N. N. MITHAL, J. These are two ap peals arising out of two different suit in which the plaintiff was the same and a com mon question of law is involved in both of them. 2. In second appeal No. 123 of 1977 facts were that a waqf had been created by Smt. Badrunnisa in 1930. According to the scheme of succession of Mutawalli as laid down in the deed of waqf on the death of the Wakif are Smt. Ejazatunnisa became its Mutwalli. However, she offered to sur render her mutwalliship rights in favour of Shamshad Ahmad and obtained order dated 25th April, 1967 from the District court permitting this change whereafter Sham-shad Ahmad became the mutawalli. On 1-6-1971 he obtained permission from the Dis trict Judge to transfer the disputed waqf property in favour of the plaintiff. Acting upon that permission a sale-deed was ex ecuted on 14th February, 1972. A suit by the waqf was then pending against the defen dant and with the leave of the court the present plaintiff was substituted for the waqf. 3. The defendant contested the ap pointment of Shamshad Ahmad as Mutwal li being opposed to the directions in the waqf deed as also the validity of the transfer in plaintiffs favour as being violative of Sec. 49-A of the amended U. P. Muslim Waqf Act, 1960. This suit by the plaintiff was dismissed by the lower appellate court against which he had come up in appeal. 4. In Second Appeal No. 429 of 1979, however, the facts are almost similar, but for minor difference in a few dates and I do not propose to set out the facts again here. The suit has been decreed by the court below and it is the defendant who has come up in ap peal. The very same questions arise in this appeal also i. e. about the validity of Sham-shad Ahmads appointment and of the sale deed. 5. Admittedly, U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 was enacted to regulate and control the working and management of waqfs in U. P. and waqfs of all kinds came under its purview, barring those class of waqfs Alalaulad which were saved by Sec. 2 (3) of the Act. By U. P. Act No. 28 of 1971, which was enforced from 5th Nov. 1971, the Waqf Act was amended whereby this sub-clause (3) was deleted. 6. By U. P. Act No. 28 of 1971, which was enforced from 5th Nov. 1971, the Waqf Act was amended whereby this sub-clause (3) was deleted. 6. According to the appellant the amending Act is prospective in operation and does not retrospectively affect those waqfs to which the present Act did not ini tially apply. In support of his submission he placed reliances on (1984) 1 S. C. C. 206 Pun jab Tin Supply Co. v. Central Govt. & others particularly on the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of the report which says that "all laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive. ". He also seeks support from Bimla Devi v. First Addl. District Judge and others (1984) 2 S. C. C. 582, where also it was laid down by the Supreme Court the substantive rights conferred by any law cannot be taken away by an amendment of that provision with retrospective effect. 7. The contentions of the appellant may be summarised as under: (1) Amendment Act of 1971 applies only to those waqfs which come into exist ence after the date of its enforcement i. e. 5-11-1971 and not to pre-existing waqfs; (2) Alternatively, those waqfs which were exempted from the operation of U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 would, in any case, continue to remain so exempt even after the coming into force of U. P. Act 28 of 1971; (3) Amended provisions can apply only prospectively and the transfer in plaintiffs favour is saved by Sec. 19 of the Amending Act; and (4) Sec. 49-A is not a bar to the permis sion obtained by the plaintiff. 8. The first two of these contentions are inter-connected and deserve treatment together Sec. 2 (1) of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 (for brevity sake referred hereafter as the waqf Act) provides that the Act shall apply to all waqfs irrespective whether those were created before or after the commencement of that Act, subject to such savings as were made in the Act. There fore, in the enforcement of this Act on 3-9-1960 all waqfs came under its purview ex cept those for which there was a saving made. There fore, in the enforcement of this Act on 3-9-1960 all waqfs came under its purview ex cept those for which there was a saving made. in the Act itself i. e. those waqfs Alal-aulad as are described in sub-clause (3) of Sec. 2. 9. What is contended by the respon dent, and in my opinion rightly so, is that the amended provisions despite being prospec tive will apply to those waqfs Alalaulad also which were hitherto not governed by the Waqf Act, being exempted under Section 2 (3 ). I have no hesitation in agreeing to this submission. Merely because an Amending provision is prospective in operation it does not mean that it would not apply to that Class of persons or bodies which did not come within its ambit before and to which the Act became applicable only after the amendment. Even if some waqfs Alalaulad were exempt from the operation of Waqf Act under Sec. 2 (3) on its deletion by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1971 by virtue of Sec. 2 the Act would become applicable to all Waqfs ir respective of whether they were earlier covered by the Waqf Act or not. Once the saving in Sec. 2 (3) is withdrawn the Act becomes applicable without exception to all waqfs. This has no relation with the date of creation or establishment of any waqf but to the date from which the Act will begin to apply. 10. Appellant then relied on a Supreme Court decision in Punjab Univer sity v. Subhash Chandra, (1983) 3 SCC 603. This case, instead of being helpful to the appellant goes contrary to his line of sub missions. It lays down that a rule amended prospectively would not be considered to have an element of retrospectivity merely because it is applicable also to those to whom pre-amended rule was applicable. In that case, the petitioner had joined the Medical College which was then governed by certain statutes of the University regard ing grant of grace marks at the rate of one per cent of the aggregate. While he was still in the Medical College, this rule was amended. Accordingly, the grace-marks could be awarded under the amended statute only at the rate of 1% of maximum marks assigned to each subject instead of the aggregate. While he was still in the Medical College, this rule was amended. Accordingly, the grace-marks could be awarded under the amended statute only at the rate of 1% of maximum marks assigned to each subject instead of the aggregate. The validity of this rule was questioned but the Supreme Court upheld the same and ruled that it would apply to all students whether admitted before or after the amendment though only prospectively. The same is the position here. The amended Act of 1971 will apply prospectively ir respective of the fact whether the waqf was covered by the Act before the amendment or not. 11. As a consequence therefore, from the date of enforcement of the U. P. Act 28 of 1971 the Waqf Act of 1960 would become applicable to all kinds of waqfs whether or not they were governed by the Waqf Act prior to that date. Once we reach this con clusion it must follow that all the amended provisions of the Waqf Act would be ap plicable to the Waqf in question also as from 5-11-1971 including Sec. 49-A thereof. 