JUDGMENT J.N. Dubey, J. - By means of this petition the petitioners challenge the validity of the notifications dated 29th and 30th June, 1977 of the State Government issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with respect to plot Nos. 11, 15 and 17 of village Maholi, district Mathura. The claim of the petitioners is that they purchased plot Nos. 11, 15 and 17 long ago for constructing their Ashram and guest house for their visiting disciples. They constructed a guest house consisting of four spacious rooms on plot No. 11 and a big Ashram consisting of more than 20 rooms and 25 huts on plot No. 15. They also installed two tube-wells, one on plot No. 11 and the other on plot No. 15 with a room connected with each of them. They further constructed a big over-head water tank on plot No. 17 and two storerooms and have made all other necessary arrangements for the supply of drinking water to the Ashram and Guest House etc. The construction work which started in 1969 was completed in the year 1974. 2. On 8-6-1973 the State Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of land for establishment of a planned industrial area in the district of Mathura. By this notification plot nos. 17, 21, 23, 24 and 30 of village Maholi and plot Nos. 56, 57 and 58 of village Pannapur belonging to the petitioners No. 1 and 2 were proposed to be acquired. The petitioners filed objection under Section 5-(A) of the Act which was partly allowed and plot No. 17 was excluded from the notification issued by the State Government under Section 6 of the Act on 2-7-1974. Regarding remaining plots they filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7575 of 1974 (Jai Guru Deo Dharam Pracharak Sansthan and another v. State of U.P. and others.) in this Court which was allowed on 16-9-1975 and the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were quashed on the ground that the substance of the notifications was not published in the locality within 21 days. Subsequently the State Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act with respect to plot Nos. 17 21, 23, 24 and 30 of village Maholi and plot Nos. Subsequently the State Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act with respect to plot Nos. 17 21, 23, 24 and 30 of village Maholi and plot Nos. 56, 57 and 58 of village Pannapur on 17-4-1976. This notification was followed by another notification dated 19-4-1976 under Section 6 of the Act by invoking the powers under Section 17 of the Act. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2 and a disciple of petitioner No. 1 filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2127 of 1976 (Jai Guru Deo Dharam Pracharak Sangh and others v. The State of U.P. and others) in this Court which was admitted on 15-5-1976. 3. On 29-6-1977 the State Government issued notification No. 5357 Bha U-XVIII-1 l-338-Bha-76 under Section 4 of the Act proposing to acquire plot Nos. 11, 15 and 17 of the petitioners for planned Industrial Development in the district of Mathura. This notification was followed by notification No. 5357(2)/Bha, U/XVIII-1 l-338-Bha-76 dated 30-6-1 the invoking the powers under Section 17 of the Act. 4. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have come up to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the aforesaid notifications on a number of grounds including mala fide and violation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, but it is not necessary for us to refer to all those grounds as in our opinion the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed on the short point that in the facts and circumstances of this case the State Government was not legally justified in invoking its power under Section 17 of the Act to deprive the petitioners of their right to file objections under Section 5-A of the Act. We find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was no material on record before the State Government on the basis of which an opinion could be formed that the land was urgently needed so as to justify the dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 7. Civil Misc. We find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was no material on record before the State Government on the basis of which an opinion could be formed that the land was urgently needed so as to justify the dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 7. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2127 of the 1976 filed by the petitioners No. 1 and 2 challenging the validity of similar notifications of the State Government with respect to the same scheme was allowed by us on 29-8-1984 on the ground that the State Government was not legally justified in dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Dealing with the power of the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act we held : "Enquiry under Section 5-A of Land Acquisition Act is summary in nature. It has been repeatedly held by Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Court that there must be some reason to exclude such enquiry and thereby deprive person concerned of getting his land excluded from acquisition proceedings. Narain Govil Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 Supreme Court page 183 and A. P. Sarain v. State, 1983 ALJ 1017. Dispensing of procedure made Section 17 is no doubt in the discretion of the State Government. But, on what material the opinion was formed and Government exercised this power can be examined by this Court to ascertain if the exercise of power was not arbitrary. But Rule of Law being define of our society action of public authority has to be in accordance with law - Legislature has no doubt empowered the executive to dispense with filing of objection if it was of opinion that the land was needed urgently. But use of word urgently itself furnishes guidelines for exercise of the power. Urgency according to dictionary means, 'immediate', 'very important', 'that which requires immediate attention'. From its meaning it is apparent that its applicability has to vary. What may be very important in one set of circumstances may not be so in another. For instance, delay in construction of road or canal as compared to allotment of land for Cinema or shopping complex may be more important and may require immediate attention. From its meaning it is apparent that its applicability has to vary. What may be very important in one set of circumstances may not be so in another. For instance, delay in construction of road or canal as compared to allotment of land for Cinema or shopping complex may be more important and may require immediate attention. Acquiring of land for industrial development in a State or city is not only laudable objective but imperative for economic and social development. But the normal procedure of giving an individual his right to file objection should not be taken away merely because a decision has been taken to industrially develop a city. Invoking of urgency provisions must precede existence of circumstances which require the State Government to take immediate action. If exercise of power under Section 17 is upheld only because a master plan had been prepared for a town or city even though there was no movement and nothing had been done even 011 neighbouring land