GUMAN MAL LODHA, J.—A preliminary objection has been taken by Shri P.D. Mathur, the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents that since the sole plaintiff appellant-Gopi Chand expired in March, 1977, the suit for pre-emption cannot survive and the legal representatives cannot continue it. 2. It is not disputed that the sole plaintiff-Gopichand has expired in 1977 when this appeal was pending. It is also not in dispute that at the relevant time, when the cause of action for this suit arose, there were no statutory law for pre-emption in the form of Rajasthan Pre-emption Act. It is also common ground that even though there was no statutory law of pre-emption yet in the former Jaipur State, the custom of pre-emption used to prevail, based on the Mohammedan Law. It is also common ground that this custom of pre-emption based on Mohd. Law was later on modified by a notification of 1927. 3. It is also common ground that both the lower courts have dismissed the suit for pre-emption on various grounds and one of the ground is that the requirements of Talab was not fulfilled. 4. Now. the controversy is, whether in the above state of circumstances, the objection deserves to be accepted or is to be rejected. Both the lower courts have referred to a number of decisions, in this respect. 5. In Mohd. Ismail Vs. Abdul Rashid (1) it has been held that if the pre-emptor-plaintiff died before the decree is passed, the right cannot survive to the heirs. Two reasons have been given by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, in that case, one, that the pre-emptor must be possessed of the property on account of which he claims pre-emption on the date of the sale; second, that, the pre-emptor must be firmly possessed of his own property till the date of the decree in his favour, and if he dies before that date, this condition is not fulfilled. The Full Bench further held that this right assumes a personal aspect for the purposes of enforcement in a court of law; but if the decree is passed then the right becomes a proprietory right fit to be transferred as well as the inherited. 6. The Full Bench further held that this right assumes a personal aspect for the purposes of enforcement in a court of law; but if the decree is passed then the right becomes a proprietory right fit to be transferred as well as the inherited. 6. The above principle of law laid down by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, based on the three-fold reasons, extracted above, deserves to be applied in the facts and circumstances of each case. 7. Before I may consider their application it must be further mentioned that their Lordships of the Apex Court in Hazari Vs. Neki (dead) by his legal representatives (2) observed as under : "5. It is necessary to emphasise that we are dealing in this case with the statutory right of pre-emption under Punjab Act 1 of 1913 and its subsequent amendments and not with the right of pre-emption under the Moham-madan Law. In regard to the latter right it has been held that according to the Mohammadan Law applicable to the Sunny sect if a plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption has not obtained his decree for pre-emption in his life time the right to sue does not survive to his heirs. See Mohammed Hussain Vs. Niamat-un-nissa, (1897) ILR 20 All 88 It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this point in the present case." 8. In Gopal Vs. Haridutt Sharam (3) it was observed that the custom of pre-emption was recognised in Jaipur City even earlier, that it was found on the Mohammedan Law but was modified by the notification regarding Talabs. 9. This Court in Pyare Mohan Vs. Rameshwar (4) has, in terms, held that if there is death of the pre-emptor, the right does not survive to heirs. The decision in Mohd. Ismail Vs. Abdul Rashid (supra) by the Fall Bench of Allahabad High Court was followed by this Court in Pyare Mohans case (supra). 10. In Bharat Singh Vs. Kallu Singh (5) it has been reiterated that the right of pre-limation is purely a personal right and it becomes to an end with the death of the pre-emptor. It was held in terms that the legal representatives cannot continue in that suit for pre-emption. 11. 10. In Bharat Singh Vs. Kallu Singh (5) it has been reiterated that the right of pre-limation is purely a personal right and it becomes to an end with the death of the pre-emptor. It was held in terms that the legal representatives cannot continue in that suit for pre-emption. 11. Confronted with the above, Shri Dalip Singh the learned Advocate for the plaintiff-appellant submitted that in Allahabad case (supra) in para 12, it has been observed that, where the pre-emption arises under the terms of a wajib-ul-arz, the right is heritable. It was also pointed out in this para that even when the pre-emptor dies after the judgment of the trial Court, the legal heirs can continue because, the judgment of the appellate court would only give the decree which the trial Court should have or could have given. 12. In this very para 12, it has been mentioned that the above judgments are based on customary law of pre-emption on the terms of wajib-ul-arz. 13. Obviously, in the present case, it has not been pointed out, that the right of pre-emption which was prevailing in the former Jaipur State till the coming into force of the present Act, was either analogous or in similar terms to what was contained in wajib-ul-arz in Punjab in those days. 14. Thus, in view of the above series of decisions and particularly the decisions of Allahabad High Court (FB) in Mohd. Ismail Vs. Rashid (supra) so also the decisions of the Apex Court in Hazari vs. Neki (supra), and also of this Court, referred to above, it is not passible to take the view that in cases based on right of pre-emption as it existed before coming i to force of the present Act of Pre-emption in Rajasthan, the legal heirs are entitled to continue in the suit even though the pre-emptor dies before the decree is passed. 15. It is thus being the clear, patent and legal position having no doubt or debate, I have got no option but to accept the preliminary objection raised by Shri P.D. Mathur, the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents. 16. 15. It is thus being the clear, patent and legal position having no doubt or debate, I have got no option but to accept the preliminary objection raised by Shri P.D. Mathur, the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents. 16. Consequently, this appeal abates as after the death of the sole plain-tiff-Gopichand so far as the right to claim the decree based on pre-emption on the basis of the custom which was prevalent earlier coming, into force of the Rajasthan Act is concerned, the legal heirs of Gopichand cannot claim it and continue to sue. 17. The appeal is dismissed. The parties would bear their own costs, through-out.