JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a defendants' appeal directed against the judgment and decree dated 9-5-1974 recorded by Sri U.C. Dikshit, learned Civil Judge, Agra who dismissed Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1973 and affirmed the judgment and decree dated 11-12-1973 recorded by Sri A.S. Shukla, learned 1st Additional Munsif, Agra who decreed the Original Suit No. 272 of 1967 with costs. 2. The aforesaid suit was filed in the court of Munsif Agra on 1-6-1967. 3. Plaintiff is Het Singh. Defendants were Mangla and Bholey. Mangla died pending the proceedings and his heirs have been substituted vide order dated 9-8-1967. 4. Plaintiff alleged that he was Sirdar of plots Nos. 40, 41M and 43 corresponding to old plots Nos. 69, 70/1 Ka 70 1Kha and 70/3 situated in village Shiv Singh, Pargana Ptamadpur, district Agra. 5. Plaintiff alleged that he was in possession of the plots in dispute and was recorded is such in the revenue record. 6. The aforesaid holding was not included in the consolidation operations and plaintiff continued to he in possession over the same as Sirdar even after the consolidation operations. 7. Plaintiff cultivated the said plots and grew crops over the same. 8. In 1974 Fasli, plaintiff had sown crop in the aforesaid plots and had reaped Pradhan and other members of the Gram Sabha bore ill-will towards the plaintiff and in order to injure him, defendant 1 (Mangla), who was a Member Gram Sabha, alleged in the village that the plots in dispute were the property of Gram Sabha and the defendants alleged to have taken a portion of this holding from Gram Sabha in public auction. Such auction sale dyad invalid and illegal. Defendants intended to dispossess the plaintiff from the plots in dispute and so the only relief sought was for it perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession over the said holding. 9. On 19-9-1969, through lease to amend paper No. Ka49. it was pleaded that pending the suit plaintiff was dispossessed by defendants from the northern portion of plot No. 41 by raising it platform and placing cattle through over the same illegally and without the consent of plaintiff and the relief for possession was further sought through the said amendment. 10. Two separate written statements were filed by defendants. a ho raised serious pleas. There was also it pleas about lack of jurisdiction. 10. Two separate written statements were filed by defendants. a ho raised serious pleas. There was also it pleas about lack of jurisdiction. 11. Both the courts below found that the plaintiff was Sirdar of the land in suit. It was further found by learned appellate court that the plaintiff was owner of the disputed land which was excluded from the consolidation operation as Abadi land. The alleged auction sale had already been cancelled by the revenue court. The civil court had jurisdiction to to the suit. In the result, the claim was allowed as given above. 12. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 13. On behalf of appellants, it was argued that the point of jurisdiction of the court was determinable on the averments made in the plaint and not on the facts proved during the proceedings. On this point, reliance was placed on Municipal Board. Faizabad s. Edward Medical Hall. Faizabad reported in AIR 1976 All 3491 (LB). 14. Reliance was also placed upon Khairullah v. Badri. reported in 1973 All WR 248 in support of the contention that acquiescence or consent of parties Could not confer jurisdiction on a court which lacks inherent jurisdiction and it decree passed without jurisdiction was nullity. 15. In support of his contention that the appellate Court could not record it finding that the disputed land was an Abadi land and owned by plaintiff when such claim was not set out by the plaintiff in plaint reliance was placed upon Chela Meri v. Mohammad Abdul Khair Khan reported in AIR 1976 Pat 332 and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh reported in AIR 1961 SC 1097 . 16. thus the main contention put forward on behalf of appellants was that the relief for 'declaration was involved in the suit: such declaration was awardable by a revenue court alone under Section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act Act No. 1 of 1951. Section 331-A bars the cognizance of such suit in a Civil Court. The character of the holding as Abadi had not been so declared by Assistant Collector in charge of the sub division under section 143 of the aforesaid Act. So the claim should not have been decreed and such decree for recovers of possession by a civil Court was simply a nullity. 17. The character of the holding as Abadi had not been so declared by Assistant Collector in charge of the sub division under section 143 of the aforesaid Act. So the claim should not have been decreed and such decree for recovers of possession by a civil Court was simply a nullity. 17. Learned Adsocate for appellants also relied upon Ram Achal v. Shashi Brind Tewari, reported in 1974 RD 385 (LB) which dealt with it suit for recovery of possession against it trespasser in respect of agricultural land and it was held that the suit was not cognizable by Civil Court and such question of jurisdiction could he raised for the first time in appeal also. 18. Learned Advocate for appellants also relied upon Chandra Nath v. Mood Chand, reported in 1976 All WC 337 in support of his argument that in it suit for permanent injunction filed by plaintiff with allegation that he was Bhumidhar of agricultural plot in dispute and that the defendant was interfering with his possession and thing to dispossess hits forcibly, no suit fur perpetual injunction could has claim in a Civil Court. 