Judgment RAMASWAMI, J. This is a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus calling for the records of the respondent made in G.O.SR.1/1201-4/84 and communicated to the detenu in letter No.SR.1/1201/ 5/84 dated 9.10.1984; quashing the same and directing the respondent to set at liberty the detenu V.M.G.Srinivasa Vandayar, son of Govindaswamy Vandayar, now undergoing detention in Central Prison, Trichy. 2. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3(1)(i), (ii), (iii) and (v) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Central Act 52 of 1974) hereinafter referred to as the Act) by an order dated 9.10.1984, the Government directed that Thiru V.M.G.Srinivasa Vandayar, hereinafter referred to as the detenu, be detained and kept in custody in the Central Prison, Trichy, on the ground that it was necessary in order to prevent him from smuggling goods; abetting the smuggling of goods; engaging in transporting or concealing smuggled goods and harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods. The grounds of detention was served on the detenu through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Trichy on 9.10.1984. In the grounds of detention, it is stated that on receipt of information that contraband goods have been smuggled by the detenu and about the likelihood of movement of those contraband goods from Katarapet area towards Madras/Bangalore in Ambassador Cars bearing Registration Nos. TMI 5693 (Parrot Green Colour), MSO 5166 (White Colour) and TNY 3011 (Sky Blue Colour), watch was. kept by Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) Officer at Bhuvanagiri at the early hours on 18.12.1983. On noticing the Ambassador Car bearing Registration No.5693, the Officer tried to stop the car but the car sped fast without heeding to the signals of the Officer. However, the Officer managed to stop the said Ambassador car at a narrow lane at Bhuvanagiri after giving a chase. Five persons were found in the car. No Contraband goods was however recovered from the said car, but found among the persons in the car one B.K.Ramachari, whose name figured in the intelligence information received earlier, was having a paper chit with the addresses of K.M.H.Batchi and Kutty Sait of Madras. Few minutes later, another Ambassador car bearing Registration No.TNY 3011 came in sight and escaped ignoring the signals of the officer to stop. Few minutes later, another Ambassador car bearing Registration No.TNY 3011 came in sight and escaped ignoring the signals of the officer to stop. Shortly thereafter, the third Ambassador Car bearing registration No.MSO 5166 also came, though it was haulted because of the check on the road due to road block, the occupants of the said car escaped. On examination of the said Car (MSO 5166) it was found to contain three gunny bags of Zip Fasteners, one paper packet of Ceylon tea and one TV antenna on the back seat of the car and three bags of Zip Fasteners in the boot of the car. Finding that they were of foreign origin and no duty had been paid on them, those goods were seized for further action under the Customs Act. The car bearing Registration No. MSO 5166 was seized on 18.12.1983 for further action. The Ambassador car bearing Registration No. TMI 5693 was also seized for further action on the ground that there was a reasonable belief that the said car had been utilised for smuggling activities and the occupants therein were also detained. The value of the articles found in the car (MSO 5166) was estimated at Rs.2,06,800/-. The officers of the Customs along with the police officers found the Ambassador car bearing Registration No.TNY 3011 abandoned at Mariammal Street, Kuriamangalam on the same day. In that car they found 11 VCRs of foreign origin. The value of those VCRs. was estimated at Rs.1,85,000/-. Thus the total value of the seizure was estimated at Rs.3,91,800/-Statements from the occupants and the driver of the car (TMI 5693) were also recorded and further investigation was done. Again in 18.6.1984 the residence of the detenu was searched under a Search Warrant issued by the Assistant Director, D.R.I., Madras which resulted in the seizure of contraband two VCRs. two T.Vs., two obscene Video Cassettes, all valued at Rs.52,200/-. The grounds of detention further stated that based on the investigations conducted and collection of corroborative evidence and statements collected/recorded and after arriving at the conclusion that the detenu was actively involved in the above smuggling activities, at the brain behind the entire operation, he was arrested on 20.6.1984 and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras for remand, who released him on conditional bail. In the grounds of detention, it is further stated that: “From the foregoing material on record, it is clear that you Thiru V.M.G.Srinivasa Vandayar, son of Govindasamy Vandayar, residing at Kavarapet, near Chidambaram, have knowingly indulged in smuggling activities and abetted smuggling and smugglers inasmuch as the fact that you have landed the contraband seized on 18.12.1983 and arranged transportation of the same with the help of your henchmen, viz., Tvl. N.Jayavel, S.Arumugham, S.Natesan, S.Perumal, Venkatesan Pillai, B.K.Ramachari and K.L.Santhanam in two cars (MSO 5166 and TNY 3011) duly pilotted by Tvl. B.K.Ramachari, K.L.Santhanam and S.Arumugham in Car TMI 5693”. After referring to the statements of B.K.Ramachari and others, the grounds of detention further stated that: “The information recorded before the actual seizure and investigation had also clearly indicated your involvement in this case which had been proved to be correct by the corroborative evidences like the registration numbers of the cars