JUDGMENT B. N. Katju, J. 1. In view of the opinion of the majority, the petition succeeds and is allowed. We direct the respondents, not to keep the petitioner under detention in pursuance of the order of the District Magistrate, Allahabad dated 10-9-1984, and to release him from custody forthwith unless he is required to be detained in connection with any other case. This is a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus. It has been referred to us for decision as it involved question of law of general importance. 2. The petitioner was detained in Central Jail Naini, Allahabad under the order of the District Magistrate, Allahabad dated 9-8-1984 passed under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The aforesaid order of detention was approved by the State Government under Section 3 (4) of the Act on 18-8-1984. The petitioner filed habeas corpus writ petition No. 10159 of 1984 challenging the legality of his detention which was admitted by this Court on 21-8-1984. The order of the District Magistrate, Allahabad dated 9-8-1984 under Section 3 (2) of the Act was subsequently revoked by the District Magistrate, Allahabad by his order dated 9-9-1984 and the District Magistrate, Allahabad passed a second order of detention against the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the Act on 10-9-1984 which was served on the petitioner in jail on 10-9-1984 along with the grounds of detention and other relevant material. The petitioner is confined in Central Jail, Naini, Allahabad under this order of detention. The detention orders were passed with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and the maintenance of supplies and service essential to the community. 3. The grounds of detention are four in number. It is mentioned in the first ground of detention that on 12-6-1983 while auction was taking place at the I. T. I. Factory in Naini, Allahabad, the petitioner armed with pistol and cartridges reached the place of auction and threatened the persons who were present there and were bidding. 3. The grounds of detention are four in number. It is mentioned in the first ground of detention that on 12-6-1983 while auction was taking place at the I. T. I. Factory in Naini, Allahabad, the petitioner armed with pistol and cartridges reached the place of auction and threatened the persons who were present there and were bidding. On receiving information regarding the aforesaid incident Ramakant Misra S. H. O. Police Station Naini, Allahabad along with his staff and witnesses went to the place of auction and objected whereupon the petitioner fired at the police party with the intention of killing them and thereafter ran towards east but he was beaten and caught at about 12.30 p. m. and on a search being taken one pistol, one fired cartridge and four live cartridges were recovered from his possession. Case crime no. 248 of 1983 under Section 307 IPC, and Section 25/27 Arms Act was registered at Police Station Naini regarding the aforesaid incident and after investigation charge sheet was submitted and the aforesaid case is pending in Court. The aforesaid incident created fear in the general public and adversely affected public order. 4. It is mentioned in the second ground of detention that on 11-2-1984 at 11.30 a. m. in village Chak Tejau the petitioner along with his associates armed with guns fired at Ram Chandra Dixit which resulted in his death and looted his gun. The aforesaid incident created fear in the public of the vicinity and adversely affected public order, Case Crime no. 72 of 1984 under Sections 147/149/302/404 IPC was registered at Police Station Naini, Allahabad regarding the aforesaid incident and after investigation charge-sheet was submitted and the case is pending in Count. It is mentioned in the third ground of detention that on 11-9-1984 information was received at Police Station Bara that at about midnight between 10-5-1984 and 11-5-1984 near village Padar close to the tent of U. P. Electricity Board of 33 KV Rewa R?ad Pratap Pur line aluminium wire and other articles valued at Rs. 1,06,000/- were looted by about thirty persons after threatening the Chaukidar by pistols sand was taken away on a truck as a result of which the construction work at 33 KV Rewa Road Pratap Pur line stopped which adversely affected public order. 1,06,000/- were looted by about thirty persons after threatening the Chaukidar by pistols sand was taken away on a truck as a result of which the construction work at 33 KV Rewa Road Pratap Pur line stopped which adversely affected public order. During investigation complicity of the petitioner and the complicity of seventeen others came to light and aluminium wire valued at Rs. 75,t00/- was recovered from the godown of the petitioner. Case Crime no. 31 of 1984 under Sections 395/412 IPC was registered at Police Station Bara regarding the aforesaid incident and after investigation charge-sheet was filled and the case is pending in Court. 5. It is mentioned in the fourth ground of detention that on 6-8-1984 single barrel 12 bore gun which was looted from Ram Chandra Dixit relating to case Crime no. 72 of 1984 under Sections 147/149/302/404 IPC was recovered from the possession of the petitioner along with eight live cartridges of 12 bore gun. Case Crime No. 309 off 1984 under Section 25 Arms Act and Section 411 IPC, was registered regarding the aforesaid incident at Police Station Naini, Allahabad and charge-sheet under Section 411 IPC has been filed in Court while the case under Section 20 Arms Act is pending investigation. 6. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the District Magistrate had no power to revoke his order of detention dated 9-8-1984 and 9-9-1984 as it had been approved by the State Government earlier on 18-8-1984. In support of his contention he relied on the case of Dulal Chandra Ghosh Ltd. v. District Magistrate Birbhum, 1974 CrLJ 24 in which it was held : ".........The Internal Security Act enjoins an officer mentioned in subsection (2) to report the fact, when an order is made to the State Government together with the grounds and other particulars and such order is to remain in force ordinarily for not more than 12 days unless approved by the State Government in the meantime. Therefore, the power of the District Magistrate of Birbhum in this case under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act subsists only subject to conditions and approval imposed by the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. Although the General Clauses Act confers on him seemingly large powers it also puts him under certain limits imposed by the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. Although the General Clauses Act confers on him seemingly large powers it also puts him under certain limits imposed by the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. His powers to rescind, therefore can only take effect at best for a maximum period of 12 days or until the State Government accords its approval. That being the position, it emerges that the District Magistrate had no power to issue a corrigendum as in the present case after his order has been approved by the State Government. The use of the corrigendum, therefore, is wrong inasmuch as the power to rescind, add to, amend or vary given to the District Magistrate by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act exhausts itself after approval is accorded to an order of detention by the Government." With great respect I am unable to agree with the view taken in the above mentioned case that the District Magistrate had no power to revoke an order of detention passed by him after it is approved by the State Government. Section 3 (4) of the Act is as follows : "(4) When any order is made under this Section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. Provided that where under Section 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted." It appears from a plain reading of Section 3 (4) of the Act that the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 (2) of the Act shall not remain in force for more than twelve days unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government. The approval accorded by the State Government extends the life of the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate beyond twelve days. The approval accorded by the State Government extends the life of the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate beyond twelve days. The State Government does not pass any fresh order of detention under section 3 (4) of the Act but it merely approves the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate. The order of detention passed by the District Magistrate thus continues even after it is approved by the State Government. It does not exhaust itself or merge in any order of the State Government. I am fortified in my view by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistrate Tripura, Agartala, AIR 1969 SC 323 in which it has been held : "The scheme of the Preventive Detention Act, is merely to approve the original detention by the District Magistrate and the continued detention after 12 days is not under any fresh order but the same old order with the added approval and what the detenu can question, if he be so minded, is the original detention and not the approval thereof." 7. Once it is held that the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate continues after it is approved by the State Government it follows that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is applicable even after the order of the District Magistrate is approved by the State Government It is noteworthy that section 14 of the Act which empowers the State Government or the Central Government to revoke an order made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act clearly mentions that this power is without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It appears from a plain reading of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act that where by any Central Act a power to issue orders is conferred then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions, if any, to rescind any order. It therefore, follows that the District Magistrate is empowered to revoke the detention order passed by him even after it has been approved by the State Government in view of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897. 8. It therefore, follows that the District Magistrate is empowered to revoke the detention order passed by him even after it has been approved by the State Government in view of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897. 8. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the revocation of the first order of detention dated 9-8-1984 by the District Magistrate was illegal as no reasons were given by him. There is no force in this contention as Section 21 of General Clauses Act and the Act do not require the District Magistrate to give reasons for revoking his order of detention. Moreover, it appears that the first order of detention was revoked by the District Magistrate on the legal advise tendered to him by the Deputy Government Advocate that the continued detention of the petitioner was illegal as the material in support of the order of detention dated 9-8-1984 was not furnished to him within the time prescribed under Section 8 of the Act. The second order of detention dated 9-9-1984 was passed on a fresh report of the police authorities and was not based on all the grounds on which the earlier order of detention was based but only on some of them. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the detention of the petitioner is illegal as the representations made by the petitioner against the second order of detention were not placed by the State Government before the Advisory Board within three weeks of the date of his detention as required under Section 10 of the Act. It appears from the counter affidavit filed by the Upper Division Assistant in Confidential Section 6 U. P. Secretariate, Lucknow that the order of detention dated 10-9-1984, the grounds of detention together with all other connected material were placed before the Advisory Board by the State Government on 25-9-1984. It is noteworthy that the State Government had placed three copies of the representation of the petitioner before the Advisory Board on 11-10-1984 whereas the case of the petitioner was heard by the Advisory Board on 11-10-1984. It is stated in the petition that a representation of the petitioner was submitted to the District Magistrate, Allahabad by his counsel Sri D. S. Misra on 29-9-1984 and another representation of the petitioner was submitted to the Home Secretary on 1-10-1984 in the forenoon. It is stated in the petition that a representation of the petitioner was submitted to the District Magistrate, Allahabad by his counsel Sri D. S. Misra on 29-9-1984 and another representation of the petitioner was submitted to the Home Secretary on 1-10-1984 in the forenoon. Both these representations were not placed before the Advisory Board on 1-10-1984 within three weeks of the date of detention of the petitioner. There was thus a violation of;5 Section 10 of the Act. