JUDGMENT : B.D. AGARWAL, J. 1. This appeal is directed against an order of the Additional Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, dated 6th August, 1977. 2. According to the Plaintiff's case one Chhuttan Lal was her grand father. He executed a registered will in her favour on 27th July, 1974. The Respondent No. 1 is the adopted son of Chhuttan Lal, aforementioned. Respondent No. 2 is the grand-son and Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are alleged to be the tenants of the property in dispute. On 5th July, 1975 it is alleged, Chhuttan Lal, aforementioned, executed another will in favour of Appellant and Respondents Nos. 5 to 8. Chhuttan Lal died in the month of October, 1975. The suit was brought for declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner-landlord vis-a-vis the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. In paragraph 6-A the averment made is that in face of the will, which Chhuttan Lal executed in Plaintiff's favour the subsequent will asserted on the Respondents' side dated 5th July 1975 is void and ineffective. In defence it was pleaded, inter alia that the court-fee paid is inadequate. The court below framed preliminary issue on the point and recorded the finding that the court-fee is deficient and that it should have been assessed and paid in conformity with Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. 3. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff has preferred this appeal. 4. Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act reads as under 5-- (iv-A). In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value, according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be... 5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends referring to this section that it cannot be said to be attracted for the reason, in the first place, that there is no relief claimed in respect of the subsequent will dated 5th July, 1975, and secondly because the instrument in question is not for the recovery of any property. The interpretation which he seeks to put upon the words "an instrument securing...other property" appearing in this section is that the instrument be one which is for recovery of property other than money. The interpretation which he seeks to put upon the words "an instrument securing...other property" appearing in this section is that the instrument be one which is for recovery of property other than money. In support thereof the argument advanced is that the earlier part pertaining to a "decree for money or other property" has been interpreted as meaning a decree for recovery of money or for recovery of some other property. On this analogy the submission made is that to attract Section 7(iv-A) the instrument has to be one for recovery of some property. I am unable to agree with this interpretation placed for the Appellant. 6. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ramkrishan Burman (Dead) by L. Rs. and Others, AIR 1971 SC 87 which the learned Counsel cites, there was interpretation involved of the expression "decree for money or other property". It was held that this means only a decree for recovery of money or other property and that it does not include a decree concerning title to money or other property. Unless we were to import the word 'for recovery of into the subsequent part, it cannot be claimed that the same interpretation be extended thereto. Secondly, in the subsequent clause the expression used is 'securing'. No such expression appears so far as the first part is concerned. The question arising, therefore, is how to interpret the expression 'securing' in the context and in relation to property other than money. This expression came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court. The decision is reported in Smt. Bibbi v. Shugan Chand 1967 AWR 552. 7. In Smt. Bibbi and another (Supra) the question involved was with respect to a deed of sale. It was held that since the deed of sale ensures the property to the vendee or that in other words it creates title in favour of the vendee in respect of the property involved, it is to be considered as securing property in his favour. This applies equally, in my opinion, where the instrument Involved is a will and not a deed of sale. Where as a deed of sale is inter vivos and may operate from the date when it is executed, the will comes into operation subsequent to the death of testator. Nonetheless, the will, as the deed of sale, may create title in respect of the property involved therein. Where as a deed of sale is inter vivos and may operate from the date when it is executed, the will comes into operation subsequent to the death of testator. Nonetheless, the will, as the deed of sale, may create title in respect of the property involved therein. It is an instrument, which assures or ensures the property in favour. The ratio, which appealed to the Full Bench in Smt. Bibbi (Supra) is stated as under: The only sense in which an instrument may be regarded as securing immovable property is that it makes the title thereto or its possession and enjoyment safe or certain. Even according to the learned Judge who decided the case of AIR 1956 All 168 an instrument securing money' obviously mean a document intended to 'assure' payment of money and the expression 'an instrument securing other property' should have, unless the context does not permit it, a similar meaning. He, however, did not regard a sale deed as 'an instrument securing property' because it conveys property and transfers the title of the property to the transferee. 1 may, with great respect to the learned Judge, say that what has been regarded by him as taking away from a sale deed the character of an instrument securing property seems to me as I imparting to it that character in the highest degree. A sale deed 'assures' in I the most effective manner the divesting of the title of the transferor in a property and the vesting of that title in the transferee; and where the sale of a property can take place only by means of a deed it is the sale deed alone that 'assures' the extinction of the transferor’s interest and the acquisition of that interest by the transferee. In ray opinion, therefore, a sale deed is 'an instrument securing property' within the meaning of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act. 8. Applying the same ratio in relation to a will it may not be doubted that this too is an instrument which secures property in favour of the beneficiary concerned. 9. It is true that the Plaintiff-Appellant has not claimed specific relief in respect of this subsequent will in the plaint drafted on her behalf. 8. Applying the same ratio in relation to a will it may not be doubted that this too is an instrument which secures property in favour of the beneficiary concerned. 9. It is true that the Plaintiff-Appellant has not claimed specific relief in respect of this subsequent will in the plaint drafted on her behalf. But then the relief claimed is for declaration of title vis-a-vis the tenants-Respondents and unless the will subsequently made or alleged to have been made gets out of the way of the Plaintiff-Appellant she may not get declared the title, which she seeks. A declaration as to the invalidity of that subsequent will or cancellation thereof on ground that it is void is, therefore, to be regarded as implicit for the relief for declaration claimed. 10. For the reasons given above, the appeal fails and Is dismissed, Costs on parties.