JUDGMENT - C.S. DHARMADHIKARI, J.:--- This writ petition is filed by the petitioner Union against the order of the Full Bench of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, dated 5th January, 1985 in Application (MRTU) No. 20 of 1983. It appears that the following question was referred to the Full Bench of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra for consideration : "Whether the term 'strike' appearing in section 12(6) and 13(1)(v) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Precention of Unfair Labour Prctices Act, 1971, mean a strike only in the very undertaking for wich the Applicant Union has applied for recognition and/or has obtained recognition under the Act. or Whether it also means a strike in any undertaking other than the undertaking for which the Applicant Union has applied for recognition and/or has obtained recognition under the Act." The Full Bench of the Industrial Court held that the term 'strike' appearing in sections 12(6) and 13(1)(v) of the Act means a strike only in the very undertaking for which the Applicant-Union has applied for recognition and/or has obtained recognition under the Act. It is this judgment of the Full Bench which is challenged in the present writ petition. 2. Respondent No. 1-the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, had filed an application under section 11 of the Act for being registered as a recognised Union for the undertaking of Messrs. Raills India Ltd. T.C.F. Division at Andheri. There is another registered Union in the said undertaking by name Teddington Chemical Kamgar Sangh, the petitioner. the petitioner Union had opposed the application made by respondent No. 1, the Maharashtra General Kamgar Union. One of the objections raised was that during the period of six months preceding the date of the application the G.M.K. Union had instigated, aided or assisted commencement or continuation of the strike, which is deemed to be illegal under the Act, in as many as four other undertakings. It was also alleged that the M.G.K. Union similarly instigated illegal strikes in a number of other undertakings, some of which have been declared to be illegal by the Labour Court on 31-10-1983 and proceedings in respect of some other strikes are still pending in the Court of law and, therefore, by virtue of the provisions of section 12(6) of the Act the M.G.K. Union is not entitled for recognition. It is not necessary to make a detailed reference to any of the averments made in the application or in reply thereto, since in this case we are purely concerned with a legal proposition. 3. Shri Shrikrishna, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner Union, contended before us that prior to the enactment of the Act, a Committee on' Unfair Labour Practice" was appointed, to define the term 'unfair labour practice' and to recommend statutory measures for prevention of unfair labour practices. The Committee came to the conclusion that the issue of unfair labour practice was inextricably mixed up with the issue of certification of a collective bargaining agent. The Committee, therefore, recommended a detailed procedure for selection of a collective bargaining agent and also defined the expression "Unfair labour practice" and recommended suitable machinery for dealing with such unfair labour practices. Thus, the legislative intent behind the Act is two-fold viz. facilitating collective bargaining in certain undertakings and prevention of unfair labour practices. Chapter third of the Act is concerned with the issue of recognition of Unions. Although the recognition of the Unions is unit wise or undertaking wise, some of the conditions, subject to which recognition is to be granted or could be cancelled are to some extent general in nature. The conditions referred to in sections 12(5), 12(6), 13(1)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) and 13(2) are not subject to express limitations, but are general in nature. The provisions of sections 12 and 13 will have to be interpreted in the light of the legislative policy and the object sought to be achieved by the enactment. The conditions in these sections are intended to ensure that the collective bargaining agent conducts itself in accordance with the policy of the Act. The policy of the Act is to encourage collective bargaining and to confer such a right upon a proper collective bargaining agent selected in accordance with Chapter III of the Act. The legislative policy is to prevent illegal strikes and it is intended to achieve the dual purpose of promoting collective bargaining and discouraging unfair labour practices. The policy of the Act is to encourage collective bargaining and to confer such a right upon a proper collective bargaining agent selected in accordance with Chapter III of the Act. The legislative policy is to prevent illegal strikes and it is intended to achieve the dual purpose of promoting collective bargaining and discouraging unfair labour practices. Therefore, if the interpretation put up by the Full bench is accepted, then a Trade Union would befree to indulge in unfair practices, including initial instigation of the illegal strike and other unfair labour practices in other undertakings, which will be contrary to the legislative policy of encouraging responsible Trade Union movement. 