used, the involvement of the said B.K.Ramachari in your transportation attempts, etc. Your continued involvement in the smuggling operation had also been clearly brought out by the fact that contraband worth Rs.52,200/-was seized from your residence at Kavarapet on 18.6.1984, for which, you could not offer valid documents to prove their licit nature and importation and you had admitted the offence in your deposition dated 18.6.1984.” In the grounds of detention, it is further stated that the State Government were fully satisfied that the detenu was indulging in smuggling goods, abetting the smuggling of goods, engaging in transporting, concealing, keeping of smuggled goods and harbouring persons engaged in the smuggling goods and in abetting of smuggling of goods. It is further stated in the grounds of detention that the activities of the detenu are as such, that further recourse to normal criminal law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in such activities and therefore, it is necessary for the State Government to take action under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. 3. Onreceipt of the grounds of detention, the detenu sent a letter on 29.10.1984 to the Government requesting among others, to furnish copies of following records: 1. The information said to have been received by the Department, about the involvement of the detenu in smuggling activities and the likelihood movement of the contraband goods from Kavarapet in three Ambassador cars, above referred to; 2. The information said to have been received by the Department, about the involvement of the detenu in smuggling activities and the likelihood movement of the contraband goods from Kavarapet in three Ambassador cars, above referred to; 2. The record of interrogation of Jayavelu, made on 6.3.1984; 3. Copy of his letter dated 16.8.1984, sent by registered post along with enclosures relating to purchase of two T.V. sets and two VCRs. seized from him on 18.6.1984. 4. Copy of the petition sent by one Muthuswamy, claiming ownership of TNY 3011 and praying for release of the vehicle; 5. The details six other old cases, in which the detenu was said to be involved and on the basis of which his bail application was opposed and the bail was refused. He further stated that the copies of the above documents are necessary in order to enable him to send a reply. It may be mentioned that Jayavelu, whose interrogation took place on 6.3.1984, is the owner of the Export Workshop at Chidambaram, from where all the three cars above referred to, are stated to have started, and who is also one involved in this gang of smugglers. His statements are also referred to in the documents enclosed with the grounds of detention. However, the recorded interrogation made on 6.3.1984, was not enclosed. When the T.Vs. and Videos were seized from the detenu’s house on 18.6.1984, the detenu is stated to have furnished then and there receipts and other evidence for the purchase of one Video set. On 16.8.1984, he sent receipts and other records relating to the purchase of other V.C.Rs. and T.Vs. along with the covering letter. Since the detenu was in Jail and he did not keep copy of those documents he called for the same and that was the third of the documents referred to above. In their communication dated 12.11.1984, this request was rejected in respect of the record of interrogation of Jayavelu made on 6.3.1984. The Govt. letter stated that no statement was recorded. However, no other reason was given as to why copies of other records were not supplied or could not be supplied. Even with regard to the interrogation of 3ayavelu on 6.3.1984 it was only stated that no “statement” was given by Jayavelu on that date. The Govt. letter stated that no statement was recorded. However, no other reason was given as to why copies of other records were not supplied or could not be supplied. Even with regard to the interrogation of 3ayavelu on 6.3.1984 it was only stated that no “statement” was given by Jayavelu on that date. But it is seen from the grounds of detention and it is not now disputed by the learned Public Prosecutor that the said Jayavelu was interrogated on 6.3.1984. Therefore, there should have been a record of that interrogation and that had not been furnished to the detenu, though he specifically asked for it. 4. Mr. G.Ramaswamy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the detenu is entitled to be supplied with the grounds of detention and also he shall be afforded an opportunity to make his representation against such an order of detention. All those documents and records, which are referred to and relied on in the grounds of detention, also form part of the grounds of detention and unless all such documents, that are referred to and relied on, are supplied along with the grounds of detention, the fundamental right of the detenu under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India would have been violated, vitiating the order of detention itself. He also contended that even in regard to those records and documents, which may not be considered as basic facts or referred to in the detention order but have a bearing on the detention, if requested by the detenu, should be furnished to him, as otherwise he could not be said to have been given an effective opportunity to make his representation against this order and it the documents called for by him, were not furnished that would vitiate the order of detention. He would bring the documents listed in Items 1 to 3 within the category of basic facts and urge that those documents should have been supplied to him even along with the grounds of detention and those documents, even after he had called for, were not supplied, and that vitiate the entire order of detention. He would bring the documents listed in Items 1 to 3 within the category of basic facts and urge that those documents should have been supplied to him even along with the grounds of detention and those documents, even after he had called for, were not supplied, and that vitiate the entire order of detention. The other documents also have material relevance to the order of detention and inspite of his request according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, they have not been furnished and no reasons have been given, as to why the same was not furnished and could not be furnished. 