JUDGMENT I.P. Singh, J. - Shiv Ram Singh petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the detenu) has through this habeas corpus writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sought to challenge the validity of the detention order dated 6-8-1984 passed by District Magistrate, Fatehpur (hereinafter referred to as the detaining authority) under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (No. 65 of 1980) (hereinafter referred to as Act) whereby the detenu was detained with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. 2. The detenu was in Jail after his bail application, granted to him on 12-7-1984 by C. J. M. Fatehpur, in crime case No. 194/84 under sections 147/148/504/506, IPC, was cancelled on 31-7-1984 by District Judge, Fatehpur and taken into custody. His second bail application was to be heard on 6-8-1984, when the detaining authority passed the detention order dated 6-8-1984, when it was felt that the detenu might be released on bail again. The said detention order was served on the detenu in District Jail, Fatehpur, on that very day. The grounds of detention were served on him simultaneously. The detention order is Annexure 1' to the writ petition while the grounds of detention are detailed in Annexure 2' to the writ petition. 3. Those grounds are three in number. Translated in English they are as follows : (1) On 6-5-1983 to 8.30 A.M. the detenu along with his six others companions named therein went to the shop of Gopi Krishna Gupta and murdered him by firing at him. This incident spread a wave of terror amongst the shop keepers and the customers present there in the Bazar. The shop-keepers closed their shops. The entire community of the locality felt terrorised. Crime case No. 118/83 under sections 147/148/149/302 IPC, was registered at Police Station Bindki. (2) On 24-6-1984 at 10 P. M. the detenu along with six companions named therein arrived at Kajhuwa Chauraha situated in the Bazar of the Town. There the detenu and his companions exhibited their respective weapons and challenged Panna Lal Gupta. Ex. M.L.A. and Freedom Fighter. After terrorising the public present there, they shot Panna Lal Gupta. (2) On 24-6-1984 at 10 P. M. the detenu along with six companions named therein arrived at Kajhuwa Chauraha situated in the Bazar of the Town. There the detenu and his companions exhibited their respective weapons and challenged Panna Lal Gupta. Ex. M.L.A. and Freedom Fighter. After terrorising the public present there, they shot Panna Lal Gupta. dead, saying fd vkt bldks tku ls ekj Mkyks cpus u ik;s] ;gh gekjs igys eqdnes dk iSjksdkj gSA It is further alleged that the incident struck a terror wave amongst the public. Those shops, which were still open, were immediately close the public ran helter-skelter due to fear. As a result of terror wave unleashed by the said incident, the shops in the town of Bindki remained closed for two days. It was further alleged that the detenu was an accused in the murder case of Gopi Krishna Gupta. the nephew of Patina Lal Gupta. The said case was fixed for hearing on 24-7-1984 in the Sessions Court when the prosecution witnesses were to be examined. It was alleged that the detenu murdered Panna Lal to terrorise the witnesses of the earlier case, so that on account of fear they may not give evidence in the said cash and that Panna Lal Gupta, who was pairokar in the earlier case may not be there to do the pairvi. The said incident was registered as Crime Case No. 177/84 under sections 147/148/149/302. IPC, on 25-6-1984 at P. S. Bindki. (3) On 12-7-1984, the bail application of the detenu in the murder case of Panna Lal Gupta was allowed (By C.J.M. Fatehpur) and he was released on Bail. After release the detenu on 17-7-1984 accompanied by his six companions named therein went armed to the shop of Chandra Kumar Gupta, who was member of the family of Panna Lal Gupta deceased and abused him and threatened to kill him. In this connection crime case No. 194/84 under Sections 147/148/504 506. IPC. was registered on 17-7-1984 at P. S. Bindki which was still under investigation. These three grounds were the basis for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the impugned detention order. At the foot of the "grounds" of detention", list of six documents was given which were supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention." They are the F.I.Rs. These three grounds were the basis for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass the impugned detention order. At the foot of the "grounds" of detention", list of six documents was given which were supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention." They are the F.I.Rs. and their corresponding G. D. entries relating to the above mentioned three crime cases. Sri D. S. Misra, the learned counsel for the detenu has challenged the validity of the said detention order and the continued detention of the detenu in pursuance thereof on various grounds. But we propose to deal with only those points which in our opinion, are sufficient to dispose of the present writ petition. First, it is contended that the grounds of detention relate only to question of "law and order" and do not present disturbance of public order. It is argued that all the three incidents involve three individuals namely Gopi Krishan Gupta (who was murdered in the first incident of 6-5-1983). Panna Lal Gupta (who was murdered in the incident of 24-6-1984) and Chandra Kumar Gupta (who was abused and threatened on 12-7-84). It is further pointed out that even though the said three incidents took place in the Bazar or at the shops of Gopi Krishan Gupta and Chandra Kumar Gupta, yet the three incidents inter spaced by long interval, were not capable of disturbing the public