JUDGMENT : B.L. YADAV, J. 1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the State of U.P. is directed against the order dated 14-10-1981 passed by the District Judge, Aligarh acting as the Prescribed Appellate Authority u/s 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The facts of the case are in a very narrow compass. Respondent No. 2 intended to execute a sale deed in respect of house No. old 213N (present No. 4/59-A) Pahasu House, Aligarh (total area 1088 sq. meters), having covered area of 222.29 sq. mtrs. and appurtenant land 865.79 sq. mtrs. Respondent No. 1, the vendor submitted a declaration before the Sub-Registrar, Aligarh and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 the vendees also submitted a statement giving details of the property owned by them. The Sub-Registrar Aligarh referred the declaration submitted by Respondent No. 1 to the Competent Authority constituted under the Act for verifying whether the proposed transfer of the property in question violated the provisions of Sections 5(3) and 10(4) of the Act. 3. The Competent Authority got the enquiry made and in the meanwhile the State Government has also issued a direction (Annexure-2 to the petition) to the Director, U.P. Urban Ceiling, Jawahar Bhawan, Lucknow that in case any transfer was intended to be made - by any person and the land was governed by the provisions of the Act, a clarification may be obtained by the Registrar from the vendors and the vendees as to whether the transfer intended to be made violates the provisions of Section 5(3) and Section 10(4) of the Act. As the enquiry was made by the Sub-Registrar from the Competent Authority as stated above, the Competent Authority passed an order dated 9-6-81 that by the proposed transfer the provisions of Sections 5(3) and 10(4) of the Act are violated, hence the registration of the intended transfer need not be made. Against this order an appeal was filed by Respondent No. 1, which was allowed by order dated 14-10-81. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed by the State of U.P. 4. I have heard Sri R.P. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri V.K. Gupta for the Respondents. 5. Against this order an appeal was filed by Respondent No. 1, which was allowed by order dated 14-10-81. It is against this order that the present petition has been filed by the State of U.P. 4. I have heard Sri R.P. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri V.K. Gupta for the Respondents. 5. Sri R.P. Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State urged that no appeal was maintainable against the order dated 9-6-81 passed by the Competent Authority as that was not an order passed under the provisions of the Act, rather that was just a direction or communication given or expressed to the Sub-Registrar in connection with the registration of certain piece of land and building and it has nothing to do with the provisions of the Act and it was not an order passed u/s 8 of the Act or any other provision of the Act hence the appeal u/s 33 was not maintainable. He further urged that the impugned order passed by the District Judge did not contain any reasons and there was no justification to allow the appeal. 6. Sri V.K. Gupta learned Counsel for the Respondents on the other hand urged that the appeal u/s 33 of the Act was maintainable and the order of the District Judge is correct. The transfer intended to be made in respect of the land was well within the ceiling limit, inasmuch as Aligarh was at serial No. 11 in the State of U.P. in Schedule I and it was In category No. 3 and further u/s 4(1)(3) of the Act 2000 sq. mtrs. was the ceiling limit and the area intended to be transferred was about 1088 sq. mtrs. along with the building, hence even permission of the Competent Authority was not required. Even before the enforcement of the Act in 1976 there was a registered agreement to sell dated 20-4-74 and thereafter even a suit for specific performance of the contract was filed and decreed and in pursuance thereof the sale deed has also been obtained. Hence the Sub-Registrar was not justified in refusing the registration of the sale deed. 7. The first point for consideration arises as to whether the appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1 was maintainable u/s 33 of the Act. Hence the Sub-Registrar was not justified in refusing the registration of the sale deed. 7. The first point for consideration arises as to whether the appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1 was maintainable u/s 33 of the Act. For the sake of convenience the statutory provisions of Section 33 of the Act is set out below: 33. Appeal (1) any person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority under this Act, not being an order u/s 11 or an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 30, may, within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed (hereinafter In this section referred to as the appellate authority): Provided that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. (2) On receipt of an appeal under Sub-section (1), the appellate authority shall, after giving the Appellant an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. (3) Every order passed by the appellate authority under this section shall be final. 