JUDGMENT : K.N. Goyal, J. This writ petition arises out of consolidation proceedings and came for hearing before a learned Single Judge who has referred certain questions for consideration by larger Bench. It is thus that this petition has come up before its. 2. The dispute relates to the Khalas, one being Khata No. 199 which was originally recorded in the name of Smt. Maktoola widow of Satya Narain, and the other, namely, Khata No. 100 which was recorded in the name of Smt. Singari who was widow of a predeceased son of Satya Narain. During the pendency of consolidation proceedings Smt. Maktoola died. Thereupon her daughter Smt. Teji and the aforesaid Suit. Singari came lo be rival Applicants for substitution as her legal representatives. The case of Smt. Teji was that Smt. Singari had remarried, and as such he had no claim over either of the two Khatas and that the said Khatas should devolve on Smt. Teji herself. Smt. Singari proposed lo sell the entire Chak No. 213 which was prepared in lieu of the aforesaid Khatas 199 and 200. u/s 5(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act while consolidation proceedings are pending no land which is the subject mailer of these proceedings can be transferred without the permission of ihe Settlement Officer Consolidation (for short, S.O.C.). Accordingly, Smt. Singari made an application on March 4, 1978 to the S.O.C. for permission lo transfer the land. This application was first given before the Chafes were carved out and therefore a fresh application was given after the Chak were carved out, Smt. Teji objected to these applications. The S.O.C. Tanda held that as the title dispute between Smt. Teji and Smt. Singari was still pending no permission should be granted at that stage. He accordingly deferred decision on the application. This order is dated April 22, 1978 An.nexure-1. Smt. Singari filed a revision before the Dy. Director against this order. Deputy Director held that the question of permission was to be decided independently of the title dispute. Any order passed on the application for permission could not affect the title dispute. He accordingly directed that the S.O.C. should consider the matter on merits wiihout being influenced by the pendency of the tide dispute. Director against this order. Deputy Director held that the question of permission was to be decided independently of the title dispute. Any order passed on the application for permission could not affect the title dispute. He accordingly directed that the S.O.C. should consider the matter on merits wiihout being influenced by the pendency of the tide dispute. He further look the view that as the S.O.C. Tanda had already expressed a certain view it would be desirable that the case be heard by a different S.O.C. He accordingly directed that after remand the case shall be heard by the S.O.C, Akbarpur. 3. When the matter came up before the S.O.C. Akbarpur an objection was raisedon behalf of Smt. Teji that the Deputy Director had no power lo transfer the case from S.O.C. Tanda to S.O.C. Akbarpur. The S.O.C. however took the view that he could not go into the validity of the order of the Deputy Director as he (S.O.C.) was an inferior Tribunal he was be and to comply with the directions of the Deputy Director and to deal with the case. He however granted time lo Smt. Teji lo obtain stay order, if any, from a higher Tribunal or court, but inspite of three dates of hearing given for that purpose no stay order was produced. Accordingly, he decided the case and granted permission for sale subject to two conditions, namely, that the sale may be made if Section 1.68 of U.P. Act No. I of 1951 permitted such sale, and secondly if Smt. Singari lost 1 he title case, the permission would be rendered infructuous. In pursuance of this order of permission dated August 21, 1978 Sml. Singari transferred the Chak in favour of opposite parties 3 to 5 some three days later. Smt. Teji filed a revision against the order of permission before the Deputy Director. During the pendency of this revision Smt. Singari died. Smt. Teji got her son Chandra Brian opposite party No. 6 substituted as legal representative in place of Sml. Singari. Nothing was said about the fact that Smt. Singari had already executed a sale-deed in favour of opposite parties 3 to 5 Chandra Brian's name having been so substituted, both parties, namely, mother and son, intimated the Depuf Director that Chandra Bhan as legal representative of Smt. Singari did not wish to pursue the application for permission to sell the land. As such on the basis of the compromise between them the order dated August 21, 1978 was set aside and the revision was allowed on February 12, 1980, vide order Annexure-4. Opposite parties 3 to 5 later made an application before the Deputy Director contending that they had no knowledge of the revision or of the substitution proceedings and that any order passed on