order as they were directed against the individuals and had no potentiality to affect the normal flow of the life of community in the locality. It is argued that even utterance "in connection with the second incident of 24-6-1984 to the effect that "he (Pannalal Gupta) be killed because he was the pairokar in the earlier case against them" was made in the course of the same incident. The whole transaction was one directed against an individual and the same could have no reach on the society as a whole. The whole transaction was one directed against an individual and the same could have no reach on the society as a whole. In this connection reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Syed Mohammad Aslam v. State of U.P., 1995 All LJ 196, in which it was held : "If a solitary incident involving an individual has no potentiality of affecting the tranquillity of the community or public at large, it cannot be said to affect the public order even if during the same incident, the detenu had committed acts to deter the onlookers from intervening in the incident or from appearing as a witness against him at the trial. The entire transaction is one and is nothing but only disturbance of law and order. A mere disturbance of law and order is not sufficient for an action under the National Security Act." It is further argued that all the three incidents make it clear that they were directed against the members of the same family and as such had no propensity of the wider spectrum to touch or affect the society at large. Learned D.G.A., has pointed out that in grounds Nos. 1 and 2 it is specifically alleged that as a result of the said incidents a wave of terror was struck amongst the shop-keepers, customers or the public present there. So much so that the shop-keepers had closed their shops immediately. In the second ground, it was also mentioned that the public present had run helter-skelter on account of fear. Terror wave was of such a degree that the shops had remained closed for the following two days. It was pointed out that in ground No. 2 it was mentioned that the murder of Panna Lal Gupta was committed to prevent him to do pairvi in the earlier case pending against the detenu and his companions in which 24-7-1984 was fixed for hearing in the Sessions Court and also to terrorise the witnesses of the earlier case not to give evidence on 24-7-1984. It is argued that in this way the said activity of the detenu was not only confined to eliminating the individual, who was doing pairvi against the detenu in an earlier case pending against him, but went much further and was aimed at the witnesses to deter them from giving evidence against him. It is argued that in this way the said activity of the detenu was not only confined to eliminating the individual, who was doing pairvi against the detenu in an earlier case pending against him, but went much further and was aimed at the witnesses to deter them from giving evidence against him. This coupled with the immediate effect on the shop-keeprs to close their shops and on the public to run helter-skelter for their lives did interfere in the normal tempo of life or flow of life of the community in the locality. It is argued that in this perspective these activities fell in the category of "disturbing public order." . However, learned counsel for the detenu has pointed out that the above narrated consequences arising out of the incidents and resulting in the closure of the shops and running away of the public helter-skelter or to overawe the witnesses or to prevent Panna Lal Gupta from doing pairvi, did not find mention either in the F.I.Rs. or G.D. entries supplied to the detenu. It is pointed out that their non- disclosure was eloquently mentioned in para 17 of the Writ Petition, but that fact was not rebutted in the affidavit filed by the detaining authority. The said para 17 was controverted in para 14 of the counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate in the following words : "That the contents of paragraph 17 of the petition are incorrect, misleading hence denied. After the commission of the murder of Sri Gopi Krishna Gupta, all the shop-keepers and inhabitants of Bindki Bazar, were terror stricken and they had closed their shops this fact has been mentioned in the grounds of detention itself, subsequent to the murder of Panna Lal Gupta on 24-6-1984, the deponent was informed by the S.D.M. Bindki orally who himself had visited the market and had found the shops closed and the inhabitants of the locality were terror stricken and panicky and thus a complete disorder prevailed there. Besides it the murder was committed for overawing and terrorising the witnesses with the instinct of jeopardising the criminal prosecution and bringing the rule of law prevailing in the society to ruins. This fact of public disorder being within the knowledge of the deponent, the order of detention is neither rendered illegal nor based upon non-existent fact. Besides it the murder was committed for overawing and terrorising the witnesses with the instinct of jeopardising the criminal prosecution and bringing the rule of law prevailing in the society to ruins. This fact of public disorder being within the knowledge of the deponent, the order of detention is neither rendered illegal nor based upon non-existent fact. The deponent would also beg to submit that from the commission of the gruesome murder of an M.L.A. and Freedom Fighter in the midst of the thickly populated market and only on account of doing pairvi in the murder case itself clearly arouse the suspicion and reasonable probability that this had created terror in the locality and in the mind of the witnesses who were likely to be examined in the Court of Sessions Judge in recent