JUDGMENT K.N. Goyal J. 1. Admit. 2. As only a short question is involved and as the order I propose to, pass is not likely to prejudice the opposite parties, it is not necessary to issue notice to the opposite parties. It will, however, be open to the opposite parties, if they feel aggrieved, to apply for reconsideration of the order. 3. The revisionist is the defendant in the trial court. A suit for partition of immovable property has been filed against him by the opposite parties in that suit the property has been valued at Rs 92, 200/ by the plaintiff,' while according to the defendantrevisionist its value is not less than Rs. 10 lacs. An issue on sufficiency of courtfee has been framed. The defendant applicant prayed that the said issue may be decided under Section 6 (4) before the court proceeds with other issues. This prayer was opposed by the plaintiff and has been rejected by the court below on the ground that Order 14 Rule 2 (2) CPC lays down that only if an issue of law only arises and the case may be disposed of on that issue then it may try that issue first, but where questions of fact have also been raised then the court should pronounce judgment on all issues. The court below has also relied on Sri Rathnavarmaraja Vs. Smt, Vimla (AIR 1961 SC, 1299) in which their lordships laid down that the sufficiency of courtfee is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State and the defendant has no right to approach a higher court against a decision holding the courtfee paid to be sufficient. 4. I have first to see whether a revision lies in the case. If the courtfee had been held to be insufficient and the plaintiff had been required to make good the deficiency in court fee and the plaintiff had failed to do so then the plaint would have had to be rejected. In this view of the matter clause (i) of the second proviso to Section 115 CPC, as substituted by U.P. Act No. 31 of 1978 is attracted, and if the court below has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law a complaint in that regard may be made to the High Court. 5. In this view of the matter clause (i) of the second proviso to Section 115 CPC, as substituted by U.P. Act No. 31 of 1978 is attracted, and if the court below has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law a complaint in that regard may be made to the High Court. 5. The decision in Sri Rathnavarmaraja (supra) is not applicable to the case because in that case the trial court had decided the issue of courtfee. If the trial court decides the issue of courtfee then it is only plaintiff who can file an appeal against that decision and not the defendant. In the instant case, however, the grievance is that the trial court has failed to decide the issue. The trial court's reliance on this authority cannot thus be said to be correct. In Baijnath Prasad Vs. Tejpal (AIR 1941 Allahabad, 55) it was pointed out that delivering one judgment in the case dealing with the question of courtfees and with the question of the rights of the parties as regards the subject matter of the suit is not proper as this procedure was in flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 6 (4) of the Court Fees Act. It creates complications as pointed out in that ruling, e.g. if court fee is found insufficient and the plaintiff fails to make good the deficiency then the question will arise whether he could appeal under Section 6A of the Court Fees Act on the issue of courtfee alone or could also appeal under Section 96 CPC against the decision on merits. In that case their lordships struck out the other grounds in the memorandum of appeal which deal with the merits of the case as superfluous and confined the appeal to the question of the sufficiency of courtfee. It was also observed that the attention of the courts below should be drawn to the imperative necessity of faithfully following the provisions of clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Section 6 of the CourtFees Act so that the anomalies of the description which their lordships had to deal in the case before them may not arise in future. 6. The learned Civil Judge seems to have been misled by the new provisions contained in order 14 Rule 2 CPC. 6. The learned Civil Judge seems to have been misled by the new provisions contained in order 14 Rule 2 CPC. The provision in Order 14 rule 2 is a general provision, while that contained in Section 6 (4) of the Court Fees Act is a special provision. The special provision, even though enacted earlier in point of time should prevail over the general provision, and for good reasons as pointed out by the Division Bench in Baijnath Prasad (supra). 7. In this view of the matter the revision is allowed subject as aforesaid, and the order dated 221184 is setaside and the trial court is directed to decide the question of sufficiency of courtfees as required by Section 6 (4) of the Court Fees Act before proceeding further with the case. (Revision allowed)