JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - By means of these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have challenged validity of the proceedings taken for the acquisition of the petitioners' land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. The Governor of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification on April 29, 1980. under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') notifying that the land mentioned in the schedule to the notification was needed for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of residential buildings for the residents of Meerut by the Meerut Development Authority under a planned development scheme. The notification stated that there was urgency for taking possession of the land and for that purpose sub-section (1) of S. 17 of the Act was applied. The notification further contained a declaration by the Governor under sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 of the Act directing that the provisions of section 5-A of the Act shall not apply. A notification under S. 6 of the Act was issued on May 1, 1981, which contained a declaration that the land was needed for a public purpose and it was further stated that since the matter was of urgency under S. 17(1) of the Act, though no award had been given, the possession of the land may be taken under section 9 of the Act. The Collector was authorised to take possession of the land under S. 9 of the Act. The petitioners, who are either owners of the land in dispute which is sought to be acquired or transferees of the land from the earlier owners, have challenged validity of the acquisition proceedings on a number of grounds. 3. The main ground urged on behalf of the petitioners was that there was no urgency to justify dispensing of the provisions of S. 5A of the Act as the State Government took more than a year to issue the notification under S. 6 of the Act after the issue of notification under S. 4. Had there been urgency for the acquisition of the land, the notification under S. 6 could have been issued immediately after the publication of the notification under S. 4 of the Act and possession would have also been taken at an early date. Had there been urgency for the acquisition of the land, the notification under S. 6 could have been issued immediately after the publication of the notification under S. 4 of the Act and possession would have also been taken at an early date. The State Government applied section 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the summary enquiry under S. 5-A without there being any material-"before it justifying the formation of opinion that the matter was of great urgency. It was further urged that there was no urgency for the acquisition and the declaration was made arbitrarily. 4. Section 4 of the Act provides that whenever it appears to the Government that land in any locality is needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect shall be published in the official gazette. Section 5-A provides for filing of objection by interested persons within 21 days after the issue of the notification under S. 4 raising erection to the acquisition of the land. The objections so filed are decided by the Collector after giving opportunity of hearing to the objectors. The Government may after considering the report, if any, made under S. 5-A, make a declaration under S.6 of the Act that the land is needed for a public purpose. Section 17(4) empowers the Government to direct that the provisions of S. 5-A shall not apply where it is satisfied that it is a case of urgency. The direction for dispensing with S. 5-A is made only when the Government forms opinion that there is urgency. The formation of the opinion by the State Government is a condition precedent for the exercise of power under S. 17(4) of the Act. The State Government's opinion is subjective and normally the Courts do not interfere with the opinion formed by the State Government if it is bona fide. Section 5-A is the only provision which affords opportunity to the persons interested in the land to file objection against the acquisition. The enquiry contemplated by S. 5-A of the Act is summary in nature but that is the only, safeguard granted by the legislature to the owners of the land to raise objection against the acquisition of their land. Section 17(4) confers power on the Government to deprive them from that opportunity in case of urgency. The enquiry contemplated by S. 5-A of the Act is summary in nature but that is the only, safeguard granted by the legislature to the owners of the land to raise objection against the acquisition of their land. Section 17(4) confers power on the Government to deprive them from that opportunity in case of urgency. The State Government was, therefore, under a legal duty to consider whether there was such an urgency that even summary proceedings under S. 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the need to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5-A which has to be considered, but the degree and extent of urgency should be considered. Though the opinion of the State Government regarding urgency for the purpose of dispensing with S. 5-A of the Act is not justiciable, yet the courts have held that if the opinion is not based on relevant material or that if the opinion is not formed bona fide the declaration so made is liable to be challenged in Court. 5. In Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 the Supreme Court considered this question and observed : "It is true that, in such cases, the formation of an opinion is a subjective matter, as held by the Court repeatedly with regard to situations in which administrative authorities have to form certain opinions before taking actions they are empowered to take. They are expected to know better the difference between a right or wrong opinion than Courts could ordinarily on such matters. Nevertheless, that opinion has to be based upon some relevant materials in order to pass the test which Courts do impose. That test basically is : Was the authority concerned acting within the scope of its powers or in the sphere where its opinion and discretion must be permitted to have full play? Once the Court comes to the conclusion that the authority concerned was acting within the scope of its powers and had some material, however meagre, on which it could reasonably base its opinion, the Court should not and will not interfere. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that the authority concerned was acting within the scope of its powers and had some material, however meagre, on which it could reasonably base its opinion, the Court should not and will not interfere. There might, however, be cases in which the power is exercised in such an obviously arbitrary or perverse fashion, without regard to the actual and undeniable facts, or, in other words, so unreasonably as to leave no doubt whatsoever in the mind of a Court that there has been an excess of power. There may also be cases where the mind of the authority concerned has not been applied at all, due to misunderstanding of the law or some other reason, to what was legally imperative for it to consider." 6. Placing reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Narayan Govind Gavate's case ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ) the counsel for the petitioners made twofold attack on the validity of the impugned notifications. He urged that the admitted facts available on record themselves show that the Government exercised power arbitrarily in a perverse fashion in dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act on the ground of urgency in the matter. In this connection he emphasised that the Collector's proposal for the acquisition of the land in dispute was forwarded to the State Government on 13-9-1979. In that letter the Collector, Meerut, had made a request to the Government to dispense with the provisions of S. 5-A of the Act on the ground that there was urgency for the acquisition. But the Government did not act promptly, instead it took seven months in issuing the notification under S. 4 of the Act. This delay itself indicates that there was really no urgency. In our opinion any delay on the part of the Government in issuing the notification under S. 4 of the Act is not relevant for deciding the question of 'urgency. Any pre-notification delay is not sufficient to vitiate the declaration made by the Government regarding urgency under S. 17(4) of the Act. 7. In our opinion any delay on the part of the Government in issuing the notification under S. 4 of the Act is not relevant for deciding the question of 'urgency. Any pre-notification delay is not sufficient to vitiate the declaration made by the Government regarding urgency under S. 17(4) of the Act. 7. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1033 , it was held that the fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage was not very relevant for deciding the question whether on the date the notification was issued there was urgency or not. The effect of pre-notification delay was considered again at length in Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1984 SC 1721 and it was held that very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired made various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed acquisition. This is bound to result in multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often the delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the submission that pre-notification delay would make the invocation of urgency provisions void. 8. Learned counsel then urged that having regard to the considerable length of time spent in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act and the taking of possession it is apparent that there was no real urgency justifying invoking of powers under S. 17(4) and, dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. He emphasised that the notification under S. 4 was issued on 29-4-1980, but the same was published in the Gazette of July 12, 1980, and the notification under S. 6 of the Act was issued on May 1, 1981, and the possession of the land was taken in November, 1982. On these facts it is urged that had there been any urgency the Government and the authorities concerned would have acted in a speedy manner. There is no denying the fact that the State Government took more than a year in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act. On these facts it is urged that had there been any urgency the Government and the authorities concerned would have acted in a speedy manner. There is no denying the fact that the State Government took more than a year in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act. If there was really any urgency for the acquisition the State Government would have in all likelihood acted speedily in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act. The persons interested in the land were denied opportunity to file objections under S. 5-A of the Act and yet the Government took more than a year from the date of issue of the notification under S. 4 of the Act in making the declaration as contemplated by S. 6 of the Act. In all likelihood proceedings under S. 5-A would have been completed during the period of one year. The Government itself did not make the requisite declaration under S. 6 of the Act for a year and yet it denied the petitioners opportunity to file objections against the acquisition. This delay coupled' with the fact that no attempt was made to take possession of the land prior to 9th July, 1982 further demonstrates that there was no urgency. 9. Learned Standing Counsel urged that affidavit of Lila Nand Joshi has been filed on behalf of the State Government disclosing the material which was taken into consideration by the State Government in forming the opinion that there was urgency. No such affidavit is available on the record of the writ petition. The office has reported that no such affidavit has been filed. In order to avoid any dispute in the matter we have permitted the Standing Counsel to hand over a copy of the affidavit of Lila Nand Joshi which we have taken into account. In the alleged affidavit of Lila Nand Joshi it is asserted that the Collector, Meerut, addressed a letter to the Government on 13-9-1979 requesting the Government to acquire the land in dispute as it was urgently required for establishing a residential colony. The Collector impressed upon the Government that there was acute necessity of houses in Meerut city and he suggested that the provisions of S. 17 of the Act may be invoked and enquiry contemplated under S. 5A of the Act be dispensed with. The Collector impressed upon the Government that there was acute necessity of houses in Meerut city and he suggested that the provisions of S. 17 of the Act may be invoked and enquiry contemplated under S. 5A of the Act be dispensed with. The Collector addressed other two letters dated 14th May, 1980 and 17th July, 1980, impressing upon the Government for issuing notification under S. 6 of the Act. The Secretary of the Meerut Development Authority also made a request to the Government by his D. O. letter dated 26-8-1980 for early issue of the notification under S. 6 of the Act. The Collector, Meerut, again sent another letter on 17-9-1980 requesting the Government to issue notification under S. 6 of the Act without any