Judgment Satya Brata Sanyal, J. This second appeal is at the instance of the defendant respondent which arises out of a suit for eviction under the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. 2. The plaintiff instituted a suit on 3.10.1977 (or eviction of the tenant from a shop where the defendant carries on retail sale of medicines on the ground of default in the payment of rent from January 1975 to September, 1977. Rent payable was at the rate of Rs.40/-per month by the last day of month next following when it falls due, on 24.3.1981 the plaint was amended adding a further ground for eviction i.e. personal necessity. It has been averred in paragraphs (4a), (4b) and (4e) of the plaint that his two sons have engaged themselves in various business and they have no independent premises where from they can operate. They do blacksmithy and undertake repair work of tempos and the premises in question is required for storing valuable tool for effectively carrying on their trade and business. The defendant, on the other hand stated that after December 1974 the plaintiff stopped realising rent for several months and in the month of March 1977 he paid a sum of Rs. 2.000/- towards the arrears of rent. He has challenged the service of notice under section 106 of the Transfer or Property Act. In the additional written statement it was averred by the defendant: "The suit premise in a small shop room in which the defendant is carrying on the business of retail medicine and in that shop neither the business of blacksmithy nor the boring or tubewell nor the business of Tempo repairing can be done. 3. At the time of admission of the appeal the substantial nations of law framed were-whether the lower appellate court ought to have permitted the parties to examine an expert having observed the necessity of experts evidence to prove the genuineness of Ext. A. the receipt, and ought not to have decided the question without the aid of such evidence and the other question was “whether the finding on the question of personal necessity is illegal and not binding on the appellant". 4. The court of appeal below found that the story of payment of sum of Rs. A. the receipt, and ought not to have decided the question without the aid of such evidence and the other question was “whether the finding on the question of personal necessity is illegal and not binding on the appellant". 4. The court of appeal below found that the story of payment of sum of Rs. 2000/- by the tenant to the landlord on 13.3.1977 is absolutely false and the tenant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises on account of non-payment of rent by reversing the finding of the trial court that the said sum at Rs. 2000/- was actually paid. It has further found that the requirement pleaded as to personal necessity has been proved and the said requirement is bona fide for the use and occupation of the plaintiff's two sons for their own business. 5. Mr. S.C. Ghose appearing for the appellant strongly assailed the findings of lower appellate court that a sum of Rs.2000/- was not paid. He submitted that the court of appeal below having itself criticised the trial court's role comparing the signature of the landlord on the receipt in (Ext. A) and his admitted signature usurped the ex pert's role itself when it observed: “I have myself compared the disputed and admitted signatures and I am of the opinion that the signature appearing on Ext. A differs in many respects from the admitted signature of Kishun Mistri appearing on the deposition." Learned counsel relying on the decision in Kesarbai v. Jethabhai Jivan argued that opportunity ought to have been furnished to the defendant to examine an expert for determination of the genuineness of the signature. He further questioned the finding of non-payment on the basis of other evidence referred to by the lower appellate court. Learned counsel also contended by reference to section 12 of the Act, that if the said payment of Rs. 2000/- is admitted then on the date the suit was instituted there were “no dues" payable by the tenant nor rent was in arrears. Therefore, the order of eviction on this score is against the provisions of law. 6. On the question of personal necessity, he submitted that this was brought about by amendment of the plaint at a very late stage and, therefore, is clearly an after thought, Assuming learned counsel argued that there is a personal necessity of the suit premises. Therefore, the order of eviction on this score is against the provisions of law. 6. On the question of personal necessity, he submitted that this was brought about by amendment of the plaint at a very late stage and, therefore, is clearly an after thought, Assuming learned counsel argued that there is a personal necessity of the suit premises. the court of appeal below failed to record a finding on partial eviction as required under the proviso to 12 (1) (c) al to whether the reasonable requirement of the landlord could be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest. 7. Mr. Rama Kant Verma, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court as to the non-payment of the Rs. 2000/- is both on the materials available on the record al well as the appellate court’s own eye verification of the admitted signature and the disputed signature and, therefore, it could not be interfered with in second appeal. According to learned counsel it was for the defendant to examine an expert, when the plaintiff in his evidence questioned the spuriousness of the said receipt. Alternatively, learned counsel contended that admittedly the tenant as would be evident from his written statement did not pay the rent for a considerable period. Therefore, the tenant is a defaulter and mere acceptance of the rent due does not amount to waiver of the cause of action, that is, default 8. On the question of personal necessity, Mr. Verma submitted that when the suit was instituted in the year 1977 the question of necessity did not arise. The suit remained pending for about four years and the necessity arose because of the avocation of the two sons of the plaintiff in the mean time. It only shows the bona fide of the landlord in the regard. Verma submitted that when the suit was instituted in the year 1977 the question of necessity did not arise. The suit remained pending for about four years and the necessity arose because of the avocation of the two sons of the plaintiff in the mean time. It only shows the bona fide of the landlord in the regard. On the question of partial eviction learned counsel contended that on the defendant, own averment in the additional written statement that the small shop cannot be shared conveniently by both the landlord and the tenant, the court of appeal below was discharged to record a separate finding on partial eviction as that was the position admitted by the tenant himself, true that it is dangerous to stake a decision in a case where there is a conflict of testimony between parties as to the character of a signature and the court for correct determination