ORDER: 1. The Writ petition and the civil revision petition are interconnected. As to what the interconnection is, I will immediately point out. Applications were invited for the grant of 10 All India Tourist Coach Permits under a single point Tax. The capacity of the vehicle’ was 29 seats. The invitation was by a Notification dated 20-12-1976 in R.No.86470/B6/76. In all, there were 126 applications. On 31-12-1976 the State Transport Authority, Madras heard these applications. By its order dated 7-1-1977 it granted 10 permits as under: 1. 3 permits to Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corporation Limited. 2. 1 permit to Pandiyan Roadways Corporations Limited. 3. 3 permits to Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited. 4. 1 permit to Sita World Travel. 5. 2 permits to Pallavan Transport Corporation (presently transferred to Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation, which has been brought on record in C.M.P.No.13059 of 1981 on 23.12.1981. 2. It should be stated at this state that the order of the State Transport Authority was based upon the guidelines issued by the Government of India in its letter T.I.T/247#x002F;75 dated 29-12-1975. Against this order, the writ petitioner (V.Ramalingam) preferred Appeal No.219 of 1977 before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. There were also several appeals and in all there were 10 appeals. All of them came to be considered by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. On 26-8-1978 the Tribunal dismissed the Appeal of the writ petitioner, who was the fifth appellant before it as well as the other appeals, following the same guidelines issued by the Government of India. It is under these circumstances, W.P.No. 3298 of 1979 has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the validity of the guidelines issued by the Central Government in the matter of permits and to quash the same by the issue of a writ of certiorari. 3. C.R.P.No.1050 of 1979 is against the concurrent orders, declining the permit to the revision petitioner both by the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. This is how both these cases are inter-connected. 4. Mr.G.Ramaswami, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that there are catena of decisions where it has been held that it is not possible for a judicial authority to abdicate its function and felt bound by the instructions of the Government. This is how both these cases are inter-connected. 4. Mr.G.Ramaswami, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that there are catena of decisions where it has been held that it is not possible for a judicial authority to abdicate its function and felt bound by the instructions of the Government. Both the State Transport Authority as well as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal are exercising the judicial or, at any rate, the quasi-judicial function. In so far as it considers the grant of permit. Therefore, they will have to merely allow the statutory provisions and cannot take note of any administrative instruction issued by the authority, however, high he may be. In support of the submission, reliance is placed on decisions reported in B.Rajagopala Saidu v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, and others B.Rajagopala Saidu v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, and others (1964)2 S.C.J.570=(1964)2 MLJ. (S.C.) 131=(1964)2 An.W.R. (S.C.) 131=A.I.R.1964 S.C.1573; R.M.Subhraj v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Limited R.M.Subhraj v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Limited (1973)1 S.C.J.337 = (1973)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 56=(1973)1 MLJ. (S.C.) 56= (1973)3 S.C.C. 871 = A.I.R. 1972 S.C.2266 and P.Palaniswami v. Shri Ram Popular Service (P) Limited and another P.Palaniswami v. Shri Ram Popular Service (P) Limited and another (1974)2 S.C.J.322 = (1974)1 S.C.C.197=A.I.R.1974 S.C.1117. 5. Thus, it is argued that if the matter had been considered independently either by the original authority or by the Tribunal something could be said in favour of those orders. But in so far as the grant of permit proceeds purely upon these guidelines, the orders cannot be supported at all. The guidelines cannot stand so as to take away or cast a fetter on the exercise of judicial function and, therefore, the writ petition should be allowed, likewise the revision, because of the following of the guidelines by both the authorities. 6. The first respondent, the Government of India, alone has filed its counter affidavit. The stand taken in the counter affidavit in paragraph 4 is that in the absence of the formal rules having been framed either by the Central Government or by the State Government in exercise of powers in section 63(7) of the Motor Vehicles Act, these guidelines were issued by the exercise of rule-making powers as well as the residuary powers contained in clause (iii) of sub- section (10) of section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Hence, the guidelines are not illegal or void. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit an amendment to section 63(7) incorporating the proviso is relied on. The learned Government Pleader urges that in so far as the procedure under section 47 is not required to be followed, in the case of grant of stage carriage permit, there is no bar to the issue of guidelines. Those guidelines are only in furtherance of the object of the statute viz. section 63 and, therefore, they are not illegal. If that be so, the orders can easily be upheld. 7. Mr.N.G.Krishan Iyengar, the learned counsel appearing for the two other grantees, that is Pallavan Transport Corporation and Pandiyan Transport Corporation, would submit that the invitation to the application were on the basis of these guidelines. