JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This writ petition has been filed by Mohd. Hanif and two others seeking mandamus directing the respondents not to dispossess them from chack No. 286. The petitioners alleged that the land was being acquired under S. 30-A of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. Their plea was that as the procedure prescribed by S. 30-B had not been complied with the acquisition proceedings were invalid. Several other irregularities and illegalities were claimed by the petitioners. 2. Two weeks' time was given to the standing counsel to file a counter-affidavit (which) was filed. The writ petition was subsequently admitted on 16-12-1981 and the respondents were restrained from dispossessing the petitioners (and) from digging a canal over the land of the petitioners. Subsequently on 3- 8-82 a counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the State asserting that the land was being acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and for this purpose notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 had been published on 16th and 30th May 1981 respectively in the notification of 16th May 1981, the purpose notified for acquisition was. "For what purpose required :- For constructing Babatpur Distributary from Km. 19.12 to Km. 42.00 under Sarda Sahayak Pariyojana in district Varanasi". 3. Being of the opinion that the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act were applicable to the land inasmuch as the land was waste and arable and as urgently required for construction of Babatpur Distributary and that in view of the pressing urgency it was necessary to eliminate the delay likely to be caused by an enquiry under S. 5-A of the said Act. The Governor further directed under sub-sec. (4) of S. 17 that the provisions of S. 5-A shall not apply. Subsequent to this notification under S. 4, the notification under S. 6 was published in the Gazette. dated 30 May 1981. 4. The counter-affidavit emphasized.that petitioner No. 1 was Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha and that he knew about the acquisition proceedings but he deliberately concealed the same from the court with a view to obtain stay order on wrong facts and assertions. The counter-affidavit further mentioned that the petitioners had full knowledge about the project as approved map had also been inspected by them. 5. After the counter-affidavit had been filed. The counter-affidavit further mentioned that the petitioners had full knowledge about the project as approved map had also been inspected by them. 5. After the counter-affidavit had been filed. The petitioner moved an application for amendment challenging the validity of the notifications referred to above, on the ground that dispensation of S. 5-A by the Governor was, in the circumstances, unjustified, being in breach of the provisions of the Act. The amendment application was contested by the respondents by means of a counter-affidavit. 6. During the pendency of the writ petition, it appears that two more notifications, one under S. 4 and the other under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were published by the State of U.P. for acquiring some more land under the Land Acquisition Act for the same purpose i.e., for construction of Babatpur Distributary. These notifications were in respect of seven plots. In the notification under S. 4 the opinion of the Government that the land was urgently required so S. 5-A was to be dispensed with, was also recorded. The petitioners. counsel got the notice of the supplementary affidavit and argued the case before us and challenged the validity of both sets of notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 7. The first argument of the petitioners' counsel was that whereas plots 992 and 989 of village Barahi Niwada were included in the notification under S. 4 dated 16th May 1981 but as no declaration in respect of them under S. 6 was made on 30th May 1981, the acquisition of these two plots was invalid. The submission of the petitioners, learned counsel has no substance inasmuch as the original notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 were produced before us and from these two notifications we find that a declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made in respect of both these plots. 8. The second submission of the petitioners' counsel was about the illegal dispensation of S. 5-A. He urged that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter. He contended that granting of an opportunity before depriving a person of his right to the property is a constitutional requirement, and as in the instant case the petitioners were not afforded that opportunity, the notifications issued under S. 6, one dated 30th May 1981 and the other 6th May 1985, were invalid. He contended that granting of an opportunity before depriving a person of his right to the property is a constitutional requirement, and as in the instant case the petitioners were not afforded that opportunity, the notifications issued under S. 6, one dated 30th May 1981 and the other 6th May 1985, were invalid. In support of his proposition, the petitioners' learned counsel placed reliance on Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 , and A.P. Sareen v. State of U.P. 1983 All LJ 1016, and urged that considering the nature of the objections which are capable of being successfully taken under section 5-A it is difficult to see why the summary enquiry should not be concluded quite expeditiously. 9. It cannot be doubted that an enquiry under section 5-A affords an opportunity to persons whose lands are to be acquired for showing that the need to the Government could be satisfied by acquiring some other land. But the question as to whether enquiry should be dispensed with is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the State Government. The decision of the State Government whether urgency exists cannot be questioned in any court provided that the Government applies its mind and acts in good faith. A court can interfere only in a case of mala fide exercise of power see Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 , and Rajbali v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 All 78 . 10. While determining the question of urgency the State Government should have material before it to come to the conclusion that the urgency was of such nature that even summary proceedings contemplated by S. 5A were required to be dispensed with. In the at case the purpose of acquisition was construction of Babatpur distributary. It has been said in the counter-affidavit that the governor has recorded his satisfaction that the proceedings of S. 5-A were likely to take time and, therefore, in order to eliminate the delay it was necessary to dispense with S. 5-A. 11. In the circumstances of the present case, we find that dispensation could not be considered to be invalid. It has been said in the counter-affidavit that the governor has recorded his satisfaction that the proceedings of S. 5-A were likely to take time and, therefore, in order to eliminate the delay it was necessary to dispense with S. 5-A. 11. In the circumstances of the present case, we find that dispensation could not be considered to be invalid. For the view taken, we find support from the aforesaid two decisions in Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 , (supra) and Rajbali v. State of U.P., AIR 1983 All 78 (supra) as well as from Sardar Singh. v. State of U.P., 1983 All LJ 220. In Sardar Singh's case the purpose of acquisition was construction of road to afford after facility to the sugarcane growers in the area for removing their produce to factory. court held that in the circumstances it would not be said that the power to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5-A was exercised in an arbitrary or perverse fashion. 