19. A look at the facts of that case shows that there ails it dispute regarding the entries made in revenue papers in favour of defendants and such dispute was pending in the Board of Revenue. The real Cause of action was a declaration that the plaintiff was a Bhumidhar of the land in dispute. The plaintiff camouflaged the relief and sought a permanent injunction with a purpose to oust the jurisdiction of the revenue Court and seek his remedy in the Civil Court. Such device was held as impermissible. 20. Learned Advocate for appellants further relied upon a division bench case reported in Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, 1973 RD 365 : AIR 1973 SC 2464 , In that case, a suit was brought by plaintiffs-appellants who were the next reversioner's to the Bhumidhar for permanent injunction or in the alternative for recovery of possession. It was held that the suit was cognizable by Revenue Court and Civil Court lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the same. 21. It was held that the suit was cognizable by Revenue Court and Civil Court lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the same. 21. On behalf of respondent, it was pointed out that such contention was not open to the learned Advocate for appellants unless his objection about the jurisdiction was raised at the earliest and unless it was shown that there was a failure of justice vide Section 21 of Code of Civil Procedure vide General Equipment Mart v. Union of India reported in, (1979) 5 All LR 94, In that case there was a dispute about the place where the suit had to be filed and no objection was raised by defendants about the jurisdiction of the court; it was held that such objection could not be raised for the first time before the appellate or revisional Court. Learned Advocate for respondent also cited Lekhraj Singh v. Ram Das Singh reported in, 1983 All WC 94 in support of such contention. 22. Sabha Chand v. Narayan Singh reported in, 1981 AWC 161 was also relied on to explain the underlying principle under S. 331 A of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which reads as below :- "S. 331-A. Z.A. Act lays down that it is not open to a party to raise the question of absence of jurisdiction unless the objection was taken by it in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity or before the settlement of issues. Even if such an objection is raised, the party has further to prove that there has been failure of justice and he suffered on account of the Civil Court taking cognizance of the suit. Two conditions must be satisfied before the question of jurisdiction can be raised before an appellate or revisional Court. Firstly, the objection must be taken before the trial court at the earliest stage and secondly, the party must show that there has been failure of justice on account of the suit being tried by the Civil Court." 23. I have carefully considered these rival contentions. 24. The conspectus of facts laid above shows that the only relief sought in the plaint was for perpetual injunction. The relief for recovery of possession was added subsequently through an amendment and the courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff was dispossessed from a portion of plot, No. 41 pending the suit only. 24. The conspectus of facts laid above shows that the only relief sought in the plaint was for perpetual injunction. The relief for recovery of possession was added subsequently through an amendment and the courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff was dispossessed from a portion of plot, No. 41 pending the suit only. Obviously, the relief for perpetual injunction was not awardable by a revenue court. 25. The point of jurisdiction was raised before the trial court also. The contention raised on behalf of appellants was that the civil court had no jurisdiction as the relief for cancellation of the auction sale in favour of defendants was involved in it. However in view of the admission of defendants in para 15 of the written statement it was obvious that the auction sale had already been quashed by the revenue court and no declaration was sought within the meaning of Section 229-B of the aforesaid Act. 26. It has also been shown that the plaintiffs consistent case was that the revenue entries in extracts of Khataunis. Khasra and the report of Naib Qanungo and Sub Divisional Officer disclosed that it was the tenure of plaintiff who was in exclusive possession thereof. Gram Sabha had nothing to do with it. So, such suit was perfectly cognizable by a Civil Court as was held in Raj Bahadur Singh v. Smt. Gaura alias Ram Piari reported in 1977 RD (HC) 165 which posited :- "In a situation where the recorded tenure holder is in possession and such a recorded tenure holder is disturbed in possession, it is not obligatory that he should file a suit under S. 229-B of the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 in the revenue court. Merely because in the written statement, a defendant chooses to question the plaintiff's recorded tenure holdership, it cannot be said that a genuine controversy about tenancy rights is involved. In the instant case, the plaintiff was recorded as a tenure holder in the revenue papers and she claimed to be in possession which has been found to be a fact by the courts below. There is no reason why the recorded tenure- holder should be compelled to file a suit for declaration in the revenue court. In the instant case, the plaintiff was recorded as a tenure holder in the revenue papers and she claimed to be in possession which has been found to be a fact by the courts below. There is no reason why the recorded tenure- holder should be compelled to file a suit for declaration in the revenue court. On the facts of the instant case, the plaintiff respondent was not obliged to file a declaratory suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951. The Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit for permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over Bhumidhari Plots." 