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not unaware that the guidelines would be valid for the purpose of grant. Where, therefore, the petitioner stake his claims and took a chance with regard to the grant of permit, he cannot now be heard to say that the following of the guidelines is improper. Certainly, he would not have come forward with such a plea had be had the benefit of permit by the following of the guidelines. Therefore, the principle of acquiescence, according to him, would apply, which is so stated in I.L.Honnegoudd v. State of Karnataka and others I.L.Honnegoudd v. State of Karnataka and others (1977)1 S.C.J.524:A.I.R. 1978 S.C.28. 8. In order to appreciate the respective contentions between the parties, it is necessary on my part to extract the guidelines, which form the subject matter of controversy between the parties. The Government of India, Ministry of Shipping and Transport (Transport Wing) in T.I.T.24/75 dated 29-12-1975 issued the following guidelines: “(i) The State Governments/Union Administrations may issue permits only after the revised notifications prescribing specifications of tourist vehicles is issued by the Ministry under section 63(1)(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, conform to the type of standard of comfort etc. laid down in the revised notification. (ii) Public sector undertakings of Central/State Governments and private tourist car operators who are on the approved list of the Department of Tourism and who have some foreign exchange earnings at their credit may be given preference over others in the matter of allotment of all India permits. laid down in the revised notification. (ii) Public sector undertakings of Central/State Governments and private tourist car operators who are on the approved list of the Department of Tourism and who have some foreign exchange earnings at their credit may be given preference over others in the matter of allotment of all India permits. (iii) in the case of approved private operators, the number of permits should be linked to the amount of foreign exchange earnings. (iv) For allotment of permits for coaches, preference should be given to the owners of air-conditions coaches, and the next preference for deluxe coaches complying with the revised specification.” 9. Thereupon, the Government of Tamil Nadu passed G.O.Ms.No.2254, Home Department, ‘on 10-9-1976 under the following terms: Government of Tamil Nadu Abstract Motor Vehicles - Tourist Vehicles - All India Permits - Grant of. ----- Home Department G.O.Ms.No.2254 dated 10th September, 1976. Read: 1. G.O.Ms.No.3225, Home dated 29-11-71. 2. G.O.Ms.No.1180, Home dated 22-4-72. 3. G.O.Ms.No.2692, Home dated 15-10-75. Read also: From the Government of India, Letters No.T/TIT/247#x002F;75, dated 29-12-1975 and 5-7-1976. From the Transport Commissioner, Letter No.3003/E27#x002F;76, dated 22-7-1976. ORDER: Under Sub- section (7) of Section 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act a State Transport Authority may, for the purpose of promoting tourism, grant in respect of tourist vehicles such number of permits valid for the whole or any part of India, as the Central Goverment may fix. The Government of India have fixed the following quota of tourist vehicles for the State of Tamil Nadu: Table Class of Tourist Vehicle Number of Permits 1. 2. i. Tourist Motor Cab 100 ii. Tourist Omni bus with passenger capacity not exceeding 29. 15 iii. Tourist Omni bus with passenger capacity exceeding 29. 10 The Government of India have published the revised specifications for tourist vehicles under section 63(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government of India have also mentioned that all the States except two have agreed to exempt tourist vehicles from road tax and passenger tax and that steps may now be taken to issue permits for tourist vehicles to be effective throughout the country, except the two states referred to above. 2. The Government of India have also mentioned that all the States except two have agreed to exempt tourist vehicles from road tax and passenger tax and that steps may now be taken to issue permits for tourist vehicles to be effective throughout the country, except the two states referred to above. 2. As regards grant of permits, the Government of India have suggested the following guidelines: “i. Public Sector undertakings of Central/State Governments and private tourist car operators who are on the approved list of the Department of Tourism and who have some foreign exchange earnings at their credit may be given preference over others in the matter of allotment of all India Permits. (ii) In the case of approved private operators, the number of permits should be linked to the amount of foreign exchange earnings. (iii) For allotment of permits for coaches, preference should be given to the owners of air-condition coaches, and the next preference for deluxe coaches, complying with the revised specifications. The Government of India have also stated that the form of application for tourist vehicles prescribed by the State Transport Authority, New Delhi, may be adopted in all States to ensure uniformity in regard to the details to be published in the application form for permits. The Government accept the above suggestions of the Government of India. 