12. Recently in Hari Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC 1020 plots were acquired for setting up market yard for Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti. The notification under section 4 had dispensed with S. 5-A. The High Court rejected the writ petition summarily. Against this judgment an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal found (Para 8) : In the circumstances of this case we do not find that there is any ground to hold that the order made under S. 17(4) of the Act preempting the operation of Section 5-A of the Act is bad in law even though there appears to be some administrative delay in commencing the construction of the market yard'. when a decision making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, the implicit obligation is to apply mind to pertinent and proximate matters only eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. It is this principle which has to be applied which judging whether the State Government while dispensing with S. 5-A was influenced by extraneous or irrelevant matters or not. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative dispensation of section 5-A would not be regarded arbitrary. In this connection two aspects of the matter must be noted. The first was the need for which the acquisition was made. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative dispensation of section 5-A would not be regarded arbitrary. In this connection two aspects of the matter must be noted. The first was the need for which the acquisition was made. That need was construction of a distributary which would have enabled the agriculturists of Jaunpur and Varanasi districts living near the land under acquisition to get water for irrigation purposes. This is undisputably an urgent need not only for the agriculturists but for the country as food grain produced by them would be needed for public consumption. In considering this aspect of the matter, the court should take into account the increasing need of the nation, a burning problem of the day, the complex issues being faced by the people which require to be solved and that judicial approach should by dynamic rather than static, pragmatic rather than pedantic, and not rigid. 13. The other thing to be seen is about the delay which is caused in proceedings under section 5-A. It is incorrect to think that the only time which is likely to be taken in the enquiry under S. 5-A is the period of thirty days which has been provided for filing of the objection. This assessment is wholly unfounded as the period of thirty days referred to in S. 5- A is merely the period given by the section for filing objections against the proposed acquisition. After objections are filed, a date has to be fixed for hearing the objector in person or through pleader. In hearing the party would be entitled to lead oral as well as documentary evidence. The opposite party has to be given an opportunity of cross- examining the witnesses and to file evidence in rebuttal. It is after an elaborate procedure that the collector will consider the evidence and make his report to the Government. It is a matter of experience that adjournments are taken off and on by a party interested in holding up a proceeding. If these factors are taken into consideration dispensation of section 5-A cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the same would not have involved more than thirty days. 14. Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 (supra) has been considered by the Division Bench in Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 (supra). 14. Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 (supra) has been considered by the Division Bench in Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 All 181 (supra). It was said in this connection that illustrations given by the Supreme Court in Narayan Govind Gavate's case were not exhaustive but they were only illustrative. Against this judgment of the High court in Smt. Kailashwati v. State of U.P. special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was filed and we find that the same has been rejected. So far as A.P. Sareen v. State of U.P., 1983 All LJ 1016 (supra) is concerned, it may be pointed out that the decision given in this case was based on its peculiar facts. 15. Counsel next urged that plot 908 (Sic) was since a pond, S. 17(1) and (4) could not be applied. Admittedly this plot is not the property of the petitioners (nor) are they owners of the plots which are mentioned in the writ petition. They have nothing to do with this plot, hence they cannot be heard in regard to the same. Moreover it was pointed out by the respondents' learned counsel, which was admitted by the petitioners' learned counsel as well, that only a very small fraction of this plot was being acquired, in area this is a big plot. We were neither shown any documentary evidence nor any map which could support the petitioners. 16. With respect to plots Nos. 987 and 991, the submission of the learned counsel that as they were not the subject matter of acquisition hence they could not be acquired is liable to be rejected because in the counter- affidavit filed on behalf of the State, equivalent of these two old numbers and that of number 929 has been given. These are; 929 744 987 762 991 766 The subsequent notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 published in the year 1985 are in respect of these plots. 17. Counsel for the petitioners urged that as the notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued after three years of finalisation of the scheme, there was no justification for dispensing with section 5-A and depriving the persons affected by it from filing objections under the same. This controversy has been recently considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Pahawa v. Lt. This controversy has been recently considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Pahawa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1984 SC 1721 . The Supreme Court has stated in para 8 of the judgment that. "We are afraid, we cannot agree with this contention. Very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired make various representations to the concerned authority against the proposed acquisition. This is bought to result in a multiplicity of enquiry communications and discussions leading delay in the execution of even urgent projects...... It is therefore not possible to age with the submission that mere pre-notification delay would render the invocation of the urgency provisions void., Moreover, there is no material on record before us to accept the premise on which to argument has been built. 18. From the facts of the present case appears that there was some confusion at the number of plots stated in the notification of the year 1981 hence to clarify that confusion the subsequent notifications in the year 198 were issued. 19. Before parting, we wish to note the petitioner No. 1 was Pradhan of the Gaon, Sabha and further it appears from the counter affidavit that he was a big businessman dealing in the trade of carpets. We are satisfied from the counter-affidavit that the petitioners have full knowledge of the land acquisition proceedings but still they filed the present writ petition by concealing these facts are wrongly alleging that the land was being acquired under the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act. This to our mind in the circumstance of the present case, is sufficient in itself to deny the petitioners the relief claimed by them in this petition. 20. The view which we have taken full support from the decision in Chandmal v. State of M.P., AIR 1985 Madh Pra 125.The Bench held that since the petitioners of t case had failed to prove that the proposal acquisition for development of industrial are amounted to mala fide exercise of power, the acquisition could not be invalid merely because S. 5-A had been dispensed with. 21. For these reasons, the writ petition dismissed with costs. The stay order discharged.