acquired earlier it would amount to conferring blanket power on executive to dispense with cherished right of filing objection. Preparing master-plan in 1971 and yet having no map in 1975 for the area which is being acquired, doing nothing on land already taken over negative the underlying concept beneath the word urgency". We further held - "In paragraphs 25, 26 and 35 of the writ petition it has been averred that there was no urgency as even on neighbouring land acquired in 1974 no planned activity had been started, it was lying vacant and there was no plan as when petitioner approached the land Acquisition Officer in December, 1973 expressed his inability to show any plan as none was there. In two counter-affidavits filed, one on behalf of U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation and other by Land Acquisition Clerk it has not been disclosed if there was any material which compelled Government to take extraordinary step of dispensing with procedure of hearing. Even the allegation that there was no plan is not denied. What is stated is that acquisition of land is necessary for proper implementation of master plan. This plan existed in 1973 when first notification was issued. No urgency was felt. Then, there must be some circumstances between 1973 to 1975 which may have led the Government to decide if the land was urgently acquired. In Civil Misc. What is stated is that acquisition of land is necessary for proper implementation of master plan. This plan existed in 1973 when first notification was issued. No urgency was felt. Then, there must be some circumstances between 1973 to 1975 which may have led the Government to decide if the land was urgently acquired. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8522 of 1979 Gaya Prasad v. State decided on 16th May, 1984. notification under Section 4 issued along with Section 17 was quashed because of sluggishness of opposite-parties." 8. The U.P. Industrial Development Corporation filed special leave petition in the Supreme Court against the aforesaid judgment but it was dismissed on 29th August, 1984. 9. Our above judgment is of great help in deciding the present writ petition, inasmuch it is not only a direct authority on the question of law but being a decision with respect to the same scheme also on the question of fact. Most of the reasons given in that case for holding that there was no justification for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act are also applicable to the present case. The fact that the opposite-parties did not take possession of the land in dispute immediately is a further indicative of the fact that there existed no urgency on the basis of which enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be legally dispensed with. It is claimed in the writ petition that the opposite-parties did not take possession of the plots in dispute. While they took paper possession of plot No. 11 on 4-11-1977 the possession of plots Nos. 15 and 17 was not taken even on paper. In paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit filed it is stated that possession of plot No. 11 was taken immediately but possession of plot Nos. 15 and 17 could not be taken. It is relevant to point out here that the opposite-parties filed suit No. 142 of 1980 in the Court of Civil Judge, Mathura for a permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with their possession over plot Nos. 11,15 and 17. In the plaint of that suit the opposite-parties stated that they were given possession of plots Nos. 11 and 17 on 15th July, 1975 and 4th November, 1977 but they could not be given possession of plot No. 15 for some reasons. 11,15 and 17. In the plaint of that suit the opposite-parties stated that they were given possession of plots Nos. 11 and 17 on 15th July, 1975 and 4th November, 1977 but they could not be given possession of plot No. 15 for some reasons. Thus on the own case of the opposite-parties they did not take possession of all the plots in dispute forthwith. It may be noted that the application moved by the opposite-parties for temporary injunction in that suit was rejected by the Civil Judge on the finding that they are not in possession of the land in dispute. Although appeal filed by the opposite-parties against the said order was allowed by the Additional District Judge but without recording any specific finding on the question of physical possession in their favour. The petitioners filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 1970 of 1983 in this Court which was admitted on 15-2-1983 and operation of the order of the Additional District Judge allowing the appeal of the opposite-parties was stayed. From the above it is clear that the land in dispute was not used by the opposite-parties till 1980 for the purpose it was acquired by them in 1977. The petitioners in paragraph 38 of the writ petition have averred that there was no urgency for acquiring the land in dispute and have given several circumstances in support of their claim. Although the contents of this paragraph have been denied in the two counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the opposite-parties but this has been done on the question of law and not of fact. Thus all the allegations on the factual aspect of the case on this point remained practically un controverted. 10. In our opinion the State Government was not legally justified in dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The claim of the petitioners that there existed huge constructions over the land in dispute on the date of notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act also appears to be prima facie correct. The petitioners apart from giving details of the constructions in the writ petition have also filed voluminous evidence in the shape of photographs etc. in support of their claim that there big Ashram and guest house etc. had come into existence long before the acquisition of the land in 1977. The petitioners apart from giving details of the constructions in the writ petition have also filed voluminous evidence in the shape of photographs etc. in support of their claim that there big Ashram and guest house etc. had come into existence long before the acquisition of the land in 1977. The opposite-parties have merely denied the allegations made in the writ petition on this point without filing any evidence in rebuttal. The State Government acquired the land in dispute and waste and arable land without knowing that there existed any construction over it. If the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was not dispensed with the petitioners would" have had an opportunity to explain to the authorities that the land was not waste and arable and could not be legally acquired in this manner. 11. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The notification dated 30th June, 1977 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is quashed and the notification, dated 29th June, 1977 issued under Section 4 of the Act so far as it dispenses with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is held to be invalid. It will be open to the opposite-parties to proceed fresh in the matter but without dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The petitioners shall be entitled to their costs.