JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This bunch of writ petitions consists of Writ No. 5813 of 1983, Gayatri Nagar Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd. Aligarh, v. State of U.P. and others, and Writs Nos. 8634, 8635, 8891, 9666. 9674, 9679, 9114, 11186 and 12107 of 1983. 2. In these petitions the validity of the notifications No. 3549/37-2-82-34 LA/82, dated 24-1-1983, and No. 4414/37-2-82-34. LA/82, dated 14-2-1983, made under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act respectively has been challenged. By the first notification issued under S. 4, the Governor was pleased to notify that the land mentioned in the Schedule was needed for a public purpose namely, for the Ramghat Road Housing Scheme, Aligarh, for the people of Aligarh by the Aligarh Development Authority, under a Planned Development Scheme. The Governor being further of the opinion that sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 of the Act was applicable to the said land inasmuch as the same was arable and was urgently required for the Ramghat Road Housing Scheme for the people of Aligarh, eliminated the delay likely to be caused by an enquiry under S. 5A of the said Act. Further, the Governor directed that under sub-sec.(4) of S. 17 of the Act, the provisions of S. 5-A were not applied. This notification under S. 4 was followed by the notification under S. 6, details of which have been given above. 3. Challenging the aforesaid notifications and the land acquisition proceedings taken in pursuance thereof, Gayatri Nagar Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited, Aligarh, filed Writ No. 5813 of 1983. The other connected writ petitions have been filed challenging the same notifications on the same grounds. 4. The Sahkari Samiti, petitioner of Writ No. 5813 of 1983, has alleged that it was a society formed for the purpose of development of house sites and for that purpose it entered into an agreement to purchase with the owner of plot No. 20. The owner of the aforesaid plot subsequently wanted to wriggle out. The petitioner society filed a civil suit and obtained a compromise decree, by which the rights of the society were recognised. However, the authorities were inimically disposed towards the petitioner and to feed their grudge they desired the plots in question to be acquired for another society known as Mansarovar Society. The petitioner society filed a civil suit and obtained a compromise decree, by which the rights of the society were recognised. However, the authorities were inimically disposed towards the petitioner and to feed their grudge they desired the plots in question to be acquired for another society known as Mansarovar Society. In that connection, a letter was also written to the State Government on 6-10-1982 for dropping the land acquisition proceedings by respondent 3 in favour of Mansarover Society. The petitioner has alleged that subsequently when the authorities found that the plots could not be released in favour of Mansarover Society, they pressed upon the State of U.P. for acquiring the same under the Land Acquisition Act. 5. The petitioner has further challenged that Aligarh Development Authority was since a Company, acquisition of land without compliance of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act was invalid. It was also alleged that there was no material before the State Government for being satisfied that the requirement was so urgent that the procedure of S. 5-A had to be dispensed with. 6. Two counter-affidavits have been filed, one on behalf of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, and the other by the Aligarh Development Authority, Aligarh, in this petition. In the connected Writ No. 8634 of 1983, which challenges these very notifications and, as stated above, on the same grounds, a counter-affidavit has been filed by the Nagar Vikas Anubhag of the State of U.P. 7. From these affidavits, the version of the respondents to be found is that the Aligarh Development Authority wanted to acquire land 43.43 acre for the construction of residential accommodations for the persons belonging to economically weaker sections of the society and such a request was made to the District Magistrate, Aligarh, by the Aligarh Development Authority. The request further was that as the settlement of weaker sections by providing them the house sites could not be delayed further, the provisions of S. 17(1) dispensing with S. 5-A be invoked. The District Magistrate considered the request of the Aligarh Development Authority and recommended, vide letter dated 28-5-1982, that the land was urgently required for the Housing Colony under planned development scheme and the land be acquired by applying the provisions of S. 4(1), S. 6 and S. 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The District Magistrate considered the request of the Aligarh Development Authority and recommended, vide letter dated 28-5-1982, that the land was urgently required for the Housing Colony under planned development scheme and the land be acquired by applying the provisions of S. 4(1), S. 6 and S. 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. A copy of the letter of the Aligarh Development Authority has been filed as Annexure 1' to one of the counter- affidavits. The State Government considered the letter and the proposal submitted by the Aligarh Development Authority through the District Magistrate. The file was sent to the law Department on 7-8-1982, when after examining the matter, a further report regarding the grounds for invoking the urgency was demanded. In consequence thereof a report was asked for by the Housing Department of the State of U.P. by letter dated 8-9-1982 from Aligarh Development Authority. The Aligarh Development Authority submitted to the Government that there was acute and critical housing problem due to the increase of population in the city of Aligarh and with the object of reducing congestion and stopping further creation of slum it was necessary to provide housing accommodations to the weaker section. This letter was written on 16-9-1982. On the materials, the Housing Department was satisfied about the urgency of the matter and the requirement of dispensing with S. 