further delay. The affidavit further states that in view of the letters issued by the Collector and the Secretary of the Meerut Development Authority it was clear that the land in dispute was urgently required for residential colony as there was acute scarcity of residential houses. The State Government considered the urgency in the light of the circumstances before it and thereupon it invoked sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 of the Act dispensing with the provisions of S. 5-A of the Act. 10. The affidavit of Lila Nand Joshi does not explain one year's delay in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act. If in reality there was urgency as stressed by the Collector, Meerut, and the Secretary, Meerut Development Authority and if the Government was satisfied with the urgency it would have certainly issued notification under S. 6 of the Act immediately after the issue of the notification under S. 4 of the Act. On the other hand, the admitted facts show that in spite of the insistence of the Collector, Meerut, for issuing notification under S. 6 of the Act the State Government took more than a year in issuing the notification under S. 6. No reasons have been disclosed for the delay caused in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act. The affidavit of Lila Nand Joshi does not contain any material which may show that there was really such an urgency for the acquisition of the land in dispute so as to dispense with the summary enquiry under S. 5A of the Act. The affidavit of Lila Nand Joshi does not contain any material which may show that there was really such an urgency for the acquisition of the land in dispute so as to dispense with the summary enquiry under S. 5A of the Act. Apart from saying that there was acute shortage of residential accommodation and there was urgency for acquiring land no other circumstances or material has been disclosed which would show that there was pressing urgency. It is a matter of common knowledge that establishment of residential colonies take time. No calamity had befallen Meerut which would have necessitated providing house sites immediately. The lethargic and tardy manner in which the Development Authority and the Government acted in issuing the notification and taking possession of the land demonstrates that there was no urgency and the formation of the opinion by the State Government was just an excuse to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. 11. In the circumstances in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate's case ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ) it is apparent that the State Government had no material before it on which it could reasonably base its opinion regarding urgency. On the admitted facts the formation of the opinion regarding urgency was in excess of the power conferred on the Government. The urgency which may prompt dispensation of the provisions of S. 5-A of the Act must be of such a nature as to deny opportunity of filing objection to the persons interested in the land, must be compelling and pressing. If a declaration under S. 17(4) is made and the minimum protection which is available to, the interested persons is denied to them and if the State and its officers act in a lethargic and tardy manner by taking several months in issuing the notification and taking possession of the land, the same would be incompatible with the sense of urgency. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the provisions of S. 5-A of the Act were dispensed with in excess of its power by the State Government. 12. A Division Bench of this Court took the same view in Ajadul Bux v. State, AIR 1982 All 435 in quashing the notifications under Ss. 12. A Division Bench of this Court took the same view in Ajadul Bux v. State, AIR 1982 All 435 in quashing the notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act as there was delay or time lag of about two years between the notifications issued under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act. In Smt. Manohari Devi v. State of U.P., 1979 All CJ 163 there was a delay of one year in issuing the notification. A Division Bench of this Court held that there was no justification to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. In A.P. Sareen v. State, 1983 All LJ 1016 the acquisition proceedings were quashed on the ground that there was no material before the State Government to come to the conclusion that there was urgency and for dispensing with the summary enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that if the acquisition is for a public purpose the declaration made by the Governor regarding urgency is not justiciable. He placed reliance on a number of decisions of this Court. namely. Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 . Rajbali v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 All 78 . Sardar Singh v. State of U.P., 1983 All LJ 220, Technical Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 1984 All LJ 1093 and Anand Kishore v. State of U.P., 1984 All LJ 58. 14. We have carefully perused these decisions. It is true that in all these decisions the declaration made under S. 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act was upheld. But in each case the Court considered the material on record to satisfy itself as to whether there was any material before the State Government to enable it to bona fide form the requisite opinion. In each case relevant material was placed before the Court by means of an affidavit to justify the dispensing of the provisions of S. 5-A of the Act. Moreover, in none of these cases the time lag between the issue of notification under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act was for a period of one year. The facts and circumstances which are available on the record of the present petitions were not available in the cases relied upon by the respondents. 15. Moreover, in none of these cases the time lag between the issue of notification under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act was for a period of one year. The facts and circumstances which are available on the record of the present petitions were not available in the cases relied upon by the respondents. 15. In the result, we allow the petitions and quash the notification dated 29-4-1980 under S. 4 of the Act which contained a direction under S. 17(4) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. Since the notification under S. 4 is quashed all subsequent proceedings including the notification issued under S. 6 of the Act are rendered void. We accordingly quash the notification under S. 6 of the Act dated 1-5-1981 also. The petitioner are entitled to their costs.