JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - The judgment of the court below is being assailed by the plaintiff in this Second Appeal. 2. The dispute relates to some agricultural land which is situated within the limits of Ramnagar in the erstwhile Benaras State. One Amar Deo was a fixed rate tenant of the disputed land under the tenancy laws then applicable to the area as adopted by the Benaras State Constitutional Laws and Procedure Act 1915. On his death Smt. Munnan acquired life interest in his property as devolution to the land was governed by the personal law of the parties. She executed a gift deed in respect of her rights in favour of the plaintiff's father on 10th January, 1927. However, on her death in 1946, the life interest which she possessed came to an end and the rights reverted back to the heirs of her husband. The defendant claimed to be the next reversioner and thus entitled to the land. According to the plaintiff despite the fact that Smt. Munnan had died in 1946, they continued to remain in possession and they are also recorded as fixed rate tenants from 1353 Fasli (1946) and thus became fixed rate tenants in their own right. In fact in the petition under Section 159 of the Benaras State Tenancy Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as 'the 1949 Act', they claimed themselves to be entitled to the land under the original gift deed dated 10-1-1927. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been forcibly dispossessed in 1367 Fasli (1960) by the defendant giving rise to the present suit in 1962. 3. The defendants denied the right claimed by the plaintiff and asserted that they being near reversioners they were entitled to the land and as they continued to remain in possession. It was asserted that as no forcible possession was taken in 1367 Fasli, the suit was not maintainable. 4. In 1915 when the Benaras State Constitutional Law and Procedure Act was enforced, the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901 was in force and it applied to the area included in the Benaras State. The right of succession was according to the personal law applicable to the concerned person and there was no separate mode of succession in respect of agricultural land. Admittedly, the same position continued till 1949 when the Act of 1949. was enforced with effect from 24-5-1949. The right of succession was according to the personal law applicable to the concerned person and there was no separate mode of succession in respect of agricultural land. Admittedly, the same position continued till 1949 when the Act of 1949. was enforced with effect from 24-5-1949. Thereafter the merger of Benaras State in U.P. took place partly on 30th September, 1952 and partly on 1st July, 1954. However, when the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force, the Act of 1949 was not repealed as it was omitted from Schedule 1 framed under Section 339 of that Act. It was only some times in 1974 or thereabouts that the Urban Area Zamindari Abolition Act was enforced in the area where the land in dispute is situate. Therefore, the legal position is that from 1946 when Smt. Munnan died to 25th May, 1949, the Act of 1949 was applicable and it continued to apply till 1974 as the area is within the Municipal limits. 5. Admittedly Amar Deo was the fixed rate tenant and those rights devolved on his widow which she gifted to the plaintiff's father under the gift deed dated 10-1-1927. Since she herself held limited life interest, the rights transferred by her under the gift deed could not be extended and, therefore, on her death in 1916, her rights would come to her husband's nearest reversioners. The defendant and his brothers admittedly are the nearest reversioners, the plaintiffs being only Matra Bandhus, and these rights devolved on them in 1946. Nothing appears to have been done by them to regain possession over the land. The courts below have found that possession had been taken by the appellant in 1367 Fasli as alleged by the plaintiffs. The question therefore, arises as to whether they had any right left in the land in question in that year. Section 13 of the Act of 1949 defines a fixed rate tenant. Section 14 deals with presumptions from an entry made during revision of records. This section is relevant for our purposes and may be quoted below : "14. Presumption from entry at revision of record. Section 13 of the Act of 1949 defines a fixed rate tenant. Section 14 deals with presumptions from an entry made during revision of records. This section is relevant for our purposes and may be quoted below : "14. Presumption from entry at revision of record. - Every entry at the last revision of records before the commencement of this Act recording a person as a permanent tenure-holder, or a fixed rate tenant, or otherwise, shall in the absence of a judicial decision to the contrary in proceedings instituted before the commencement of this Act, be conclusive proof that such person is a permanent tenure-holder, or a fixed rate tenant, or not, as the case may be." 6. According to the aforesaid provision, every entry which records any person as a fixed rate tenant in the last revision of records before the Act was enforced would be conclusive proof that such person was the fixed rate tenant subject to any decision in any proceedings commenced before the enforcement of the Act. Admittedly no proceeding was pending on behalf of the respondents in any court at the time when the 1949 Act was enforced from 24th May, 1949. The last revision of records prior to 1949 Act coming into force was made in 1353 Fasli. A faint effort was made by Sri Shitla Prasad for the respondent that this was not the last revision of records. However, from grounds of appeal Nos. 4 and 6 taken by the respondent himself in the court below, it is admitted that the last revision of records had taken place in 1353 Fasli. In the face of this admission, the respondent cannot urge that it was not the last revision of records. In view of the conclusiveness attached to the entry under Section 14, it is obvious that from 1353 Fasli the appellants were the fixed rate tenants of the disputed land. The position continued even thereafter without respondent taking any steps to evict the appellants. Admittedly no proceeding was taken by the respondent in this behalf although it is contended that he was already in possession since the death of Smt. Munnan. However, the courts below have recorded a finding that dispossession of the appellant had taken place in 1367 Fasli as alleged in the plaint. Admittedly no proceeding was taken by the respondent in this behalf although it is contended that he was already in possession since the death of Smt. Munnan. However, the courts below have recorded a finding that dispossession of the appellant had taken place in 1367 Fasli as alleged in the plaint. This also finds supports from the entry of the name of the appellant as fixed rate tenant in the record of 1353 Fasli which continued even thereafter. There is no escape from the conclusion, therefore, that the plaintiffs had been in possession as before even after 1946 after the death of Smt. Munnan and have been evicted forcibly only in 1960 equivalent in 1367 Fasli. 