JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - Both these appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment as these centre round the same legal question about the maintainability of execution application by appellant against respondent surety. 2. The impugned judgments were recorded by Sri 0. P. Garg, learned Second Civil Judge, Kanpur on 5-9-1973 in Civil Appeals Nos. 245 and 246 of 1972 arising out of Execution Applications Nos. 44 and 49 of 1969 who upheld the orders recorded by land Additional Munsif, Kanpur who dismissed the execution applications of decree holder under S. 145 of Code of Civil Procedure as not maintainable. It was found that surety was not responsible to pay the. decretal amount. 3. Decree-holder appellant filed Misc. Case No. 276 of 1963 under S. 7-B of U.P. Temporary Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947 (Act No. III of 1947) against Smt. Sarla Devi, daughter-in-law of respondent. 4. Smt. Sarla Devi put in appearance in the miscellaneous case preferred by landlady and wanted to file objection but she was under the necessity to furnish security or to deposit the amount in cash as claimed by landlady under S. 7-B(7) of the aforesaid Act. 5. Smt. Krishna Devi, mother-in-law of tenant, stool as surety to enable the tenant to file the objection against the application under S. 7-B. The proceedings under S. 7-B were converted into a regular suit after the tenant had filed the security. It was registered as a Regular Suit No. 810 of 1965. It was eventually decreed and the first appeal preferred by tenant failed. 6. A suit under S. 5(4) of U.P. Act Ill of 1947 was also filed by tenant for fixation of rent. 7. Landlady filed an execution application to enforce the liability under the decree against the surety Smt. Krishna Devi under S. 145 of Code of Civil Procedure. 8. The objection preferred by respondent was that the security was filed only for the purpose of proceeding under S. 7-B of the Act and did not render surety liable to pay the decretal amount of the regular suit. Other ancillary objections were also raised which are not necessary to be detailed for the disposal of these appeals. 9. It appears that Sri K.K. Srivastava, the then learned IInd Additional Munsif, Kanpur held that the decree holder was not entitled to enforce the decree against the surety. Other ancillary objections were also raised which are not necessary to be detailed for the disposal of these appeals. 9. It appears that Sri K.K. Srivastava, the then learned IInd Additional Munsif, Kanpur held that the decree holder was not entitled to enforce the decree against the surety. The decree-holder went up in appeal and on 26-9-1970. Sri Santosh Kumar Misra, the then IInd Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur set aside the order of the executing court and remanded the case for rehearing and disposal according to the observations in the body of his judgment. Thereafter, the case was disposed of by Sri Shailendra Saxena, the then IInd Additional Munsif, Kanpur who dismissed the execution application as not maintainable. 10. The same view was upheld in appeal. 11. I have heard Sri R.K. Kakkar and Sri S.K. Kakkar, learned Advocates for appellant and perused the record. 12. Sri V.B.L. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent, despite all efforts, did not appear in the case. 13. The only question which falls to be determined in these appeals is whether the surety bond furnished at the stage of application under S. 7-B of Act III of 1947 is enforceable against the surety in execution of the decree in which the aforesaid proceedings may eventually culminate. 14. The appeals allowed for the following reasons : (i) In Execution Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1970, Sri Santosh Kumar Misra, learned find Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur on 26-9-1970 found that the surety was liable. In this connection, he referred to S. 128 of Indian Contract Act and AIR 1954 Pepsu 3 (Vol. 41 C.N. 2), (a) Civil P.C. (1908) and Amulya Raean v. Prosad Chandra Kar, AIR 1916 Cal. 143, So the categorical finding recorded by him was that the application was maintainable and the surety was liable. The case was sent back to the court below to be decided in the light of the aforesaid observations in the body of judgment. That judgment became final and no appeal etc. was preferred against it. When an appellate court remands the case, the scope of trial court is to function within the ambit of the remand order. The observations made by learned appellate court were transgressed by learned Additional Munsif. This is impermissible. (ii) Both the courts below have simply ignored that contractual liability of surety which flowed from the bond furnished by her. When an appellate court remands the case, the scope of trial court is to function within the ambit of the remand order. The observations made by learned appellate court were transgressed by learned Additional Munsif. This is impermissible. (ii) Both the courts below have simply ignored that contractual liability of surety which flowed from the bond furnished by her. The surety deed is dated 10-5-1963 and it specifically refers to Misc. Case No. 276 of 1963 under S. 7-B. Smt. Krishna Devi v. Smt. Sarla Devi which was pending in the court of Munsif City, Kanpur on the date of execution of the bond. Smt. Krishna Devi surety rendered herself liable under the decree which was to be eventually passed in these proceedings against Smt. Sarla Devi. The surety and her .legal heirs were made liable to pay the decretal amount and interest in case of default by judgment-debtor without any objection. After such undertaking it is difficult to hold that Smt. Krishna Devi would have raised an objection about the maintainability of the execution application to the extent 4 amount for which she stood surety. Learned court below relied upon Tulsi Misir v. Bindeshri Misra reported in, AIR 1936 All 593 . In that case, security was given while the judgment debtor applied for setting aside the ex parte decree. This security was offered under S. 17(1), Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. The security was given to the satisfaction of the Court up to the period ex parte decree was set side. It could not be availed of by the decree holder when the decree was passed in the regular suit to which the surety was not a party. Obviously, the restoration proceedings on the miscellaneous side are different from the proceedings on regular side. It was not a ease under S. 7B of Act III of 1947. 15. Reliance was also placed upon Bal Krishna Gupta v. Brijeshwari Prasad reported in, 1964 All LJ 175 It was held that the payment in proceedings under S. 7-B sub-clause (iv) was not identical with the payment under S. 7-B sub-clause (vii) of the said Act. In that case, the payment was done by the tenant and raised a plea about the title of landlord who was entitled to receive the rent. There were rival claimants in that case. In that case, the payment was done by the tenant and raised a plea about the title of landlord who was entitled to receive the rent. There were rival claimants in that case. The disputed point in that case was whether such payments were made by tenant within one month of demand so as to save him from ejectment. 16. A look at S. 7-B of the aforesaid Act shows that the said section provides a summary procedure for eviction of tenants in default of payment of rent. If the amount is paid by tenant within the time allowed in the notice, he can save ejectment and the amount deposited has to he paid to the landlord in satisfaction of the arrears vide S. 7(4). If the tenant appeared and filed objection, then the objection is entertainable only on deposit of cost in court or furnishing security to the satisfaction of court. On payment of necessary court fee by the landlord, the application is to be treated as a plaint. Obviously, the decree has to be drawn after hearing the parties and means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit vide S. 2(2) of Civil Procedure Code. Prior to the drawing of the decree, the earlier proceedings are terminable with an order as contemplated by S. 7-B sub- clauses (5) and (6) of the Act. 17. I have referred to surety bond which does not refer to any order but specifically mentioned the decree which was to be eventually passed in the suit. So there was a specific undertaking given by the surety to the court which renders even her heirs liable to pay the decretal amount. There is nothing in S. 145 of Code of Civil Procedure to cut down the extent of liability of the surety which was co-extensive with principal debtor vide Section 128 of Indian Contract Act and the execution applications are maintainable against her and her heirs etc. as laid in the surety bond itself. 18. In this view of the matter, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. The case is remanded to the executing court to dispose of these applications in accordance with law. Costs easy.