27. In the instant case, plaintiff had no grievance against village record and so was not under the necessity to file a suit for declaration in a revenue court as held in Parsottam v. Narottam reported in 1970 RD (HC) 216 which posited :- "U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1 of 1951, S. 229-B - Suit under S. 229-B Maintainability in revenue court - Legal position lies in revenue court if plaintiff has grievance against village records - Suit for injunction restraining defendants from interfering with plaintiffs possession over the plot in suit - Entries in revenue papers supporting plaintiffs claim. No relief claimed against Gaon Sabha or State Government nor plaintiff obliged to do so - Suit would be cognizable by civil court. The legal position appears to be that where a plaintiff has grievance against the village records which are maintained by the State Government and Gaon Sabha the suit will lie in revenue court under S. 229-B and any other person who disputes the plaintiffs title shall also be impleaded as a defendant but if the village records support the claim of the plaintiff, the suit will not lie under S. 229-B but will be cognizable by a civil court in case the plaintiffs right is disputed by a third person." 28. A similar view was taken in Lekhraj v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow, reported in 1983 RD (HC) 41 which posited : "U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1 of 1951, 5.229-B - Maintainability of dismissal of objection under O. 21 R. 58 C.P.C. - Suit contemplated under O. 21, R. 63 - Suit is cognizable by Civil Court and suit under S. 229-B is not maintainable - Limitation for such suit is one year." In Rameshwar v. Ram Asrey reported in 1965 All LJ 677, it was laid:- "it is declaratory suit against the landholder or the State Government and the Gaon Samaj, which has been taken away from the jurisdiction of the civil court and not every suit for declaration. To put it differently, if it be found that in substance, declaration is being asked for against the landholder, in the instant case the State Government and the Gaon Samaj, and they are necessary parties to the suit, the civil court shall not have the jurisdiction to entertain such a suit for declaration and also a suit in which a relief for injunction with regard to that plot based on the same cause of action has been prayed for. But if the facts indicate that the land holder, or the State Government and the Gaon Samaj, as the case may be, do not challenge the status of the plaintiff, or on the basis of the entries existing in the village record the plaintiff continues to enjoy the status claimed by him, the suit for declaration cannot be deemed to be against the landholder, or the State Government and the Gaon Samaj, and consequently shall be cognizable by the civil court on account of its jurisdiction not being taken away by order under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The plaintiff enjoyed the status of a sirdar and consequently it was not necessary for him to sue the State Government and the Gaon Samaj for a declaration of his rights as such. When it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue the State Government or the Gaon Samaj, he could ask for a declaration against a third party without impleading them, and such a declaratory suit could be taken cognizance of by the civil court. When it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue the State Government or the Gaon Samaj, he could ask for a declaration against a third party without impleading them, and such a declaratory suit could be taken cognizance of by the civil court. In the circumstances, the civil court could entertain a suit for injunction against the third party alone, based on the same cause of action.". 29. It has been shown above that no relief for declaration was sought by plaintiff against Gaon Sabha or the State Government in this case. In Bajrang Bali v. 1st Addl. District Judge reported in, 1982 RD (HCLB) 165, a suit was filed under S. 6 of Specific Relief Act for recovery of possession. It was held that S. 331 of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act did not operate as a bar to such suit and was triable by civil court. 30. Learned lower appellate court relied upon a Full Bench case reported in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, 1968 All LJ 1108 : AIR 1969 All 526 , It has been shown above that the only relief sought plaintiff in his plaint at the time of institution of the suit was for perpetual injunction. It was subsequently that the relief for possession, which flowed from the cause of action laid in the plaint, was also sought. Under such circumstances, the suit was perfectly cognizable by civil court. 31. The mere fact that the learned lower appellate Court also found that the plaintiffs claim was supported by the entries in revenue papers and the reports of revenue authorities that the land was Abadi and he is the owner of the same did not change the nature of the suit. The relief was awardable on the allegations made in the plaint itself. 32. Under such circumstances, the aforesaid contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellants are ruled out. 33. The next contention was that the defendants 3 and 4 were minors and no guardian ad item has been appointed. It appears that such contention was never raised before the courts below. No evidence was adduced in defence about the point of their ages. The contesting defendants viz. 1/1 and 2 were majors and so there was no question of appointment of their guardian ad litem. 34. In the result I do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed. Costs easy.