JUDGMENT : K.P. Singh, J. This is a tenant's writ petition against the judgment of Sri Usha Kant Verma, III Additional District Judge, Kanpur dated 8-4-1981 in Rent Appeal No. 176 of 1978 between Smt. Rahimunnisa and Riazul Haq. It arises out of an application u/s 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No 13 of 1972 filed by contesting opposite party Smt. Rahimunnisa. 2. The landlady, contesting opposite party No. 2 in the present writ petition, had applied for release of the accommodation in question on the ground of bonafide need. She had mentioned in her application that there were 12 members in her family and she bonafide required the premises in question. Her claim was contested by the Petitioner on the ground that the landlady had unnecessarily inflated the number of members in her family and that two sons lived separately from her since long more than 10 years and that their need could not be taken into account in the application filed by the landlady, and various other pleas were taken. 3. The Prescribed Authority in its order, dated 16-9-1978 accepted the pleas raised on beheld of the Defendant-Petitioner and rejected the application Bled by the contesting opposite party. Against the judgment of the Trial Court the landlady had preferred an appeal which has been allowed by the appellate court through its order dated 8-4-81. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court the tenant Petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has 'Contended before me that the landlady got an accommodation during the pendency of the application for release and that accommodation was considered sufficient for her need by the Trial Court and the lower appellate court has not addressed itself to that question and has patently erred in allowing the appeal. 5. The second contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner is that two sons of the contesting opposite party were living separately for the last ten years, yet their needs have been taken into account by the lower appellate court while considering the release application filed by the contesting opposite party. 6. The learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to support the impugned judgment. 6. The learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to support the impugned judgment. According to him the needs of the two sons of the contesting opposite party could be taken into account according to the definition of the term 'family' defined under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. He has emphasised that in view of the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court the Defendant-Petitioner cannot get any relief by this Court in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this connection he has placed reliance upon the ruling reported in AIR 1978 SC 28 , Mwmi Lal v. The Prescribed Authority as well as the ruling reported in 1979 ARC 269 J.N. Bhatia v. The District Judge Shcthjahanpur and 1979 ARC 433, Sarvottam Bhargava v. The District Judge Lucknow. 7. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 8. The Trial Court has recorded the following finding in support of its conclusion: ...It was asserted by the opposite party that two sons who are living separately are living separately not on account of paucity of accommodation but on account of other reasons, although the landlady and the sons have denied this assertion of O.P. but the fact that they are living separately since last more than 10 years has not specifically been denied and in these circumstances I see no reason why the assertion of the opposite party should not be relied. Since the two sons are living separately for the last more than 10 years and also there is no threat of their being evicted, they have sufficient accommodation in their possession so while considering the needs of the landlady the needs of these two sons who are already living separately and comfortably should not be considered. 9. The appellate court has recorded the following finding in paragraph 4 of its judgment: ...The Respondent, however, has pleaded that the Appellant had been rough towards the wives of her sons and so sons went to live "separately and were not desirous of living with the Appellant. The husband of the Appellant controverted the affidavit of the Respondent that his sons had no intention to live with him. He, however, averred in the affidavit that due to the paucity of accommodation in his house the peace in the family slightly affected. The husband of the Appellant controverted the affidavit of the Respondent that his sons had no intention to live with him. He, however, averred in the affidavit that due to the paucity of accommodation in his house the peace in the family slightly affected. The affidavit filed by the husband of the Appellant Abdul Majid does inspire confidence. The Respondent in his affidavit has not given details of the quarrel between the Appellant and the wives of her sons. I am unable under the circumstances to infer that the relations between the Appellant and her sons were so bad that they would not come to live with their parents and look after them in their old age. The Respondent is merely paying Rs. 15/- by way of rent whereas the sons of the Appellant together are paying Rs. 35/-. The sons of the Appellant even on the ground of economy would be interested in coming to live with her. The finding of the Prescribed Authority-cum-I Civil Judge that they were not interested in residing with the Appellant and her husband is purely conjecture and is against the probabilities of human behaviour. The husband of the Appellant had retired and he certainly needs help of his sons which he is not in a position to get as there is not enough accommodation with him, in his house wherein he could ask his sons to shift. 10. To my mind the findings recorded by both the courts below are plausible findings. I am unable to hold that the findings recorded by the appellate court suffer from patent error of law or the findings recorded by it are perverse. 11. Section 3(g) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 defines the term 'family' as below: (g) 'family', in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building means, his or her; (i) Spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents, grand parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant as may have been normally residing with him or her and includes in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building. 12. 12. In view of the definition of the term 'family' quoted above I think that the appellate court was fully justified in considering the claim of the contesting opposite party taking into account the need of her sons as well. In view of the authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the contesting opposite party I think that the tenant-Petitioner cannot successfully challenge the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court in the present case. The findings on question of bonafide need as well as on question of hardship are findings of fact which cannot be termed as perverse or without any basis in evidence in the circumstances of the present case. Even if I agree with the conclusions recorded by the Trial Court on different grounds I would not be justified in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court in exercise of my powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in the present case. 13. In the result the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.