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Law Department granted approval to the proposed acquisitions and dispensation of S. 5A on 4-10-1982. It was thereafter that the State Government being fully satisfied, got the notification issued under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act which also recited that the matter being urgent, and further that the land sought to be acquired was arable, applied S. 17(1) and dispensed with S. 5-A. This notification further directed under sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 that provisions of S. 5-A would not apply. 8. The question that was first raised by the learned counsel was about the mala fide on the ground that since the petitioner was incorporated to provide housing sites, the purpose of acquisition could be achieved by the petitioner itself and, therefore, the acquisition of the plots, in respect of which it had entered into an agreement and obtained a decree as against the owner of the plots, by the State Government by issuing notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was colourable exercise of power. In that connection, the petitioner also drew our attention to the Government orders which have been filed as Annexures XI and XII learned counsel urged that even if the notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 had been issued, they should have been rescinded and the land be exempted from acquisition. We find no merits in this submission. 9. In the counter-affidavit, one of the points raised by the respondents was that the petitioner society was not a genuine one, being only of the members of one family and its friends. The society, the counter-affidavit has alleged, had been incorporated for selfish purposes and was a fake institution for obtaining undue gains. It desired the land to be exempted so that the same could be sold at an exorbitant price. The counter-affidavit further suggested that the civil court decree obtained by the petitioner as against the owner of the land was collusive. 10. After considering the merits, we are satisfied that the plea taken in the counter-affidavit is made out and the petitioner was not a genuine society which could be entitled to the benefits of the Government orders filed along with the writ petition. Moreover, for achieving the benefits of Annexure XI, relied upon by the petitioner, it was necessary to establish that the society was prepared to get its area developed by the Development Authority on payment of the development charges in advance, and further it would make allotment of plots after development without obtaining profit. The petitioner's counsel could not draw our attention from any one of the papers or the averments made in the writ petition and the rejoinder-affidavits which could satisfy that these requirements were established. 11. Furthermore, the acquisition of land by the State Government for a Development Authority, which has been created by a statute, is definitely different from the purpose which the petitioner society wanted to achieve. The Aligarh Development Authority acquired land for the weaker section of the society. It is a local authority and, as such, the petitioner society cannot be kept at par with the Development Authority. The two purposes for which the petitioner wanted the land and the Development Authority are different and distinguishable. 12. The argument of the learned counsel for giving unfair treatment to Mansarover Society has also no legs to stand upon. It is a local authority and, as such, the petitioner society cannot be kept at par with the Development Authority. The two purposes for which the petitioner wanted the land and the Development Authority are different and distinguishable. 12. The argument of the learned counsel for giving unfair treatment to Mansarover Society has also no legs to stand upon. In para 6 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Special Land Acquisition Officer the assertion of the petitioner that Mansarover society has influence over respondents 2 and 3, has been denied. The authorities did not agree with the suggestion given in the letter quoted in the writ petition. The Aligarh Development Authority had written to the District Magistrate in favour of the Mansarover Society, but the District Magistrate did not agree with the same. It was subsequently that the land was notified under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act by the State Government on satisfaction that the land was needed for the purpose of Aligarh Development Authority under a planned development for the people of Aligarh. 13. The next argument of the petitioner's learned counsel was that there was no material before the State Government for waiving off S. 5-A. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 the learned counsel urged that for dispensing with S. 5-A, the authority was required to apply its mind to the questions as to whether there was urgency of such a nature that even summary proceedings were to be eliminated. He urged that it was not just existence of urgency but need to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5A (which) was required to be considered. 