impugned orders were passed on 2. 3. 1984 and from the certified copies thereof filed it appears that only one day could be excluded from the time taken in obtaining the same as these were made really and delivered on the very date of the application on 7. 5. 1984. The period prescribed for filing criminal appeals under the Sikkim Law of Limitation being 60 days, the revisions ought to have been filed on or before 2. 5. 1984, while these were filed on 11. 5. 1984 and therefore, there was 9 days delay excluding one day taken for obtaining the copies. From his order dated 11. 5. 1984 admitting the revisions, it appears that the learned Sessions Judge, while adverting to this aspect, observed that the point would be decided at the time of the hearing of the petition on merits. But as would appear from the records and the impugned orders, the learned Judge did not consider this aspect at any point of time. ( 3 ) THE learned Advocate-General has contended that the learned Sessions Judge acted illegally not only in not deciding the question of limitation at all, but also in deferring the decision to the stage of final hearing. While it may be desirable that the question of limitation, which might shut out a proceeding in limine, should be decided as early as possible, it should be noted the even if the Sessions Judge decided the question of limitation at the admission stage and admitted the revisions after deciding the question in favour of the petitioner, whether by condoning the delay or otherwise, such admission and condonation would have been open to challenge at the instance of the other party aggrieved thereby and would have required reconsideration at a later stage. Such a procedure of initial admission subject to limitation and subsequent consideration of the question of limitation has been referred to by the Privy Council in Krishnasami v. Ramasami4 as sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in India5 and, it may be noted, this Privy Council decision has been referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in Dinabandhu v. Jadumani6. But there should be no doubt that the learned Judge was obviously wrong in not considering the question of limitation at all at any stage, even Though he expressly left the question for decision at the time of final hearing. But there should be no doubt that the learned Judge was obviously wrong in not considering the question of limitation at all at any stage, even Though he expressly left the question for decision at the time of final hearing. ( 4 ) BUT were the revisions before the learned Judge barred by time? We have already noted that there was 9 days delay in filing the revisions before the Court of Session, but Mr. Kharga, the learned counsel for the petitioner, would invite us to hold that this period was also covered by the time taken in obtaining certified copies of the impugned orders. We have already noted that the endorsements in the certified copies of the impugned orders filed in this Court show that the copies were applied for as well as delivered on the same date being 7. 5. 1984 and, therefore, the revisions having been filed 10 days after the expiry of the period of 60 days from the date of the impugned order, the remaining 9 days would remain uncovered and unexplained. Mr. N B. Kharga has, however, contended that copies were actually applied for on 2. 3. 84, but that the relevant application having been mislaid in the office of the Court, the petitioner had to apply afresh on 7 5. 1984. An application for copy dated 2. 3. 1984 is no doubt in the records before us which purports to bear an endorsement of the Judicial Magistrate dated 14. 3. 1984 to the effect issue copies on payment. But there is nothing to show as to whether this application was not pr could not be acted upon because of being mis-filed in the office or because of non-payment or any other default on the part. 9f the petitioner and, therefore, it is not possible for us to, hold, that the entire period from 2. 3. 1984/ 14. 3. 1984 was taken for obtaining the copies or the impugned orders. We, therefore, cannot but hold that the revisional applications before, the Court of Session were beyond time by about 9 days. ( 5 ) BUT should we decline the revisions solely on the ground that the learned Judge in reporting the cases acted on applications barred by time? 3. 1984 was taken for obtaining the copies or the impugned orders. We, therefore, cannot but hold that the revisional applications before, the Court of Session were beyond time by about 9 days. ( 5 ) BUT should we decline the revisions solely on the ground that the learned Judge in reporting the cases acted on applications barred by time? In Jasman Rai v. Sonamaya Rai (supra), this Court no doubt dissented from a series of decisions of the Patna High Court reported in Lala Mahto v. Emperor6, in Zainab Bibi v. Anwar Khan7 and in State v. Bipat Gope8, purporting to lay down that once a criminal revision, Though filed after the due date, has been admitted it has to be decided on merits and it cannot be thrown out simply on the ground that it was filed beyond sixty days. It was held by this Court in Jasman Rai (supra, at 502-503) that even if a time-barred criminal revision application is admitted, whether inadvertently or after condoning the delay and such admission or condonation are made in the absence of and without notice to the respondent, the respondent, on the receipt of the notice of revision, must be allowed to urge that the revision should not have been admitted and the delay should, not have been, condoned. But this Court nevertheless proceeded to point out that these consideration will not obviously apply where the High Court proceeds