8. From a bare reading of Section 33 of the Act it is clear that against any order passed by the competent authority the appeal Is maintainable and there are only two exceptions, i.e. that in case the order has been passed u/s 11 of the Act (pertaining to the payment of compensation for the vacant land acquired) and Section 30(demolition and stoppage of building in certain cases) of the Act, in that event the appeal would not lie, the order passed by the competent authority was certainly not an order either u/s 11 or Section 30 of the Act. The order was passed in the capacity of a Competent Authority as is clear from the order dated 9-6-81 (Annexure 5 to the petition). The simple interpretation of the Section is that when an order has been passed by a Competent Authority, whatever may be its nature, an appeal has been provided and there are only two exceptions as stated above. In the instant case the order passed by the Competent Authority was certainly not an order either u/s 11 or Section 3D of the Act. In the instant case the order passed by the Competent Authority was certainly not an order either u/s 11 or Section 3D of the Act. The only irresistible conclusion is that the appeal against the order of the Competent Authority was maintainable. 9. I need not cite authority about the interpretation of statutory provisions of Section 33 of the Act as the meaning appears to be very clear. Suffice it to say that in Barrel v. Fortree (1932) AC 673, it was held as follows: The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases. Further in Capper v. Baldwin (1965) 2 Q.B. 53, it has been held as follows: The object of all Interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used. 10. Section 33 of the Act is very clear, if an order has been passed by the Competent Authority an appeal would certainly lie provided the order has not been passed u/s 11 or Section 30 of the Act. In the Instant case even if it was a direction given or opinion expressed by the Competent Authority to the Sub-Registrar nevertheless it was an order passed in the capacity of a Competent Authority, an appeal would lie. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner cannot accordingly be accepted that the appeal was not maintainable. 11. The next point that falls for consideration is the necessity of the Respondents (the vendor and vendees) to seek compliance of Sections 5(3) and 10(4) of the Act apart from obtaining permission u/s 27(1) of the Act. It appears that Sections 5(3) and 10(4) of the Act have been enacted with a view to see that the provisions of the Act are not defeated by the vendor by making a sale of either the vacant land or the land covered by the building, and the land was more than the area of the ceiling limit allowed to a person being resident of a particular category of city. Here the ceiling limit was 2000 sq. Here the ceiling limit was 2000 sq. meters, hence if the transfer was sought to be made for the area less than that there was no necessity to obtain permission and in case the area sought to be sold was more than the ceiling limit the permission would be necessary See State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Vs. Smt. Philips Mehrotra and Others, (1980) AWC 473. 12. Section 27(1) of the Act has been held to be constitutionally invalid in Maharao Saheb Bheem Singh v. The Union of India AIR 1981 SC 234 . Hence the application could not have been filed before the Competent Authority for obtaining permission. The Competent Authority has passed the order just like a direction given to the Sub-Registrar in connection with the registration of the sale deed. It appears that what the Competent Authority cannot do by order u/s 27 of the Act as it had been held invalid, the same has been done by communication to the Sub-Registrar, Hut as the area sought to be transferred was only 1088 sq mtrs. which was less than 2000 sq. mtrs. the ceiling limit for Aligarh, hence there was no necessity to obtain permission See State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Vs. Smt. Philips Mehrotra and Others, (1980) AWC 473 . 13. In the present case the registered agreement to sell has been executed in favour of the vendee by the vendor on 20-4-74 whereas the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations; Act, 1976, (Act No. 33 of 1976) has received the assent of the President of India on February 17, 1976 and was published in the Gazette of India Extra Ordinary Part II dated 17-2-76 (pages 249 to 294), it can accordingly not be said that there was any intention or any remote possibility on the part of vendor or vendees to defeat any provisions of the Act. The transaction appears to be confide and the District Judge was justified in allowing the appeal. I need not go into the validity or otherwise of the civil court decree obtained by the contesting Respondents in the suit for specific performance of the contract. 14. In view of the discussions made above, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.