5. There could be no doubt that the information received about the detenu’s involvement in smuggling activities and movement of contraband goods is one of the basic facts which was relied on in the grounds of detention. As already stated, the order states that the investigation was initiated only on the basis of that information. Again it is stated in the passage extracted above, that the information recorded before the actual seizure and investigation, clearly indicated the detenu’s involvement in the smuggling activities and that had been proved to be correct by the corroborative evidence like the registration numbers of the cars used, the involvement of Ramachari in the transportation attempts, etc. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the petitioner has specifically contended that the detaining authority had relied on this information as disclosing the link between the detenu and the contraband goods and that he was entitled for a copy of the same. In the counter affidavit filed, not only this statement was not denied but asserted that that formed the basis for the conclusion, that the detenu was involved in the smuggling activities. In the grounds of detention, it is further stated, with reference to the seizure of the T.Vs. and VCRs. on 18.6.1984, from the residence of detenu, that the detenu did not possess any receipt for the payment of customs duty or document to prove licit nature of importation of those articles. This statement, according to the detenu, is contrary to the evidence available on record and the documents already furnished and which were in the possession of the department to prove the licit origin of those articles. This statement, according to the detenu, is contrary to the evidence available on record and the documents already furnished and which were in the possession of the department to prove the licit origin of those articles. Under these circumstances, according to the petitioner, those documents should have been furnished along with the grounds of detention oratleast when he called for it. 6. In Hansmukh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) M.L.J. (Crl.) 172: (1980) Crl.L.J. 1286: (1981) 1 S.C.J. 250: (1981) 2 S.C.C. 175 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 387: (1981) 1 S.C.R. 353 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 28 the scope of Article 22(5) and in particular the meaning of the ‘grounds’ of detention was considered and it was held: "While the expression "grounds" in Article 22(5), and for that matter in Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA, includes not only conclusion of fact but also all the ‘basic facts’ on which those conclusions are founded they are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars of the basic facts. The distinction between "basic facts" which are essential factual constituents of the "grounds" and their further particulars or subsidiary details is important. While the "basic facts" being integral part of the "grounds" must according to Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA be communicated to the detenu, as soon as may be, after the detention, ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 15 days from the date of detention, further particulars of those grounds in compliance with the second constitutional imperative spelled out from Article 22(5) in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975) Crl.L.J. 446: (1975) S.C.C. (Crl.) 435: (1975) 2 S.C.C. 81 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550 are required to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be practicable, with reasonable expedition. If the grounds communicated are elaborate and contain all the "basic facts" but are not comprehensive enough to cover all the details or particulars of the "basic facts", such particulars, also must be supplied to the detenu, if asked for by him, with reasonable expedition, within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time conforming with reasonable expedition, required for the supply of such details or further particulars, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstance of the particular case. What is reasonable time conforming with reasonable expedition, required for the supply of such details or further particulars, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstance of the particular case. It follows that if in a case the so-called "grounds of detention" communicated to the detenu, lack the basic or primary facts on which the conclusions of fact stated therein are founded, and this deficienty is not made good and communicated to the detenu within the period specified in Section 3(3) the omission will be fatal to the validity of the detention. If, however, the grounds communicated are elaborate and contain all the”basic facts” but are not comprehensive enough to cover all the details or particulars of the”basic facts”, such particulars also must be supplied to the detenu, if asked for by him with reasonable expedition, within a reasonable time. What is”reasonable time conforming with reasonable expedition”, required for the supply of such details or further particulars, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In the circumstances of a given case, if the time taken for supply of such additional particulars, exceeds marginally, the maximum fixed by the statute for communication of the grounds it may still be regarded “reasonable”, while in the facts of another case, even a delay which does not exceed 15 days, may be unjustified and amount to an infraction of the second constitutional imperative pointed out in Khudiram’s case, (1975) Crl.L.J. 446: (1975) 2 S.C.C. 81 .” 