B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant stands convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced there under to undergo imprisonment for life by the Court of Session after accepting the case of the prosecution that on November 9, 1980, sometime before evening, the appellant called his wife Janga (hereinafter referred to as Tthe deceased) for sexual intercourse and as she did not to inside the house, the appellant, by means of a Mugura (M. O. 1), dealt two blows on her forehead while she was plastering mud and cowdung outside her house which resulted in her death. The order of conviction has been based on the evidence of P. W. 1 Kanga Ho, the brother of the deceased, who had been examined as the sole witness to the occurrence and that of P. Ws. 3 and 4, two co-villagers, one of them (P. W. 3) being the headman of the village, with regard to an extrajudicial confession said to have been made by the appellant before them and P. W. 1 besides the recovery of M. O. 1 on the spot in the course of investigation. Mr. Jena, appearing for the appellant, challenges the order of conviction as legally unfounded having been based on false and tainted evidence while the learned Additional Government Advocate finds no reason to discard the prosecution evidence on which reliance had been placed by the trial Court. ( 2 ) IN order to be acted upon, the evidence of a solitary witness to the occurrence must be clear and cogent, true and trustworthy and above reproach: When a witness is neither an accomplice nor a person analogous to an accomplice, but is an ordinary witness, the court may, as a general rule, act on the testimony of such a solitary witness without corroboration unless the circumstances of a particular case necessitate it. But some corroboration should be sought from the other prose caution evidence in support of the testimony of a solitary, witness, particularly where such witness also happens to be closely related to the deceased. See Ramji Surya and another v. State of Maharashtral and Chintamani Nahak alias Naik v. State2. ( 3 ) IN the instant case, P. W. 1 was no other person than the brother of the deceased. See Ramji Surya and another v. State of Maharashtral and Chintamani Nahak alias Naik v. State2. ( 3 ) IN the instant case, P. W. 1 was no other person than the brother of the deceased. On his own showing, he had not been pulling on well with the appellant at the time of the occurrence. The evidence of a relation of the deceased is not to be discarded merely on the ground of relationship and the term related may not be equated with the term interestedt, but such evidence should be examined with care before its acceptance. If P. W. 1 was the brother-in-law of the appellant, he was also a person who had not been pulling on well with him. His evidence required very careful scrutiny and we are constrained to observe that the learned Sessions Judge had not critically examined his evidence as it should have been. ( 4 ) SPEAKING about the occurrence, P. W. I had testified thus: In the afternoon when I was washing my hands in order to take food outside my house, I saw that the accused dealt two strokes with this Mudgar M. O. 1 to the head of his wife Birang who was plastering her threshing floor with mud and cowdung. Birang had then bent for that purpose. The stroke was given on her forehead. Other inmates of the accused had gone out for Bandana Parba. After getting the blows Birang fell down. Then I went to the Dakua of our village Motai. I narrated the incident to him. Then we went to Jadumani. I narrated the incident to Jadumani also. ( 5 ) IF the deceased had been plastering the threshing floor bending herself, it was highly unlikely that the two blows alleged to have been dealt by the appellant would have landed on the forehead of the deceased facing towards the ground. M. O. 1 was, no doubt, lying at the place of the occurrence, but the fact remains that it had no stains of blood in it and for this the Investigating Officer (P. W. 6) did not take steps for its chemical examination. M. O. 1 was, no doubt, lying at the place of the occurrence, but the fact remains that it had no stains of blood in it and for this the Investigating Officer (P. W. 6) did not take steps for its chemical examination. As observed by the Supreme Court in Rana Pratap and others v. State of Haryana3, different persons react differently in different situations when they see a murderous assault and the evidence of a witness is not to be rejected merely because he had not raised a cry or had not intervened. In the instant case, however, P. W. 1 was no other person than the brother of the deceased He had not said that he was so afraid that he did not dare to intervene or even to raise a cry. He was not very near to the spot, as deposed to by him. It is surprising that he did not even raise a. cry at the time of the murderous assault on his sister, far from taking any steps for informing or calling out the villagers to come to the spot. ( 6 ) P. W. I had claimed to have narrated the occurrence first to Motai, the Dakua of the village. The prosecution did not choose to examine this material witness as he could narrate in the court as to what was the first version given by P. W. 1 about the occurrence. P. W. 1 also deposed that he had narrated the incident to Jadumani (P. W. 4 ). The latter had not spoken about it. On the other hand, the evidence of P. W. 4 was that P. W. I and Motai went to him and Motai called him saying that the appellant had assaulted his wife to death. P. W. 4 did not, in terms, say that he had received any information from P. W. 1. In his cross-examination, he had stated that as P. W. 1 did not know the Oriya language, Motai told him about the incident. What exactly had been told by P. W. 1 to Motai could, therefore, be spoken to only by Motai There was thus no evidence corroborating that of P. W. 1 that he had informed the other co-villagers about the occurrence. What exactly had been told by P. W. 1 to Motai could, therefore, be spoken to only by Motai There was thus no evidence corroborating that of P. W. 1 that he had informed the other co-villagers about the occurrence. ( 7 ) THE evidence and the circumstances indicated above would clearly show that until the police officer had come to the scene, P. W. 1 had not disclosed the occurrence to anyone and this would seriously affect his testimony. For the foregoing reasons, we are not prepared to place any reliance on the testimony of P. W. 1. ( 8 ) THERE remains for consideration the extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the appellant before P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4. ( 9 ) P. W. 1 had spoken thus: Jadumani, Turianath, San Malu and others came to the spot. Turianath asked the accused as to why he assaulted his wife. The accused replied that he wanted to cohabit with the deceased but as she did not allow he assaulted her to death. Speaking about this, P. W. 3 had testified:. . 