12. Sec. 49-A of the Act lays down restrictions on the rights of Mutwalli to transfer immoveable property belonging to the waqf and no transfer of immoveable waqf property by way of sale, gift, mortgage or exchange would be valid without the pre vious sanction of the Waqf Board. Although permission to transfer had been obtained from the District Judge on 1-6-71 i. e. prior to the enforcement of the amending Act yet by that time no sale-deed infact had been executed which was admittedly done after 5-11- 1971. The question arises whether such a sale-deed would be hit by Sec. 49-A? Although permission to transfer had been obtained from the District Judge on 1-6-71 i. e. prior to the enforcement of the amending Act yet by that time no sale-deed infact had been executed which was admittedly done after 5-11- 1971. The question arises whether such a sale-deed would be hit by Sec. 49-A? According to Sri Rajesh Tandon, Sec. 49-A will not come in the way of the transferee as this would be saved by Sec. 19 of U. P. Act No. 38 of 1971 which may be extracted below: Sec. 19 Transitory provision.- Nothing in Sec. 49-B Sec. 57-A or Sec. 69-A inserted in the principal Act by this Act: (a) shall affect any suit or other proceedings instituted by the Board in a civil court for any relief mentioned in the said sections before the commencement of this Act, and any such suit or proceedings may be continued as if this Act had not come into force; or (b) affect the validity or executability of any judgment or decree passed by any court before the commencement of this Act. 13. A bare perusal of the section will show that it does not apply to cases to which Sec. 49-A applies. Its applicability is confined to cases covered under three other sections mentioned therein. In any case even this provision can only save a suit or proceeding instituted by the Board or such judgment or decree which had been obtained before the commencement of the amending Act. In this case neither a suit nor a proceeding at the instance of the Board was pending at that time nor any judg ment or decree had been obtained by the Board before the commencement of the Act. Sec. 19 of the U. P. Act 28 of 1971, therefore, cannot come to plaintiffs rescue. A mere permission to transfer the waqf property obtained by the Mutwalli from the District court does not per se amount to transfer of the property. It only enables the Mutwalli to execute the sale-deed. Until the deed is executed according to law, no transfer can be affective and if after 5-11-1971 any such transfer is affected it would be wholly in violation of Sec. 49-A of the amended Waqf Act. It only enables the Mutwalli to execute the sale-deed. Until the deed is executed according to law, no transfer can be affective and if after 5-11-1971 any such transfer is affected it would be wholly in violation of Sec. 49-A of the amended Waqf Act. It is, therefore, ob vious that the transfer in favour of the plain tiff which was made after 5-11-71 would be hit by the prohibitions contained in Section 49-A for want of prior permission from the Waqf Board in this behalf. 14. As a last resort Sri Tandon sought to urge that the defect, if any on the above nature stood cured during the pendency of the appeal in this court. He submitted that the Waqf Board had initiated proceedings against the plaintiff under Sec. 49-B and on cause being shown by the plaintiff the notices were withdrawn. It is, therefore, urged that this should be deemed to be the permission for transfer so as to cure any existing lacuna in the validity of the sale deed. The argument has no merit. Sec. 49-B is a special remedy designed to invest the Waqf Board with powers to protect Waqf property against being dealt within a man ner contrary to the provisions of the Act. It has been given the power to launch an en quiry and after hearing the party concerned to adjudicate upon the rights pertaining to the property. The Board can have its order enforced with the aid of the Collector. This section, however, does not give any authority to the Board to validate any sale-deed executed in violation of the provisions of the Act. All that the Waqf Board can do is to discharge its notice and to refrain from taking any action as contemplated under Sec. 49-B of the Act. However, by mere discharge of its notice, it does not follow that the sale deed executed in contravention of Sec. 49-A would stand validated. Since the matter is now before the court it alone has the jurisdiction to decide the question of validity of the transfer. 15. In view of what I have said above, I must held that the sale-deed executed by Shamshad Ahmad Mutawalli of the Waqf in plaintiffs favour was invalid and ineffective being violative of the provisions of Sec. 49-A of the Act. 16. 15. In view of what I have said above, I must held that the sale-deed executed by Shamshad Ahmad Mutawalli of the Waqf in plaintiffs favour was invalid and ineffective being violative of the provisions of Sec. 49-A of the Act. 16. In the light of the view that I have taken above it is not necessary for me to decide the other point which was raised by Sri G. N. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Second Appeal No. 429 of 1978 about the validity of appointment of Sri Shamshad Ahmad as Mutawalli of the Waqf. Suffice it to say that the District Judge has no power to make any departure from the line of succession set out in the deed of Waqf and to appoint any Mutawalli against the wishes of the Wakif. 17. In view of the above discussions I find no force in second appeal No. 123 of 1977 which deserves to be dismissed while second appeal No. 429 of 1978 merits to be allowed. I will prefer not to make any order as to costs in the two appeals. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. 18. Sri Rajesh Tandon has orally prayed that a copy of the judgment be provided to him within a week. Office will supply necessary copy within a week on an application make in that behalf on payment of charges according to rules. Order accordingly. .