14. On the materials, the State Government was satisfied that the matter was such which required dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A. The letters, which have been filed as Annexures C-1 to C-4 of the counter-affidavit of Dinesh Chandra Joshi in Writ No. 8634 of 1983 on behalf of the State Government demonstrate the same. 14. On the materials, the State Government was satisfied that the matter was such which required dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A. The letters, which have been filed as Annexures C-1 to C-4 of the counter-affidavit of Dinesh Chandra Joshi in Writ No. 8634 of 1983 on behalf of the State Government demonstrate the same. The other counter-affidavits of the contesting respondents also are to the same effect and establish the need of dispensing with S. 5-A. These materials and the publication of the notification under S. 4 established that the State Government had not only applied its mind to the urgency of the matter for which the land was intended to be acquired but also to the question that the urgency was of such a nature that even summary proceedings contemplated by S. 5-A were required to be dispensed with. Whether enquiry should be dispensed with is primarily and fundamentally a matter of subjective satisfaction of the State Government. Such a decision cannot be questioned in any court provided that the Government applies its mind and acts in good faith. The Government is the best judge for determining about these matters. It is only in a case of mala fide exercise of power that the Court can interfere. (See Rajbali v. State, AIR 1983 All 78 , and Kailashwati v. State, AIR 1978 All 181 .) 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of this Court in Ajadul Bux v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 All 435 for the submission that dispensation of S. 5-A in the instant case had to be held as invalid. From the facts of this decision, it appears that no material had been placed before the State Government as to why provisions of S. 5-A were required to be dispensed with. In this situation, the Division Bench held that direction of the State Government dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A was arbitrary. This decision is therefore, distinguishable. 16. In State of Punjab v. Gurdayal Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319 , the Supreme Court found that acquisition was made with ulterior motive to wreak private vengeance of politicians and therefore, on that material it found that the acquisition was mala fide. This case does not apply. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the executive and judicial circumspection keeps the court away. This case does not apply. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the executive and judicial circumspection keeps the court away. We are not satisfied in this case that the notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 had been issued in colourable exercise of power or any fraud was committed with an object to attain oblique motives. At various levels the question of acquisition for the purpose, mentioned above, was considered. Ultimately, the Government was satisfied with the purpose as well as with the requirement of dispensing with S. 5-A. 17. After considering sub-secs. (1), (1-A) and (4) of S. 17, this Court in Somdutt v. State of U.P., 1976 All LR 529 : AIR 1977 NOC 10 held that the purpose for which the acquisition is being made plays a vital role in determining the question of urgency and dispensation with S. 5-A. It was said that the character of land which is sought to be acquired is not material for the said purpose. 18. The argument next raised before us by the learned counsel was that since the period of limitation provided for filing of an objection under S. 5-A is only 21 days (according to U.P. Amendment), therefore, if publication of the notification is deferred by 21 days, the same should not come into consideration of the State Government in dispensing with S. 5-A. The submission made is untenable. It wrongly takes into account the time given for filing of objection as consideration for the purposes of dispensing with S. 5-A. An objection under S. 5-A, experience shows, takes long time. Parties which file objections take adjournments for giving oral and documentary evidence and for making arguments. More than often, judicial experience is that the object of acquiring and for achieving the public purpose is defeated because of the long delay which occurs in concluding the proceedings under S. 5A. In this connection, we would quote a passage from a decision given in Ishwar Lal v. State, (1967) 8 Guj LR 729: "But this assumption is wholly unfounded as the period of 30 days referred to in S. 5-A is merely the period given by the section for filing objections against the proposed acquisition. This period can. under the rules made by the Government under S. 55, be extended by the Collector, if proper cause is shown. This period can. under the rules made by the Government under S. 55, be extended by the Collector, if proper cause is shown. After the objections are filed, a date has to be fixed for hearing the objector in person or by pleader. The hearing then takes place and if the Collector permits, oral as well as documentary evidence can be led and where evidence is led by one party, the opposite party has to be given an opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses of the first party as also to rebut the case by means of other evidence. The Collector then has to consider the objections and to make his report to the Government and the Government has to decide the objections after taking into account the report of the Collector. This elaborate procedure is bound to take a considerable amount of time and it is difficult to see how the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court has limited the determination of the existence of urgency by saying that the urgency must be of such a nature as cannot brook a delay of 30 days." 19. Counsel next challenged