3. The Transport Commissioner has pointed out that according to the orders in G.O.Ms.No.1180, Home, dated 22-4-1972 All India Tourist Bus permits should be granted only to the State Transport Undertakings and has requested for a revision of this order. The orders in G.O.Ms.No.1180, Home, dated 22-4-1972 are hereby cancelled. The Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Department has published a scheme for nationalising the contract carriage permits in the State of Tamil Nadu and certain Writ petitions filed by operators are pending in the High Court. The question of formulating a revised scheme is under consideration of the State Transport Undertaking. Necessary action will be taken by the Government in the Transport Department to exclude tourist vehicles that may be granted permits under section 63(7) of Motor Vehicles Act while republishing the scheme. Sd. K.Subramaniyam Special Secretary to Government. It cannot be gainsaid that section 47 is inapplicable to the grant of contract carriage permit. This is because section 47 deals with the grant of stage carriage permit. Sd. K.Subramaniyam Special Secretary to Government. It cannot be gainsaid that section 47 is inapplicable to the grant of contract carriage permit. This is because section 47 deals with the grant of stage carriage permit. It is section 50 that lays down the procedure for the Regional Transport Authority to follow, while considering the application for contract carriage permit. It says that the Regional Transport Authority shall consider an application for a contract carriage permit, having regard to: (1) The extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable; (2) In the public interest; (3) Shall also take into consideration any representations, which may then be made or which may previously have been made by persons already holding contract carriage permits in the region; (4) By any local authority; (5) or police authority in the region to the effect that the number of contract carriage for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region. 10. I have to analyse the section to show that the power exercised under section 50 is not an administrative power. On the contrary, having regard to the scope of the section, which has been analysed as above, it is beyond any reasonable doubt that it is a quasi-judicial power. On this basis, I will proceed to consider the respective submissions. 11. Section 63 deals with the validation of permits for use outside the region in which permits were granted. This being an All India Contract Carriage permit, undoubtedly the section would apply. Sub- section (7) is important for our present purpose. That is extracted below: (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) but subject to any rules that may be made under this Act any State Transport Authority may, for the purpose of promoting ‘Tourism’ grant (permits valid for the whole or any part of India, in respect of such number of tourist vehicles) as the Central Government may, in respect of that State, specify in this behalf, and the provisions of sections 49 , 50 , 51 , 57 , 58 ,59 , 59-A , 60 , 61 and 64 shall, as far as may be apply in relation to such permits’. Provided that preference shall be given to applications for permits from - i. The India Tourism Development Corporation; ii. Provided that preference shall be given to applications for permits from - i. The India Tourism Development Corporation; ii. A State Tourism Development Corporation; iii. A State Tourist Department; iv. such operators of tourist cars, or such travel agents, as may be approved in this behalf by the Ministry of the Central Government dealing in tourism).‘ I may at once state that the proviso has no application, because that was introduced by amending Act 48 of 1978, which came into force on 16-1-1979. Therefore, that can have no application at all to the facts of the present case, since the order of the State Transport Authority is dated 7-1-1977, while the Appellate order is dated 26-8-78. Therefore, the learned Government Pleader is not correct in relying upon this proviso. Be that as it may, of course, the rules may be made under this sub-section, enabling any State Transport Authority to grant All India Permit for the purpose of promoting tourism. While considering that grant, as the sub- section itself states, regard can be had to the various other sections like sections 49 ,50 ,51 etc. Therefore, in the light of these two sections, permits have to be granted. In so far as I have observed above, that the grant of permit is of a quasi-judicial function, it is well settled in law that no judicial or quasi-judicial authority can be instructed to do a particular thing. In other words, the issue of such instruction to quasi judicial authority cannot be brooked however high that authority may be. If that judicial authority happens to follow those administrative instructions, it would be tantamount to a clear application of judicial powers. Authorities in this regard are not wanting. First I may refer to a decision in B.Raja-gopala Naidu v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and others B.Raja-gopala Naidu v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras and others (1964)2 S.C.J.570,=(1964)2 MLJ. (S.C.) 131= (1964)2 An.W.R. (S.C.) 1318A.I.R. 1964 S.C.1573. In that case G.O.Ms.No. 1298 dated April 28, 1956 issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu under section 63-A, giving directions to Tribunal in matters which had to be dealt with in quasi-judicial manner was held to be invalid. The order of the Tribunal, solely based on the basis of such a Government Order, was quashed. In that case G.O.Ms.No. 1298 dated April 28, 1956 issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu under section 63-A, giving directions to Tribunal in matters which had to be dealt with in quasi-judicial manner was held to be invalid. The order of the Tribunal, solely based on the basis of such a Government Order, was quashed. In so doing, their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraph 19: “In reaching this conclusion, we have been influenced by certain other considerations which are both relevant and material. In interpreting ‘ section 43A, we think, it would be legitimate to assume that the legislature intended to respect the basis and