JUDGMENT : B.L. YADAV, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 11th August, 1971 passed by Sri Parmanand Misra, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur, the order dated 31st December, 1970 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the order dated 25th January, 1968 passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer in a proceeding u/s 9-A(1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the Act). 2. The facts of the case are in a very narrow compass. A conciliation in respect of the plots in dispute was arrived at between the parties and the order was passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer on 25th January, 1968. The Petitioner preferred an appeal challenging the conciliation mainly on the ground that she did not enter into any compromise in respect of Khata No. 1-B, hence the order passed may be set aside. There was some delay in filing the appeal which was condoned and thereafter the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) decided the case on merits holding that the rights of the parties are based on the basis of the nature of the acquisition of the plots which were ancestral In this connection in appeal no opportunity was given to the Petitioner, or to the contesting Respondents to lead evidence. The revision of the Petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation also met the same fate. 3. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that even the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) has recorded a finding on the merits of the case that the Petitioner cannot get any right in the land in dispute on the basis of the nature of the acquisition of the plots without providing an opportunity either to the Petitioner or to the contesting Respondents to lead evidence. An observation about this fact has been made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. An appeal arising from an order of conciliation u/s 9-A(1) of the Act cannot be decided on merits of the case making reference to evidence when in fact no opportunity to lead evidence was given to either of the parties. 4. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondents has urged that in respect of the compromise the allegations were made about the fraud and the contents of conciliation were also challenged. 4. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondents has urged that in respect of the compromise the allegations were made about the fraud and the contents of conciliation were also challenged. In that event it shall be a case of voidable document and the Civil Court alone bad jurisdiction to decide the controversy and not the Consolidation Authorities. According to learned Counsel the appeal preferred by the Petitioner was not maintainable as she should have filed a civil suit. He placed reliance on Sheopal v. Smt. Lakhpata 1979 AWC 524 DB'. But that was a case in respect of the suit filed in Civil Court for cancellation of the gale-deed and controversy was about void or voidable nature of document and In the meanwhile the consolidation operations had commenced. The question arose as to whether a suit for cancellation of sale-deed can be abated u/s 5(2)(a) of the Act. On those facts it was held by this Court that the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed which was voidable in nature would abate u/s 5(2)(a) of the Act. But that analogy cannot be borrowed in the instant case where against an order u/s 9-A(1) of the Act the appeal has been provided u/s 11 of the Act. 5. In Sheopal v. Lakhpata (supra) it was observed on page 527 as follows: ...If, however, a party has been misled into executing a deed or signing a document essentially different which he intended to execute or sign, he can raise the plea known in English law as the plea of non est factum. In most of the cases in which the plea of non est factum has been successfully pleaded, the mistake has been Induced by fraud. Further in the case of Sheopal Das (Supra) reference has been made to Chitly on Contracts, Twenty Fourth edition page 299 and in that connection the reference was made to the case in Thorough good v. Cole LXXVI E.R. 408, in which it was held that a deed executed by an illiterate person does not bind him if read falsely either by the grantee or a stranger. Further Thorough good’s case (Supra) was considered in Forester v. Machinnon (1869) LR 4 CP 704 and the observation was made as follows: It seems plain, on principle and on authority that, if a blind man or a man who cannot read or who for some reason (not implying negligence) forbears to read has a written contract falsely read over to him, the reader misreading to such degree that the written contract is of a nature altogether different from the contract pretended to be read from the paper which the blind or illiterate man afterwards signs, then, at least if there he no negligence, the signature so obtained is of no force. And it is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words that lie never intended to sign, and therefore, in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended. 