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government and the District Magistrate, Allahabad it has been stated that no representation of the petitioner was submitted by his counsel in the office of the District Magistrate on 29-9-1984 and that a representation of the petitioner was received by the Home Secretary on 1-10-19S4 late in the evening. Even if it be accepted that a representation of the petitioner war submitted by his counsel before the District Magistrate, Allahabad or 29-9-1984 and that another representation was submitted before the Home Secretary in the forenoon of 1-10-1984 the question that requires determination is whether these two representations of the petitioner even though they were submitted after the reference of the grounds of detention and the report of the District Magistrate under Section 3 (4) of the Act to the Advisory Board by the State Government on 25-9-1984 were required to be sent to the Advisory Board within three weeks of the date of his detention on or before 1-10-1984 under Section 10 of the Act or section 10 of the Act was not applicable to such representations. On a plain reading of Section 10 of the Act it appears that the State Government is required to make a reference in every case where a detention order has been made to the Advisory Board within three weeks of the date of detention by sending the grounds of detention, the report of the District Magistrate under section 3 (4) of the Act and the representation of the detenu, if any. Section 10 of the Act thus contemplates only one reference of the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board by the State Government and not repeated references within three weeks of the date of detention. Section 10 of the Act thus contemplates only one reference of the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board by the State Government and not repeated references within three weeks of the date of detention. It does not contemplate sending the grounds of detention, the report of the District Magistrate under section 3 (4) of the Act and tie representation of the detenu, if any, separately on different dates within three weeks of the date of detention by the State Government to the Advisory Board. If at the time of referring the case of the detenu to the Advisory Board by the State Government within three weeks of the date of his detention by sending the grounds of detention and the report of the District Magistrate under Section 3 (4) of the Act the representation of the detenu is not in existence then obviously it cannot be sent to the Advisory Board under Section 10 off the Act. It is only when the representation of the detenu is in existence and has been received by the State Government before it refers his case to the Advisory Board under section 10 of the Act that it must be sent along with the grounds of detention and the report of the District Magistrate under section 3 (4) of the Act to the Advisory Board. The case of the petitioner is required to be referred to the Advisory Board by the State Government withita three weeks of the date of detention so that it may give its opinion within seven weeks as required by Section 11 of the Act. It must, however, be mentioned that if the representation of the detenu comes into existence or is received by the State Government after it has referred his case to the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act by sending the grounds of detention and the report of the District Magistrate under Section 3 (4) of the Act it must be sent to the Advisory Board before his case is considered by the Advisory Board so that no prejudice is caused to him. Not only the representation made by the detenu within three weeks of the date of his detention but also the representation made by him after three weeks of the date of his detention must be sent by the State Government to the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board may also call for them under section 11 (1) of the Act before his case is considered by the Advisory Board so that no prejudice is caused to him. I am fortified in my view by the decision of this Court in Habeas; Corpus Writ Petition No. 9881 of 1984 Naseer v. District Magistrate Bareilly decided on 17-1-1985 and by the decision of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.107-108 of 1985 State of Rajasthan v. Shamsher Singh decided on 1-5-1985. A contrary view was taken by this court in the case of Faishal Mallik v. State of U. P., 1984 ALJ 851 which in my opinion does not lay down good law. In these circumstances there was no violation of Section 10 of the Act by the State Government in placing the representations of the petitioner before the Advisory Board on 11-10-1984 after three weeks of the date of his detention but before his case was considered by the Advisory Board on 19-10-1984. 9. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that relevant material relating to the grounds of detention was neither placed before the District Magistrate nor before the State Government or the Central Government. The relevant material regarding ground no. 1 which was not placed before the aforesaid authorities was the application made by the petitioner to the District Magistrate on 26-6-1983 the order of the District Magistrate to the Sub-Divisional Officer to inquire into the incident and report. The relevant material regarding ground no. 2 which was not placed before the aforesaid authorities were the affidavits of the witnesses. The relevant material relating to ground no. 3 which was not placed before the aforesaid authorities was the identification memo. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court. The relevant material regarding ground no. 2 which was not placed before the aforesaid authorities were the affidavits of the witnesses. The relevant material relating to ground no. 3 which was not placed before the aforesaid authorities was the identification memo. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Ashadevi v. K. Shivraj, AIR 1919 SC 447 in which it was held : "The principle that could be deduced is that if material or vital facts which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order, are not placed before or are not considered by the detaining authority it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal, After all the detaining authority must exercise due care and caution and act fairly and justly in exercising the power of detention and if taking into account matters extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute vitiate the subjective satisfaction and renders the detention order invalid then failure to take into consideration the most material or vital facts likely to influence the mind of the authority one way or the other would equally vitiate the subjective satisfaction and invalidate the detention order, In the instant case admittedly three facts were not communicated to or placed before the detaining authority before it passed the impugned order against the detenu, namely (i) that; during interrogation of the detenu, inspite of request, neither the presence nor the consultation of the Advocate was permitted ; (ii) that inspite of intimation to the Advocate in that behalf the detenu was not produced before the Magistrate on December 14, 1977 and (iii) that the confessional statements were squarely retracted by the detenu on December 22, 1977 at the first available opportunity while he was in judicial custody : the first two had a bearing on the question whether the confessional statements had been extorted under duress from the detenu or not, while the third obviously was in relation to the confessional statements which formed the main foundation of the impugned order and as such were vital facts having a bearing on the main issue before the detaining authority." In the case of S. K. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 2353 it was held ; "We should have thought that the fact that a criminal case is pending against the person who is sought to be proceeded against by way of preventive detention is a very material circumstance which ought to be placed before the District Magistrate. That circumstance might quite possibly have an impact on his decision whether or not to make an order of detention. It is not made an order of detention. It is not altogether unlikely that the District Magistrate may in a given case take the view that since a criminal case is pending against the person sought to be detained, no order of detention should be made for the present, but the criminal case should be allowed to run its full course and only if it fails to result in conviction, then preventive detention should be resorted to. It would be most unfair to the person sought to be detained not to disclose the pendency of a criminal case against him to the District Magistrate." In the case of Suresh Mahato v. District Magistrate Burdwan, AIR 1975 SC 728 it was held : "Now we do not know as to when the criminal cases were dropped and the petitioner was diseharged-whether it was before the making of the order of detention or thereafter. If the criminal cases were dropped and the petitioner was discharged before the making of the order of detention then obviously it was not a material fact which ought to have been placed before the District Magistrate. On the other hand, if the criminal cases were pending, it was certainly a material fact which ought to have been brought to the notice of the District Magistrate." In the case of Mohd. Shakeel Wahid Ahmad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SG 541 it was held : "It is clear that Shamsi was detained for engaging in a smuggling activity arising out of the same incident and transaction which forms the subject matter of ground no. 1 in the instant case. The opinion of the Advisory Board that there was no sufficient cause for Shamsi's detention may not have been binding on the detaining authority which ordered the detention of the petitioner but, it cannot be gain said that the fact that the Advisory Board had recorded such an opinion on identical facts involving a common ground was at least a relevant circumstances which ought to have been placed before the detaining authority in this case. Since three out of the four grounds on which the petitioner was detained have been held to be bad by the High Court, we have to proceed on the basis that the petitioner was detained and could validly be detained on the remaining ground only. That ground is similar to one of the grounds on which Shamsi was detained, the transaction being one and the same, as also the incident on which the two orders of detention are based. That is why the opinion of the Advisory Board in Shamsi's case becomes relevant in the petitioners' case. The failure of the State Government to place before the detaining authority in the instant case, the opinion which the Advisory Board had recorded in favour of a detenu who was detained partly on a ground relating to the same incident deprived the detaining authority of an opportunity to apply its mind to a piece of evidence which was relevant, if not binding. In other words, the detaining authority did not, because it could not apply its mind to a circumstance which, reasonably, could have affected its decision whether or not to pass an order of detention against the petitioner." In the case of Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1303 it was held : "The fourth ground speaks of a pending case in which the appellant is said to be on bail. The grounds were furnished in July 1967. The appellant was tried for the offence and acquitted as far as in February 1967. This ground discloses carelessness which is; extremly disturbing. That the detaining authority does not know that the appellant was tried and acquitted months before, and considers the pendency of the case against him as one of the grounds of detention shows that due care and attention is not being paid to such serious matters as detention without trial. If the appellant was tried and accquitted, Government was required to study the judgment of acquittal to discover whether all these allegations had any basis in fact or not. One can understand the rase of The case if the acquittal was technical but not when the case was held to be false. In any event, even if there was no need to consider the result of the case the case could not be referred to as pending case." 10. One can understand the rase of The case if the acquittal was technical but not when the case was held to be false. In any event, even if there was no need to consider the result of the case the case could not be referred to as pending case." 10. It would appear that in the aforesaid cases it has been held by the Supreme Court that retraction of confession by the detenu when the detention order is based on the confession, the pendency of criminal proceedings with respect to the incidents which formed the basis of the detention order; the opinion of the Advisory Board in favour of the detenu with respect to an incident mentioned in the ground of detention, the judgment of acquittal with respect to an incident which formed the basis of the order of detention are material and vital facts which must be placed before the detaining authority before it passes the order of detention. If they are not placed then the order of detention is vitiated. It is noteworthy that pendency of criminal proceedings relating to incidents which are mentioned in the grounds of detention, the opinion