4. The paramount principle in the sphere of collective bargaining is that collective bargaining should eschew everything which is prejudicial to the interests of the employees. This activity of Trade Union cannot be restricted to a particular undertaking for which recognition is sought. For achieving the object of healthy, responsible and strong trade unionism, the applicant Trade Union should generally behave well and cannot plead that it has misbehaved elsewhere and not in the undertaking in question. Further, in its wisdom the legislature has not used the words 'the undertaking' in section 12(6) or section 13(1)(v) of the Act. This omission is not accidental, but is deliberate. When the legislature has omitted to use the said expression, by process of interpretation the said words cannot be read in the said sections so as to restrict their import to the undertaking in question. It is well-settled that casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court. Further, if it is held that the disability contemplated by sections 12(6) or 13(1)(v) is restricted to the undertaking for which the recognition is sought, then the same will run counter to the policy of the legislation viz. to foster collective bargaining and encourage healthy and responsible trade unionism with an intention to prevent unfair labour practices. Therefore, according to Shri Shrikrishna, the interpretation put forward by the Full Bench of the industrial Court is wholly illegal. In support of his contentions, Shri Shrikrishna has place strong reliance upon the decisions of this Court in (Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha v. Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Therefore, according to Shri Shrikrishna, the interpretation put forward by the Full Bench of the industrial Court is wholly illegal. In support of his contentions, Shri Shrikrishna has place strong reliance upon the decisions of this Court in (Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha v. Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd)1, 84 Bom.L.R. 161 and (Nichari Hotels Corproation v. Bombay Labour Union and others)2, 1981 Mh.L.J. 711 as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in (The Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P. v. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur)3, A.I.R 1979 S.C. 1039. 5. On the other hand, it is contended by Shri Deshmukh, the learned Counsel appearing for the M.G.K. Union, that collective bargaining is the best method of settling industrial disputes and, therefore, it needs to be facilitated and fastered. The existence of a strong, well-organised, responsible and independent Trade Union movement in the shape of a recognised Union, which is the sole bargaining agent will be in the best interest of collective bargaining recognition of a sole bargaining agent with statutory obligations and rights facilitates and fosters collective bargaining and encourages responsible trade unionism. The present enactment is also intended to provide for the recognition of Trade Unions for facilitating collective bargaining for certain undertakings. Chapter III of the Act deals with the recognitions of Unions. The various sections appearing in this Chapter will have to be read harmoniously. If so read, it leads to only one conclusion that the provisions of the various sections therein are with reference to only one and the same undertaking for which recognition is sought or in respect of which recognition is to be cancelled. The provisions of the said Chapter are by necessary implication or imtendment, applicable to only one and the same undertakng for which such a recognition is sought or in respect of which recognition is being cancelled. The activities of a Trade Union in other undertakings are wholly irrelevant. If such an interpretation is not accepted, then the proceedings for granting recognition or cancellation can become an unending process because in that case the functioning of the Union will have to be investigated at random and qua all other undertakings. This will defeat the requirement of quick disposal of his application. If such an interpretation is not accepted, then the proceedings for granting recognition or cancellation can become an unending process because in that case the functioning of the Union will have to be investigated at random and qua all other undertakings. This will defeat the requirement of quick disposal of his application. Section 11(2) prescribes that such an application has to be disposed of by the Industrial Court as far as possible, within three months from the date of the receipt of such an application. This will become an impossibility if the interpretation put forward by the petitioner is accepted. Further, the trade union movement will become fragmented and weak, as such interpretation will encourage forming of Unions unitwise or undertaking wise and will discourage multi-undertaking large unions from seeking recognition and thus they will not be subject to the duties and obligations of the recognised unions and their members will be deprived of the benefits, which a recognised union enjoys, resulting in industrial discontent and strife. If the provision of Chapter III are read with the rules and the contents of the prescribed form, the conclusion is inevitable that the provisions of section 12(6) and 13(1)(v) only take in their import the undertaking for which the recognition is sought or with reference to which an application for cancellation is made. Thus, in substance, it is contended by Shri Deshmukh that the provisions of Chapter III will have to be understood in the context of, in respect of and in connection with one and the same undertaking for which an application for recognition is made. The words "concern" and "undertaking" are defined in the Act. The word "undertaking" is used in the various sections and sub-sections of section 10 so as to make the meaning clear. But there are various sub-sections in Chapter III, such as section 12(2), 12(5) and 12(6) where the said word is not used, in section 13 as a whole, the word "undertaking" is not used anywhere. The legislature has not used the said expression or the word since it was not necessary to do so. If the provisions of sections 12 and 13 are read together, it is quite clear that the said provisions are restricted to the undertaking in questions. Any other interpretaion of the said provisions will lead to absurdity and will defeat the very purpose of the Act. If the provisions of sections 12 and 13 are read together, it is quite clear that the said provisions are restricted to the undertaking in questions. Any other interpretaion of the said provisions will lead to absurdity and will defeat the very purpose of the Act. In support of his contentions, Shri Deshmukh has placed strong reliance upon the decision of this Court in (J.G. Vakharia v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. Bombay)4, 1957(1) L.L.J. 448. and the decisions of the Supreme Court in (Forbes Forbes Compbell Co. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sabha)5 A.I.R. 1978 S.C, 340 (K.P Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and another)6, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1922 and (Commissioner of Income Tax v. National Taj Traders)7, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 485. 6. For properly appreciating the controversy raised before us, it will be worthwhile if a detailed reference is made to the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Act, which read as under: "12(1) On receipt of an application from a union for recognition under section 11 and on payment of the prescribed fees, not exceeding rupees five the Industrial Court shall, if it finds the application on a preliminary scrutiny to be in order, cause notice to be displayed on the notice board of the undertaking, declaring its intention to consider the said application on the date specified in the notice, and calling upon the other union or unions, if any, having membership of employees in that undertaking and the employees and employees affected by the proposal to show cause, within a prescribed time, as to why recognition should not be granted to the applicant union. (2) If after considering the objections, if any, that may be received under sub-section (1) from any other union (hereinafter referred to as 'other union') or employers or employees, if any, and if after holding such enquiry in the matter as it deems fit, the Industrial Court comes to the conclusion that the conditions requisite for registration specified in section 11 are satisfied, and the applicant union also complies with the conditions specified in section 19 of this Act, the Industrial Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section, grant recognition to the applicant union under this Act, and issue a certificate of such recognition in such form as may be prescribed. (3) If the Industrial Court comes to the conclusion, that any of the other unions has the largest membership of employees employed in the undertaking, and the said union has notified to the Industrial Court its claim to be registered as a recognised union for such undertaking, and if it satisfies the conditions requisite for recognition specified in section 11, and also complies with the conditions specified in section 19 of the Act, the Industrial Court shall, subject to the provisions of this section grant such recognition to the other upon, and issue a certificate of such recognition in such form as may be prescribed. Explanation.---For the purpose of this sub-section, the other union shall be deemed to have applied for recognition in the same calender month as the applicant-union. (4) There shall not, at any time, be more than one recognised union in respect of the same undertaking. (5) The Industrial Court shall not recognise any union, if, it is satisfied that the application for its recognition is not made bona fide in the interest of the employees, but is made. In the interest of the employer, to the prejudice of the interest of the employees. (6) The Industrial Court shall not recognise any union, if, at any time, within six months immediately preceding the date of the application for recognition, the union has instigated, aided or assisted the commencement or continuation of a strike which is deemed to be illegal under this Act. 13(1) The Industrial Court shall cancel the recognition of a union if after giving notice to such union to show cause why its recognition should not be cancelled, and after holding an inquiry, it is satisfied :--- (i) that it was recognised under mistake, misrepresentation of fraud; or (ii) that the membership of the union has, for a continuous period of six calender months, fallen below the minimum required under section 1 for its recognition. Provided that, where a strike (not being an illegal strike under the Central Act) has extended to a period exceeding fourteen days in any calender month, such month shall be excluded in computing the said period of six months: Provided further that, the recognition of a union shall not be cancelled under the provisions of this sub-clause, unless, it membership for the calender month in which show cause notice under this section was issued was less than such minimum, or (iii) that the recognised union has, after its recognition, failed to observe any of the conditions specified in section 19, or (iv) that the recognised union is not being conducted bona fide in the interests of employees, but in the interest of employer to the prejudice of the interest of employees; or (v) that it has instigated, aided or assisted the commencement or continuation of strike which is deemed to be illegal under this Act; or (vi) that its registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, is cancelled, or (vii) that another union has been recognised in place of a union recognised under this Chapter. (2) The Industrial Court may cancel the recognition of a union