to exercise its revisional jurisdiction suo motu for which no period has been prescribed either by statute or by the practice of the Courts and that even if a time-barred revisional application bas been admitted and it is found that there is no sufficient ground for condoning the delay, the High Court can still, in exceptional cafes, treat it as a revision initiated suo motu if there are flagrant violations of law resulting in failure of justice. It now appears that this view has been approved by the Supreme Court in a later decision in Delhi Municipality v. Girdharilal9, to which the learned Advocate-General has very fairly drawn our attention, where the Supreme Court has observed as hereunder: Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 still operating in Sikkim (enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality, the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time-barred, thereby perpetrating the illegality or miscarriage of justice If in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised, what a. glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established, by this case itself. ( 6 ) WE are satisfied that glaring illegality resulting in consequential failure of justice, as indicated herein below, would go unnoticed and unrepressed, if we decline to exercise our revisional jurisdiction in this case solely on the ground that the revisional applications before the learned Sessions Judge, on which the learned Judge reported these two cases to this Court, were beyond time by about 9 days. ( 7 ) AS noted at the outset, the charges for which the petitioner was prosecuted and has been found guilty are under section 447 and section 379 of the Penal Code and it would be trite to say that offences thereunder being against possession, the charges must fail if the possession of the complainant or some one on his behalf in respect of the properties is not established at any rate the properties must be proved to be in the actual possession of some one other than. the alleged trespasser or the alleged thief. But strangely enough, in the evidence on record there is even no whisper about the actual possession of the complainant or anyone on his behalf in respect of the disputed land, but, on the other hand, P. W. 3, a Government Head Surveyor, who in 1976 went to survey the lands of the accused to effect a partition, found the accused to be in possession of the disputed plot even in 1976, while the present criminal prosecutions were launched in 1980. This evidence has been fortified to a great extent by the complainants own admission in cross. This evidence has been fortified to a great extent by the complainants own admission in cross. examination to the effect that the disputed land formed part of Plot No. 666 and that in terms of some earlier settlement a portion of that plot was given to the accused. The learned trial Magistrate, however, purported to rely on some Khatiyan and Survey Map, which, according to him, showed that the land in question stood recorded in the name of the complainant, without these documents being duly proved and without making them part of the evidence on record and thus without giving the accused any opportunity to meet, explain or counter them in any way at any stage. This, as the learned Sessions Judge has rightly held, the learned Magistrate could not obviously do, as pointed out by this Court in Ghimirey Bhutia v. Wangey Lepcha10, on which reliance has been placed by the learned Sessions Judge. This being the state of evidence, the learned Magistrate committed manifest error of law as to the basic requirements for a criminal prosecution for trespass and for theft. ( 8 ) THE learned Magistrate appears to have committed another patent error of law and the learned Sessions Judge has also failed to advert to this aspect while reporting these cases to this Court. Even assuming argue do that the requisite possession in favour of the complainant was proved in evidence on record, the learned Magistrate still went entirely wrong in holding as he did that where the probable consequence of the act alleged to be criminal trespass was to cause annoyance to the person in possession, it will be presumed that it was committed with that intent. For this view the learned Magistrate relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesar Singh v. Rex11, but we are sorry to note that the learned Magistrate failed to notice that this view was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court as early as in 1959 in Punjab National Bank v. All India Punjab National Bank Employees Federation12, and that the Allahabad decision relied on by him was expressly overruled by the Supreme Court in Mathri v. State of Punjab13 and that this decision in Mathri (supra) has again been relied on by the Supreme Court in Rash Behari v. Fagu Shaw14. In Punjab National Bank (supra), the Supreme Court declared that it is impossible to accede to the argument that the likely consequence of the act and its possible knowledge must necessarily import a corresponding intention. In Mathri (supra), the Supreme Court, after reviewing the relevant authorities on the point, stated the law as hereunder: In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the person entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequence would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance being the dominant intention which prompted of the entry. The above extract was quoted with fullest approval by the Supreme Court in Rash Behari (supra) ( 9 ) IN the result, we accept the revisions and set aside the impugned orders. The fines, if paid by the accused-petitioner, are to be refunded. Revision accepted. --- *** --- .