JUDGMENT RAMASWAMI, J. : - In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for direction to the respondent to release his wife, one Rani, detained in the Central Prison, Madras, pursuant to detention order No.171 of 1981 dated 14.8.1984 under section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bottleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By that order, the Commissioner of Police directed the said Rani (hereinafter referred to as the detenu) to be detained and kept in the Central Prison, Madras, on the ground that she is a bootlegger and it was necessary to detain her under the Act with a view to prevent her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public Order. 2. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner relates to the constitutional validity of the detention for a period longer than three months. Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 received the assent of the President on the 12th March, 1982 and was published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette on 13th March, 1982. Under section 3, the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Section 8 requires that when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. Section 9 deals with the Constitution of Advisory Board and section 10 requires that the State Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention, place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. Section 11 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board and, section 12 deals with the action to be taken on the report of the Advisory Board. Section 11 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board and, section 12 deals with the action to be taken on the report of the Advisory Board. It states that in any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the State Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period not exceeding the maximum period specified in section 13, as they think fit. Section 13 prescribes the maximum period for which any person may be detained as twelve months from the date of detention. 3. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Parliament is bound to prescribe the maximum period of detention under Article 22(7) of the Constitution and the. procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board and until such a law has been made by the Parliament, no person can be detained under any law providing for preventive detention for a period longer than three months and such detention beyond that period would be violative of Article 22(4) of the Constitution. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on some of the observations in the dissenting Judgment in Fagu Shaw v. State of West Bengal Fagu Shaw v. State of West Bengal (1974) Crl.L.J. 486: (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 316: (1974) 4 S.C.C. 152 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 613'. The question for consideration in that case was, whether it is obligatory on the Parliament to prescribe the maximum period of detention under Clause 7(b) of Article 22 if the detention is to be made for a longer period than 3 months under sub-clause (a) of clause (4). In the dissenting judgments, the learned Judges held: the making of a law by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause 7 is obligatory if the detention period is for a period longer than three months. It was stated that apparently the power to prescribe a maximum period given to the Parliament is to prevent the State Legislatures from making laws with regard to preventive detention without any maximum limit. However, the majority decision in that case itself was contrary to this contention of the petitioner. It was stated that apparently the power to prescribe a maximum period given to the Parliament is to prevent the State Legislatures from making laws with regard to preventive detention without any maximum limit. However, the majority decision in that case itself was contrary to this contention of the petitioner. In that case, the legality of an order made under section 12(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 by the Government of West Bengal was questioned on almost all identical grounds raised in this writ petition. After referring to the earlier Judgments and the provisions of Articles 22 (4) and (7) and Entry 3 of List III and Entry 9 of List I, the majority held: “Under Entry 3 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, both Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary power to pass laws for preventive detention as respects the subjects sanctioned therein. As ancillary to that power, or, as an inseparable part of it, Parliament and State Legislatures have power to fix the period of detention also. One cannot imagine a power to pass a law for detention unless that power carries with it the incidental power to provide for the period of such detention. Therefore, both Parliament and State Legislature have power under the entry to provide for detention of a person for a specified period. The purpose of Article 22(4)(a) is to put a curb on that power by providing that no law shall authorise the detention of a person for a period exceeding three months unless an Advisory Board has reported within the period of three months that there is sufficient cause for detention. And, what the proviso means is that even if the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of three months that there is sufficient cause for detention, the period of detention beyond three months shall