7. However on facts of that case it was held that: “the ‘grounds’ supplied to the detenu were elaborate and full and contained all the”basic facts”, although they did not set out all the details or particulars of those “basic facts” relied upon or referred to therein. There was thus no breach of the first constitutional imperative embodied in Article 22 (5)” and that “in the totality of the circumstances of the present case, the period of about 17 days taken in considering the supply of the other particulars to the detenu was not unreasonably long period which could amount to a denial of the detenu’s right to make an effective representation”. Therefore the word ‘grounds’ under Article 22(5) would mean all the basic facts and materials, on which the order of detention is passed. Therefore the word ‘grounds’ under Article 22(5) would mean all the basic facts and materials, on which the order of detention is passed. Therefore all the basic facts and materials which influenced the detaining authority to pass the order of detention must be communicated to the detenu. 8. In Kamla Kanhaiyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) Crl.L.J. 353: (1981) 1 S.C.C. 748 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 287: (1981) All. Crl. C. 790: (1981) 2 S.C.R. 459 : A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 814, the Supreme Court specifically ruled: “The documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention form an integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenu paripasu the grounds of detention. If the documents and materials are supplied later, then the detenu is deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. Before an order of detention can be supported, the constitutional safeguards must be strictly observed”. In Smt. Lcchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983 the Supreme Court further observed: “If the grounds of detention are not furnished to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, the continued detention of the detenu would be rendered illegal both on the ground of violation of Clause (5) of Article 22 as also on the ground of breach of requirement of Section 3, sub-section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act. Now it is obvious that when Clause (5) of Article 22 and sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention they must also be communicated to the detenu because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. If there are any documents statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention they must also be communicated to the detenu because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them. It would not therefore be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time subject of course to Clause (6) of Article 22 in order to constitute compliance with Clause (5) of Article 22 and Section 3, sub-section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act. One of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult to see how the detenu can possible make an effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. There can therefore be no doubt that on a proper construction of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, sub-section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid continuance of detention that subject to Clause (6) of Article 22 copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention should be furnished to the detenu along with the grounds of detention or in any event not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. If this requirement of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, sub-section (3) is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void." Even the earlier decisions rendered by the Supreme Court reported in Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. The State of Tamil Nadu and another, (1979) 2 S.C.R. 633 : (1979) Crl.L.J. 462: (1979) S.C.C. (Crl.) 318: (1979) 1 S.C.C. 465 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 541; Krishnalal Dutta v. The State of West Bengal, (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 259: (1974) 3 S.C.C. 782: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 955; and Prabhu Dayal Deorah etc., v. District Magistrate, Kamrup, (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 18: (1974) 1 S.C.C. 103 : (1974) Crl.L.J. 286: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 183 are also to the same effect and it is not necessary to refer to the same. 9. There could be no doubt in this case, as already stated, that the grounds of detention specifically relied on the information received, which is stated to have implicated the detenu in the smuggling activities and therefore such material document ought to have been sent along with the grounds of detention. The non-furnishing of the same will be a violation of the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The decision relied on by the learned Public Prosecutor reported in State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, (1984) Crl.L.J. 177: (1984) 1 S.C.C. 596 : (1984) S.C.C. (Crl.) 