if, after giving notice to such union to show cause why its recognition should not be cancelled, and after holding an inquiry, it is satisfied that it has committed any practice which is, or has been declared as, an unfair labour practice under this Act. Provided that, if having regard to the circumstances in which such practice has been committed, the Industrial Court is of opinion, that instead of cancellation of the recognition of the union, it may suspend all or any of its rights under sub-section (1) of section 20 or under section 23, the Industrial Court may pass an order accordingly, and specify the period for which such suspension may remain in force." Chapter III of the Act deals with the recognition of unions, section 10 deals with the application of the provisions of this Chapter to certain undertakings. Section 11 deals with the application for recognition of a union. From the bare reading of section 12, it is clear that recognition is contemplated qua particular undertaking. The words and expression "the undertaking", "that undertaking", "such undertaking", "same undertaking" appearing in the various sub-sections of section 12. Only in sub-section (5) and (6) such words and expression are not used. From the bare reading of section 12, it is clear that recognition is contemplated qua particular undertaking. The words and expression "the undertaking", "that undertaking", "such undertaking", "same undertaking" appearing in the various sub-sections of section 12. Only in sub-section (5) and (6) such words and expression are not used. In section 13 the word "undertaking" is not used in any of the sub-sections. Section 12 deals with the recognition of a union and section 13 deals with the cancellation of recognition of a union and the suspension of its rights. Therefore, the area and field covered by both these sections is one and the same. 7. It is by now a well-settled rule of interpretation that the Court is "entitled and indeed bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light on the intention of the Legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the Act. The statute must be read as a whole and every provision in the statute must be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the statutes as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute". See (Municipal Corporation of the City of Hubli v. Subha Rao)8, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1398. Obviously, therefore, sections 12(6) and 13(1)(v) of the Act must be construed so as to harmonise with the other sections of Chapter III. They must be lead together so as to form part of a connected whole. This is more so since we are dealing with the sub-sections of sections relating to the recognition of the union or its cancellation. There is, in our opinion, sufficient indication in the various provisions of the Act and particularly in Chapter III itself, to show that the provisions of sections 12(6) and 13(1)(v) also relate to a particular undertaking, though the word "undertaking" is not used in the said sections. 8. As a matter of fact, this is a case of harmonious construction of the various sub-sections and is not a case of supplying casus imussus. 8. As a matter of fact, this is a case of harmonious construction of the various sub-sections and is not a case of supplying casus imussus. As observed by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National Taj Traders, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 485 : "Two principles of construction-one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole appear to be well-settled.... ... ... ... ... ... In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clauses of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof, so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a contestant enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature." In the light of these observations we will have to construe sections 12(6) and 13(1)(v) of the Act. 9. As already observed, in section 13 of the Act the word 'undertaking' is not used anywhere. Therefore, will it mean that the recognition of a recognised union could be cancelled for a mistake within the contemplation of section 13(1)(i), or a fall in membership under sub-section (ii), or failure to observe the conditions specified in section 19, under sub-section (iii), or the Union not being conducted bona fide in the interests of employees, but in the interests of the employer and to the prejudice of the interest of the employees under sub-section (iv) qua other undertakings or the activities unconnected with the undertaking in question? In our view, such an interpretation will result in absurdities and unforeseen and unintended complications. Similar will be the position qua sub-section (5) of section 12 in which also the word "undertaking" is not used. In our view, such an interpretation will result in absurdities and unforeseen and unintended complications. Similar will be the position qua sub-section (5) of section 12 in which also the word "undertaking" is not used. As to whether an application is made bona fide in the interests of the employees or is made in the interests of the employer to the prejudice of the interest of the employees will have to be considered with reference to the interest of the employees in the same undertaking and not qua the interests of the employees or employers in other undertaking. To say the least such as inquiry is wholly irrelevant as under the Act recognition is contemplated qua a particular undertaking and not for an industry or an area. If this is so, then the whole inquiry must be restricted to the undertaking in question and the said inquiry cannot travel beyond it. Therefore, we generally agree with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Industrial Court. This is more so, as the conditions laid down in section 12(6) or section 13(1)(v) are in the nature of disqualifications. The recognition under Chapter III is restricted to a particular undertaking, though under section 18 a union can be recognised for more than one undertaking. Section 20 of the Act confers certain rights upon the recognised union. The employees of the undertaking in relation to which recognition is sought cannot be punished for the conduct of the employees in other undertakings or the activities of the Union unconnected with the undertaking in question, in the matter of recognition of Union qua their undertaking. 