the basis of compromise between mother and son to which they (opposite parties 3 to 5) were not parties could not bind the latter. As the order dated February 12, 1980 was ex-parte in so far as opposite parties 3 to 5 were concerned, they prayed that they may be brought on record and the earlier order dated February 12, 1980 be recalled and the revision be decided afresh after hearing them. This application of opposite party Nos. 3 to 5 was allowed on March 25, 1980 vide Annexure-5. Thereafter the matter was heard between Smt. Teji Petitioner, and opposite parties 3 to 5. After hearing the parties the Deputy Director dismissed the revision and upheld the order of the S.O.C. This order of the Deputy Director is dated March 21, 1980 Annexure-6. It is against the said order of the S.O.C. Akbarpur and the order dated March 25, 1980 and March 31, 1980 passed by the Deputy Director and so the writ petition was filed. 4. The learned Single Judge has referred the following questions to this Bench: 1. Whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation while hearing the revision application u/s 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act can exercise the powers conferred upon the Director of Consolidation under Rule 65(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954, for sending back the case to another Settlement Officer Consolidation before whom neither the case was pending nor was taken cognizance of at any stage? 2. Whether a person who has not moved a substitution application as assignee or transferee was not a party to the case at any stage can file an application for setting aside the order passed on the basis of compromise purporting to be u/s 201 of U.P. Land Revenue Act on the ground that it was an ex-parte order. 3. 2. Whether a person who has not moved a substitution application as assignee or transferee was not a party to the case at any stage can file an application for setting aside the order passed on the basis of compromise purporting to be u/s 201 of U.P. Land Revenue Act on the ground that it was an ex-parte order. 3. Whether permission to transfer holding can be granted to a person whose rights as a tenure-holder are under jeopardy and the question of title is still pending before the appellate court in respect of a part of holding? 5. We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties. 6. As regards the first point it is not disputed that prayer to permit the transfer vested u/s 5(1)(c) in the S.O.C, The only error pointed out in respect of this order granting permission is that it was the S.O.C. Tanda who was competent to grant permission and (not) the S.O.C. Akbarpur. It is true that normally it is the Director or the District Deputy Director of Consolidation who is competent to pass an order transferring the proceedings pending before one Officer to another Officer. In this case however the Deputy Director has not passed an order of transfer on the administrative side but on the judicial side while deciding the revision. When a Deputy Director exercises the power of deciding a revision he is vested with all powers of the Director. If, while judicially disposing of the revision, the Director or the Deputy Director considers, rightly or wrongly, that the inferior tribunal to whom the case is to be remanded was biased it is certainly open to the revisional authority to direct that the matter be dealt with after remand by another officer of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Such a direction is part of judicial process. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even though administratively the Deputy Director could not pass such order of transfer from one S.O.C. to another S.O.C. yet while deciding a revision he could pass an order 11 he considered it necessary for reasons to be recorded in the judgment. This is an inherent power of the superior judicial authority. 7. That apart, it is well settled that mere want of territorial jurisdiction is not fatal if the authority was otherwise competent to deal with the matter. This is an inherent power of the superior judicial authority. 7. That apart, it is well settled that mere want of territorial jurisdiction is not fatal if the authority was otherwise competent to deal with the matter. The matter rested within the power of S.O.C. and only the territorial competency of the S.O.C. Akburpur is being objected to. In Section 21, CPC Parliament has given effect to this general principle. It has also been applied in Merla Ramanna Vs. Nallaparaju and Others, AIR 1956 SC 87 , Tara Chand v. Misri Lal AIR 1970 Raj. 58, Konthan Kosawan v. Varkey Thoman AIR 1964 Karn 206 and Pathumma v. Kuntalan Kutty AIR 1981 SC 1663. The same principle has been applied in Shitla Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation 1970 RD 270 by another Division Bench of this Court, after discussion of various Supreme Court as well as Patna High Court rulings. We respectfully agree with the reasoning of that decision. It has held the field for about fifteen years now and we do not find any good reason to depart from the same. It is true that -the facts of that decision are not on all fours with those of the present case but the ratio of the decision is certainly applicable to the instant case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the S.O.C. Akbarpur cannot be held to have acted without jurisdiction in the matter. 