the decision of the State Government dispensing with S. 5A by applying sub-ss. (1) and (4) of S. 17 by urging that these provisions could be invoked only in cases where the land is waste or arable and as, in the instant case the land was abadi. sub-secs. (1) and (4) of S. 17 could not be resorted to. We have noticed above that in the notification under S. 4. on the materials placed before the State Government, the Governor was satisfied that the land was arable. This was a question of fact. Furthermore, from the counter-affidavit of Reoti Prasad Gupta, Head Clerk, office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Aligarh, it is established that the land under acquisition was being used for agricultural purposes. Then portion of the land over which there stood a building and Ahata had been left out from acquisition. In the counter-affidavit of Vishnu Dutt Sharma, filed on behalf of the Aligarh Development Authority, the statement of fact in this regard is given in para 3. The said paragraph stated that plot No. 20 measured 12 Bighas 18 Biswas and out of that plot, 10 bighas had been acquired, which had been shown as arable in the revenue record of 1387 Fasli. The said paragraph stated that plot No. 20 measured 12 Bighas 18 Biswas and out of that plot, 10 bighas had been acquired, which had been shown as arable in the revenue record of 1387 Fasli. Similarly, with regard to plot No. 26, the statement made in this affidavit is that plot No. 26. measuring 2 Bigha 9 Biswas was wholly agricultural and, as such, was acquired by utilising sub-secs. (1) and (4) of S. 17. This statement has although been challenged in the rejoinder-affidavit and in the arguments before us, but we do not find any substance in the objection of the petitioner to that effect. Apart from any other consideration, it may be noted first that the petitioner being interested in the result of the litigation could have motive to state a fact which may not be correct. The affidavits filed on behalf of the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the Aligarh Development Authority are to the same effect. None of them had any personal interest in the litigation. Therefore, the prudence requires to rely on their affidavits. By doing so, we find that the satisfaction of the Governor mentioned in the notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act that the land was arable is conclusive on this controversy. In Hari Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 , the Supreme Court has found that in a writ petition filed raising disputed questions of fact, the High Court would have no power to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. 20. For the meaning of the word "arable" counsel for the petitioner made a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, AIR 1980 SC 91 and Ishwar Lal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 870 in the latter decision, the Supreme Court held that by arable land is meant not only land capable of cultivation but actually cultivated. It is not arable not because it is cultivated, but because it is something else such as waste, pasture, ancient meadows. In State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (supra), the Supreme Court has dealt with as to what waste land is, which, according to the Supreme Court, would mean barren or desolete lands which are unfit for any use or is worthless. In State of Gujarat v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (supra), the Supreme Court has dealt with as to what waste land is, which, according to the Supreme Court, would mean barren or desolete lands which are unfit for any use or is worthless. In the present writ petition, we find that the land was held to be arable by the Governor. Counsel's submission, therefore, that in the neighbourhood of the land in question there was abadi, and, as such, the present land should also be considered as abadi other than waste or arable has no merit. Simply because the land acquired is situated in the neighbourhood of the abadi, it does not mean that it has to be held as such. The land was recorded in the revenue papers, as stated above, as cultivator plots or agricultural. This would, therefore, negative the submission of the petitioner's learned counsel that it was not waste or arable. 21. The case of Hari Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 (supra) is also relevant to meet the other argument of the petitioner's counsel about the delay in making the notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Counsel urged that as the proceedings had been started in May 1982, the notification under Ss. 4 and 6, if the same were required to be issued on satisfaction of urgency of purpose and dispensation of S. 5A. should have been made immediately and ought not have taken more than six months. The submission is not tenable. The period of six months in a matter like the present cannot justify the view that was propounded on behalf of the petitioner. The Government was required to consider the materials and thereafter to issue notifications under Ss. 4 and 6. This could not be done earlier than the dates on which the notifications were issued in the instant case. Counsel for the petitioner was not right in submitting that merely because six months' time was spent in issuing the notification under S. 4. there was really no urgency. 22. Counsel's next argument that since there was a delay in publishing the notification under S. 4, the Court should hold that there was really no urgency, has no substance. The acquisition proceedings were initiated in this case in May 1982 followed by the notification under S. 4 in Jan. 1983. there was really no urgency. 