JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is a second appeal filed by defendant No. 1 Parmoo, who died and has been substituted by his sons. 2. This appeal is against judgment and decree dated July 26, 1982 passed by learned Additional Commissioner Allahabad Division Allahabad allowing Appeal No. 79 of 1970-71 Farrukhabad decreeing plaintiff's suit for declaration to be co-sirdar in possession with defendants No. 1 and 2 setting aside judgment and decree dated December 28, 1970 dismissing plaintiff's suit. 3. The suit was filed by Nathoo son of Jassa for declaration to be co-sirdars in possession with defendants 1 and 2 of the land in suit, that his name is not recorded in village papers on account of mistake of the Lekhpal; although orders were passed during consolidation operations. 4. Defendant, Parmu contested the suit, that he was sole Sirdar in possession and plaintiff or defendant No. 2 have got no concern and the Act was barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 5. Defendant No. 2 Chhotey contested the suit on the ground that the land in suit was acquired by Basant father of the defendants and the defendants were co-Sirdars in possession and the plaintiff has got no concern. 6. State filed written statement admitting defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to be co-tenants. 7. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court is based on wrong appraisal of oral evidence reading the evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant against defendant No. 1 when all the three had different claims that the affect of entry in C.H. Form 7 was wrongly construed against the defendant which was at best an entry of a correction of papers case. The plaintiff or defendant No. 2 were never recorded either prior to consolidation or during consolidation or after it; that they had never paid any rent, that the entry in C.H. Form VII is not according to Rule 19 or Rule 20 of the C.H. Act and no reliance should have been placed on it; that the village was denotified under Section 6 of the C.H. Act, therefore, no reliance ought to have been placed on that entry. There was no specific plea of estoppel and acquiescence or adverse possession by the plaintiff and they could not be complied in the case. There was no specific plea of estoppel and acquiescence or adverse possession by the plaintiff and they could not be complied in the case. Reliance has been placed on 1971 R.D. 242, A.I.R. 1973 Alld. 89 and 1957 R.D. 66. 8. It was argued in reply that during consolidation operation before denotification, the order dated September 6, 1956, November 28, 1956 and October 4, 1956 show that there was proper conciliation and C.H. Form 1 was properly prepared; that if proper facts are laid, the plea of estoppel and acquiescence or adverse possession should not be raised in the specific legal names, and it is the duty of the court to frame proper issues and to decide the matter. It is not the duty of the party to point out the legal effect of such allegations what legal pleas arises out of them; that defendant No. 1 had knowledge of reconciliation and the order for recording plaintiff and defendant No. 2 in village papers and the limitation stated after denotification of the village on February 1, 1957 as its effect on suit, under Rule 18 of the C.H. Rules the suit was filed on June 28, 1967, more than 12 years of denotification and the orders passed on C.H. Form 7, therefore, the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 became co-tenants by estoppel, acquiescence and adverse possession too. Reliance has been placed on 1980 A.L.J. page 487, A.I.R. 1950 Allahabad page 121 and A.I.R. 1976 Allahabad page 618. The following pedigree is admitted by the parties:- 9. It is also admitted by the parties that the notification of consolidation operation dated August 15, 1955 under Section 4 was cancelled under Section 6 of the C.H. Act on February 1, 1957 and this suit was filed on June 28, 1969. 10. The copy of judgment dated August 30, 1941 Masiruddin Ahmad and others v. Basant son of Jabba for old plot No. 1478, 1479 and 1480 Basant was held to be hereditary tenant on a rent of Rs. 40/- and a sub-tenant of plot No. 2142 on a rent Rs. 20/- per annum. 10. The copy of judgment dated August 30, 1941 Masiruddin Ahmad and others v. Basant son of Jabba for old plot No. 1478, 1479 and 1480 Basant was held to be hereditary tenant on a rent of Rs. 40/- and a sub-tenant of plot No. 2142 on a rent Rs. 20/- per annum. The finding of the lower appellate court that judgment does not relate to the present plots in suit is wrong because the Khatauni of 1347 Fasli gives old plot numbers and new plot numbers and the present plot No. 1696-1.31 is equal to old plot No. 1479/2.1.31 and present plot No. 1697.73 correspondent with old plot No. 1480.73 and the present plot No. 1698.42 correspond to old plot No. 1479/2.42 thus it is clear that the tenancy of the disputed plot was acquired by Basant father of defendant No. 1. This fact goes a long way to prove that the plots in dispute were acquired by Basant father of defendant No. 1 and by no one else. The plaintiff and defendant No. 2 have failed to prove by