JUDGMENT : N.D. OJHA, J. 1. Some plots of land belonging to the claimant-Respondent situate within the municipal limits of Pilibhit were acquired by the Appellant under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for construction of a by pass-road. In support of their claim for compensation the Respondent placed reliance on certain sale deeds as exemplars before the Land Acquisition Officer. Relying on one of them the Land Acquisition Officer fixed the rate of compensation at the rate of Rs. 2.84 per sq. yard. He, however, deducted 50% of the compensation towards expenses for development of the land. 2. Thereafter at the Instance of the claimant-Respondent a reference was made to the District Judge for determination of compensation u/s 18 of the Act. The claimant-Respondent was claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yard. The District Judge after going through the material on record, however, agreed with the Land Acquisition Officer and relying on the sale deed on which reliance had been placed by the Land Acquisition Officer came to the conclusion that the compensation payable to the claimant-Respondent was to be determined at the rate of Rs. 2.84 per sq. yard. He, however, disagreed with the Land Acquisition Officer in so for as deduction of 50 per cent of the compensation towards the charges for development was concerned. The District Judge pointed out that deduction towards expenses for development could be made where large track of land was acquired for planned development and it was necessary to improve the land before buildings were constructed thereon. In a case where small pieces of land were acquired for construction of a by pass road the principle of deduction of some amount towards charges for development of the land was not applicable. 3. Aggrieved by the award of the District Judge the State of U.P. has preferred this First Appeal. It has been urged by the counsel for the Appellant that the District Judge committed an error in taking the view that no deduction for development of the land could be made from the amount of compensation. We find it difficult to agree with the submission. It has been urged by the counsel for the Appellant that the District Judge committed an error in taking the view that no deduction for development of the land could be made from the amount of compensation. We find it difficult to agree with the submission. The view taken by the District Judge in this behalf that deduction for development was permissible in these cases where a large track of land was acquired for planned development and improvement had to be made thereon before buildings could be constructed and that the said principle was not applicable to the cases where small pieces of land were acquired just for construction of by pass road, is correct and does not call for any interference. 4. It was then urged by the counsel for the Appellant that since no written objection has been filed by the claimant-Respondent u/s 9 of the Act the District Judge could not award compensation higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. Reliance in support of this submission has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilawarsab Babusab Mullasab and Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1974 SC 2333 . A perusal of Paragraph 10 of the report indicates that that was a case where the parties bad not appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer and had not put forward any specific amount as compensation. Such is not the situation in the instant case. Here as is apparent from the award given by the District Judge the Land Acquisition Officer not only entertained the oral objection about the compensation but also permitted the claimant-Respondent to produce evidence which lie did. And it was on the basis of an exempler that was produced before him that the Lind Acquisition Officer fixed the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs. 2.84 per sq. yard. 5. Section 9 of the Act contemplates notice to be served on the persons interested. The last sentence of Sub-section (2) of Section 9 reads: The Collector may in any case require such Statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or its agent. 6. This sentence indicates that even an oral objection in regard to compensation is permissible. The last sentence of Sub-section (2) of Section 9 reads: The Collector may in any case require such Statement to be made in writing and signed by the party or its agent. 6. This sentence indicates that even an oral objection in regard to compensation is permissible. It has been found by the District Judge that there was nothing on record to indicate that notice as contemplated by the Section 9 was served on the claimant-Respondent. This being so it is not possible to take the view that the Collector bad in the instant case required any statement about compensation to be made in writing and signed by the claimant-Respondent. 7. The view that an oral objection u/s 9(2) of the Act is permissible finds support from the decision of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deomani Bhagat and Others, AIR 1980 Patna 265. 8. As seen above the Land Acquisition Officer had not only entertained his oral objection but bad permitted the claimant-Respondent to produce evidence. 9. The matter can be looked into from another angle. It is Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act which is relevant so far as the aforesaid submission made by the counsel for the Appellant is concerned. This sub-section reads: 25(2). When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim the amount awarded by the court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. 10. Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act, therefore, on sufficient reason being shown entitles the court to condone the default in filing written objection. In the circumstances of the instant case the District Judge has specifically condoned the default made by the claimant in this behalf as is apparent from the award appealed against. We find no good ground to interfere with the said order of the District Judge. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion we find no force in either of the two pleas raised by the counsel for the Appellant before us. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.