7. It is urged that on account of continuous possession for almost 16 years, the right of the respondent, if any, came to an end as no proceeding to evict was taken against the plaintiff-appellant by the respondent. It is submitted that Section 28 of the Limitation Act of 1908 replaced by Section 27 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the defendant's right had come to an end. Sri Shitla Prasad, however, submitted that Section 28 of the Limitation Act did not apply and a special limitation has been provided under the 1949 Act. Apart from this, there is no period of limitation provided under the 1949 Act for the purpose and as such the respondent's right has not extinguished even today. 8. Under Section 221 of the 1919 Act, only Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908 was made applicable to proceedings under that Act. Section 222 provided that a suit or other proceedings specified in the Third Schedule shall be guided by the limitation prescribed in that Schedule Prima facie it would appear that there is no scope for applying Section 28 to this case. However, it is well settled that even though Section 28 of the Limitation Act may not apply in terms to such cases yet the principle underlying the Section would be applicable. In Nanhey Khan v. Ganpathi, AIR 1954 Hyderabad 45 a Full Bench of Hyderabad High Court held that on the expiry of the period of limitation the right of the minor in the property stood extinguished even though the transfer made by his guardian was without any authority. In Nanhey Khan v. Ganpathi, AIR 1954 Hyderabad 45 a Full Bench of Hyderabad High Court held that on the expiry of the period of limitation the right of the minor in the property stood extinguished even though the transfer made by his guardian was without any authority. In Vidya Dutt v. Jagnandan Das, AIR 1969 Allahabad 31 a learned Single Judge of this Court was dealing with the Tehri and Garhwal Limitation Act which did not contain any provision like Section 28. It was held that even though Section 28 of the Limitation Act did not apply, the principle underlying the section would be applicable. It was also held that in order to apply Section 28 of the Limitation Act or the principles thereof, it was not necessary that adverse possession or independent possession of the defendant may be essential. Similarly in Deen Dayal v. Raja Ram, AIR 1970 SC 1019 their Lordships of the Supreme Court had this to say on this question : "It is well settled that the principle underlying Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (same as Section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963) is of general application. It is not confined to suits and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act." 9. Thus if it is found that the defendants failed to seek eviction of the plaintiffs within the prescribed period of time and that time had expired, then their right to the claim propounded by them would stand extinguished and it will not be permissible for them to stake a claim on its basis. Section 28 of the old Limitation Act reads as under : "At the determination or the period hereby limited to any person or for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to property shall be extinguished. 10. To apply the provisions of this Section, it is necessary that the suit should be for possession of any property and the suit must be filed within the time prescribed for instituting such suit. There is no doubt that the defendants on the basis of their claim to the property as the nearest revisioners of Smt. Munnan were supposed to bring a suit for possession against the plaintiffs after her death. There is no doubt that the defendants on the basis of their claim to the property as the nearest revisioners of Smt. Munnan were supposed to bring a suit for possession against the plaintiffs after her death. If no period of limitation is prescribed for the purpose, then the said right shall still survive and Section 28 of the Limitation Act shall have no application thereto. In case it is found that there was a period of limitation and the defendant had failed to bring the suit within the prescribed period of limitation, then the right claimed by him would clearly stand extinguished. 11. Sri Shitla Prasad has submitted that for ejectment of a person who had taken possession or was retaining possession of the land without the written consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such land, a proceeding under Section 159 has to be taken for which a period of limitation is prescribed under Item No. 17 of Schedule III of the Act. The said provision may be quoted below: SI. No. Section of Act Description of suits Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run Proper Court fee Do 17 159 For the ejectment of a person occupying land without title and for damage. None None As in the Court-fees Act. 1870 (1) If the land is contiguous to any other land lawfully occupied by such person. (a) if such person has at the commencement of this Act, occupied the land for more than six years since the land-holder first knew of the unauthorised occupation. Twelve years When the land holder first knew of the unauthorised occupation. As in the Court-fees Act, 1870, on the rent payable. (b) in any other case. Six years From the 1st July, following the date of such occupation or following the date of the commencement of this Act, whichever is later. - do - (2) in any other case. (a) If such person has at the commencement of this Act, occupied the land for more than nine years since the land-holder first knew of the unauthorised occupation. Twelve years When the land holder first knew of authorised occupation. -do- (b) in any other case. Three years From the 1st July following the date of the unauthorised occupation or following the date of the commencement of this Act whichever is later. Twelve years When the land holder first knew of authorised occupation. -do- (b) in any other case. Three years From the 1st July following the date of the unauthorised occupation or following the date of the commencement of this Act whichever is later. As in the Court-fees Act 1870 on the rent payable. 