not exceed the maximum period that might be fixed by any Jaw made by Parliament under Article 22(7)(b). The proviso cannot mean that even if Parliament does not pass a law fixing the maximum period under Article 22(7)(b), the State Legislatures, for example, cannot pass a law which provides for detention of a person beyond three months. The proviso cannot mean that even if Parliament does not pass a law fixing the maximum period under Article 22(7)(b), the State Legislatures, for example, cannot pass a law which provides for detention of a person beyond three months. The period of such detention, viz., detention beyond the period of three months, would then be a matter within the plenary power of Parliament or State Legislatures, as the case may be, as such a power is incidental to the power to pass a law with respect to the topics covered by Entry 3 of List III.” They further observed that the proviso in effect says that if Parliament fixes the maximum period under Article 22(7)(b), the power of Parliament and State Legislatures to fix the period of detention in a law passed under the entry would be curtailed to that extent. The Supreme Court further observed: “To put it differently, as Parliament and State Legislatures have power under the entry to pass a law enabling the detention of a person for a period longer than three months in case the law provides for the opinion of the Advisory Board, there could be no limit to that period, except in the context of its reasonableness, as the power to fix the period of detention is incidental to the plenary power to legislate on the topic of preventive detention. The proviso merely enables Parliament to put a curb on that power by prescribing the maximum period of detention under Article 22(7)(b). The proviso does not, proprio vigore, compel the Parliament to fix the maximum period. Nor does Article 22(7). On the other hand, it expressly says otherwise. Whence then arises the obligation of Parliament to fix the maximum, period under Article 22(7)(b) ? we see no provision which either expressly or by necessary implication compels Parliament to do so.” Learned Counsel for the petitioner then sought to distinguish this judgment on the ground that that case related to interpretation of Article 22(7)(a) and (b) and proviso to clause (a) and (b) of Article 22(4) and it was not really concerned with the applicability of the provisions Article 22(7)(c). According to the learned Counsel, since the proviso to Article 22(4)(a) and Article 22(4)(b) deals with only the law made by Parliament under Sub-Clause (a) and (b) of Clause (7) alone, the ratio of the judgment holding that power under sub-clause (a) and (b) of Clause (7) are only permissive and not obligatory is not applicable in interpreting the provisions of sub-clause (7)(c) of Article 22. We are of the view that this argument has no substance. Clause (7) of Article 22 states that the Parliament "may by law prescribe". The word ‘may’ in this Article was held not to mean as "shall". It is not possible to accede to the argument that in respect of clause (c) alone, this will have to be read as ‘shall’. Further, this point is also not res integra and it is covered by authority against the petitioner's contention and that is the decision reported in State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey (1972) Crl.L.J. 1010: (1972) S.C.C. (Crl.) 128:A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1660. In that case, the Constitutional validity of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 1970, which Is not a law by Parliament as contemplated under Article 22(7) and which is a State enactment, was challenged on the ground that sections 10 to 13 of the Act which permitted the extension of the detention for a period longer than three months were violative of Article 22(4) and (7) and therefore unconstitutional. It may be mentioned that sections 11 and 13 of that Act related to the procedure before the Advisory Board in respect of persons detained for a period longer than three months. It was contended that the provisions contained in sections 11 and 13 were ultra vires Article 22(7)(c) on the ground that under that Article, the Parliament alone has been vested with jurisdiction to legislate on these matters. It was held by the Supreme Court: “We are unable to accept this construction of clause (7) of Article 22. It is noteworthy that Shri Chatterji, learned Counsel for the respondents, expressly conceded before us that Article 22(7) is only an enabling or a permissible provision and it does not impose a mandatory obligation on the Parliament to make a law prescribing the circumstances under which a person may be detained for more than three months as stated therein. It is noteworthy that Shri Chatterji, learned Counsel for the respondents, expressly conceded before us that Article 22(7) is only an enabling or a permissible provision and it does not impose a mandatory obligation on the Parliament to make a law prescribing the circumstances under which a person may be detained for more than three months as stated therein. But according to him, sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Clause (7) do contain a mandate to the Parliament which is obligatory. In our view, clause (7) of this Article on its plain reading merely authorises or enables the Parliament to make a law prescribing, (i) the circumstances under which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months, (ii) the maximum period for which a person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention and (iii) the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board in an enquiry under clause (4)(a) of this Article. The respondents’ contention that "may" in the opening part of this Article must be read as "shall" in respect of sub-clauses (b) and (c) though it retains its normal permissive character in so far as clause (a) is concerned, in the absence of special compelling reasons can be supported neither on principle nor by precedent of which we are aware. On the other hand, this Court has in S. Krishnan v. State of Madras S. Krishnan v. State of Madras (1951) S.C.R. 621 at 639: 1951 S.C.J. 453: (1951) 2 MLJ. 105: 64 L.W. 945: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 301, agreeing with the observations of Kania, C.J., in Gopal v. State of Madras Gopal v. State of Madras (1950) S.C.R. 88: 1950 S.C.J. 174: (1950) 2 MLJ. 42: 63 L.W. 638: A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, held sub-clause (b) of clause (7) to be permissive. This opinion is not only binding on us but we are also in respectful agreement with it. Apart from the exclusive power of the Parliament to make laws in respect of "preventive detention for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs or security of India; persons subject to such detention" (Vide Article 246(1) and Entry 9, List I, Seventh Schedule). This opinion is not only binding on us but we are also in respectful agreement with it. Apart from the exclusive power of the Parliament to make laws in respect of "preventive detention for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs or security of India; persons subject to such detention" (Vide Article 246(1) and Entry 9, List I, Seventh Schedule). Parliament and States Legislatures have both concurrent powers to make laws in respect of "preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of a State, the maintenance of Public Order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; persons subject to such detention" (Vide Article 246 (2) and Entry 3 in List III of Seventh Schedule). A law made by Parliament in respect of preventive detention falling under Entry 3 of List III has to prevail over a State law on the subject to the extent to which it is repugnant to the State law unless the State law is covered by Article 254(2). Parliament, however, is not debarred by clause (2), as is clear from the proviso, from enacting a law with respect to Preventive detention enumerated in Entry 3 of List III which may have the effect of adding to, amending, varying or repealing such State law. The State Legislature has thus plenary power to make a law providing for preventive detention within the limitations imposed by the Constitution justice noticed. The power of the State Legislatures under Article 246 with respect to preventive detention enumerated in Entry 3 of List III is co-extensive with that of Parliament with respect to such preventive detention and it must necessarily extend to all incidental matters connected with preventive detention as contemplated by this entry, subject only to the condition that it does not come into conflict with a law made by Parliament with respect to the same matter. There is no provision of the Constitution to which our attention has been drawn nor has any principle of law or precedent been brought to our notice, which would justify a limitation on the power of the State Legislature, as suggested by the respondent, to make a valid law providing for detention under Article 22(4) for a period beyond three months on the ground of absence of a law made by Parliament permitting detention for such period. Had the Constitution intended such a result, it would certainly have made an express provision to that effect. Since Article 22 covers the subject of preventive detention both under the law made by Parliament and that made by State Legislatures, if State Legislatures were intended by the Constitution to function under a limitation in respect of the period of detention one would have expected to find such a limitation expressly stated in this Article. But, as we read clause (7) of Article 22, it merely invests the Parliament with an overriding power enabling it, if the circumstances so require, to make a law, providing for preventive detention prescribing the circumstances under which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board, and also, prescribing the maximum period for which any person may be detained under any such law and further prescribing the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board. It does not prohibit the State Legislature from making a law either providing for preventive detention for a longer period than three months when there is a provision for securing the opinion of an Advisory Board or prescribing procedure to be followed by such Advisory Board. Such a power with the State Legislature, hedged in by effective safeguards as it is, appears to us to be necessary to enable it to deal with emergent situations necessitating enactment with respect to preventive detention for safeguarding the security of the State against violent activities secretly organised by anti-social and subversive elements with the intention of producing chaos. Security of a State, maintenance of public order and of supplies and services essential to the community demand effective safeguards in the larger interest of sustenance of peaceful democratic way of life. Article 22, therefore, must be construed on its plain language consistently with the basic requirement of preventing antisocial