8. As regards the second question it is true that the transferee, tamely, opposite parties 3 to 5, were not parties to the revision which was earlier allowed in their absence on February 12, 1980 vide Annexure 4. But if this be the objection against their competency to move an application for restoration, then it would follow that the said order of the Deputy Director dated February 12, 1980 was not binding on them. If the order was not binding on them then the Petitioner Smt. Teji cannot derive any benefit out of that order as against those opposite parties. We are not concerned with the factual controversy as to whether Smt. Teji was aware of the transfer or not, whether these opposite parties were aware of the tendency of the revision or not. The fact remains that if they were not parties to the decision the decision could not be binding on them. We are not concerned with the factual controversy as to whether Smt. Teji was aware of the transfer or not, whether these opposite parties were aware of the tendency of the revision or not. The fact remains that if they were not parties to the decision the decision could not be binding on them. Any compromise with Smt. Singari or with Smt. Singari's reversionary heir entered into after the date of transfer by Smt. Singari in 1.heir favour cannot be binding on them. 9. As transferees the opposite parties were necessary parties to the revision, or at any rate, proper parties. It was therefore open to them to ask for a decision after giving them an opportunity of hearing. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that even a person who is not a party to the decision may be allowed by an appellate court to appeal against decision if the decision would prejudicially affect his interest, vide Smt. Ratan Golcha Property Ltd., 1970 (3) SCC 575. Extending the same principle of equity and justice we see no reason why the transferees could not ask for the recall of the aforesaid decision dated February 12, 1980 which was rendered in their absence and without any opportunity to them and for a fresh decision after due opportunity to them. The subsequent fresh decision of the Deputy Director was passed after opportunity to the said transferees and also to Smt. Teji the Petitioner. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there was no legal error in Deputy Director entertaining the said application of the opposite parties 3 to 5 in this behalf. 10. As regards question No. 3 it may be pointed out that grant of permission by S.O.C. u/s 5(1)(a) cannot affect the controversy on title. By way of analogy, we may mention that a permission granted by a Municipal Board or other Prescribed Authority in accordance with the building regulations cannot affect any title dispute. It will be unreasonable to hold that merely because of tire pendency of such a title dispute the grant of this nature would be indefinitely deferred. No legal principle or authority to this effect could be pointed out by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. On the contrary it has been decided in Lalji v. Joint Director of Consolidation 1983 RD 201. No legal principle or authority to this effect could be pointed out by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. On the contrary it has been decided in Lalji v. Joint Director of Consolidation 1983 RD 201. by one of us (K.N. Gayal, J.) that the pendency of tie title dispute does not stand in the way of granting permission u/s 5(1)(c). We endorse the view expressed in that case. We, therefore, see no impediment in the grant of permission merely because of the controversy with regard to title which was pending. 11. Accordingly we answer the three questions as follows: Question No. I--Tn the alternative, if the Deputy Director did not have this power the order of the S.O.C. would be binding as mere want of territorial competency is not fatal. Question No. 2--Yes. Question No. 3--Yes. 12. As we have beard arguments on the merits and have answered the questions as above we have not thought it necessary to go into the plea raised on behalf of the opposite parties 3 to 5 that the Petitioner has already lost the battle so far as the tide dispute is concerned and on that ground the petition has become in fructuous. That is a matter which may be raised before the learned Single Judge. 13. Let the case be now sent back to the learned Single Judge with the aforesaid answers. Questions answered.