of the Advisory Board in favour of the detenu with respect to an incident mentioned in the ground of detention, the judgment of acquittal with respect to the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention are collateral matters unconnected with the evidence which the prosecution would lead to prove the charge against the detenu if he is being prosecuted in a criminal case with respect to an incident mentioned in the grounds of detention. In the case of Ashadevi v. K. Shivraj (supra) the detention order was solely based on the confession made by the detenu before the customs authorities. The detenu had, however, retracted the confession subsequently before the customs authorities. The detenu was also not allowed to consult an advocate during his interrogation inspite of request by him and the detenu was not produced before the Magistrate after his arrest on the day his confession was recorded by the customs authorities. It was held by the Supreme Court that the customs authorities were required to place these facts also before the detaining authority along with the confession of the detenu made before them as they were material and vital facts for determining whether the confession was reliable. It was held by the Supreme Court that the customs authorities were required to place these facts also before the detaining authority along with the confession of the detenu made before them as they were material and vital facts for determining whether the confession was reliable. This case is, however, clearly distinguishable as an affidavit sworn by a witness before the Oath Commissioner and filed in Court is distinct from retraction of a confession by an accused before the same authority which had recorded his confession earlier. If a witness makes a statement under Section 161 CrPC before the police authorities connecting an accused with a crime and thereafter makes another statement before the police authorities showing his innocence then the police authorities are required to send both the statements to the detaining authority for obtaining an order under Section 3 (2) of the Act against the accused if it seeks to rely on the earlier statement of the witness implicating the accused. If a witness swears an affidavit in favour of the accused before an Oath Commissioner after his statement under Section 161 CrPC is recorded the police authorities obviously do not know in what circumstances that statement was made and whether it was true. They are not required to investigate into the matter and only after coming to the conclusion that it is false place the statement of the witness under Section 161 CrPC before the detaining authority for obtaining an order of detention against the accused. It is noteworthy that an order of detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act is an administrative order which is of a preventive nature. It is to be prompt and timely. It is quite possible that an accused after obtaining a false affidavit of a witness in his favour may compell him to leave his place of residence. It may not, therefore, be possible for the police: to contact him and find out whether the affidavit filed by him was false and obtained under coercion or not. If the police authorities are requiired to first find out the correctness or otherwise of an affidavit filed by such a witness it may not be possible for them to submit a report to the detaining authority for the detention of the accused within time so that he may be prevented from acting in a manner prejudical to the maintenance of public order. The object of the Act would thus be defeated. In a trial the prosecution is required to lead evidence connecting the accused with the crime. It is not required to lead evidence which is in favour of the accused and prove his innocence. If prosecution witness file affidavits before a Magistrate during the investigation of a case it; is not the duty of the prosecution to file them before the trial Court. Such affidavits are put to the prosecution witnesses in their cross-examination by the defence in order to contradict the statement made by them in the trial and are proved by the defence. It would, therefore, not be proper to expect that the police authorities would place such affidavits before the detaining authority alongwith the material which connects an accused who is sought to be detained with offences mentioned in the grounds of detention regarding which cases are pending. If the police authorities were to submit the affidavits filed by prosecution witnesses in favour of am accused sought to be detained along with the offences mentioned in the grounds of detention regarding which cases are without submitting a report that such affidavits are unreliable it is difficult to expect that any detaining authority would pass an order of detention against an accused in whose favour such affidavits have been submitted by the police authorities. If the police authorities were to submit materials in favour of an accused sought to be detained along with the material which is against him on the basis of which the order of detention is required to be passed the police authorities would also have to submit a report that the material in favour of an accused sought to be detained submitted by them should not be relied upon. It is difficult to accept that the police authorities are required to do this. If the police authorities come to know that a witness whose statement has been recorded by them under Section 161 CrPC has filed a voluntary and a true affidavit which is contrary to the statement of the witness recorded by them under Section 161 CrPC they would obviously not rely on such a statement for preventive action being taken against the accused and would not place it before the detaining authority. If on the other hand they come to the conclusion on investigation that it is false and has been detained by the accused by coercion no useful purpose would be served by sending it to the detaining authority with their report that it should not be relied upon as it is false and obtained by coercion. It may be mentioned that the detaining authority will be bound to accept their report as there would be no material before it to rebut it. Such an affidavit is, therefore, not a material or vital fact which must be placed before the detaining authority before it passes; an order of detention. When a proposal is made by the police authorities for the detention of an accused on the basis of the cases which are pending against him they are expected to furnish material to the detaining authority which is against him and not which is in his favour. An order of detention is passed by the detaining authority under Section 3 (2) of the Act on the basis of the material furnished to it by the police authorities whose duty is to maintain law and order. A judgment of a criminal Court is on the other band passed after considering the evidence led by the prosecution and the defence. What may be material and vital facts produced in evidence by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and by the defence to prove the innocence of the accused in a trial are obviously not material and vital facts which the police authorities are expected to place before the detaining authority for obtaining an order of detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act for the detaining authority is not expected to pass a judicial order after considering the evidence of both the parties. The detenu has been given the right under Article 22 (5) of (he Constitution and under Section 8 of the Act to be furnished with the grounds of detention and the material on which the grounds are based and also to be provided with an opportunity to make a representation at the earliest. The State Government and the Advisory Board are required under the Act to consider the representation made by the detenu. The State Government and the Advisory Board are required under the Act to consider the representation made by the detenu. It is thus for the detenu to furnish material which is in his favour regarding the cases mentioned in the grounds of detention which are pending trial which is required to be considered by the Advisory Board and the State Government which may revoke the order of detention. In the case of State of Gujrat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya, AIR 1981 SO 2003 it was held : "The High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is to see whether the order of detention has been passed on any materials before it. If it is found that the order has been passed by the detaining authority on materials on record, then the Court cannot go further and examine whether the material was adequate or not, which is the function of an appellate authority or Court. It can examine the material on record only for the purpose of seeing whether the order of detention has been based on no material. The satisfaction mentioned in section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act is the satisfaction of the detaining authority and not of the Court. " In the case of Mohd. Salim Khan v. Shri C. C. Bose, Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 187 )) it was held J The second difficulty is that under the Act the subjective satisfaction, which is the basis for an order under it, is that of the relevant District Magistrate and not of a Court of law, and for that reason the court is precluded from going into the question as to the adequacy or otherwise of the materials on which such satisfaction has been reached." In the case of Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1303 it was held : "The formation of the opinion about detention rests with the government or the officer authorised. Their satisfaction is all that the law speaks of and the courts are not constituted an appellate authority. Thus the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be agitated before the Court." It is thus settled law that the adequacy and sufficiency of the material on which the detention order is based is not justifiable. A detention order is not invalid if it is based on some material. Thus the sufficiency of the grounds cannot be agitated before the Court." It is thus settled law that the adequacy and sufficiency of the material on which the detention order is based is not justifiable. A detention order is not invalid if it is based on some material. It is invalid only if it is based on no material. In the present case the detention order was passed on the basis of the documents which are mentioned in the grounds of detention, namely, FIR Crime No. 248 of 83 under section 307 IPC and 25/27 Arms Act, Police Station Naini, FIR Case Crime No. 72 of 84 under sections 147/149/302/404 IPC Police Station Naini, FIR Case Crime No. 51 of 1984 under sections 395/412 IPC Police Station Bara, recovery memo Case Crime No. 51 of 84, copy of statement of accused Sorab son of Abdul Aziz Case Crime No. 51 of 84 under sections 395/412 IPC Police Station Bara, Case Crime No. 309 of 84 under section 25 Arms Act and under section 411 IPC, recovery memo, report of SHO Naini and report of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad which were submitted to the detaining authority by the police authorities. It cannot, therefore, be held that the detention order can be struck down on the ground that it was not passed after considering the affidavits of the eye witnesses of the incident mentioned in ground no. 1 and other material in favour of the accused. In these circumstances with great respect I am not in agreement with the view tabEn by this Court in the case of Anil Kumar Sharma v. State of U. P., 1983 All. LJ 693 that ignorance of the filing of affidavits by eye witnesses disowning to have witnessed the incident and further asserting that the accused are not the assailants, vitiated the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority. Moreover, in the present case it has been denied by the District Magistrate in his counter affidavit that the police authorities had any knowledge of the affidavits filed by the eye witnesses Suresh Kumar and Ramesh Chandra of the incident mentioned in ground no. 1. They could, therefore, not place the copies of those affidavits before the District Magistrate before he passed the order of detention against the petitioner. 