of the genuineness of the signature should be aided by an expert as observed by Lord Atkin in Kesarbai's Case (supra). The lower appellate court however, in the instant case has referred both to the oral evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant of the factum of payment debars the receipt (Ext. A) and concluded that the said sum of Rs.2000/- was not paid to the plaintiff. It has criticised the finding of the learned Munsif, who recorded a contrary finding, by himself comparing the signature without ascribing any scientific data on the basis of which the trial court so concluded and while doing so the lower appellate court itself looked Into the matter and observed. "The learned Munsif should not have hazarded the conclusion that the two are by one and the same person”. In my opinion, the onus was on the defendant to examine an expert when the plaintiff did not admit the receipt to be genuine. The defendant having taken the risk of not examining an expert at the earliest opportunity cannot be allowed to assail the judgment of the lower appellate court for not having afforded him an opportunity to examine an expert in the lower appellate court, which could have been only granted in exercise or/he powers under Order 41 rule 27 or the Code of Civil Procedure. The court of appeal below did not think the necessity of so doing as it concluded on the basis of other evidence on the record that there was no such payment as is said to have been evidenced by Exhibit A. The argument of Mr. Ghose that the court of appeal below has not correctly considered the other evidence is a matter of appreciation of evidence which can not be gone into while exercising powers under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by this court. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the finding of non-payment of a sum of Rs. 2000/- is not vitiated nor any substantial question of law arises in relation thereto. 9. Further I find that Mr. Ghose, learned counsel for the appellant, cannot resist the evidence on the ground of default, even assuming that the said sum of Rs.2000/- was paid before the institution of the suit. The submission that if there was no arrear on the date of the presentation of the suit there could be no cause of action for default within the meaning of section 12 (1) (d) of the Act, overlooks the entire provision of section 12 (1) (d). The laid sub-section envisages that "where the amount of two months" rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears, by not having been paid within the time fixed". “This sub-section cannot be read in the manner sought by the learned counsel, It has to be read as a whole. The word "due" must be read in conjunction with the words "within the time fixed". When there is a breach on the part of the tenant, the landlord becomes entitled to obtain a decree for eviction. Any other interpretation will make the words emphasised redundant. This is not the permissible construction of a provision of law. Further, mere acceptance of the said dues after the default has already been caused does not amount to waiver or forfeiture of a right to sue as has been held in the case of Raj Kumar Prasad v. Uchit Narain Singh. I, therefore, reject the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the tenant was not a defaulter in the eye of law. 10. I, therefore, reject the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the tenant was not a defaulter in the eye of law. 10. Coming now to the question of personal necessity, I cannot take an adverse inference because it is said that necessity was pleaded by way of amendment after about three years of the institution of the suit. It is now well settled that subsequent events have to be taken into account for the purpose of finding out whether the landlord requires the premises in possession of the tenant and the stage for taking notice of the same is when the Court is hearing the proceeding before it See M/s. Variety Emporium v. V.R.M. Mohd Ibrahim. In the instant case the need arose during the pendency of the suit because of the engagement of the two sons of the plaintiff in business It is possible that on the date when the suit was instituted there was no such bonafide need but as the time passed and the court's Inability to dispose of the suit for eviction for about three years, it is quite possible and reasonable that the sons came up of age and got themselves engaged in business. The courts below have found that the necessity of the two sons are bona fide and I do not find any reason to disbelieve that finding because the ground of personal necessity has been urged at a later date. 11. Mr. Ghose is correct that section 12 (1) (c) mandates the Court to find out whether the requirement of the landlord can be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building. It is further true that the word "substantially" can notes not fully satisfied but reasonably satisfied (See Nasirul Haque v. Jitendra Nath Dey) The proviso to section 12 (1) (c) further requires that the tenant agrees to such part occupation. In that event the Court shall pass a decree accordingly and fix a proportionately fair rent. It has been held by this Court in the case of Kedarnath Bohri v. Md. Safiulla (1983 P.L.J.R. 759). while determining the question of partial eviction, it is the duty of the Court to See whether the premises can be shared for two separate businesses smoothly, conveniently and profitably. The compatibility of two businesses is also a relevant consideration. It has been held by this Court in the case of Kedarnath Bohri v. Md. Safiulla (1983 P.L.J.R. 759). while determining the question of partial eviction, it is the duty of the Court to See whether the premises can be shared for two separate businesses smoothly, conveniently and profitably. The compatibility of two businesses is also a relevant consideration. In the instant case the defendant himself has averred in his pleading that the shop is too small to be shared by the landlord and the tenant. This only manifests that two business cannot be carried on conveniently from the said small shop. It is, therefore, clear that the tenant' showed his disagreement to part occupation of the small premises with the landlord. In my opinion, it was in that view of the matter that the Court did not resort to the proviso to, section 12 (1) (c) and consider the question separately. I do not think that the judgment of the court of appeal below is vitiated on this account. 12. I may, however, state here that during the course of argument learned counsel for the defendant proposed that his client would be satisfied if 4' width of the shop is allowed to him giving the remaining 6' width of the shop to the landlord. Mr. Verma took one day’s time in order to consult his client and communicated to me when the matter was taken up that the balance of 6' width of the shop will not even substantially satisfy the need of his client. It would be wholly frustrative. 13. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs, Appeal dismissed.