any paper entry that Basant and their father Jassu were co-tenants of the disputed plots. They or their witnesses, namely, P.W. 1 Naththu, Har Dayal P.W. 2 Chhotey Lal D.W. 3 and Sukh Lal D.W. 4 could not be relied upon jointly or separately to prove that the land in suit was acquired by Jabba grand-father of the parties or by Jassu and Basant father of the parties. Actually the P.Ws. and D.Ws. for Chhotey Lal do not know about the acquisition of the disputed plots. Their statements have been wrongly considered by the lower appellate court jointly for holding that the parties had been in possession as co-tenants. The interest of the plaintiff is denied by defendant No. 2 and his witnesses. I wonder how the statements of P.Ws. and D.Ws. for Chhotey Lal can be jointly read and even if read so they never go to prove co-tenancy and possession of the parties and the findings of the lower appellate court are contrary to their statements and amounts to a sweeping finding based on no evidence and this cannot be upheld. There are contradiction in the statement of P.Ws. interest and in the statement of D.Ws. There are contradiction in the statement of P.Ws. interest and in the statement of D.Ws. for Chhotey Lal and P.Ws., regarding possession, location of land in suit, and about division by mends or no mends in the disputed plots. The plaintiff P.W. 7 has not been his grand-father. His father had pre-deceased Basant and when Basant died he was only 10 or 12 years of age. He and Chhotey Lal defendant live separately. Chhotey Lal lives in Unada where he has inherited land of his maternal uncle and does not come to village in question often and some times does not come even for 3 and 4 years and there is no division in the disputed plots according to P.W. 1. In view of statement how Chhotey Lal can be in joint possession. He also does not know who was the Zamindar. He has got no receipts for payment of rent of the disputed land. His witness Har Dayal P.W. 2 stated that Chhotey and Basant Lal i.e. plaintiff and defendant No. 2 are in possession as Sajhidars over the disputed land which is not case of any party. He was Pradhan when the Chakbandi operations took place up to the stage of Section 7 or 8 of that Act. He had not gone to the disputed plots at the time of their Partal. He also stated that Chhotey Lal comes to this village after 4 or 5 years. He does not know whether the land in suit was acquired by Basang or Jassu. According to him there is division between Parmu and Chhottey and Naththu and there are mends in the middle of each filed. While P.W. 1 the plaintiff states that there is no division in between the parties. D.W. 3 Chhotey Lal and D.W. 4 Sukhlal stated that the plaintiff is not in possession. D.W. 3 stated that there is no division between him and Naththu but they do not live jointly and he does not know whether the plots in suit was divided in two parts or 3 parts. He further stated that he is in possession towards west but he does not know whether a Neem tree which existed towards west is still existing or some body has cut it. He further stated that he is in possession towards west but he does not know whether a Neem tree which existed towards west is still existing or some body has cut it. D.W. 4 Sukhlal stated that he had seem Jassu and Basant, both in possession then plaintiff and defendants and Basant came in possession and then stated that he had understood the question and that only Chhotey Lal is in possession. The statement of P.Ws. and D.Ws. for Chhotey Lal, therefore, cannot be safely believed and have been wrongly relied upon by the lower appellate court for holding the possession of the parties. A very heavy burden lay on the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 for proving their case of co-tenancy which they have failed to prove so far. 11. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the Khatauni of 1362 Fasli in which there is incorporation of order of case No. 166 dated September 28, 1956 for recording on plot No. 1686 Naththu by removing the name of Parmu. This plot is not in suit. There is another incorporation of order of case No. 117/7 dated October 4, 1956 to record Chhotey Lal with Parmu on the disputed plots as real brother of Parmu and there is another incorporation of order case No. 175 dated December 17, 1956 to record Naththu and Chhotey Lal on plot No. 1698.42 with (Aam logon ke sath). There was no need of last order for Chhotey who was already ordered to be recorded with Parmu on October 4, 1956 as his real brother. He is not real brother of Parmu so name of plaintiff Naththu was ordered to be recorded only on disputed plot No. 1698 by order dated December 17, 1956 and by that ambiguous entry he cannot lay claim on plot numbers 1696 or 1697. Reliance has also been placed on Chitha Partal Chakbandi, as the plaintiff is recorded Kabiz on the disputed plots as found in the partal. Reliance has also been placed on Chitha Partal Chakbandi, as the plaintiff is recorded Kabiz on the disputed plots as found in the partal. The Partal was not visited by the Pradhan P.W. 2 and this paper is not worthy of reliance as it depicts only a disputed matter the entry in C.H. Form No. 7 