1. They could, therefore, not place the copies of those affidavits before the District Magistrate before he passed the order of detention against the petitioner. It is true that the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail to the petitioner mentions that affidavits have been filed by the witnesses in the aforesaid incident but from this it cannot be inferred that copies of these affidavits had been sent to the police authorities of Police Station Naini. These affidavits were also not annexed along with the earlier petition of the petitioner. In these circumstances it was not possible for the police authorities to place them before the District Magistrate before he passed the order of detention against the petitioner. In my opinion the identification memo with respect to the incident mentioned in ground no. 3 was also not a material or vital fact which was to be placed by the police authorities before the detaining authority as it did not connect the petitioner with the incident mentioned in the said ground. The petitioner's participation in the said incident was based on the recovery of stolen aluminium wire of the value of Rs. 75,000/- from his godown soon after the incident and the confession of a co-accused. The fact that he was not identified by any witness at the time of identification parade did not establish that he did not participate in the incident as witnesses may not have been able to identify all the persons who participated in the said incident as they were about thirty in number. The District Magistrate, Allahabad has denied in his affidavit that the petitioner made an application to the District Magistrate in June 1983 giving the counter version of the incident mentioned in ground no. 1 and that the District Magistrate had directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to inquire into the incident and report by his order dated 27-6-1983. It is noteworthy that in the earlier petition no. 10159 of 1984 filed by the petitioner it has not been mentioned when the petitioner had filed an application before the District Magistrate and other authorities giving the counter version of the incident mentioned in ground no. and the date on which order was passed on it by the District Magistrate. It is noteworthy that in the earlier petition no. 10159 of 1984 filed by the petitioner it has not been mentioned when the petitioner had filed an application before the District Magistrate and other authorities giving the counter version of the incident mentioned in ground no. and the date on which order was passed on it by the District Magistrate. It is noteworthy that the District Magistrate did not file any counter affidavit in the aforesaid petition but instead revoked that earlier order' of detention dated 9-8-1984 passed by him against the petitioner and passed a fresh order of detention dated 10-9-1984 against the petitioner on the basis of the legal advise tendered to him by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that the continued detention of the petitioner on the basis of the earlier order of detention dated 9-8- 1984 was illegal as relevant material was not furnished to the petitioner along with the grounds of detention as required by section 8 of the Act. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the Superintendent Central Jail, Naini that the earlier order of detention dated 9-8-1984 had been revoked by the District Magistrate on 9-9-1984. An application was also moved on behalf of the State that the aforesaid petition be dismissed as it had become infructuous. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the District Magistrate bad perused the earlier petition no. 10159 of 1984 filed by the petitioner and had come to know that an application had been made by him in w.hich he had given a counter version of the incident mentioned in ground no 1. It was, therefore, not possible for him to consider the said application before passing the order of detention against the petitioner on 9-9-1984. It may be mentioned that Sri B. S. Lali the District Magistrate, Allahabad who passed the order of detention against the petitioner on 9-8-1984 and on 9-9-1984 was not the District Magistrate of Allahabad in June 1983 but Sri Malhotra was the District Magistrate, Allahabad at that time when the aforesaid application is said to have been submitted by the petitioner to the District Magistrate, Allahabad. The said application could not also have been located in the office of the District Magistrate, Allahabad on the basis of the earlier petition as no dates of the application and the order passed on it were mentioned therein. The said application could not also have been located in the office of the District Magistrate, Allahabad on the basis of the earlier petition as no dates of the application and the order passed on it were mentioned therein. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the order of detention dated 9-9- 1984 is vitiated as it was passed by the District Magistrate without considering the aforesaid application of the petitioner and the order of the District Magistrate directing the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to inquire into the incident and report which was passed on the said application. It may be mentioned that a supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Magistrate in which it has been stated that no application dated 26-6-1983 is either on the record maintained in the office of the District Magistrate or in the office of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Karchana and it appears that the original application dated 26-6-1983 on which the District Magistrate had directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to inquire into the incident and report may have been handedover to the petitioner has not been taken into consideration by me as the said supplementary counter affidavit has been filed after the judgment was reserved and the learned counsel for the petitioner had no opportunity to file a supplementary rejoinder affidavit in reply to the aforesaid supplementary counter affidavit for the reasons mentioned above it cannot be held that the detention order is vitiated for not placing the aforesaid material before the District Magistrate, State Government or the Central Government. 11. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the grounds of detention are stale. The order of detention was passed against the petitioner on 9-9-1984. The incident mentioned in the first ground of detention took place on 12-6-1983. The incident mentioned in the second ground of detention took place on 11-2-1984. The incident mentioned in the third ground of detention took place on 11-5-1984. The incident mentioned in the fourth ground of detention took place on 6-8-1984. The order of detention is thus not based on a single incident in which the petitioner is alleged to have participated but is based on four incidents in which the petitioner is alleged to have participated during a period of about one year and three months. The incident mentioned in the fourth ground of detention took place on 6-8-1984. The order of detention is thus not based on a single incident in which the petitioner is alleged to have participated but is based on four incidents in which the petitioner is alleged to have participated during a period of about one year and three months. In determining whether the grounds of detention are stale or not cases in which the order of detention is based on a solitary incident differ from cases in which the order of detention is based on a number of incidents. If the order of detention is based on a single incident in which the detenu is involved and that incident took place a long time before the order of detention was passed, it suffers from the vice of staleness as it cannot be reasonably inferred from that incident that the detenu is likely to repeat it but where the detenu is involved in a number of incidents then the incidents which took place even a considerable time prior to the passing of the order of detention can be taken into consideration if they form a chain of incidents in which the detenu was involved. In the case of Fitrat Raza Khan v. State of U. P., AIR 1982 SC 136 it was held : "The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. It is usually from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order...............It is true that the order of detention is based on two grounds which relate to two incidents, one of August 13, 1980, and the other of July 24, 1981 i.e. the second incident was after a lapse of about a year, but both the incidents show the propensities of the petitioner to instigate the members of the Muslim community to communal violence. The unfortunate communal riots which took place in Moradabad City led to wide spread carnage and bloodshed resulting in the loss of many innocent lives. The memory of the communal riots is all too recent to be a thing of the past. The unfortunate communal riots which took place in Moradabad City led to wide spread carnage and bloodshed resulting in the loss of many innocent lives. The memory of the communal riots is all too recent to be a thing of the past. The past conduct or antecedent history of a parson can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order, It is usually from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Although there was a lapse of a year but the incident of July 24, 1981 was just on the eve of the Id festival and the ground alleged is that the petitioner was trying to instigate the Muslims to communal violence by promise of better arms, with a view to an open confrontation between the two communities. It cannot be said that the prejudicial conduct or antecedent history of the petitioner was not proximate in point of time and had no rational connection with the conclusion that his detention was necessary for maintenance of public order." In the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 it was held : " A perusal of the FIRs shows that the petitioner is a person of desperate and dangerous character. This is not a case of a single activity directed against a single individual. There have been a series of criminal activities on the part of the detenu and his associates during a span of four years which have made him a menace to the society. " In the case of Sahib Singh Dugal v. The Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 340 it was held; " As was pointed out by this court in Rameshwar Shaw's case, AIR 1964 SC 334 , detention is made generally in toe light of the evidence about the past activities of the person concerned. " In the case of Sahib Singh Dugal v. The Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 340 it was held; " As was pointed out by this court in Rameshwar Shaw's case, AIR 1964 SC 334 , detention is made generally in toe light of the evidence about the past activities of the person concerned. But these past activities should ordinarily be proximate in point of time in order to justify the order of detention...............As a matter of fact, the affidavit on behalf of the Government of India is that the material In respect of the activities of the petitioners ranged over a period of two years before the date of detention and that was taken into account to come to the conclusion whether the detention under the Rules was justified or not. We are, therefore, of opinion that the petitioners cannot get advantage of the decision of this Court in Rameshwar Shaw's case, AIR 1964 SC 334 on the facts in the present case." In the case of Gora v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 473 it was held . "Now it is true as pointed out by this Court in Golam Hussain v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta, (1974) 4 SCC 330 = AIR 1974 SC 1336 = 1974 CrLJ 938 that "there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial activity of the species specified in the statute. This credible chain is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 4 SCC 1 = AIR 1974 SC 1264 = 1974 CrLJ 936 . No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for. the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for. the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. We have to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. "There is, therefore, no hard and fast rule that merely because there is a time lag of about six months between the 'of lending acts' and the date of the order of detention, the casual link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the District Magistrate must be regarded as sham or unreal. Whether the acts of the detenu forming the basis for arriving at a subjective satisfaction are too remote in point of time to induce any reasonable person to reach such subjective satisfaction must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the 'offending acts' and the order of detention. It is a subsidiary test evolved by the court for the purpose of determining the main question whether the past activities of the detenu is such that from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies only in so far as is it subserves that purpose and ill cannot be allowed to dominate or drown it." 12. In the present case the four incidents in which the detenu was involved took place between 12-6-1983 and 11-5-1984. All these incidents could, therefore, be taken into consideration while passing the order of detention on 10-9-1984 and none of these incidents could be said to be stale. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the grounds of detention did not relate to public order but relate to law and order. There is no force in this contention. In the first ground of detention it is mentioned that the petitioner threatened the persons who were taking part in the auction at the I.T.I. Factory, Naini. When the police party reached there on receiving information and objected, the petitioner fired at the police party. There is no force in this contention. In the first ground of detention it is mentioned that the petitioner threatened the persons who were taking part in the auction at the I.T.I. Factory, Naini. When the police party reached there on receiving information and objected, the petitioner fired at the police party. He was, however, beaten and arrested. The aforesaid incident created fear in the general public and adversely affected public order. In my opinion this ground clearly relates to public order as firing at the police party at I.T.I. Factory, Naini where an auction was taking place was bound to create panic and terror in the members of public who were present there. It is noteworthy that it is mentioned specifically in this ground that the aforesaid incident created fear in the general public and adversely affected public order. I am fortified in my view by decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Kanu Biswas v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1656 it was held ; "The second incident which took place at 9.40 p. m. on November 4, 1971 related to the attack by the petitioner and his associates on a police party on the platform of Beliaghata Railway Station with a view to kill them. The petitioner and his associates are stated to have been then armed with bombs, daggers, knives and iron rods and they exploded two bombs with terrible sound. It is further stated that the above act of the petitioner and his associates created panic and confusion among the passengers and thus disturbed public order. Each one of the above two incidents of September 26, 1971 and November 4, 1971 in our opinion, affected public order and not merely law and order." In the case of Sk. It is further stated that the above act of the petitioner and his associates created panic and confusion among the passengers and thus disturbed public order. Each one of the above two incidents of September 26, 1971 and November 4, 1971 in our opinion, affected public order and not merely law and order." In the case of Sk. Kedar v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1647 it was held :- " Where the detenu along with others while removing material from the wagon at the railway station yard attacked the on-duty Railway Protection Force party with bombs and ballasta when challenged by them the acts of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order................" In the case of Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 197 it was held : "The second ground is that on June 29, 1971 at about 10 P. M. he was arrested by the police personnel at Debinagar which is within the police station Monaguri. At the time of his arrest he had a bomb in his hand. He made an attempt to throw the bomb on the police personnel at the time of his arrest with a view to killing them............The 'victims of the petitioner's activity in the second ground are the police personnel. They are public servants in-charge of maintenance of law and order in the community............ The activity specified in the second ground is bound to affect public order. The object of throwing bomb on the police personnel was to cause intimidation and confusion in their minds in order to facilitate his escape. Creating panic in the minds of the police personnel by throwing the bomb would scare the police personnel of the State from performing their legitimate duties in the maintenance of law and order in the Stale. That would disturb the even tempo of the Community life. Accordingly, we think that the second ground is also connected with 'public order'." 13. Creating panic in the minds of the police personnel by throwing the bomb would scare the police personnel of the State from performing their legitimate duties in the maintenance of law and order in the Stale. That would disturb the even tempo of the Community life. Accordingly, we think that the second ground is also connected with 'public order'." 13. In the case of Ajay Dixit v. State of U. P., AIR 1985 SC 18 the first ground of detention was "That on date 27-9-82 at 3.10 p.m. you collected goondas in your house in the town of Ferozabad and when the police party reached in order to arrest the goondas you fired at the police party on which a case against you under section 307/34 of Indian Penal Code is pending the trial in the court" and it was held ; " This grounds mentioned therein are not of such magnitude as to amount to apprehend disturbance of public order, nor was there any evidence that for any conduct of the detenu public order was endangered, or there could be reasonable apprehension about it. " This case is, however, clearly distinguishable as in the present case it was mentioned in the first ground that the incident mentioned therein created fear in the general public and adversely affected public order. 14. It is mentioned in the second ground of detention that the petitioner and his associates fired at Ram Chandra Dixit deceased in village Chak Tejau which resulted in his death and they also looted his gun. The aforesaid incident created fear in the general public of the vicinity and adversely affected public order. It may be mentioned that in the first information report relating to this incident the number of the associates of the petitioner who fired at Ram Chandra Dixit with rifles and guns was given as five. In the case Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 it was held ; "The true distinction between the areas of 'public order' and 'law and order' lies not in the nature of quality of the act. but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order." In the case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228 it was held ; "In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case, 1966-1 SCR 709 = AIR 1966 SC 740 examples were given by Sarkar and Hidayatullah, JJ. They show how similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquality of the society undisturbed. This question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another." In the case of Jadunandan Sah v. District Magistrate Dhanbad, AIR 1983 SC 1130 it was held ; "In one incident one of the petitioners threw a bomb in a large gathering where a cultural programme was going on at the dead of night whereupon the public started running helter-shelter to save their lives. That will in our opinion make out a case of public order inasmuch as it disturbed the tranquility and the even tempo of life of the public. The second incident was also of the same nature. That will in our opinion make out a case of public order inasmuch as it disturbed the tranquility and the even tempo of life of the public. The second incident was also of the same nature. If the detaining authority in the circumstances was satisfied that the two incidents make tout a case of apprehension of breach of public order we find no infirmity in the order." It may be mentioned that the second incident mentioned in the aforesaid case was as follows "That on 8-11-82 at about 11.30 A. M. the subject along with Rambriksh Singh, Jadunandan Mahato and Chandra Shekhar Singh armed with bombs gun etc. went to the house of Ram Naresh Chauhan in Khudia Colliery. One of his associates under the direction and guidance of the subject opened fire on Shri Chauhan resulting in grievous injury to him. Opening of gun fire in a thickly populated residential colony of Khudia Colliery created great panic and alarm in the area and adversely affected public order." In the case of Ramesh Roy v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1678 the order of detention was based on the under mentioned ground : "That on the night of 1-6-1971 at about, 01.30 hrs., while committing theft of rice from wagon no. SF 39751 at Bongaon Rly. Station Yard, you and your associates charged bombs upon the on-duty RPF Party with a view to do away with their lives, when challenged by them. As a result of your bomb charge, SR 3179 Himangshu Bhushan Dhar Sharma of the RPF Party sustained burn injury on his person. By explosion of bombs you and your associates created panic in the station area and in the adjoining locality. You created disturbance of public order thereby." It was held by the Supreme Court that the incident mentioned in the above mentioned ground disturbed public order. 15. In the case of Shyamal Chakraborty v. The Commissioner of Police Calcutta, 1969 (2) SCC 426 the first ground of detention was as follows ; "That on 23-7-68 at about 6.10 p. m. you along with your associates being armed with lathis, iron rods, hockey stick etc. 15. In the case of Shyamal Chakraborty v. The Commissioner of Police Calcutta, 1969 (2) SCC 426 the first ground of detention was as follows ; "That on 23-7-68 at about 6.10 p. m. you along with your associates being armed with lathis, iron rods, hockey stick etc. attacked constable Sankar Lal Bose and Jagdish Singh both of Shyampukur PS on Kaliprasad Chakraborty Street near the Gaudiya Math who went there to discharge their lawful duties, as a result of which constable Shankar Lal Bose sustained bleeding injuries on his person...-......" The question which arises is this : do the grounds reproduced above relate merely to maintenance of order or do they relate to the maintenance of public order ? It will be noticed that the detenu in each of these cases acted along with associates who were armed with lathis, iron rods, acid bulbs etc. It is clearly said in ground no. 1 that he committed a riot and indiscriminately used acid bulbs, iron rods, lathis etc. endangering human lives. This ground cannot be said to have reference merely to maintenance of order because it affects the locality and every body who lives in the locality. " In my opinion this ground clearly relates to public order as the incident mentioned therein which took place in broad day light (11,30 A. M.) in village abadi created fear in the general public and adversely affected public order. 16. It is mentioned in the third ground that the petitioner along with about thirty other persons looted aluminium wire and other articles valued at Rs. 1,06,000/- near village padar close to the tent of the U. P. State Blectricity Board of S3 KV Rewa Road Pratap Pur line after threatening the Chaukidar by pistols and the aforesaid articles were taken ;away on a truck. It was held in the case of Noor Mohammad v. State of U. P., 1983 CrLJ 995 : "Another contention of the petitioner's learned counsel was that the activities complained of, namely, the dacoities in which the detenu was said to have taken part, could not be said to be affecting public order and they could at best be referable to law and order. The contention has obviously no force. The contention has obviously no force. In the cases of Gora v. State of West Bengal, 1975 SCC (Cr) 391, 1975 CrLJ 429 , Narayan Debnath v. State of West Bengal, 1976 CrLJ 632 (SC) (supra), Mohd. Dhana Ali Khan v. State of West Bengal, 1975 SCC (Cr 695); ( 1976 CrLJ 622 ) and Dhena Hembram v. D. M. West Bengal, 1975 SCC (Cr) 825 : 1975 CrLJ 1549 , it was held that cases of dacoity were referable to breach of public order because they did not have the effect of disturbing public life and the even tempo of the life of the community of the area in which such acts were committed. " In the case of Rajendra Singh v. State of U. P., 1982 CrLJ 1987 it was held ; "I am unable to accept the submission of Shri S. N. Mulla that only these offences of robbery or dacoity which are committed in congested localities or trains within the view of a large number of people alone can be said to relate to 'public order' and other offences of such a nature should be taken to relate only to the problem of 'law and order'." In the case of Dhena Hembram v. The Distinct Magistrate, West Dinajpur, AIR 1975 SC 1804 it was held : " The detenu is alleged to have committed two dacoities, one after the other within a period of two months. In the course of both the occurrences he is said to have used fire arms and threatened witnesses and, therefore, no body is available to depose against him. This has undoubtedly disturbed public order. " 17. In the present case, the dacoity was committed near village Padar by about thirty persons after threatening the Chaukidar, with pistols and property worth more than a lac of rupees was looted. This was bound to create panic and terror in the residents of village Padar, which would effect the even tempo of their life, as a result of which public order would be disturbed. 18. It is mentioned in the fourth ground that single barrel 12 bore gun, which was looted from Ram Chandra Dixit at the time of his murder on 11-2-1984, was recovered from the possession of the petitioner on 6-8-1984 along with eight live cartridges of 12 bore gun. This ground is, therefore, connected with ground no. 18. It is mentioned in the fourth ground that single barrel 12 bore gun, which was looted from Ram Chandra Dixit at the time of his murder on 11-2-1984, was recovered from the possession of the petitioner on 6-8-1984 along with eight live cartridges of 12 bore gun. This ground is, therefore, connected with ground no. 2 and must be read along with it. When so read, it also relates to public order as ground no. 2 has already been held to relate to public order. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is mentioned in the order of detention that it has been passed with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and also from acting in any manner prejudicial to the supplies and services essential to the community whereas in the grounds of detention it is only mentioned that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This shows that the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate without applying his mind. There is no force in this contention as all the four grounds of detention relate to public order. Ground no. 3 also relates to maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community as on account of the looting of the aluminium wire and other articles by the petitioner and his associates from near the tent of U. P. Electricity Board of 33 KV Rewa Road Pratap Pur line construction work at 33 KV Rewa Road Pratap Pur line stopped. It is true that it is not mentioned in the grounds of detention that it was necessary to detain Che petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, but this is clearly mentioned in the order of detention. It cannot, therefore, be held that the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate without applying his mind. 19. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation of the petitioner was not considered expeditiously or independently by the State Government. It cannot, therefore, be held that the detention order was passed by the District Magistrate without applying his mind. 19. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation of the petitioner was not considered expeditiously or independently by the State Government. It appears from the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the State Government that the representation of the petitioner was received by the Home Secretary on 1-10-1984. The offices of the State Government were closed from 2-10-1984 till 7-10-1984 due to Gandhi Jayanti, Dusehra and Moharram holidays. The representation of the petitioner was dealt with in the Home Confidential-6 Section of U. P. Government on 8th October, 1984 as the cases of preventive detention had to be sorted out as large number of eases had accumulated during the aforesaid holidays. Note was prepared on the representation of the petitioner on 10-10-1984 by the Office Assistant which was put up before the Joint Secretary Home on 11-10-1984. On 11-10-1984 the representation of the petitioner was sent by the State; Government to the District Magistrate Allahabad for his comments. The comments of the District Magistrate, Allahabad were received by the State Government on 18-10-1984. The file of the petitioner was sent to the Advisory Board as his case was heard by the Advisory Board on 19-10-1984. On 20-10-1984 the file of the petitioner was sent to the Government Advocate at Allahabad for preparation of the counter affidavit in the present petition. There were Dipawali holidays from 23-10-1984 till 26-10-1984. The representation of the petitioner was examined on 29-10-1984 by the Joint Secretary and also by the Home Secretary. It was rejected by the Chief Secretary on 30-10-1984 as the Chief Minister was not available. In the case of Mst. L. M. S. Ummu Saleema v. B. B. Gujarai, 1981 CrLJ 889 it was held : "We do not doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition but as observed by one of us in Francis Coralie Mullin v. W. C. Khambra, (1980) 2 SCR 1095 : AIR 1980 SC 849 . "The time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive." The occasional observations made by this court that each day's delay in dealing with the representation must be adequately explained are meant to emphasise the expedition with which the representation must be considered and not that it is a magical formula, the slightest breach of which must result in the release of the detenu. Law deals with the facts of life. In law, as in life, there are no invariable absolutes. Neither life nor law can be reduced to mere but despotic formulae. " In the case of Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 665 it was held ; " As held in Javanaravan's case, then can be no hard and fast rule with regard to the time which Government can or should take, and that each case must be decided on its own facts. "' 20. In view of the facts mentioned above it cannot be held that the representation of the petitioner was not considered expeditiously by the State Government. The record of tbh State Government also shows that the representation of the petitioner was considered independently by the State Government and was not rejected on the basis of the opinion of the Advisory Board. There is no merit in this petition. I accordingly dismiss it. 21. H. N. Seth, J. :-I have read the judgment prepared by brother Katju, As I find myself unable to agree with all that has been stated in his judgment, it has become necessary for me to state my own reasons separately in respect of my conclusions. 22. By this petition under Article 2216 of the Constitution petitioner Manni Lal has questioned the validity of his continued detention in pursuance of an order under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) made by the District Magistrate, Allahabad on 10-9-1984. The grounds served upon the petitioner indicated that the satisfaction of the district Magistrate that if. was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, was based on four grounds enumerated by brother Katju. It appears that the District Magistrate had on 8-8-1984 passed an order for petitioner's detention on certain grounds including the grounds on which the present order of detention has been made. It appears that the District Magistrate had on 8-8-1984 passed an order for petitioner's detention on certain grounds including the grounds on which the present order of detention has been made. After the said order was approved by the State Government on 18-8-1984, it was revoked by the District Magistrate vide his order dated 9-9-1984 and thereafter the impugned order of detention was made on 10-9-1984. For the reasons stated by Katju, J. I fully agree with him that, in the circumstances of the case, the District Magistrate was fully competent to revoke the order dated 8-8-1984 even after the same had been approved by the State Government and to thereafter, pass a fresh order of petitioner's detention on 10-9-1984. I, however, make it clear that at the juncture I am not expressing any opinion on the question as to whether it would be open to the District Magistrate to revoke the order of detention passed by him even after the same had been confirmed by the State Government under Sec. 12 of the Act, for the simple reason that such a controversy is not involved in the petition before us. 23. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner claimed petitioner's continued detention has been rendered illegal for the reason that his representation was not placed before the Advisory Board within a period of 21 days of his detention as stipulated by Section 10 of the Act. The petitioner was detained on 10-9-1984. The grounds of detention along with other connected material was placed by the State Government before the Advisory Board on 25-9-1984. According to the petitioner, he had submitted a representation against the impugned detention order for consideration of the State Government to the District Magistrate on 29-9-1984. Another representation in this regard was submitted by him to the Home Secretary on 1-10-1984. These two representations ought to have been placed by the Stale Government before the Advisory Board within 21 days of the order of his detention, namely, by the 1st of October, 1984. However, the said representations were placed by the State Government before the Advisory Board only on 11-10-1984. These two representations ought to have been placed by the Stale Government before the Advisory Board within 21 days of the order of his detention, namely, by the 1st of October, 1984. However, the said representations were placed by the State Government before the Advisory Board only on 11-10-1984. Thus there has been a contravention of the mandatory provision contained in Sec. 10 of the Act relevant portion whereof reads thus :- In every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Sec. 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order......... rendering petitioner's continued detention invalid." 24. The question whether the continued detention of a detenu is rendered invalid in a case where the representation made by him within 21 days is placed before the Advisory Board after a lapse of 21 days from the date of his detention, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Sri Shamsher Singh, Criminal Appeal No. 107 and 108 of 1985, decided on 1-5-1985. The Supreme Court, after noticing the legislative scheme behind Sec. 10 of the Act observed thus :- "While making of the reference under Sec. 10 with the grounds of detention is a must, furnishing of the representation is conditional upon it having been made and receipt thereof by the State Government. Though under the general scheme of the Act definite and different periods have been prescribed for compliance with the step to step treatment of the matter, there is no obligation cast on the detenu to make a representation within any definite time. We are, therefore, prepared to accept the submission of the learned Advocate General that while considering the compliance with Sec. 10 of the Act emphasis has to be laid on the making of reference and forwarding of the grounds of detention and the placing of the representation has to be judged on different basis. We may not be understood to be of the view that it is open to the appropriate Government to withhold the placement of the representation unduly or indefinitely-...... We agree with the submission of Mr. We may not be understood to be of the view that it is open to the appropriate Government to withhold the placement of the representation unduly or indefinitely-...... We agree with the submission of Mr. Jethamalani that it is obligatory for appropriate Government to forward the representation, when received to the Board without dealy.........where the representation has been received the same should as expeditiously as possible reach the Board...____" The Supreme Court then observed that it is obligatory for the appropriate Government to forward the representation, when received, to the Board without delay and that when the representation has been received, the same should as expeditiously as possible reach the Board It also observed that it was difficult to hold that in the case before it: the time taken by the State Government amounted to withholding of the representation made by the detenu which could result in non-compliance of the provisions of Sec. 10 of the Act. Eventually the Court while repelling the submission raised on behalf of the detenu concluded thus :- "We agree with the principle indicated above and in our opinion on the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that there has been any negligence or remissness on the part of the State.........in the matter of causing the same to be placed before the Advisory Board. We are impressed by the fact that no prejudice has been caused to the detenu on account of the delay of a day beyond the statutory period in placing the representation before the Advisory board inasmuch as the Advisory Board had caused the matter to be heard on 10-9-1984 and before the appointed date the representation was before the Board........." It thus appears that the Supreme Court has construed Sec. 10 of the Act as laying down that whereas under that Section tie State Government is bound to place before the Advisory Board the grounds on which the detention order has been made within a period of 21 days ; its obligation in respect of a representation received from a detenu merely is not to withheld the same and to place it expeditiously and without delay before the Board. Accordingly, only such delay on the part of the State Government in forwarding a representation to the Advisory Board that causes prejudice to the detenu and can be classified or termed as amounting to its withholding can result in contravention of the provision of Sec. 10 of the Act. In this view of the matter the earlier decisions of the Court which lay down that merely because representation made by the detenu to the State Government within 21 days of his detention was not placed before the Advisory Board within the same period would constitute non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Sec. 10 of the Act rendering his continued detention invalid, have lost their validity. In the result, I am unable to agree with the observation of brother Katju that Sec. 10 of the Act is not applicable to a representation made by a detenu received by the State Government after it had placed the grounds of detention before the Advisory Board and in respect of such representations no question of non-compliance with Sec. 10 of the Act can possibly arise. 