22. Counsel's next argument that since there was a delay in publishing the notification under S. 4, the Court should hold that there was really no urgency, has no substance. The acquisition proceedings were initiated in this case in May 1982 followed by the notification under S. 4 in Jan. 1983. The time spent in between these two actions cannot be held as sufficient to vitiate the exercise of power conferred by sub-sees. (1) and (4) of S. 17. The Government has to take into consideration reports and other materials before applying S. 17(1) and (4). This is bound to take time. On account of the gap, therefore, the acquisition cannot be held to be invalid. In Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1984 SC 1721 the Supreme Court has held that : "Multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussion invariably lead to delay in the execution of urgent projects. Therefore on that account, the exercise of power by having resort to S. 17(1) and (4) cannot be held to be wrong or illegal". 23. The next argument of the learned counsel was that the Aligarh Development Authority was a company, hence Part VII should have been complied with. This submission of the learned counsel has no merit. The Aligarh Development Authority has been constituted by the State Government by notification issued under S. 4 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. This Act was passed to provide for the development of certain areas of Uttar Pradesh according to plan and available materials ancillary thereto. As it was found that the existing local bodies and other authorities in spite of their best efforts. had not been able to cope with the problems to the desired extent, therefore, in order to bring about improvement in the situation, the State Government considered it advisable to constitute Development Authorities patterned on the Delhi Development Authority for the said purpose. The Aligarh Development Authority is not a company, but is a local authority. It is entitled to maintain its own funds under S. 20 of the aforesaid Act. 24. In Prithiv Nath Kapoor v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. The Aligarh Development Authority is not a company, but is a local authority. It is entitled to maintain its own funds under S. 20 of the aforesaid Act. 24. In Prithiv Nath Kapoor v. State of U.P., Civil Misc. Writ No. 10165 of 1981, decided on 23-3-1982 a Division Bench of this Court was called upon to consider a similar controversy with regard to the Allahabad Development Authority, which had also been created under the same Act by which the Aligarh Development Authority has been created. After making a reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. R.C. Jain, AIR 1981 SC 981 , holding that Development Authority is a local authority, this Court held that the Allahabad Development Authority was not a company, but a local authority. For this purpose, reliance on the definitions of the words 'local authority' used in S. 3 of U.P. General Clauses Act and 'local fund' defined in the U.P. General Clauses (Amendment) Act, 1975, had also been placed. After having referred to the relevant provisions, this Court held that the Allahabad Development Authority was not a company. For the reasons given in that judgment, we take a similar view in this petition. To a local authority Part VII does not apply. 25. Manubhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 SC 120 relied upon by the petitioner's learned counsel in fact, goes against the petitioner than supporting it. In that case, acquisition was for Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. The Supreme Court held that it was not the acquisition for a company with the funds exclusively provided by the company and therefore, Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act did not apply. We need not make a reference of the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission that to a case of company, Part VII has to be applied before acquisition as there is no dispute with that proposition of law. 26. Sri G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that as plots Nos. 20 and 26, which are the subject matter of the present acquisition proceedings, were reserved in the Master Plan prepared for Aligarh for "central activity", hence acquisition for the Aligarh Development Authority for housing scheme being contrary to the Master Plan, was invalid. 26. Sri G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that as plots Nos. 20 and 26, which are the subject matter of the present acquisition proceedings, were reserved in the Master Plan prepared for Aligarh for "central activity", hence acquisition for the Aligarh Development Authority for housing scheme being contrary to the Master Plan, was invalid. In the counter-affidavit the fact that these plots were reserved for central activity has not been denied. However, it has been asserted that the central activity does not run contrary to the purpose for which the land has been acquired by the State of U.P. Sri H. P. Gupta, counsel for the respondent Aligarh Development Authority, has produced before us a copy of the notification changing the land use mentioned in the Master Plan. The land use now is in accordance with the purpose for which the notification under S. 4 was issued. In Writ No. 3422 of 1982, Smt. Shashi Nanda v. Union of India, decided on Nov. 15, 1983, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that merely because at the time of issuance of S.4 notification the master plan does not permit the land, which is sought to be acquired, to be used for, say, residential purposes, does not mean that the acquisition proceedings cannot take place for acquiring land for that purpose. The master plan can be amended. The last submission also thus has no substance. 27. For these reasons, all the writ petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. The stay orders passed in all the writ petitions are discharged.