that Naththu son of Jassu be recorded on the plots of Khata No. 665 by order dated September 6, 1956 of A.C.O. which was confirmed on October 4, 1956 by C.O. The order of the C.O. dated October 4, 1966 confirming the recommendation of A.C.O. as no objection was filed is not an order based on conciliation and it shows that only Chhotey Lal had signed. The defendant No. 1 had no knowledge of this order, and its knowledge cannot be imputed to defendant No. 1 for prescription of any right to the plaintiff or defendant No. 2. There is no order for recording defendant No. 2 also in the Khatauni of 1362 Fasli. There is endorsement for recording Chhotey Lal as real brother of Permu on the three disputed plots. The entry in the Khatauni on the basis of order dated October 4, 1956 in the name of Chhotey Lal is obviously wrong without any basis and there is no order on December 17, 1956 in C.H. Form 7 to record the name of Naththu and Chhotey Lal over plot No. 1698. Thus the whole claim based by the plaintiff or defendant nor on the incorporation of orders of A.C.O. without confirmation by consolidation officer in the Khatauni of 1362 Fasli is devoid of legal sanctity and no reliance can be placed on them. Because revision and correction of records is provided by Section 8 of the C.H. Act and by Rules 19 and 20, 21 and 22 of the rules. No notice was issued to the recorded tenant according to Rule 22(2). Nobody was examined by A.C.O., therefore, the entry of 1362 Fasli and orders passed in C.H. Form 7 have got no value and on their basis no rights can accrue to the plaintiffs or defendant No. 2. 12. The argument on behalf of respondent Naththu that co-tenancy rights can be created by estoppel and acquiescence. Relying on Daya Singh v. D.D.C. Etah A.I.R. 1976 Alld. 12. The argument on behalf of respondent Naththu that co-tenancy rights can be created by estoppel and acquiescence. Relying on Daya Singh v. D.D.C. Etah A.I.R. 1976 Alld. page 618 and that legal plea on the facts laid down in the plaint is to be raised in the form of issue by the court. Relying on 1980 A.L.J. page 437 and that plea of adverse possession is covered by suit based on title. Relying Khajan Singh v. Abhaya Ram and another 1966 A.W.R. page 254 and relying on Ram Prasad v. Bhagwan Din 1975 R.D. 210 and Chaudhari Surat Singh v. Palat 1963 R.D. 280 is of no help to the plaintiff or defendant No. 2 because the facts alleged in the plaint or W.S. 2 D.W. do not go to show that the facts have been laid for raising pleas for estoppel, acquiescence or adverse possession and that the courts below have failed to raise legal pleas based on the facts alleged. Estoppel, is a rule of evidence, no substantive right is created as held in Union of India v. M/s. Ram Nath A.I.R. 1974 Alld. 296 and Anant Goel v. Prem Shanker Agarwal A.I.R. 1973 Alld. 89 has been held that no foundation for estoppel laid down in the plaint nor any issue according to same raised in the plaint, the plea cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal. Estoppel, acquiescence and adverse possession must be pleaded specifically in the plaint, by laying down foundation to raise such pleas but if no such foundation has been laid such pleas cannot be raised in second appeal. In Munshi v. Ram Adhar 1957 R.D. 66, it has been rightly held that the estoppel must be specifically pleaded and or it must be the subject of an issue and if it is not so pleaded such plea cannot be availed of later. In Munshi v. Ram Adhar 1957 R.D. 66, it has been rightly held that the estoppel must be specifically pleaded and or it must be the subject of an issue and if it is not so pleaded such plea cannot be availed of later. In the present case no such foundation has been laid, therefore, no co-tenancy was acquired by estoppel, acquiescence or by adverse possession, neither the plaintiff nor defendant No. 2 were recorded during/prior to abolition of Zamindari, nor they were recorded during the consolidation operation nor afterwards nor they did they pay any rent and they have failed to prove joint possession with defendant No. 1 and they have failed to prove adverse possession also and the endorsement in Khatauni of 1362 Fasli and in C.H. Form 7 mentioned above being not of any evidentiary value and even after it as the plaintiff or defendant No. 2 were not recorded they do not prove to create any estoppel or acquiescence against defendant No. 1 who had no knowledge about those orders and the argument on behalf of the respondents that the suit had been filed after 13 years of the denotification of the village under Section 6 of the C.H. Act, therefore, the plaintiff became co-tenant with the defendants by adverse possession acquiescence and estoppel has got no force. In view of these circumstances the judgment passed to the lower appellate court is liable to be set aside and that of the trial court is liable to be restored and this appeal is liable to be allowed. 13. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed with costs. The findings, judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are hereby set aside and that of the trial court are restored and the plaintiff's suit stands dismissed with costs all through.