elementary postulate of the rule of law, that in exercising their authority and in discharging their quasi-judicial function the Tribunals constituted under the Act must be left absolutely free to deal with the matter according to their best judgment. It is of the essence of fair and objective administration of law that the decision of the Judge or the Tribunal must be absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State. If the exercise of discretion conferred on a quasi-judicial tribunal is controlled by any such direction, that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi-judicial (tribunal is controlled by any such direction, that forges fetters on the exercise of quasi-judicial authority and the presence of such fetters would make the exercise of such) authority completely inconsistent with the well-accepted notion of judicial process. It is true that law can regulate the exercise of judicial powers. It may indicate by specific provisions on what matters the tribunals constituted by it should adjudicate. It may by specific provisions lay down the principles which have to be followed by the Tribunals in dealing with the said matters. The scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals constituted by statute can well be regulated by the statute and principles for guidance of the said tribunals may also be prescribed subject of course to the inevitable requirement that these provisions do not contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But what law and the provisions of law may legitimately do cannot be permitted to be done by administrative or executive orders. But what law and the provisions of law may legitimately do cannot be permitted to be done by administrative or executive orders. This position is so well established that we are reluctant to hold that in enacting section 43-A the Madras Legislature intended to confer power on the State Government to invade the domain of the exercise of Judicial power. In fact, such had been the intention of the Madras Legislature and had been the true effect of the provisions of section 43-A. Section 43-A itself would amount to an unreasonable contravention of fundamental rights of citizens and may have to be struck down as unconstitutional. That is why the Madras High Court in dealing with the validity of section 43-A had expressly observed that what section 43A purported to do was to clothe the Government with authority to issue directions of an administrative character and nothing more. It is somewhat unfortunate that though judicial decisions have always emphasised this aspect of the matter, occasion did not arise so long as to consider the validity of the Government order which on the construction suggested by the respondent would clearly invade the domain of quasi-judicial administration.” 12. The next ruling which came to be referred is R.M.Subharai v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Limited and others R.M.Subharai v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Limited and others (1973)1 S.C.J.337= (1973)1 An.W.R. (S.C.) 56= (1973)1 MLJ. (S.C.)56= A.I.R.1972 S.C.2266. Here again, another order of the Tamil Nadu Government made in G.O.No.2265 dated 9-8-1958, directing the issue of stage carriage permit on the basis of that Government order was held to be bad on the following observations in paragraphs 9 and 11: This Court as in several decisions held that the Regional Transport Authority discharges quasi-judicial function in dealing with applications for permits and evaluating the rival claims of the parties for the grant of permit. Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, as inserted by the Madras Amending Act 20 of 1948 confers power on the State Government to issue orders and directions to the State Transport Authority only in relation to administrative functions. Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, as inserted by the Madras Amending Act 20 of 1948 confers power on the State Government to issue orders and directions to the State Transport Authority only in relation to administrative functions. It is also held by this Court that the decision of the Regional Transport Authority’ must be absolutely unfettered by any extraneous guidance by the executive or administrative wing of the State.” “It is manifest that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal not only referred to the Government Order as indicating the basis for giving preference for the grant of permits but also applied the Government Order in assessing the competing claims of the contenders for permits. Once it is found that a Tribunal which under the statute has to deal with applications for permits in a judicial manner is directed by the Government to adopt any specified method for assessing the merits of the applicants and the Tribunal takes into consideration such direction of the executive, the judicial determination by the Tribunal is polluted.‘ 13. In P.Palaniswami v. Shri Ram Popular Service (P) Limited and another P.Palaniswami v. Shri Ram Popular Service (P) Limited and another (1974)2 S.C.J.322 =A.I.R.1974 S.C.1117 the extract of head note would suffice for our purpose: “When there is a Government Order in existence and parties applying for permits come to know that the authorities under the Act were disposing of their applications for permits in accordance with the order, matters not referred to in the order but which may be very germane for consideration under section 47 get automatically excluded during the hearing. Where the decision of the. Transport Appellate Tribunal in respect of the applications for permits is polluted because of the instructions contained in the Government Order, the Court is justified in remanding the case to the tribunal for a re-hearing without the constraint of the Government Order. 