JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Some plots of land belonging to the claimant-respondents situate within the municipal limits of Pilibhit were acquired by the appellant under the Land Acquisition Act for construction of a bye-pass road. In support of their claim for compensation the respondents placed reliance on certain sale deeds as exemplars before the Land Acquisition Officer. Relying on one of them the Laud Acquisition Officer fixed the rate of compensation at Rs. 2.84 per square yard. So, however, deducted fifty per cent of the compensation towards the expenses for development of the land. At the instance of the claimant-respondents a reference was thereafter made to the District Judge for determination of the compensation under Section 10 of the Land Acquisition Act inasmuch as the respondents were claiming compensation at a higher rate. After hearing the parties the District Judge agreed with the Land Acquisition Officer that the compensation payable to the claimant respondents was to be determined at the rate of Rs. 2.84 per square yard. The District Judge, however, disagreed with the Land Acquisition Officer in so far as the deduction of 58% of the compensation towards the development charges of the land was concerned. On this view the amount of compensation was enhanced by calculating it at the rate of Rs. 2.84 per square yard without making any deduction for development of the land. The claimant respondents were also awarded interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 1st June, 1961, which was the date on which the notification under Section 4 of the aforesaid Act was issued. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award of the District Judge the State of U.P. has preferred this first appeal. 2. Counsel for the appellant has urged that the District Judge has committed an error in holding that no deduction for development of land could be made from the amount of compensation. A similar argument was made on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh in First Appeal No. 149 of 1973 (State of U.P. v. Afazulul Haq) decided by us on 18th July, 1985. The land in respect of which compensation had been claimed in the aforesaid appeal had also been acquired by the same notification by which the land of the claimant-respondents in the present appeal has been acquired. The submission made by counsel for the appellant was repelled. The land in respect of which compensation had been claimed in the aforesaid appeal had also been acquired by the same notification by which the land of the claimant-respondents in the present appeal has been acquired. The submission made by counsel for the appellant was repelled. It was held that deduction for development was permissible in those cases where a large track of land was acquired for planned development and improvement had to be made thereon before buildings could be constructed and that the said principle could not be applicable to a case where small pieces of land were acquired just for construction of a bye-pass road. For the same reason we do not find any substance in the aforesaid submission made by counsel for the appellant. 3. It was then urged by counsel for the appellant that possession over the land of the respondents was taken on 15th March, 1963 and consequently they were entitled to a decree for interest with effect from that date and not with effect from 1st June, 1961, which was the date of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Suffice it to point out so far as this submission is concerned that the District Judge has pointed out in the award appealed against that the notification under Section 4 dated 1st June, 1961, itself stated that possession had been taken under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. That being so it cannot be said that the District Judge committed any error in awarding interest with effect from 1st June, 1961. 4. No other point has been pressed. 5. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall, however be no order as to costs.