6. The aforesaid observation was relied upon in Ningawwa Vs. Byrappa and Others, AIR 1968 SC 956 . It Is thus obvious that in the instant case also the Petitioner alleged in an unequivocable language that she never intended to include plots of Khata No. 1-B and it was fraudulently inserted in the conciliation. In this way it is clear that she never intended to sign it and such a document cannot bind her. 7. In view of the aforesaid discussions it is evident that in the instant case before me the Petitioner was misled into executing a deed of conciliation or signing or putting her thumb-impression on a document essentially different from one that she intended to execute or sign and she could very successfully raise plea of non est factum and it is obvious that her mind did not accompany the signature or thumb impression and that she never intended to sign or put thumb impression on the transaction to which her name was appended. In this way there was no legal existence of such a document and the doctrine of non est factum was obviously proved I am, therefore, of the opinion that the case of Sheopal v. Smt. Lakhpata (Supra does nut help the contesting Respondents rather it goes against them. 8. In this way there was no legal existence of such a document and the doctrine of non est factum was obviously proved I am, therefore, of the opinion that the case of Sheopal v. Smt. Lakhpata (Supra does nut help the contesting Respondents rather it goes against them. 8. On behalf of the contesting Respondents reliance was placed on Munshi Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1976 RD 147 DB. In that case the facts were that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had decided the revision and thereafter an application was filed in the form of review that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation was passed on the basil of fraud and in that reference it was held that the remedy for the applicant was to file a civil suit for setting aside the order on the ground of fraud. But In the Instant case the facts are entirely different and against the order passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties an appeal was filed by the Petitioner u/s 11 of the Act and the grievances of the parties including the allegation that no conciliation was arrived at or that fraud was committed could also be gone into by the appellate authority. This case is also not indistinguishable. 9. No counter affidavit has been filed by the contesting Respondents denying the allegations made in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that no opportunity was given by Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) to lead evidence. It is well settled that any uncontroverted affidavit cannot be disbelieved unless there are some inherent defects in it. See Juggi Lal Kamla Pati v. Ram Janki Gupta 1962 AWR 331. 10. Further under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act a clear provision has been made u/s 11 that appeal would lie against an order u/s 9-A (including an order passed in conciliation proceedings). Such appeal can be decided after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. In the instant case the uncontroverted affidavit of the Petitioner was that no opportunity for hearing or for leading evidence was given. 11. In this connection it will not be out of place to mention few relevant Maxims (1) Audi Alteram Pattam which means hear the other side and (2) Actus Cliriae Neminem Gravabit, i.e. an act of the Court shall prejudice no men. 11. In this connection it will not be out of place to mention few relevant Maxims (1) Audi Alteram Pattam which means hear the other side and (2) Actus Cliriae Neminem Gravabit, i.e. an act of the Court shall prejudice no men. It is, therefore, clear that hearing to the other side is a must. Hearing obviously in such situation means opportunity to lead evidence. Further if an act is to prejudice no men in that event also opportunity for hearing and leading evidence has to be granted. As no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the contesting Respondents inspite of sufficient opportunity being given to them the allegations in the petition that the land in dispute was acquired by the Petitioner on the basis of a gift-deed in her favour from her mother and that the land in dispute describing in Khata No. 1-B being never in dispute was fraudulently inserted in the conciliation and the contesting Respondents were given no shares in the said property cannot be disbelieved. It has also been alleged in paragraph Nos. 22 and 23 of the petition that the land was Petitioner's self acquired property and that no such dispute was ever raised by the Respondents that the land was ancestral acquisition. 12. As an order for conciliation was passed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and u/s 11 of the Act the appeal was provided against such an order and grounds of appeal can be that, nature of conciliation can be challenged on ground of fraud. 13. Salmond in his Jurisprudence (11th Edition) page 132, observes that duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of legislature--"the Mens or Sententia Legis." In The Newspapers Ltd. Vs. The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P., AIR 1957 SC 532 it was held that every part of statute should be construed with reference to context. 14. In the present case against the order passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer appeal was maintainable and Civil Court has no jurisdiction. 15. The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P., AIR 1957 SC 532 it was held that every part of statute should be construed with reference to context. 14. In the present case against the order passed by Assistant Consolidation Officer appeal was maintainable and Civil Court has no jurisdiction. 15. In view of the discussions made above, I allow the writ petition and quash the impugned orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 11th August, 1971 and that of the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation), dated 31st December, 1970 as also that of the Assistant Consolidation Officer dated 25th January, 1968 and direct the Consolidation Officer to decide (be case afresh after affording proper opportunity to the parties for being heard and to lead evidence in the light of the observations made above. There shall, however, be no orders as to costs.