14. In view of the settled position of law, I do not think it is necessary for me to refer to the other cases, which arose before this court. Therefore, Mr.G.Ramaswami is well founded in his submission that the case on hand falls squarely within the ratio of the above Supreme Court's rulings. 14. In view of the settled position of law, I do not think it is necessary for me to refer to the other cases, which arose before this court. Therefore, Mr.G.Ramaswami is well founded in his submission that the case on hand falls squarely within the ratio of the above Supreme Court's rulings. A reading of the order of the State Transport Authority clearly discloses that the basis of the order is the instruction of the Government of India, which came to be incorporated by the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms.No.2254 dated 10-9-1976. What is more surprising is the State Transport Appellate Tribunal manned by a District Judge should have chosen to follow these guidelines. In paragraph 6 of its order it states: “All these ten permits in question have to be granted following the guidelines, as stated supra prescribed by the Government of India. The above guidelines divide the category of the tourist operators into two viz., public sector undertakings of Central or State Governments and private tourist operators viz., who are on the approved list of the Department of Tourism and who have some foreign exchange earnings at their credit….” Therefore, it is beyond dispute now that the Transport Authorities clearly abdicated the judicial function and proceeded to grant the permit purely on the basis of the Government Order. Consequently, it should be held that the ratio of the Supreme Court's rulings applies to this case with full vigour. 15. I am unable to accept the argument of the learned Government Pleader that in the absence of rules, there could J be guidelines. This is precisely what was deprecated by the Supreme Court. In the case dealt with by the Supreme Court, Government orders were made under section 43-A of the Motor vehicles Act in exercise of the rule-making power. Therefore, even section 63 , sub- section 10(iii) will not come to the rescue of the Government. 16. I am equally unable to accept the argument of Mr.N.G.Krishna Iyengar that because the invitation to applications made in R.No.86470/B6/76 dated 20-12-1976 mentioned that the applications will be considered on the basis of these guidelines, the petitioner is estopped from contending that the guidelines are bad. There is no question of acquiescence in this case. No doubt, he did apply pursuant to the above invitation. There is no question of acquiescence in this case. No doubt, he did apply pursuant to the above invitation. But that does not mean that a quasi-judicial authority can abdicate his function and yet when such abdication is known to the petitioner, he should remain silent on the basis of the principle of acquiescence. What has he to do than to apply at the call of the invitation? It is not either too much or unreasonable to expect a quasi-judicial authority to follow the provisions of the statute and the rules made in that behalf (if any) while considering the grant in accordance with section 50 and section 63(7) which made a pointed reference to the various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. From this point of view, I see no relevance in the ruling reported in I.L.Honnegoudd v. The State of Karnataka and others I.L.Honnegoudd v. The State of Karnataka and others (1977)1 S.C.J.524, = A.I.R. 1978 S.C.28 cited on behalf of the grantees. 17. Thus, in conclusion, I hold that the instruction of the Government of India in TIT (24)/74 dated 29-12-75 will have absolutely no binding force on the authority entrusted with the power to grant the permit. It is needless to say that the statement will govern both the State Transport Authority as well as the Tribunal. This would obviously mean, the grant will have to be considered do hors the instrcutions, which are undoubtedly bad, as they fettered the judicial discretions of the above authority. In view of this conclusion, I have no other option, but to remit the matter to the State Transport Authority for reconsideration, which procedure was approved by the Supreme Court in P.Palaniswami v. Shri Ram Popular Service (P) Limited, and another P.Palaniswami v. Shri Ram Popular Service (P) Limited, and another (1974)2 S.C.J. 322 = A.I.R.1974 S.C.1117. Accordingly, I set aside the orders of both the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Tribunal and remit the matter to the State Transport Authority for reconsideration in the light of what I have observed above. I make it clear that the lis is only between the petitioner (V.Ramalingam) on the one hand and the grantees on the other. There is absolutely no necessity to consider the case of other applicants or the appellants, as the case may be, before the State Transport Authority or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal respectively. I make it clear that the lis is only between the petitioner (V.Ramalingam) on the one hand and the grantees on the other. There is absolutely no necessity to consider the case of other applicants or the appellants, as the case may be, before the State Transport Authority or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal respectively. The matter will have to be considered and orders passed on or before 15-4-1985. Till orders are so passed, it will be open to the present respondents (Grantees) to continue the transport operation without any let or hindrance whatsoever. 18. Accordingly, the writ petition and the civil revision petition will stand allowed with costs. One set, Counsel's-fee Rs.500/-. The first respondent, the Government of India, is directed to pay the costs of the petitioner. Petition allowed.