25. In the instant case, however, I find that the petitioner was detained on 10-9-1984. According to him he handed over a copy of the representation to the District Magistrate, Allahabad on 29-9-1984 (on the 19th day) and another similar representation which was handled over in the Secretariat of the State Government on 1-10-1984. The period of 21 days after the detention was to expire on 1-10-1984, but as per counter affidavit of Sri Jagdish Narain Yadav, Upper Division Assistant Confidential Section Secretariat, Lucknow, it was placed before the Advisory Board only on 11-10-1984, that is, after a lapse of 10 days. On behalf of the State Government the Averment with regard to the receipt of the representation by the District Magistrate on 29-9-1984 in the petition are seriously disputed. But then it is not necessary for us to resolve the said dispute in the present proceeding and we may proceed on the basis that the petitioner did handover a representation to the relevant authorities on 29-9-1985 for being considered by the State Government. But then it is not necessary for us to resolve the said dispute in the present proceeding and we may proceed on the basis that the petitioner did handover a representation to the relevant authorities on 29-9-1985 for being considered by the State Government. It has been explained in the counter affidavit of Sri Jagdish Narain Yadav that the State Government Offices were closed from 2-10-1984 to 7-10-1984 (2nd October being a holiday on account of Mahatma Gandhi's birthday, 3rd and 4th October were holidays on account of Dushera and 5th and 6th October were holidays on account of Muharram). Likewise the office of the Advisory Board was also completely closed from 2-10-1984 to 7-10-1984. Petitioner's case before the Advisory Board was fixed for 19-10-1984 and the representation made on behalf of the petitioner with the State Government was placed before the Advisory Board on 11-10-1984. In these circumstances, even if it be taken that a representation was handed over by the petitioner to the District Magistrate, as claimed by him, on 29-9-1984 there has been no such delay/ negligence or remissness on the part of the State Government which can be termed as amounting to its withholding the same from the Advisory Board. It has not been shown that the petitioner has in any way been prejudicially affected because of his representation not being placed before the Advisory Board on any date prior to 11-10-1984. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that in the instant case there has been any non-compliance with the provisions of Sec. 10 of the Act. I, therefore, agree with brother Katju that continued detention of the petitioner is not rendered illegal on this account. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the relevant material in respect of three out of four grounds was withheld from the District Magistrate and as such the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in respect of those three grounds stands vitiated. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the relevant material in respect of three out of four grounds was withheld from the District Magistrate and as such the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in respect of those three grounds stands vitiated. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Asha Devi v. K. Shivraj, AIR 1979 SC 447 , that it is well settled that the subjective satisfaction requisite on the part of the detaining authority, formation of which is a condition precedent to the passing of the detention order gets vitiated if material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other are ignored or not considered by the detanining authority before issuing the detention order. In this connection after considering its decisions in the case of SK. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, MR 1974 SC 353 and Suresh Mahato v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1975 SC 728 observed thus : "The principle that would be clearly deduced from the above observations is that if material or vital fact which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order, are not placed before or are not considered by the detaining authority it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal. After all, the detaining authority must exercise due care and caution and act fairly and justly in exercising the power of detention and if taking into account the matters extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute vitiates subjective satisfaction and renders the order invalid then failure to take into consideration the must material or vital facts likely to influence the mind of the authority one way or the other would equally vitiate the subjective satisfaction and invalidate the detention order." While making the aforementioned observation the Supreme Court has emphasised that where a person is directed to be detained under the law relating to preventive detention without trial it is of utmost importance that in arriving at the requisite satisfaction for detaining him the detaining authority has to act fairly, justly and with due care and caution. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that the persons responsible for placing facts before the detaining authority with a view to induce it to pass an order of detention must bring all material and vital facts which would have a bearing on the issue and influence the mind of the detaining authority one way on the other, to its notice. Any lapse on the part of the persons moving the detaining authority to pass an order of preventive detention in this regard would detract from the principle of fairness and justice. 27. So far as the first ground for petitioner's detention is concerned, it mentions that on 12-6-1983 while auction was taking place at the I. T. I. Factory in Naini, Allahabad, the petitioner armed with pistol and cartridges reached the place of auction and threatened persons who were present there and were bidding. On receiving information regarding the aforesaid incident, Rama Kant Misra, Station House Officer, police station Naini, Allahabad along with his staff and witnesses went to the place of auction and objected whereupon the petitioner fired at the police party with the intention of killing them and thereafter ran towards east, but he was beaten and caught at about 12.30 p. m. and on search being taken, one pistol, one fired cartridge and four live cartridges were recovered from his possession. Consequently, Crime Case No. 248 of 1983, under section 307 IPC and section 25/27 Arms Act was registered at police station Naini regarding the aforesaid incident and after investigation a chargesheet had been submitted and the case is pending in the court. The ground mentions that the said incident created fear in the general public and adversely affected public order. 28. In paragraph 24' of the petition the petitioner asserted that so far as the incident referred to in the aforesaid ground, he bad presented an application before the District Magistrate, Allahabad in the month of June, 1983 in which he had given correct version of the case and as to why the Station House Officer was taking proceedings to [implicate him after concocting a false case and had requested that after taking appropriate proceedings, the police officers be appropriately punished. The District Magistrate then on 27-6-1983 passed an order directing the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Karchhana to enquire into the matter and to submit his report. The District Magistrate then on 27-6-1983 passed an order directing the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Karchhana to enquire into the matter and to submit his report. According to the petitioner, the counter version set up by him in that application was not placed by the Station House Officer before the District Magistrate and the District Magistrate did not take into consideration while passing the detention order. According to the petitioner, the counter version contained in the said application was a vital material which should have been considered by the detaining authority before passing the impugned order. The averment made by the petitioner in paragraph 24' of the petition in this regard has been replied to in paragraph 15' of the counter affidavit by the District Magistrate wherein,, to begin with, he stated generally that the contents of paragraph 24' of the writ petition were incorrect and denied. He asserted that while passing the order he had placed reliance on the report of the Station House Officer, police station, Naini, dated 9-9-1984 which clearly indicated that the activities of the petitioner had disturbed the public order. He then went to state with regard to the counter version of the petitioner thus :- "Whatever application was made by the petitioner against any police officer that did not form the basis of the deponent's satisfaction. Moreover the petitioner's application does not contain the instances of the criminal activities which can be said to be prejudicial nor does it contain the facts which negatives the drawing of the aforesaid assumption or inference or suspicion. Thus it was neither essential for the deponent to take it into consideration before passing the order of detention nor it was incumbent upon the law enforcing agency i. e., police to make it available to the deponent while making request for taking action under the National Security Act........." 29. These averments made by the District Magistrate clearly imply an admission on his part that an application setting up a counter version of the incident, dated 12-6-1983 adverted to in ground on. 1' had to the knowledge of the District Magistrate, in fact been made by the petitioner before the Distt.Magistrate in the month of June, 1984, for, if it had not been so, the District Magistrate could not have mentioned that the said application did not contain facts which negatived the drawing of the assumption or inference against (he petitioner. 1' had to the knowledge of the District Magistrate, in fact been made by the petitioner before the Distt.Magistrate in the month of June, 1984, for, if it had not been so, the District Magistrate could not have mentioned that the said application did not contain facts which negatived the drawing of the assumption or inference against (he petitioner. The District Magistrate, however, lis categorical in his statement that it was neither necessary for him to take the facts mentioned in that application into consideration nor was it necessary for the law enforcing agency i. e., the police to make it available to him. It is thus apparent that the District Magistrate did not take the counter version of the incident as set up by the petitioner into consideration before passing the impugned order as he thought that it was, in the circumstances of the case, irrelevant. 30. It is significant to note that in this connection some sort of inconsistency between the allegations made by the petitioner in his earlier writ petition (Writ Petition No. 10159 of 1984) and those contained in the present writ petition has been adverted to for creating a doubt that the averment made by the petitioner to the effect that he moved an application setting up a counter version on which the then District Magistrate had ordered an enquiry, appears to be false and that the general denial by the District Magistrate in the beginning in paragraph 15' of the counter affidavit should be treated as not admitting the existence of such an application by the petitioner. I do not find any inconsistency in this regard in the averments made by the petitioner in the two writ petitions. In paragraph 5' of the earlier writ petition, the petitioner had merely stated that on 12-6-1983 he had gone to the I. T. I., Naini to participate in the auction. There the Station House Officer Rama Kant Misra had, in connivance with the rival contractors, misbehaved and assaulted the petitioner within the factory premises and had deprived him of a sum of Rs. 29,000/- and some documents and after concocting imaginary version had registered a case against him. In that connection, he had made applications to the Inspector General of Police, District Magistrate, Home Secretary and the Chief Minister. 29,000/- and some documents and after concocting imaginary version had registered a case against him. In that connection, he had made applications to the Inspector General of Police, District Magistrate, Home Secretary and the Chief Minister. 1 do not find any inconsistency in the version set up by the petitioner in his two petitions. On the material on record, therefore, it is quite clear that so far as the counter version of the incident referred to in Ground no. 1' is concerned the petitioner had already placed it before the District Magistrate in the month of June 1983. Despite the fact that this fact bad been brought to the notice of the District Magistrate by the earlier writ petition, namely, Writ Petition No. 10159 of 1984, the District Magistrate based his satisfaction in respect of this ground merely on the basis of the report of the police and completely ignoring the counter version of the petitioner. It is difficult to accept that the District Magistrate was not aware of this allegation and this fact specially when it is the own case of the respondents that the earlier detention order had been revoked after writ Petition No. 10159 of 1984 had been filed and the Standing Counsel had advised the District Magistrate about the infirmities in the order of detention passed by him earlier. 