JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a plaintiffs' appeal directed against judgment and decree dated 14-9-1972 recorded by Sri O.P. Srivastava, learned Additional District Judge, Agra by which he dismissed Civil Appeal no. 157 of 1969 and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 19-4-1969 passed by Sri N.S. Gablat, learned 1st Additional Munsif, Agra in Original suit no. 412 of 1964. Plaintiffs' suit was dismissed with costs. 2. Parties are sweepers residents of Agra, Dispute related to a house shown in schedule 2 of the plaint. Relief for ejectment of defendants 1 to 3 from the house aforesaid was refused by the courts below on a concurrent finding of fact that the plaintiffs have failed to prove their ownership and possession over the house in dispute. That concurrent finding of fact was not assailed before me. 3. The plaintiffs further prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining defendants 1 to 4 from taking possession over the Birt Khakrobi and Jarkhobi (scavening rights) of the plaintiffs in the houses detailed in schedule one of the plaint. 4. A pedigree was also laid in para 1 of the plaint according to which Nathan was the common ancestor of the parties. Plaintiffs averred that Birt in dispute was ancestral to them and was acquired by Nathan and his father who formed a joint Hindu family with his sons Sukha and Sanwalia. After the death of Nathan and Sukha, Sanwalia and plaintiffs remained members of the joint family with plaintiffs nos. 2 and 3 and became owners in possession of the birt in question. On the death of Lalla, his widow Smt. Bhagge and Sanwalia along with the plaintiffs became owners of the said birt. It was further averred that deceased Khuddan remarried' Smt. Bbagge who expired in 1963 leaving behind a daughter Smt. Chanda Devi, defendant no. 1. Sanwalia also died in 1950. He was a heavy drunkered and was old and feable. Taking advantage of the weakness of Sanwalia Smt. Bhagge obtained an invalid writing from him in her favour and she executed a fraudulent document in favour defendant no. 1 regarding the said birt. Then defendant no. 1 Smt. Chanda Devi filed suit no. 752 of 1962 against Khuddan and others for possession over the birt in suit but it was dismissed by trial court and the appeal against that dismissal also failed. Defendant no. 2 was husband of.
1 regarding the said birt. Then defendant no. 1 Smt. Chanda Devi filed suit no. 752 of 1962 against Khuddan and others for possession over the birt in suit but it was dismissed by trial court and the appeal against that dismissal also failed. Defendant no. 2 was husband of. Smt. Chanda Devi and defendant no. 3 was her brother and defendant no. 4 was a subsequent transferee of a portion of the said birt and hence they were all impleaded. Thus the plaintiffs set up their ownership and possession over the birt in suit and alleged that the defendants were threatening to interfere with the possession over the said birt. 5. The pedigree was admitted in defence but other pleas were raised which are not material to be detailed for the disposal of this appeal. As regards the briti in question, it was held by learned Munsif that the right of plaintiffs about that britti was not enforceable because the said right was not property in the eye of law and hence the suit in respect of the same was not maintainable and was barred by Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code. However, he found that the plaintiffs were in possession of the birtti in question. He further found that in view of the earlier decision inter parties, it was not open to the defendants to plead that Sanwalia and Smt. Bhagge were competent to transfer the birt in favour of Smt. Cbanda Devi. 6. Learned appellate court further found that in the earlier suit no. 752 of 1962, it has been held by trial court vide paper 29-C that birtti right was not transferable and hence unenforceable. The appeal filed against that judgment was dismissed vide paper no. 27-C. Learned appellate court thus found that in view of the said decision, it must be held that plaintiffs' right to the said birtti was not enforceable. He further found that it had neither been pleaded her proved by plaintiffs that the origin of the birtti was traceable to a last grant or custom or long and uninterrupted usage to the exclusion of others. In the result, the finding recorded by learned Munsif was also affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs. So the simple question which fails for determination in this appeal is as to whether the said scavengery rights as claimed by the plaintiffs are enforceable? 7.
