Judgment 1. The respondent filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for realisation of a sum of Rs. 4996.00 with interest at six percentum per annum on the basis of certain commercial transactions, which was allowed in part. Accordingly a decree for Rs. 4980.00 with interest was passed. The defendant appellant filed an appeal before this Court on 2-8-71. The stamp reporter made a note that in view of the low valuation of the suit, the appeal was not maintainable before the High Court. The appellant withdrew the appeal on 18-8-71 and filed the same two days later before the District Judge, Munger, with an application for condonation of delay. The appeal was admitted ex parte without notice to the respondent. When the respondent appeared he raised the question of limitation. By the impugned judgment the lower appellate Court held that the delay was not fit to be condoned. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The appellant has now come to this Court in second appeal. 2. From the memorandum of appeal, which was filed in this Court in the first instance and later before the District Judge, it is clear that the appellant had correctly mentioned the valuation of the suit on the first page of the memorandum at less than Rs. 5000/-. The valuation of the appeal initially was erroneously mentioned as Rs. 996/- only which was later amended as Rs. 4996/-. As is the practice in this Court, the memorandum was filed before the Stamp Reporter on 2-8-71 and the Stamp Reporter took the objection about the maintainability of the appeal on the ground of low valuation as mentioned above. The memorandum was returned to the learned counsel for presentation before the Registrar in accordance with the High Court Rules. In spite of the objection the learned Advocate for the appellant did not desist from filing the appeal in the High Court. The memorandum, however, was returned 16 days later. 3. According to the case of the appellant, he had consulted an Advocate of Begusarai and was advised to file the appeal before the High Court. The lower appellate Court has rejected this case on the ground that neither a certificate by a Begusarai Advocate was filed in the case nor even the name of the counsel is mentioned. The reasons given in the impugned judgment appear to be correct. The lower appellate Court has rejected this case on the ground that neither a certificate by a Begusarai Advocate was filed in the case nor even the name of the counsel is mentioned. The reasons given in the impugned judgment appear to be correct. It is to be noted that the period of limitation for filing an appeal before the District Judge had already expired before 2-8-71 when the appeal was filed before the High Court. Even assuming that the delay till 2-8-71 be condoned, it is not possible to allow the prayer under S.5 of the Limitation Act due to the delay between 2-8-71. It has been firmly established that it is not every wrong advice by the legal adviser that will amount to a sufficient cause entitling a party to claim the indulgence under S.5. Acting upon wrong advice will amount to a sufficient cause only when the advice was itself given bona fide, that is, after the exercise of due care and attention. The expression good faith" has been defined in S.2(h) of the Limitation Act in the following terms : " good faith - nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention." The definition is clearly different from that in the General Clauses Act. The expression sufficient cause in S.5 has to be interpreted in the light of this definition. The act on the part of the appellants counsel in filing the appeal in spite of the objection of the Stamp Reporter cannot, therefore, be deemed to be in good faith within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It has also been established that in consideration of the question of condonation of delay under the Limitation Act the explanation has to be examined with reference to every days delay (See 30 Calcutta 309 P.C.). The delay of a fortnight in August 1971, therefore, is not fit to be condoned. 4 Mr. N. K. Agrawal appearing in Support of the appeal contended that the order of admission of the appeal by the Court below, although ex parte, concludes the question of limitation which could not have been reopened by the Court below. He has relied on the observation in Murugappa Naicker V/s. Thayammal AIR 1923 Mad 82. 4 Mr. N. K. Agrawal appearing in Support of the appeal contended that the order of admission of the appeal by the Court below, although ex parte, concludes the question of limitation which could not have been reopened by the Court below. He has relied on the observation in Murugappa Naicker V/s. Thayammal AIR 1923 Mad 82. It cannot be denied that an order condoning delay in filing an appeal adversely affects the respondent and he has a right to be heard before a final order in this regard can be passed. To deny such a right will amount to serious violation of the principles of natural justice. With great respect, I, therefore, venture, to differ from the observation made by the Madras Court and hold that where an ex parte order has been passed admitting a time barred application without giving an opportunity to the respondent to contest the matter, the order must be deemed to be subject to the right of the respondent in this regard. Relying on the observation of the Privy Council in Krishnaswami Panikondar V/s. Ramasami Chettiar, AIR 1917 P.C. 179 and Sunderbai V/s. Collector, Balgaum, AIR 1918 PC 135, the Punjab High Court has in Om Sarup Nand Lal V/s. Gur Narain, AIR 1965 Punj 367 expressed a similar view. 5. The lower appellate Court has considered the question at considerable length and has given very cogent reasons in support of its decision and I do not find any error which can be corrected in second appeal. 6. The appeal is therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.