Judgment :- 1. The tenant in a rent control petition for eviction of a building is the revision petitioner. The landlord filed the petition for eviction under S.11 (3) and 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Rent Control Court held that the petitioner is not entitled for eviction under both these sub-sections, and accordingly dismissed the petition. However the Appellate Authority allowed eviction under both these sub-sections. The Revisional Court allowed eviction only under S.11(3) of the Act. The tenant is challenging the order of the revisional court in this Civil Revision Petition. 2. The petition schedule building is one part of a building consisting of three residential units. The landlord was residing in his official quarters as Manager of Spencer & Company Ltd. When he was transferred to Coimbatore, he was directed to vacate the official quarters. Since the petitioner could not take his family to Coimbatore, and in view of the difficulties stated in the petition, he wanted the eviction of the tenants in the entire building consist ing of three separate portions. The tenant contended that there are no grounds for evicting him. The other two portions of this building will be sufficient for the landlord. As stated above, the District Court has allowed eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. 3. Ext.C-1(a) is a rough plan of the building showing the three parts. The petition schedule building, the present No. of which is 5/946, is the easternmost portion of the building. The general description of that portion as well as the description of the other two portions of the building are given by the Commissioner in Ext. C-1 report. At present the landlord is in possession of the two remaining portions of this building, since the tenants therein vacated the premises and handed over possession to the landlord, at his request. At the time of filing of the rent control petition, the landlord was temporarily continuing to occupy his official quarters out of grace shown by the company, even though he was transferred from that station. At the time of filing of the rent control petition, the landlord was temporarily continuing to occupy his official quarters out of grace shown by the company, even though he was transferred from that station. One of the main contentions of the learned counsel for the tenant is that the landlord has subsequent to the filing of the petition obtained possession of portion of the same building and therefore the petition for eviction is really under S.11 (8) namely for additional accommodation and not under S.11(3). In case such a proper petition was filed, the tenant could have sought for reliefs under the first proviso to S.11(10) of the Act under which the eviction petition is liable to be rejected if the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting the relief will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. As it is, the tenant was unable to put forward such a contention since the relief is granted under S.11(3) of the Act. Though S.11 (8) is also mentioned in the petition for eviction, the averments therein would go to show that the landlord was not in possession of any portion of the building at the time of filing of the petition. It is only stated therein that the landlord requires the building as a whole including the portion in the possession of the tenant herein. 4. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner the revisional court ought to have taken cognizance of the subsequent event, namely, the landlord got vacant possession of a portion of the building in question. For that proposition the learned counsel places reliance on the decision reported in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (A. I. R.1975 SC 1409). So also it was submitted that the condition existing at the time of disposal of the eviction petition is to be taken note of. Accordingly the submission is that the landlond ought to have amended the petition for eviction and confined his prayer to one for eviction under S.11 (8). 5. Learned counsel for the landlord pointed out that whether the eviction is sought for under S.11 (3) or 11 (8), the landlord has established a, case warranting eviction. So also there is no basis for the contention that the inconvenience to the tenant is greater than the inconvenience to the landlord as per the evidence in this case. 5. Learned counsel for the landlord pointed out that whether the eviction is sought for under S.11 (3) or 11 (8), the landlord has established a, case warranting eviction. So also there is no basis for the contention that the inconvenience to the tenant is greater than the inconvenience to the landlord as per the evidence in this case. Even if the "rigorous test" mentioned in some of the decisions is applied, the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant in this case. 6. Even the Rent Control Court which dismissed the petition found that the bona fide need alleged by the landlord for getting eviction is true. According to the landlord his children are studying in the local schools and colleges and therefore he cannot take his family to Coimbatore, where he is not provided with official quarters. It has come out in evidence that subsequently he is working at Ernakulam and therefore also he requires the building. The two other portions of the building were also required by the landlord and at his request those two tenants have vacated the portions occupied by them. The three units are under the same roof and it cannot be said that the petitioner owns and possesses two buildings other than the petition schedule building herein. The Appellate Authority as well as the District Court have examined the commissioner's report and sketch and have observed that there is only one bed room in the two units in the possession of the landlord. There is only one common latrine for all the three units. The appellate authority has examined the case on both grounds namely under S.11 (3) and 11 (8). At the time when the landlord was examined as P. W.1 he has given evidence that he is already in occupation of a portion of this building and that he requires additional accommodation and so he is entitled to get vacant possession of the petition schedule rooms also. Even in the application for eviction the landlord has stated that for the residence of himself and his family the entire building consisting of all the three units is bonafide required. The family of the landlord consists of himself and his wife and six grown up children, the eldest being a girl. The fact that there is only one common latrine for all the three units is not disputed. The family of the landlord consists of himself and his wife and six grown up children, the eldest being a girl. The fact that there is only one common latrine for all the three units is not disputed. In the two units in the possession of the landlord there is only one bed room. Under the circumstances, I see no illegality in the finding of the courts below that the landlord bona fide requires the petition schedule premises. 