Order The Petitioners/accused have preferred this petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings against them in C.C. No. 464 of 1983, on the file of the Court of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate No.2, Tirunelveli. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: The 1st petitioner is the Tahsildar of Madurai and the 2nd Petitioner is a Government Servant being the Office Superintendent of the Civil Supplies Corporation. The 1st petition is the General Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Revenue Officials Association and the 2nd petition is an office-bearer in the said Association. One Visuvasam a Revenue Officer, was suspended from service by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirunelveli pending enquiry in some complaint of falsification of accounts and embezzlement of Government money. The petitioners herein who are office-bearers of the Revenue Officials Association passed a resolution and addressed the District Collector by a letter dated 29.1.1983 to withdrew the prosecution launched against the said Visuvasam. In that letter they have stated that the said Visuvasam did not receive any money and that it was the practice of the revenue officials at the lower level to issue advance receipts to the pattadars in the matter of collection of kist. They have further stated that the District Collector had abused the powers vested in him and the order sanctioning the prosecution was illegal and contrary to the instructions issued by the Government. The petitioners have also stated at the end that, in the interest of administration, the Collector will correct the mistake, withdraw the prosecution and restore amity in the revenue administration. On the basis of this letter, the petitioners were charged for offences under Section 189 and 189 read with Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. Now, the petitioners have come forward with this petition for quashing the proceedings against them. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the ingredients of the offence under Section 189 of the Indian Penal Code are totally lacking in the present case, even if the allegations put forward by the prosecution against the petitioners are true. It was then urged that there was no threat of injury to any public servant and that it is neither a warning nor a remonstrance to the District Collector, but only a representation by the Union to withdraw the prosecution on a revenue official. 4. It was then urged that there was no threat of injury to any public servant and that it is neither a warning nor a remonstrance to the District Collector, but only a representation by the Union to withdraw the prosecution on a revenue official. 4. Thus, the point for decision is whether there is any threat of injury to the public servant on this letter dated 29.1.1983. Section 189 of the Indian Penal Code runs as follows: “189. Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any public servant, or to any person in whom he believes that public servant to be interested, for the purpose of inducing that public servant to do any act, or to forbear or delay to do any act, connected with the exercise of the public functions of such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to two years or with fine, or with both.” It is clear from a reading of this section that in order to constitute an offence under this section, there must be threatening of injury either to a public servant or to any one in whom the public servant is interested. It is of the essence of the offence that the threat should be uttered in order to influence the public servant against whom it is uttered. Therefore, the vital question is, what is a threat? In common parlance, threat is a declaration of an intention to inflict injury, loss or pain on another. Above all, the intention of uttering the threat must be to induce the Government Servant to do or forbear and, therefore, this is necessarily a question of fact depending upon the construction of the words used by the accused. 5. With these principles in mind, let us consider whether the letter by the petitioners, namely the Tahsildar and the Office Superintendent (the office-bearers of the Association) addressed to the Collector Constitutions a threat of injury to him. I have perused the letter and the tenor or spirit of the letter written by the Revenue Officials Association was to impress upon the Collector the difficulties of the Revenue Inspector in collecting kist and remitting the same to the Treasury, after the abolition of the posts of Village Officers who were previously collecting the amounts. I have perused the letter and the tenor or spirit of the letter written by the Revenue Officials Association was to impress upon the Collector the difficulties of the Revenue Inspector in collecting kist and remitting the same to the Treasury, after the abolition of the posts of Village Officers who were previously collecting the amounts. The letter further explained to the Collector that the practice of issue of advance receipts to the agriculturists was prevalent throughout the State and that, in that process, some village menials who collect the amount do not remit the amounts in time or account for the same and thus the Revenue Inspectors are held liable for the same. As already pointed out, this letter was addressed by the Association to the Collector pointing out that the suspension of the Revenue Inspector Visuvasam was not warranted. The petitioners have further recited in that letter they have made representations to the Honourable Minister and the Secretary to the Revenue Department and that the matter was pending issue of orders. In that context, the petitioners have stated therein that the sanction for the prosecution of the Revenue Inspector Visuvasam granted by the Collector was illegal and that it was an abuse of power. In the end, they have requested the Collector that in the interest of administration, the prosecution must be withdrawn and amity restored in the lower ranks of the Revenue Department. From this letter, I am unable to see that the petitioners held out any threat of injury to the District Collector with a view to do any set or forbear from doing any act in the exercise of his public functions. There was no intention of causing any injury to any person in body, mind, reputation or property. In other words, there was no threat of injury against the Collector or against any one in whom/he is interested, for the purpose of inducing him to do any act or to forbear. It is also important to note that the petitioners have not written this letter in their individual or personal capacity, but it was meant to be a representation on behalf of the Revenue Officials Association. Of course, the impugned letter could have been written in a polite land polished manner. It is also important to note that the petitioners have not written this letter in their individual or personal capacity, but it was meant to be a representation on behalf of the Revenue Officials Association. Of course, the impugned letter could have been written in a polite land polished manner. The petitioners should have avoided the offending words like “vindictive”, “abuse the powers vested in you”, “defame”, etc., The Officer-bearers of the Association, more so when they are responsible public servants, cannot afford to use such invectives against the District Collector who is the Head of the Administration of a District, and it is quite likely that such user of those offending words by. the office-bearers has had the opposite effect of what they had asked for. In this connection, I must point out that the petitioners were not all justified in sending copies of this letter to the Superintendent of Police and Sub Inspector of Police, requesting them not to take cognizance of any complaint that might be launched against the Revenue Officials by the Collector. This is hardly the way of a responsible Association, and the petitioners were not justified in interfering with the Police Officers in the discharge of their duties. It may be an act of impropriety or even impertinence on the part of the office bearers of the Association, but it cannot be construed as a threat of injury. It is hoped that in future the petitioners or other office-bearers of the Association will not use such strong language in their representations which do not and will not serve the purpose or deliver the desired goods. 6. With these observations, I hold that there are no materials to hold that an office under Section 189 of the Indian Penal Code has been committed by these petitioners. For this conclusion, I am fortified by the decision reported in Shahdad Khan v. King Emperor Shahdad Khan v. King Emperor A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 139 wherein Le Rossignol, J., has held that a mere threat to bring a complaint against a constable will not amount to injury. For this conclusion, I am fortified by the decision reported in Shahdad Khan v. King Emperor Shahdad Khan v. King Emperor A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 139 wherein Le Rossignol, J., has held that a mere threat to bring a complaint against a constable will not amount to injury. It was a case where in an’ altercation between a policeman and a driver of a car, the driver protested and made an oral threat to report the matter to the superior officer or to the Court, and in that context, it was held that there was no injury nor any implication of any illegal harm. The learned Judge held that the word “injury” in Section 189 of the Indian Penal Code implies an illegal harm, and a mere threat to bring a legal complaint either before a Court or before the superiors is not an injury. 7. In the result, the petition is allowed and the prosecution against the petitioners is quashed. Petition allowed.