future and thereby the public order would have been disrupted. The detaining authority is clearly within his domains to legitimately draw such inferences from such dreadful and horrifying activities." It is, therefore, clear that the detaining authority did not deny the fact that the above things and circumstances narrated in the grounds touching the subject of "public order" were not mentioned in the said three F.I.Rs. of their corresponding G.D. entries. In other words these basic facts were not communicated to the detenu. As seen above the grounds of detention were accompanied by the copies of the said three F.I.Rs. and their corresponding entries only. As a matter of fact, in para 8 of the counter-affidavit filed by the detaining authority it is mentioned that "a perusal of the grounds of detention would reveal that on its fact, the details of the document supplied to the detenu have been enumerated. These are the only documents upon which reliance was placed by the deponent." Besides the detaining authority has taken the stand that the fact the shops were closed and inhabitants of the locality were terror stricken and panicky and thus a complete disorder prevailed there, was reported to him orally by the S.D.M. Bindki after having visited the market. The detaining authority in said para 14 of his counter-affidavit has further stated that the fact of public disorder was within the knowledge of the deponent. Obviously, his knowledge depended on the above report of S.D.M. Bindki. However, we find that said para 14 of the counter-affidavit was verified on perusal of the record. The detaining authority in said para 14 of his counter-affidavit has further stated that the fact of public disorder was within the knowledge of the deponent. Obviously, his knowledge depended on the above report of S.D.M. Bindki. However, we find that said para 14 of the counter-affidavit was verified on perusal of the record. Obviously on oral communication of the report of S.D.M. Bindki could not form the basis of any record which could be perused. In this background the verification of para 14 of the counter-affidavit is not proper and cannot be regarded as relevant. Besides, the factum of said oral report of the S.D.M. was never communicated to the detenu along with grounds of detention. Para 8 of the counter-affidavit of the detaining authority also refers to the report of the Station Officer of Police Station Bindki and the letter of Superintendent of Police, Fatehpur, which were submitted to him for passing the detention order. It is further alleged that the said report of Station Officer P. S. Bindki only repeated the contents of F.I.R. about the activities of the detenu and the letter of Superintendent of Police, did not contain any instance of such prejudicial activities. Perhaps, it was only a letter forwarding report of Station Officer P.S. Bindki to the detaining authority. What we want to stress is that the said report or letter of the concerned police authorities did not refer to the disturbance in the flow of life or even tempo of the life of the community in the locality, as a result of the said activities of the detenu. In para 20 of the writ petition, it is alleged with respect to ground No. 1 which relates to crime case No. 118/83 that dying declaration of Gopi Krishna Gupta was recorded in which one Gore Lal was named as the only accused (assailant) meaning thereby that the detenu was not involved in the said incident. In para 21 of the writ petition it is alleged that the concerned Police Authorities did not place the said dying declaration before the detaining authority, which was very material document for consideration by him in arriving at his subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of detaining the detenu or otherwise and as such failed in performing their obligation. In para 21 of the writ petition it is alleged that the concerned Police Authorities did not place the said dying declaration before the detaining authority, which was very material document for consideration by him in arriving at his subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of detaining the detenu or otherwise and as such failed in performing their obligation. Those allegations were replied by the detaining authority in para 17 of his counter-affidavit as follows : "That the contents of paragraphs 20 and 21 of the petition are incorrect, misleading hence denied. The entire evidence collected during the course of the investigation is not required to be placed before the detaining authority. Thus if the copy of the dying declaration was not placed before the deponent it could not possibly be said that any relevant material was withheld from being placed before the detaining authority. The sufficiency or the adequacy of the material upon which the deponent was satisfied is not justiciable as such it is not open to question that the deponent formed the satisfaction upon insufficient or inadequate material. The copies of the reports which contain the facts of the commission of the prejudicial activities and' upon which the deponent formed the satisfaction were made available to the deponent as such the petitioner's detention is in accordance with the procedure established by law." In this way the detaining authority does not deny the existence of the said dying declaration of Gopi Krishna Gupta or the fact that it, refers only to the name of one Gore Lal as the sole accused (assailant). It is well settled law that the sufficiency or adequacy of the material, upon which the detaining authority was satisfied, is not justiciable and the Courts, cannot substitute their own satisfaction in place of that of the detaining authority. In the case of Nanha Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail Kanpur, 1984 All LJ 898. it has been held that : "it is now well established that the satisfaction of detaining authority in this regard is a subjective satisfaction and the High Court can neither examine the sufficiency of the material on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based nor can it substitute its own satisfaction in place that of the detaining authority. it has been held that : "it is now well established that the satisfaction of detaining authority in this regard is a subjective satisfaction and the High Court can neither examine the sufficiency of the material on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based nor can it substitute its own satisfaction in place that of the detaining authority. However, it is not correct to say that the only ground on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority can be questioned before the High Court is that the material relied upon by the detaining authority is, in the eye of law, no material. It is now well settled that apart from the ground that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not based on no material, the validity of the satisfaction can be questioned on a number of other grounds as well. Thus it can be held that validity of an order for preventive detention passed by the detaining authority can inter alia be questioned on ground that the same has been passed without consideration of material circumstances which in the circumstances of the case ought to have been placed before the detaining authority and considered by it. It is not disputed that it can be questioned also on the ground that the order has been passed mechanically or that it was passed for some other ulterior reasons." "In the instant case while making the order of detention the District Magistrate was aware of the fact that the petitioner detenu had been acquitted by the Special Judge in the case under Ss. 399/402 and 400 IPC, relating to an incident but the District Magistrate was not merely required to be aware of the fact that the petitioner has been acquitted of a criminal charge in respect of the fact proposed to be relied upon by him but also to evaluate and to take into consideration the effect of such acquittal before deciding to base his satisfaction on facts in respect of which the detenu was acquitted by a court of law. The reasons given by the Court in this regard would be relevant material which can, in the normal course, affect the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The reasons given by the Court in this regard would be relevant material which can, in the normal course, affect the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. In such cases, it is obligatory on the District Magistrate to scan the judgment of acquittal and thereafter to form his own personal opinion either in accordance with the reasons contained in the judgment of the Criminal Court or if there be legitimate reasons to do so, even contrary to it. While it is true that the judgments of the two Courts, are not binding on the detaining authority they do furnish material which ought to be considered by the detaining authority before passing an order of detention, based on facts which were involved in those criminal cases. In the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the detaining authority had, before passing the impugned order, ignored relevant material and his satisfaction based on the incident that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order gets vitiated. This clearly has the effect of vitiating the entire order." In the present writ petition, before us, the dying declaration of Gopi Krishna Gupta was a very relevant material of considerable probative value and in the circumstances of the case, the concerned Police authorities should have placed the said dying declaration before the detaining authority for being considered by him to arrive at his subjective satisfaction in the matter. In the case of Syed Mohammad Aslam (supra), 1985 All LJ 196, it was held : "In a case of detention under section 3 though the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be examined its validity can be questioned on a variety of grounds. The ground that a material or a document which had the potentiality of affecting the decision of detaining authority, while passing the detention order was suppressed from him is a ground which can be taken into consideration by the Court as a relevant fact. The ground that a material or a document which had the potentiality of affecting the decision of detaining authority, while passing the detention order was suppressed from him is a ground which can be taken into consideration by the Court as a relevant fact. If a document is relevant to the question on which the detaining authority had to base his subjective satisfaction and such a document is in existence on the date of the detention order within the knowledge of the reporting authority, the reporting authority is under a duty to place that document before the detaining authority and non-compliance of such a duty would invalidate that order." In para 8 of the counter-affidavit of the detaining authority it is mentioned "the report of the Station Officer P.S. Bindki only repeats the contentions of the F.I.R. about the activities and the letter of the Superintendent of Police, Fatehpur does not contain any instance of such prejudicial activities. Thus the deponent did not place reliance upon these two police reports." From this assertion it becomes clear that the concerned Police authorities had submitted their report to the detaining authority for passing the impugned order against the detenu. Since they had failed to place the dying declaration in question before the detaining authority for his