135: A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 444 in no way detracts from the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. In that particular case, actually the C.I.D. report was supplied to the detenu, but the contention on behalf of the detenu was that he should have been informed about the "source" of information and also of the entire evidence gathered by the detaining authority. There, the Supreme Court held that the detenu was not entitled to the source of information nor was he entitled to all the materials gathered and all that the detenu was entitled to was such of those materials which were relied on in the order of detention and not the entire evidence gathered. There, the Supreme Court held that the detenu was not entitled to the source of information nor was he entitled to all the materials gathered and all that the detenu was entitled to was such of those materials which were relied on in the order of detention and not the entire evidence gathered. In fact, the learned Judges referred to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Smt. IcchuDevi Choraria v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983, which we referred to already, and held that since no material, which was relied on in the grounds of detention had been shown to be not furnished to the detenu, that decision is of no assistance to the department to contend that the detenu was not entitled to be furnished with a copy of the information received as part of the grounds of detention. The decision reported in Beni Madhab @Benia v. The State of West Bengal, (1973) Crl.L.J. 1621: (1973) S.C.C. (Crl.) 1076: (1974) 3 S.C.C. 481 : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2455 relied on by the learned Public Prosecutor does not also help the Department. What was held therein was that: "Under Section 8 of the Act only grounds of order of detention are required to be disclosed to the person affected by such order. The grounds in the present case were actually disclosed. They are neither vague nor ambiguous. The furnish adequate information for enabling the detenu to make effective representation against his detention." In this case, even in his petition, the detenu has specifically stated that he is not asking for the source of information or the person, through whom the information was gathered or even the date or other particulars and all that he requires is only the contents of information, which implicated him in the involvement of smuggling activities. Under these circumstances, none of the decisions relied on by the learned Public Prosecutor enables the department to refuse furnishing of information called for by the detenu. The continued detention is therefore illegal and the order of detention is liable to be quashed. 10. It may also be mentioned that the other grounds raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he was entitled to be furnished with the other records called for also, has to be accepted. The continued detention is therefore illegal and the order of detention is liable to be quashed. 10. It may also be mentioned that the other grounds raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he was entitled to be furnished with the other records called for also, has to be accepted. The decision cited above also shows that unless the documents called for have no bearing on the case and if they have some relevance, the detenu is entitled to be supplied with such documents. The non-supply of the same or the delayed supply of these documents would also vitiate the order of detention. It may be seen from the provisions of the Act that each one of the steps to be taken is time bound and unless the grounds are supplied at the earliest opportunity, the detenu could not be said to have given an effective opportunity to make his representation against the detention. It is this aspect which was emphasised by the Supreme Court in Ganga Ramchand Bharvani v. Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra and others, (1980) Crl.L.J. 1263: A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1744, wherein, their Lordships observed that the detenu had the constitutional right to be afforded and that the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention communicate the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made and the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representative against the detention order and any refusal or delayed supply of copies would violate that right, of the detenu. 11. We may also mention that in respect of the violation of constitutional provision under Article 22(5), the provisions of Section 5-A of COFEPOSA Act has no bearing. The Division Bench of this Court in S.Ravindran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1984) Crl.L.J. 763: (1983) L.W. (Crl.) 177: I.L.R. (1984) 1 Mad. 105: (1983) M.L.J. (Crl.) 448 observed: "We are not concerned with the severability or otherwise of the grounds, as urged by the learned Public Prosecutor, but only with the constitutional mandate which cannot be overridden by Section 5-A of the Act and which is an inescapable mandate. 