ORDER B.L. Yadav, J. - The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 19-8-1971 passed by the Judicial Officer, Moradabad, the order dated 30-7-73 passed by the Additional Commissioner and the order dated 30-9-82 passed by the Board of Revenue in a suit under S. 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), filed by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 claiming co-tenancy and co-sirdari/bhumidari rights alleging that their father Masit Ullah was the father of Bulaki, who was the common ancestor of the parties and who had acquired the plots in dispute and his other two sons, namely Annu was the father of the petitioners and the third son Khuda Bux died leaving behind his widow Smt. Sundaria. After the death of the latter the share of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and that of the petitioners became 1/2 and 1/2. But in the revenue papers the names of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 did not appear and the petitioners were denying the title of respondent Nos. 4 and 5. Hence the necessity for filing the suit arose. 2. The suit was contested by the petitioner alleging that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were not the co-tenants nor co-Sirdar/Bhumidar and that Masit Ullah, father of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 was not the son of Bulaki, the common ancestor and hence respondent Nos. 4 and 5 cannot inherit the plot and nor they were co-tenants nor they were in possession. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that Masit Ullah, father of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 was the son of Bulaki after believing the oral evidence and held that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were the co-tenants to the extent of share,hence the suit was decreed. The petitioners preferred an appeal before the Commissioner which was dismissed and the Second Appeal filed by them also met the same fate. 4. I have heard the learned counsel Tor the petitioners. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the oral evidence on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 has been incorrectly relied upon, inasmuch as the parentage of respondent Nos. 4. I have heard the learned counsel Tor the petitioners. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the oral evidence on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 has been incorrectly relied upon, inasmuch as the parentage of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 was to be proved and that could have been proved only by leading evidence of such witnesses who could have special means of knowledge about the family and relationship of the person and the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of relationship of any person was relevant. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners even though respondent Nos. 4 and 5 examined three witnesses, namely, Kallu, Mohd. Rafiq and Abdul Rahim, who stated that the plaintiffs are sons of Masit Ullah alias Habib Ullah, who was the son of Bulaki. The statement of P. W. 2 Mohammad Rafiq was disbelieved on the ground that he has not given the source of knowledge about the fact he was deposing, whereas the statement of Abdul Rahim was relied upon as he has stated that he has seen Masit Ullah and Bulaki, namely, father of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and their grandfather. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimal Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 914 . 5. The case of Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimal Charan Misra (supra) indicates the principles for applying the provisions of Sections 50 and 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as to how the relationship can be proved and how far the statement of witnesses could be relevant. Even if the statement could be relevant, what would be the nature of the statement made. The observation made by the Supreme Court at page 917 Para 6 is quoted below:- "It states in effect that when the court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship of any person who has special means of knowledge on the subject of that relationship is a relevant fact. The two illustrations appended to the section clearly bring out the true scope and effect of the section. The two illustrations appended to the section clearly bring out the true scope and effect of the section. It appears to us that the essential requirements of the section are.(1) there must be a case where the court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another; (2) in such a case the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship is a relevant fact; (3) but the person whose opinion expressed by conduct is relevant must be a person who as a member of the family or otherwise has special means of knowledge on the particular subject of relationship; in other words, the person must fulfil the condition laid down in the latter part of the section. If the person fulfils that condition, then what is relevant is his opinion expressed by conduct. Opinion- means something more than mere retailing of gossip or of hearsay; it means judgment or belief, that is, a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question. Now, the belief or conviction may manifest itself in conduct or behaviour which indicates the existence of belief or opinion. What the section says is that such conduct or outward behaviour as evidence of the opinion held is relevant and may, therefore, be proved." 6. In view of the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court it is clear that the person whose opinion is expressed by conduct must have special means of knowledge about relationship and the opinion must be expressed by his conduct. The opinion expressed by conduct certainly means something more than mere retailing of gossip. In the instant case P. W. 3 has stated that he was residing very close to the house of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 and he has seen Masit Ullah C Habib Ullah and his father Bulaki. The witness was aged about 80 years and he resides just in the third house from the house of the grandfather of respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that he has got no special means of knowledge. Even in the cross-examination it was not suggested that he was deposing incorrectly or that he has no special means of knowledge nor it was suggested that what he was deposing was a just gossip, or that he was not a reliable witness. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that he has got no special means of knowledge. Even in the cross-examination it was not suggested that he was deposing incorrectly or that he has no special means of knowledge nor it was suggested that what he was deposing was a just gossip, or that he was not a reliable witness. Under these circumstances from the statement of P.W. 2, coupled with the statement of P. W. 1, I am satisfied, have fulfilled the conditions as indicated under Sections 50 and 60 of the Indian Evidence Act. 7. Apart from the statement of P.Ws. 1 and 3 there were other circumstances and evidence on which reliance has been placed. The reliance has been placed on Khatauni of 1348 F where the plaintiffs were recorded as co-tenants along with Smt. Sundaria, widow of Khuda Bux. In view of these facts a number 1986 AIL L.J./30 IV (2) of circumstances have been considered to arrive at the conclusion that respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were the sons of Masit Ullah, who was the son of Bulaki, who was grandfather of the plaintiffs, who has acquired the plots. 8. Further whether the plaintiffs were the sons of Masit Ullah and their father was the son of Bulaki, is a question of fact and all the Courts below including the trial Court, Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue have held that the plaintiffs were the sons of Masit Ullah, who was the son of Bulaki, the common ancestor. Even the plaintiffs father was recorded as co-tenant along with Mst. Sundariya, widow of Khuda Bux. 9. In view of the discussions made above, it is clear that the plaintiffs have correctly been held to be the sons of Masit Ullah, who was the son of Bulaki. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the petitioners were in exclusive possession, hence the right of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 came to an end as they remained out of possession for more than the prescribed period. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner proceeds on an erroneous assumption of fact. In the instant case respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were claiming to be co-tenant along with petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and the possession of one co- tenant is the possession of all. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner proceeds on an erroneous assumption of fact. In the instant case respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were claiming to be co-tenant along with petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and the possession of one co- tenant is the possession of all. Unless a plea of ouster was set up and proved it cannot be said that the right of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 came to an end. I do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 11. In view of the facts stated above, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed summarily.