7. Then the question is whether the petition ought to have been filed under S.11 (8) since, according to the learned counsel for the tenant, the degree of proof to be adduced by the landlord in a petition under S.11(8) will be more than the degree of proof in a petition under S.11(3). According to learned counsel, the hardship which may be caused to the tenant in case eviction is ordered will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. In fact the Appellate Authority held that the claim of the landlord for eviction can be allowed under S.11(8) also. 8. Under S.11(3) the landlord is allowed to get eviction "if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him". Under S.11(8) a landlord who is occupying a part of the building may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use. In S.2(1) of the Act, building is defined as including a part of a building. Therefore prima facie I see no bar in invoking the provisions of S.11(3) and 11(8) together. 9. Subramonian Poti, J, as he then was, has in Subramania Iyer v. Krishnaswamy (I.L.R.1981 (2) Kerala 442) and in Lakshmana Naikan v. Gopalakrishna Pillai (1981 K.L.T. 167) considered the principles applicable in a case of a petition under S.11(8) and observed in the former case at Para.3 page 448 as follows: "Then what has to be considered first is whether the additional accommodation is required for the personal use of the landlord. Personal use in this context is not necessarily use by himself but by the members of his family who want to live with him. Personal use in this context is not necessarily use by himself but by the members of his family who want to live with him. xxx xxx xxx xxx In other words where the court is called upon to assess the need of a person for additional accommodation, the test may be more rigorous. If he could do without such accommodation, the court may say so. But, even if he could do without such additional accommodation, but such accommodation would normally enhance the convenience of his living, then be can very well require such convenience. This is to be found at the first stage. If the court finds that such claim is not bona fide in the sense that it is not honestly made, either because be wants to evict the tenant on this ground or for other ulterior purposes, then, the court can rightly reject the claim of the landlord. xxx xxx xxx xxx 4. In this case there must be considerable confusion in the minds of the courts below as to the scope or applicability of S.11(8) of the Act. In this case eviction is sought on grounds falling under sub-sections (3) and (8) of S.11 of the Act. These two provisions are mutually exclusive and when the Statue itself provides these two independent provisions, they are capable of being construed as serving independent and different purposes." In the latter case the learned judge made the following observation-(Paragraph 3-1981 KLT 167 at page 169): "Of course the test of bona fide need under S.11(3) would be more rigorous than the test under S.11(8). xxx xxx xxx xxx Therefore, the test of bona fides under S.11(8) read with S.11(10) is not whether the landlord would very well afford to live without the additional accommodation, but whether in seeking the additional accommodation the landlord is pleading an honest purpose and not merely setting up an excuse to obtain eviction." Khalid J., as he then was, in Abdul Rahiman v. Ramankutty Moothan (1983 K.L.T. 726) held as follows: "In an application under S.11(8) the court has to test the bona fides of the requirement. It has also to consider the first proviso to S.11(10). If the evidence satisfies both these requirements, the landlord is entitled to an order in his favour." The learned judge further held (para 13): "According to me, S.11(3),11(4) (iv) and 11(8) are independent provisions. It has also to consider the first proviso to S.11(10). If the evidence satisfies both these requirements, the landlord is entitled to an order in his favour." The learned judge further held (para 13): "According to me, S.11(3),11(4) (iv) and 11(8) are independent provisions. In all these cases the requirement should be bona fide. But the nature of the requirement in each section is different. In certain cases, the shades of requirement may overlap. But each section operates independent of the other. It may be that in certain cases the Court may while odering eviction under S.11(3) permit the landlord to occupy it after necessary alterations or reconstruction. But a combined order for eviction under S.11(3),11(4)(iv) and 11(8) cannot be passed, for these sections prescribe different post-eviction conditions." 10. No doubt there is an observation in Subramania Iyer v. Krishnaswamy, (I.L.R.1981 (2) Kerala 442) that the provisions under sub-sections (3; and (8) to S.11 are mutually exclusive. But the learned judge was not considering specifically the question whether reliefs can be sought for under both these provisions. So also in that judgment there is no finding as such that a petition in which reliefs under sub-sections (3) and (8) are prayed for is not maintainable. The learned judge only clarified the circumstances under which sub-sections (3) and (8) can be resorted to. Really in that case the learned judge was not called upon to consider a case where both these provisions may be applicable. However in Abdul Rahiman v. Ramankutty Moothan (1983 K.L.T 726) Khalid J. (as he then was) has specifically indicated that in certain cases the shades of requirements for granting reliefs under S.11(3) and 11(8) may overlap eventhough each sub-section operates independent of the other. In that decision also the learned judge was not considering whether a petition under S.11(3) and S.11(8) will be maintainable or not. However, in Mohammed