105: (1983) M.L.J. (Crl.) 448 observed: "We are not concerned with the severability or otherwise of the grounds, as urged by the learned Public Prosecutor, but only with the constitutional mandate which cannot be overridden by Section 5-A of the Act and which is an inescapable mandate. The question of sustaining the grounds will come only at a later stage but the constitutional safeguards with regard to the communication of the grounds so as to enable the detenu to make an effective representation, have got to be adhered to and satisfied without any exception." The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Chandra Shekhaar Ojha v. A.K.Karnik and others, (1982) Crl.L.J. 1642 observed: "However, it is contended by Mr. Kotwal that assuming that because of non-supply of some of the documents the grounds which are based on them are invalid for that reason, the order of detention as a whole cannot be declared as illegal in view of Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act. According to the learned Counsel, in view of the said provision it will have to be held that the order of detention was based on the remaining grounds or ground that therefore is legal and valid. Before dealing with this contention it will have to be seen as to what is the effect of non-supply of relevant documents. The Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect of the matter in various decisions. In Kamala Kanhaiyalal Khushalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 748 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 287: (1981) All.Crl.C. 190: (1981) 2 S.C.R. 459 : (1981) Crl.L.J. 353: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 814 the Supreme Court held that the documents and materials relied upon in the order of detention form an integral part of the grounds and must be supplied to the detenu pari passu the grounds of detention. If the documents and materials are supplied later, then the detenu is deprived of an opportunity of making an effective representation against the order of detention. Thus before an order of detention CAN BE SUPPORTED, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARD MUST BE STRICTLY OBSERVED. Thus it is clear that supplying the relevant documents to enable the detenu to make an effective representation is a constitutional safeguard. Thus before an order of detention CAN BE SUPPORTED, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARD MUST BE STRICTLY OBSERVED. Thus it is clear that supplying the relevant documents to enable the detenu to make an effective representation is a constitutional safeguard. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India lays down that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. The communication of the grounds is part and parcel of the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. As observed by the Supreme Court in various decisions the documents which form an integral part of the grounds must be supplied along with the grounds of detention. If this is not done, the detention of the detenu is liable to be declared as void. The Supreme Court in S.Gurdip Singh’s case, (1981) 1 S.C.C. 419 : (1981) S.C.C. (Crl.) 168: A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 362: (1981) Crl.L.J. 2 has taken a view that the service of grounds of detention can be completed only if they are accompanied by the documents and materials on which the order of detention is based. For then alone will the detenu be able to make an effective representation. In other words, if the documents which form the basis of the order of detention are not served on the detenu along with the grounds of detention, in the eye of law, there will be no service of the grounds of detention and that circumstance could vitiate his detention and make it void ab initio. From this decision it is clear that non-supply of relevant documents will render the detention itself void ab initio. Therefore, once it is held that the supply of wholly blank or illegible documents amounts to non-supply of copies of the relevant documents which are relied upon for passing the detention order, then we have no other alternative but to hold that the detention of the detenu is void ab initio. If the detention is void abinitio, then the question of sustaining such a void order under Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act cannot arise. If the detention is void abinitio, then the question of sustaining such a void order under Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act cannot arise. Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act will come into operation after the communication of grounds and following the constitutional safeguards. In our opinion, Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act will have no application if the grounds themselves are not communicated. Otherwise, the constitutional safeguard guaranteed under Article 22(5) will have no meaning. From the various decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the non-supply of the grounds of detention or relevant documents must have an effect of invalidating the detention itself. In that case the detention cannot be said to be according to the procedure prescribed by law. If the detention itself is not according to the procedure prescribed by law, then the question of supporting the void order of detention by taking recourse to Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act will not arise." Though it may be said that the order of detention could not be treated as void abinitio, by reason of non-compliance of the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the continued detention would be illegal and contrary to the provisions of Article 22(5). Therefore, the decision of the Bombay High Court, referred to above, also supports the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act could not save the detention, when it is contrary to Article 22(5) of the Constitution. We are in entire agreement with these two judgments of the Bombay High Court and our High Court. 12. In view of the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the continued detention of the detenu is contrary to Article 22(5) of the Constitution and we accordingly quash the order of detention. The respondent is directed to set the detenu at liberty forthwith.