In the result, the finding recorded by learned Munsif was also affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs. So the simple question which fails for determination in this appeal is as to whether the said scavengery rights as claimed by the plaintiffs are enforceable? 7. Learned Advocate for appellants argued that even though in para 2 of the plaint, it was simply mentioned that birt khakrobi and Jarkhobi was ancestral and was acquired by Nathan and his father yet in view of the fact that khuddan was 70 years old and alleged that this light was ancestral, acquired by Nathan, his grand father, as it should be presumed that plaintiffs enjoyed an uninterrupted user of this right to the exclusion of others and such right was enforceable in law. Learned Advocate for appellants also relied upon a decision of this Court in Second appeal no. 1020 of 1975, Sri Chandra Sahai and others v. Sri Rama Shanker, decided on 29-4-1976 cited in 1976 A.W.C. 29 in which birt Jajmani was held as property and was found as heritable and transferable under certain circumstances. However, such right could not be transferred by an auction sale in execution of decree. In that case, the suit was brought for perpetual injunction restraining defendants from taking offerings from Jajmans, It was a right to receive offerings attached to an office. It did not relate to scavengery rights/and so is not in point. 8. Obviously, the plaint is silent about the origin of this right by way of last grant or custom or long uninterrupted usage to the exclusion of others. In his statement, Khuddan (P.W. 1) alleged that this birt was acquired by his grand-father Nathan. He did not testify about the manner and mode of acquisition. Both the courts below found that such statement of khuddan or P.Ws Ram Swarup and Shakura did not satisfy the requirements of law. This finding is perfectly correct. In Dhandu and others v. Girdhari Lal, reported in 1961 ALJ page 565, it was held that a right of birt khakrobi was not a transferable right. It was not property within the meaning of Section 6 of Transfer of Property Act and a lease of such right was void. Reliance was placed on P.Raghudu v. N. Erraiva, reported in AIR 1938 Mad 881.
It was not property within the meaning of Section 6 of Transfer of Property Act and a lease of such right was void. Reliance was placed on P.Raghudu v. N. Erraiva, reported in AIR 1938 Mad 881. The observation of learned Judge of the Madras High Court quoted with approval are extracted below- "The right that is claimed is therefore, in substance a right to prevent a man from pursuing his legitimate calling. The general principle is that the law will not permit any one to restrain a person from doing what the public welfare and his own interest requires that he should do..... It is well settled principle that any custom which is contrary to public good and operates to the prejudice of the many and beneficial only to a particular individual is prima facie unreasonable and cannot be enforced by any Court of law." 9. This has been the consistent view of this Court (see Durga Prasad and another v. Shambhu, ILR XLI All. 656). 10. A similar view was held in Radha v. Kamraya and another, reported in AIR 1951 MB 120 : 17 ALJ 842. It is further notable that in Dhandu and others v. Girdhari Lal (supra) such rights were being enjoyed for a long time. 11. In Buddha and others v. Balwanta and another, reported in AIR 1958 All. 699 , it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that where the question related to birt Jajmani in respect of scavenging rights, the origin of the right has to be traced. The right could have originated either in an agreement between the sweepers amongst themselves or in a grant usage or prescription. Till the origin of the right was known, it could not be possible to determine the incidents of that right and the extent to which it was enforceable or transferable. It was further held- "Where the right cannot possibly be traced to a grant of an irrevocable character by the owner of the houses or to usage and prescription proved by evidence to be binding on the owner of the house, the right of birt-jajmani though enforceable between the rival claimants cannot prevail against the wishes of the owner.
It was further held- "Where the right cannot possibly be traced to a grant of an irrevocable character by the owner of the houses or to usage and prescription proved by evidence to be binding on the owner of the house, the right of birt-jajmani though enforceable between the rival claimants cannot prevail against the wishes of the owner. A voluntary consent of the people to the employment of the plaintiff or his predecessor as scavengers cannot confer upon them any exclusive right and the continuance of this state of things for generations cannot confer upon the plaintiff a legally enforceable right." This case was quoted with approval in the Full Bench decision reported in Pearey and another v. Pachchoo and another, 1964 ALJ 135 (Full Bench). It was observed- "Where the plaintiff claimed a right of birt khakrobi to the exclusion of others held that such a right of others cannot be enforced unless the origin by way of a grant or a last grant or custom or a long and uninterrupted usage to the exclusion of the others has been established and the mere fact that the defendants themselves claimed to have been exercising that right for a long time will not create any difference and the suit must fail and the origin or long and uninterrupted usage to the exclusion of others was not pleaded and proved." I respectfully follow the said authority. 12. The essential ingredients of legal right, as given by Salmond on jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition by P.J. Fitzgerld at page 221 are as follows - (1) It is vested in a person who may be distinguished as the owner of the right, the subject of it, the person entitled, or the person of inherence. (2) It avails, against a person, upon whom lies the correlative duty. He may be distinguished as the person bound, or as the subject of the duty, or as the person of incidence. (3) It obliges the person bound to an act or omission in favour of the person entitled. This may be termed the content of the right. (4) The act or omission relates to same thing (in the widest sense of that word), which may be termed the object or subject matter of the right.
(3) It obliges the person bound to an act or omission in favour of the person entitled. This may be termed the content of the right. (4) The act or omission relates to same thing (in the widest sense of that word), which may be termed the object or subject matter of the right. (5) Every legal right has a title, that is to say, certain facts or events by reason of which the right has become vested in its owner, 13. In the instant case, no obligation was cast on the owners of the houses or the defendants to submit to such right, as claimed by plaintiffs. 14. Plaintiffs failed to plead or prove the origin of such right by way of grant, or last grant or custom or long and uninterrupted vage of the exclusion of others. 15. So I do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.