consideration in forming a subjective satisfaction they had clearly failed to fulfil their obligations. The non- consideration of the said dying declaration the most relevant document) and non- communication to the detenu of the substance of the oral report made by S.D.M. Bindki to the detaining authority respectively went to the root of the formation of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and deprived the detenu in making an effective representation against the detention-order. Besides, the incident forming subject-matter of ground No. 1 had taken place on 6-5-1983, about which criminal case was pending in the Sessions Court. The detention order was passed on 6-8-1984, after one year and three months of the incident. To our mind this ground was 'stale' so far as the detention of the detenu in connection with the breach of the public order was concerned. The detention order was passed on 6-8-1984, after one year and three months of the incident. To our mind this ground was 'stale' so far as the detention of the detenu in connection with the breach of the public order was concerned. Learned counsel for the detenu has then pointed out that non-placing of the dying declaration in question before the detaining authority had not only rendered the detention order invalid and illegal, but its non-placing before the State Government and its non- consideration by the State Government, while approving the detention order under section 3(4) of the Act, manifestly reveal that it was a case of non-application of mind both by the detaining authority as well as the State Government and this feature renders the detention order invalid and illegal inasmuch as both the detention order as well as the 'approved order' became mechanical. (See Nanha Singh v. Superintendent. District Jail, Kanpur, 1984 All LJ 898 (supra). In the case of Aruna Shankar v. State of U.P., 1984 All LJ 1031, it was held as follows : "The State Government while approving the detention order or confirming the same has to apply its mind and cannot mechanically take a decision to approve it or disapprove it. Naturally if the Government has to record its approval or disapproval to a particular detention order it cannot be recorded without the application of mind as to in what particular circumstances an order is to be approved and in what other circumstances, it is not to be approved." In the case of Bhajan Lal v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 15799/84, decided on 25-3-1985 by this Court, it was held as follows : "The fact that he was not picked up by anyone in that test identification was not placed by the detaining authority before the State Government. Not only this, the State Government itself ignored this fact while according approval of the detention order of the petitioner. This was undisputably a material fact showing non-involvement of the petitioner in that case. Such a fact could have influenced not only the satisfaction of the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order but also of the State Government while according approval to such an order of detention. As observed by the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., Habeas Corpus Writ Petn. Such a fact could have influenced not only the satisfaction of the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order but also of the State Government while according approval to such an order of detention. As observed by the Lucknow Bench of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., Habeas Corpus Writ Petn. No. 3196 of 1984, decided on 18-9-84 the approval of an order of detention necessarily implies consideration of not only the grounds of detention but also other particulars having bearing on the material facts. In fact. this position is clear from the language of section 3(4) of the Act, which reads as under : "When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government." The words "and such other particulars as ...... have a bearing on the matter" leave no room for doubt that all such facts which have bearing on the matter have to be placed before the State Government. Since the material facts which have bearing on the matter were not placed before the detaining authority, the detaining authority could not have placed the same before the State Government while making a report to the Govt. under S. 3(4) of the Act. If the material fact which ought to have been placed before the State Government and considered by it is not placed, the validity of the approval made by the State Government of such an order of detention can be questioned on the same principle on which the order of detention can be questioned. The principle of law laid down in this regard in Nanha Singh v. Supdt. District Jail, Kanpur, 1984 All LJ 898 will apply in such a case. The principle of law laid down in this regard in Nanha Singh v. Supdt. District Jail, Kanpur, 1984 All LJ 898 will apply in such a case. In other words the validity of approval of an order of detention passed by the State Government can be questioned on the ground that the approval has been made by the State Government without considering the material circumstance, which, in the circumstances of the case, ought to have been placed before it for consideration. The approval in such a case can be held to be made mechanically." For all the above reasons, the present writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed not to detain Shiv Ram Singh detenu any more in pursuance of impugned order of detention dated 6-8-1984, passed by District Magistrate, Fatehpur. 4. It is made clear that the order, which we have passed today would not entitle the detenu to be released in case he is wanted otherwise or can be detained in pursuance of other lawful order.