12. The argument of the respondent is that for ejectment of such a person, no period of limitation is prescribed because in columns 4 and 5 of the Schedule, the word 'none' has been written. This argument is countered by Sri R. N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, by submitting that the use of the word 'none' in columns 3 and 4 against Serial No. 17 is a mistake and appears to have been copied from Item Nos. 15 and 16 against which in these columns the word 'none' has been used. If the word 'none' is taken to be existing against Item No. 17 then the whole provision will make no sense and these words must, therefore, be ignored. A reading of column 3 of the Schedule will show that the proceeding under Section 159 envisages ejectment of a person occupying land without title and for damage. This broad heading has been sub-divided into part (1) and (2). Part (1) deals with a case where the land on which possession is sought is continuous to any other land lawfully occupied by such person is against whom ejectment is sought. Part (2) however deals with the remaining cases. Part (1) is again sub-divided into parts (a) and (b). Part (a) speaks of a person who has been in possession for more than six years over the land which is subject of proceedings from the date of the knowledge of such occupation by the landholder reckoned from the date of the commencement of the Act. In such cases, the period for instituting such proceedings is 12 years. In other cases, it is six years. The words "in any other case" under sub-heading (b) refers to those cases where such possession may have commenced within six years of the commencement of the Act or thereafter. Whereas clause (a) would apply to all those cases where such possession was taken more than six years before the commencement of the Act. The words "in any other case" under sub-heading (b) refers to those cases where such possession may have commenced within six years of the commencement of the Act or thereafter. Whereas clause (a) would apply to all those cases where such possession was taken more than six years before the commencement of the Act. Similarly in Part (2), which applied to those cases where the land in dispute is not contiguous to any other land lawfully in occupation of the person sought to be evicted and the only land in the area in possession of an evictee is the land in dispute itself, if the possession was more than nine years old at the time of the commencement of the Act, then the period of limitation will be twelve years from the date of the knowledge of the landholder about such unauthorised occupation. Where the occupation of the unauthorised occupant is less than nine years or commenced after the commencement of the Act, the period of limitation would be three years from the date mentioned in Serial No. 5. 13. It appears that there could be no occasion for mentioning any period of limitation or even the word 'none' against the preamble of description because the period had to be prescribed with reference to the nature of right and the period of occupation as detailed in the latter part of entry under part (1) and part (2) of Column 3. The entry 'none' against the first portion of column 3 appears to be totally unwarranted and would lead to an absurd result. There appears to be, therefore, sufficient force in the submissions made by the appellant in this respect and it must be held that the maximum period within which the suit for possession could be filed against an authorised occupant was twelve years irrespective the fact whether Part (1) or Part (2) of this provision applied to a genuine case. Thus the appellants having become fixed rate tenants since 1953 Fasli, they could be evicted only by 1365 Fasli and if this was not done the rights of the respondent would become extinguished thereafter. When the defendant dispossessed the plaintiff in 1367 Fasli, his right to the property had already become extinguished and the nature of his possession thereafter would be unauthorised. When the defendant dispossessed the plaintiff in 1367 Fasli, his right to the property had already become extinguished and the nature of his possession thereafter would be unauthorised. After 1365 Fasli, the plaintiffs would become the persons authorised to admit a person to occupy a plot as a fixed rate tenant. The suit of this nature could be filed and the minimum period of limitation for such a suit is three years irrespective of the fact whether it is covered by Part (1) or Part (2) of Entry 17 in Schedule III of the Act. 14. It has been urged by the respondent that the proceedings under Section 159 could not be taken against him and the proper course was to bring a proceeding under Section 162 of the Act. Section 162 applies to a case where a tenant has been ejected from or prevented from obtaining possession of his holding by his landholder. It has no application to the case like the one before me because the plaintiffs are not the tenants of the defendant. The predecessors of the defendant were also fixed rate tenants and they also acquired right as a fixed rate tenant in view of Section 14 of the Act as already discussed earlier. To a case like the one before me, only Section 159 can apply because it refers to occupation of plot without the written consent of a person entitled to admit him to occupy any land which was not in accordance with law. The very fact that the defendant had occupied the land forcibly shows that the occupation of the defendant was otherwise than in accordance with law. After acquiring rights as a fixed rate tenant on the strength of the entry in the last revision of records which took place in 1353 Fasli and in view of the right of a fixed rate tenant to sublet the land under Section 24, the plaintiffs were the persons entitled to admit a person to occupy the land. Therefore, in my opinion Section 159 would apply to the facts of the case and a proceeding under that section was proper and legally maintainable. 15. Therefore, in my opinion Section 159 would apply to the facts of the case and a proceeding under that section was proper and legally maintainable. 15. In the result, the respondent is an unauthorised occupant of the land in which the plaintiffs were fixed rate tenants and since the proceedings had been started within three years from the date of their dispossession, the same was within time and was also in accordance with law. The view to the contrary taken by the court below is not at all justified in the circumstances of the case. 16. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The suit of the plaintiff under Section 159 shall stand decreed. However, I will make no order as to costs.