1 asked the accused as to why he has killed his wife. The accused replied that he called his wife to have cohabitation, but as she did not come inside the house he has assaulted her to death. He also informed us that with a Puda Pita Mugura he has assaulted Birang. This Mugura M. O. 1. was lying at the spot. The second part of the statement of this witness had not been deposed to by P. W. 1. P. W. 4 went a step further and deposed: Turianath asked the accused as to why he has killed his wife. The accused replied that he called his wife for cohabitation twice or thrice, but as she did not come in he assaulted her to death. He pointed out to this M. O. I. which was lying at the spot and with that Mugurahe has dealt the strokes. It would thus be seen that the exact words said to have been spoken by He appellant were not uniform and consistent and improvements had been made by the prosecution witnesses. ( 10 ) NO materials had been placed by the prosecution as to how and why the appellant would blurt out an extrajudicial confession before P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4. ( 10 ) NO materials had been placed by the prosecution as to how and why the appellant would blurt out an extrajudicial confession before P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4. It may be stated that the cost of repetition that P. W. 1 was the brother of the deceased and he was a person who was not pulling on well with the appellant. There was no evidence that he had close acquaintance with P. Ws. 3 and 4 and no materials had been shown that the appellant could repose confidence in P. Ws. 3 and 4 and confess his guilt before them. No circumstance had been brought out in the evidence to show that the appellant could have any reason or motive for making the confession. In these circumstances, it would be extremely unsafe to accept the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 in this regard. ( 11 ) AS has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Rahim Bag v. State of U. P4 and Heramba Brahma and another v. State of Assam5, extrajudicial confession, in order to afford a piece of reliable evidence, must pass the test of reproduction of exact words, the reason or motive for confession and the person selected in whom confidence is reposed. When there has been no history of previous associative and there is no reason for an accused to repose confidence in the persons who have deposed about an extrajudicial confession, the evidence in this regard may not be accepted, as held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1973 Supreme Court 343 (supra ). Lakhanpal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh6 and AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1595 Isupra ). If there are discrepancies as to what precisely has been said by the accused, the evidence relating to an extrajudicial confession cannot safely be acted upon, as observed by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dayaram Hemraj. 7. ( 12 ) IN State of UP. v. M. K. Anthony8, the Supreme Court has laid down: There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extra-judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The Courts have considered the evidence of extra-judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. 7. ( 12 ) IN State of UP. v. M. K. Anthony8, the Supreme Court has laid down: There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extra-judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The Courts have considered the evidence of extra-judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. (See Jagta v. State of Haryana (1975) 1 SCR 165 at p. 170: (A. I. R. 1974 SC 1545 at p. 1548) and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh (1975) 1 SCR 747 at p. 751; (A. I. R. 1975 SC 258 at p. 2611. In Sahoo v. State 4 U. P. (1965) 3 SCR 86 : (A. I. R. 1966 SC 40), it was held that an extra-judicial confession may be an expression of conflict of emotion, a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience; an argument to find excuse or justification for his act; or a penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime. Before evidence in this behalf is accepted, it must be established by cogent evidence what were the exact words used by the accused. The Court proceeded to state that even if so much was established, prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In that case, the evidence was that after the commission of murder the accused was heard muttering to himself that he has finished the deceased. The High Court did not interfere with the conviction observing that the evidence of extra-judicial confession is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. However in Pyara Singh v. State of Punjab (1978)1 SCR 597 : (A. I. R. 1977 SC 2274), this Court observed that the law does not require that evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. It thus appears that extra- judicial confession appears to have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. It thus appears that extra- judicial confession appears to have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. If the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of witness/witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused; the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test, on the touch stone of credibility, if it passes the test the extra-judicial confessions can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproach the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon. TI ( 13 ) JUDGED in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, we must hold that the evidence with regard to the extrajudicial confession was far short of the mark and could never have been acted upon. Even assuming that such a confession had been made, although such an assumption would be unwarranted in view of what has been recorded above, there was no evidence corroborating the evidence with regard to the retracted confession and although not as a rule of law, the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 in this regard could not be accepted without corroboration as a rule of prudence. ( 14 ) UNFORTUNATE as it might seem, the learned Sessions Judge did not take into consideration the aforesaid inherent weaknesses and improbabilities in the evidence coming from the side of the prosecution and recorded an order of conviction. ( 15 ) WE would allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed. .