subversive elements from imperilling the security of States or the maintenance of public order or of essential supplies and services therein.” Though this decision directly answers even on the scope of Article 22(7)(c), learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to convince us that in view of a later judgment of a larger Constitution Bench reported in S.N. Shankar v. State of West Bengal S.N. Shankar v. State of West Bengal (1973) 2 S.C.J. 401: (1973) MLJ. (Crl.) 512: (1973) 1 S.C.C. 856 : (1973) S.C.C. (Crl.) 618: A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1425, we would take the view that a law by Parliament as to the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board, is mandatory for a State Legislature to make law relating to preventive detention enabling a person to be detained for a period longer than three months even with the interposition of an Advisory Board. In that judgment, the passage relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is with reference to the dissent expressed in the judgment over the majority view in 1950 S.C.J. 174: A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, and that passage reads as follows: “In our opinion, clause (4)(a) of Article 22 lays down a rule to which clause (4)(b) read with clause (7)(a) is an exception. Upon that view, clause (7)(a) must be construed as a restriction on Parliament's power of making preventive detention laws in the sense that it can depart from the rule laid down in clause (4)(a) and dispense with reference of cases to an Advisory Board only by a law which prescribes both the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which a person may be detained for a period longer than three months without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4). With great respect to the distinguished Judges who formed the majority in 1950 S.C.J. 174: (1950) S.C.R. 88: A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27, we are not able to concur in their views on the construction of clause (4)(b) and clause (7)(a) of Article 22 : Section 17A of the Act, in our opinion, has failed to comply with the requirement of clause (7)(a), and has; therefore, to be declared bad as being inconsistent with that cause.” We are unable to see how the different views expressed on the scope of clause (7) (a) as to whether the words "the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases in which" a person may be detained are to be read disjunctively or not any way affected the need for a Parliament Law on the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board in order to enable the State law to detain a person for more than 3 months. On the other hand, in the same decision also, the Supreme Court has made the following observations which are relevant for our purpose: “These provisions clearly indicate that ordinarily preventive detention can only be for a period of three months only. If a Law, however, provides for detention for a longer period, it can only do so with the intercession of an impartial, independent body, viz., an Advisory Board. Sub-clause (b) of clause (4), however, provides that a detention for a longer period than three months can be had, if a person is detained under a law made by Parliament under clause (7)(a) and (b). Clause (4) thus lays down two situations in which the rule of three months detention can be relaxed: (1) where the intercession of an Advisory Board is provided, and (2) where Parliament has enacted a law under clause 7 (a) and (b). The proviso to sub-clause (a) of clause (4) lays down that even where there is intercession of the Board, detention cannot be in any event for more than the maximum period prescribed in the law in question under clause (7). Reading clause (4) thus in its entirety, the plain meaning of the language used there is clear. The first lays down the ordinary rule of detention being only for three months and then provides two exceptions to it, viz., (a) detention for a longer period if intercession of an Advisory. Board is provided for, and (b) where Parliament acts under clause (7)(a) and (b), subject to both the cases to the maximum period provided in the law under consideration. It will be seen that sub-clause (a) of clause (4) is not restricted to Parliamentary Statutes, while sub-clause (b) is and applies to an Act passed by Parliament alone.” We have, therefore, no doubt, that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 relating to the Constitution of the Advisory Board, the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board and the provision enabling the State Government to detain a person for a period longer than three months after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board on sufficiency of cause for such detention are valid are not violative of Article 22(4) or Article 22, Clause (7) and in particular Article 22(7)(c). 4. 4. On the merits, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the detenu is a sick person having undergone his techtamy operation in April, 1984 and also suffering from Ischemia as seen from the medical reports and that any continued detention would be detrimental to the health and life of the detenu and on that ground she may be released. But, we cannot release the detenu on those grounds. It is for the respondents to consider if really the diseases which she is suffering from are so serious which would necessite releasing her and setting her at liberty. The writ petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. B.S. ----- Petition dismissed.