10. We find that Full Bench of the Industrial Court was also right in relying upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Forbes Forbes Campbell Co. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 340, wherein it is observed by the Supreme Court in Para 8 of its judgment: "Moreover, the expression 'union which seeks recognition' has also been emphasised before us. Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 340, wherein it is observed by the Supreme Court in Para 8 of its judgment: "Moreover, the expression 'union which seeks recognition' has also been emphasised before us. Taking an overall view of the provisions of law viz., sections 11, 12, 19 and Rule 4 and Form A, which must all be read together, we are satisfied that any union which seeks recognition and applies in that behalf must, when it applies, be able to convince the Industrial Court that it is qualified for recognition." Thus, it is clearly intended by the Supreme Court that these various provisions should be read with Rule 4 and Form A together. Rule 4 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of unfair Labour Practices Rules, 1975 lays down that an application by any union for registration made under section 11 shall be in Form A. Clause 9 of Form A reads as under :--- "The applicant union has not instigated, aided or assisted the commencement or continuation of a strike among the employees in the undertaking for which the applicant union seeks recognition which is deemed to be illegal under Act within six months immediately preceding the date of this application." It is no doubt true that a rule cannot travel beyond the scope of the Act, nor can it restrict or expand its import. However, Shri Deshmukh has placed reliance upon these Rules and Form A since according to him, it shows as to how the provision was understood by the Government which was authorised to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act under section 61 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 61 provides that every rule made under this section shall be laid as soon as maybe after it is made before each House of the State Legislature. In this context Shri Deshmukh has placed strong reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and another, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1922 and particular upon the following observations :--- "The rule of construction by reference to contemparaneo expositio is a well established rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. This rule has been succinctly and fellcitously expressed in Crawford on Statutory Construction where it is stated in para 219 that ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... The validity of this rule was also recognised in (Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass)9, 1980 I.L.R. 35 Cal. 701 where Mookerjee, J., stated the rule in these terms- "It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of it enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it." and this statement of the rule was quoted with approval by this Court in (Deshbhandhu Gupta Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Assosciation Ltd.)10, 1979(4) S.C.C. 565 : A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1049. It is accepted cannon of interpretation of statute that in case of doubt, and if two interpretations are reasonably possible, the terminology used in the Rules and the form prescribed can be looked into for light. In such cases Rules are legitimate aid to construction of statute as contemparaneo expositio see (The Engineering and Locomotive Co. v. Gram Panchayat, Pimpri)11, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2463 and (Jeshade v. Judge, Labour Court), 1980 Mh.L.J. 453. Therefore, the Full Bench was right in relying upon the interpretation put upon the said provisions in the Rules and the form prescribed as it is in consonance with the intention of the legislature and the scheme of the Act. 11. Once it is held that section 12(6) and 13(1)(v), which are sub-sections of sections 12 and 13 and part and parcel of Chapter III, will have to be read with the other provisions of the Act and harmoniously, then, the conclusion is inevitable that the provisions of section 12(6) and 13(1)(v) should also be restricted to the undertaking in which recognition is sought or in respect of which an application for cancellation is made. Therefore, we agree with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Industrial Court. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the other decisions cited at the Bar which are not directly on the point. 12. In the result, therefore, the Rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 13. Mr. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the other decisions cited at the Bar which are not directly on the point. 12. In the result, therefore, the Rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 13. Mr. Kochar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner orally prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave refused. -----