v. Abdul Rahiman (1983 K.L.T. 374) Balakrishna Menon J: had to consider specifically whether the landlord can apply under both these subsections. In that decision also the learned judge was not considering whether a petition under S.11(3) and S.11(8) will be maintainable or not. However, in Mohammed v. Abdul Rahiman (1983 K.L.T. 374) Balakrishna Menon J: had to consider specifically whether the landlord can apply under both these subsections. The learned judge observed in Para.4 of the judgment as follows; "Learned counsel for the revision petitioners contended that since part of the building is in the possession of the landlord himself, it is not open to him to apply for eviction under sub-section (3) of S.11 and the only ground on which he can seek eviction is under sub-section (8) of S.11 of the Act. S.11 of the Act enacts that a tenant shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and enumerates the grounds on which the landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for the eviction of the tenant. Under the general law of landlord and tenant, a landlord is entitled to evict the tenant on the determination of the lease. S.111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the various modes under which a lease of immovable property determines. Under clause (q) of S.108 of the T,P. Act the lessee is bound to put the lessor in possession of the property on the determination of the lease. The preamble to the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 states the purpose of the Act is to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings in the State. It is in the context of acute scarcity of residential and non-residential accommodation that the Act was passed restricting the right of the landlord k) evict the tenants. Under sub-section (3) of S.11 of the Act. the landlord in bona fide need of the building for the occupation of himself or of any member of his family dependant on him may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The expression'building' as defined in the Act includes part of a building. Sub-section. the landlord in bona fide need of the building for the occupation of himself or of any member of his family dependant on him may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The expression'building' as defined in the Act includes part of a building. Sub-section. (8) of S.11 enacts another ground, as per which a landlord in occupation of a part of the building may apply for the eviction of the tenant in occupation of the whole or any portion of the remaining part if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use. Sub-sections (3) and (S) of S.11 are not mutually exclusive. If both the grounds are available to the landlord it is open to him to apply for eviction on either of the grounds or on both. The mere fact that there is a specific provision applicable to a situation where the landlord is in occupation of a part of a building and the remaining portion or part thereof is in the possession of a tenant, does not preclude the landlord from seeking eviction under sub-section (3) of S.11 of the Act. It is not a sound principle of statutory construction to place more restrictions on the rights of parties than what is provided for in the Statute itself. There is therefore no substance in the plea that for the reason of the landlord's possession of a part of the building, sub-section (8) excludes the operation of sub-section (3) of S.11 of the Act for a landlord to apply for eviction of his tenant." 11. I do not see any material difference in the approach of the three learned Judges. The observation made by Subramonian Poti J. (as he then was) that these two sub-sections are mutually exclusive was made only to emphasise the fact that when statute itself provides these two independent provisions they are capable of being construed as serving independent and different purposes. The learned judge has not spoken against the filing of a petition under both these sub-sections if circumstances exist which justify such an application. The words mutually exclusive used in that judgment have to be understood in that manner. The learned judge has not spoken against the filing of a petition under both these sub-sections if circumstances exist which justify such an application. The words mutually exclusive used in that judgment have to be understood in that manner. Such an understanding of these words is justified by the observation of Khalid, J. (as he then was) in Abdul Rahiman's case (1983 KLT 726) where the learned judge has observed that the requirements under these sub-sections may overlap even though the sub-sections operate independent of the other. 12. As I understand these judgments, the distinction between the requirements under sub-sections (3) and (8) is this. Where the landlord who is occupying a portion of the building requires additional accommodation for himself and the members of his family it would mean that he requires additional accommodation for his "personal use" which requirement is under sub-section (8) of S.11. But in a case where the landlord is occupying a portion of the building and his tenant is occupying the other portion, if the landlord seeks that portion for accommodating another member of his family dependent on him and if what he seeks is possession for the independent occupation of such member it would be governed by sub-section (3) of S.11. On the other hand if he wants to take his dependents to his own residence and live with them, sub-section (8) will apply. However, if both these grounds are available to the landlord, it is open to him to apply for eviction on either of the grounds or on both. 13. In this case admittedly the landlord was not in possession of any part of the building when the petition was filed. However by the time he gave evidence, he got possession of a portion of the building. Even if that changed circumstance is taken into consideration the evidence in the case justifies the finding of the District Court that the landlord bonafide requires the building. The tenant was well aware of the nature of the case put forward by the landlord because by the time the landlord gave evidence he had obtained possession of a portion of the building. I do not think that any prejudice is caused to the tenant by the approach of the revisional court. I see no error of law requiring interference under S.115 C.P.C. The C.R.P. is dismissed.