31. It is true that before passing an order of detention on the basis of the police report and other material available to him, it is not obligatory upon the detaining authority to obtain an explanation or counter version from the person against whom the order is proposed to be made, but then if, in that regard, the version of the person proposed to be detained is already there, in all fairness the detaining authority must consider that version also along with that of the police before making up his mind whether or not he should act upon the report of the police. In case the District Magistrate had looked into the counter version it is likely that he would not have acted upon the police report in this regard without first looking into the report, if any, made by the Sub-Divisional Officer. His satisfaction, therefore', was likely to be effected by this vital material. In case the District Magistrate had looked into the counter version it is likely that he would not have acted upon the police report in this regard without first looking into the report, if any, made by the Sub-Divisional Officer. His satisfaction, therefore', was likely to be effected by this vital material. I am, therefore, of opinion that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate with regard to the involvement of the petitioner in the incident referred to in ground no.'1' ignoring the counter version set up by him in his application to the District Magistrate moved in the month of June 1983, stands vitiated. 32. So far as the ground no. 2' is concerned, it recites that on 11-2-1984 at about 11.30 A. M. in village Chak Tejau, the petitioner along with his associates armed with guns fired at Ram Chandra Dikshit which resulted in his death and looted his gun. The aforesaid incident created fear in the public of the vicinity and adversely affected public order. Case Crime No. 72 of 1984, under section 147/149/302/404 IPC was registered at police station Naini, regarding the said incident and after investigation, chargesheet was submitted in the case which is pending in court. The case of the petitioner in this regard has been set out in paragraph 39' of the petition wherein it has been mentioned that two witnesses of the case, namely, the informant Sushil Kumar Dikshit and Ramesh Chandra Dikshit had filed affidavits in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad in which they have mentioned that Manni Lal was not at all involved in the murder of Ram Chandra Dikshit. He was not present at the time of occurrence and that his name had been included in the first information report because of mental distress. Kamesh Chandra Dikshit had stated that he too was not present at the scene of incident and he had not seen any body committing the murder of Ram Chandra Dikshit. This allegation was made by the petitioner with a view to urge that there is evidence to indicate that the averments mentioned in ground no. 2' were false and to urge on that basis that the said ground was non-existent. This allegation was made by the petitioner with a view to urge that there is evidence to indicate that the averments mentioned in ground no. 2' were false and to urge on that basis that the said ground was non-existent. In reply, the District Magistrate in paragraph 26' of his counter affidavit stated that the Station House Officer, police station, Nairn, Allahabad never received any copy of the said affidavits and on verification and enquiry of the judicial record of the court, it has been found that no such affidavit is available on record of the said case. The Station House Officer having not been aware of any such affidavit, it is erroneous on the part of the petitioner to say that any relevant material was withheld from being placed before him. Taking a clue from the averments made in paragraph 26' of the counter-affidavit of the District Magistrate, learned counsel made a submission that the affidavits filed by Ramesh Chandra and Sushil Kumar Dikshit were vital documents which had not been placed before the District Magistrate before he made the order based on ground no. 2' and as such his satisfaction in that regard stands vitiated. He also filed a photostat copy of the enquiry slip from the office of the Chief Judicial Magistrate which indicated that the affidavits filed by Ramesh Chandra Dikshit and Sushil Kumar Dikshit before the Chief Judicial Magistrate in connection with Crime Case no. 72 of 1984 had been forwarded to the Station House Officer, Naini. He further produced a copy of the bail application and that of the bail order indicating that the petitioner was granted bail for the reason that despite time having been granted the State did not get the affidavit filed by the witnesses verified within the time allowed by the Court. Although the affidavit of the District Magistrate indicates that before he passed the impugned order, be did not have any knowledge about the said affidavit filed by Ramesh Chandra Dikshit and Sushil Kumar Dikshit, but then the District Magistrate is not competent to swear whether or not the Station House Officer, Naini, who made the report to him, was aware of the said affidavit filed by two witnesses in the case. There is no affidavit from the Station House Officer, Police Station, Naini, Allahabad in this regard. There is no affidavit from the Station House Officer, Police Station, Naini, Allahabad in this regard. Photostat copy of the certified copy of the enquiry slip filed alongwith the reioinder affidavit as corroborated by the certified copy of the bail order passed by the Sessions Judge does not indicate that the affidavits filed by Ramesh Chandra Dikshit and Sushil Kumar Dikshit were, in fact, forwarded to the Station House Officer, Naini, Allahabad. The reporting officer bad thus knowledge of these two affidavits, but be did not bring it to the notice of the District Magistrate while the matter was reported to him for taking action under the National Security Act on the basis of ground no. 2' against the petitioner. 33. The question, therefore, that survives for consideration is whether non-disclosure of these two affidavits to the District Magistrate, before he passed the detention order based on ground no. 2' amounted to withholding of a vital material from the detaining authority, which material if brought to the notice of the detaining authority, might: have affected his satisfaction in this regard. On the face of it, where a first informant, who claims to be an eye witness of the incident, files an affidavit in a court detracting from the version given by him in the first information report, certainly can create a doubt with regard to the veracity of the first information report and to the involvement of the person named therein. It was, therefore, a vital fact which should have been brought to the notice of the District Magistrate. It may be that after considering this fact in the light of other circumstances available to him, the District Magistrate might have thought that there were reasons to believe that the affidavits in detraction were motivated and that they deserved to be ignored, but then it was for him to consider this matter. I am unable to subscribe to the view that for purposes of obtaining an order under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, it was, for the reasons mentioned by brother Katju in his judgment, not necessary for the police to have brought those affidavits to the notice of the District Magistrate. The difficulty in the way of the police in verifying the genuineness and voluntary nature of the affidavits filed by the witnesses in the case is not at all material. The difficulty in the way of the police in verifying the genuineness and voluntary nature of the affidavits filed by the witnesses in the case is not at all material. It is the satisfaction of the detaining authority and not that of the police that is material for purposes of an order under Sec. 3 of the National Security Act. The police is merely in a position of an agency which lays information before the detaining authority to enable him to, if ha considers it necessary, pass appropriate orders under the Act. In relation to such proceedings, police is not the prosecutor whose anxiety merely is to see that the person booked by them should be punished. In this regard it is their duty to lay all relevant informations available with them, before the detaining authority so that the detaining authority may form its own opinion. In my opinion, the obligation placed on the police to place all the informations available with it whether it be for or against the person against whom it proposes action under Section 3 of the National Security Act, does not tend to frustrate the objective of the enactment. 34. I am accordingly of opinion that even in respect of ground no. 2' relevant and vital material which might have affected the satisfaction of the District Magistrate with regard to ground no. 2' was also not placed before the District Magistrate and as such satisfaction based on the second ground also stands vitiated. Coming now to the third ground of detention which recites that on 11th of September, 1984 an information was received at police station Bara that at about midnight between 10th of May, 1984 and 11th of May, 1984 near village Padar close to the tent of U. P. State Electricity Board of 33 KV Rewa Road-Pratappur line, aluminium wire and other articles valued at Rs. 1,06,000/- were looted by about 30 persons after threatening the chaukidar by pistols and were taken away on a truck as a result of which the construction work at 33 KV Rewa Road-Pratappur line stopped which adversely affected public order. During investigation complicity of the petitioner and complicity of 17 others came to light and aluminium wire valued at Rs. 75,000/- was recovered from the godown of the petitioner. Case Crime no. During investigation complicity of the petitioner and complicity of 17 others came to light and aluminium wire valued at Rs. 75,000/- was recovered from the godown of the petitioner. Case Crime no. 31 of 1984, under section 395/412 IPO was registered at police station Bara regarding the aforesaid incident and after investigation, chargesheet was filed and the case is pending in court. 35. In connection with this ground, the complaint of the petitioner is that he was not named in the first information report as a person who had participated in the said incident. His participation in the said incident could be fixed only by the identification proceedings conducted in jail. Such identification proceedings were held and no one was able to pick him out as a person who had participated in the crime. The police, however, did not place identification memo before the District Magistrate and merely reported to him that his complicity became known during investiigation and was confirmed by the recovery of the aluminium wire from his godown. They withheld the identification memo. Had the identification memo been produced before the District Magistrate, the District Magistrate might, in view of the fact that none of the witnesses who went to identify to the petitioner, pick him out as a person who was seen committing dacoity on the might between 10th and 11th of May, 1984, not have felt satisfied that the petitioner had actually taken part in the said dacoity. Since this vital fact was not placed before the detaining authority, the satisfaction of the District Magistrate based on this ground stands vitiated. 36. It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that before the District Magistrate passed the impugned order based on the third ground, the fact that in the identification parade the petitioner was not picked out by any witness of the occurrence, was not brought to his notice. In paragraph 27' of the Counter-affidavit of the District Magistrate it has been mentioned that no deduced facts about petitioner's involvement in regard to the said crime on the basis of the statement of accused Shohrab as also the recovery memo of the electricity wire which was upto the tune of Rs. 75,000/-. In paragraph 27' of the Counter-affidavit of the District Magistrate it has been mentioned that no deduced facts about petitioner's involvement in regard to the said crime on the basis of the statement of accused Shohrab as also the recovery memo of the electricity wire which was upto the tune of Rs. 75,000/-. No body disputes the rights of the District Magistrate to draw his inference about involvement of the accused in the crime on the basis of the statement of accused Shohrab and the recovery of the stolen property from his possession, but then the fact that no one was able to pick out the accused was certainly a very material fact la the light of which the District Magistrate may not have chosen to dispute the statement made by the accused fell satisfied about the involvement of the petitioner in the said crime by way of actually pirticipating in commission of the dacoity. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that failure on the part of the winesses to pick out the petitioner in the identification parade was purely neutral circumstance and that it was not necessary for the police to have brought it to the notice of the District Magistrate. I am, therefore, of opinion that even in respect of this ground, a vital and important material has been withheld from the District Magistrate before he passed the impugned order. It was also contended that any speculation made by the Court with regard to the fact that had a particular material been brought to the notice of the detaining authority, its satisfaction might have been otherwise, virtually amounts to going into the question of sufficiency of the material which the High Court cannot do. According to the respondents, doing this, in substance, amounts to saying that the existing material on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority was based, was not adequate for coming to any conclusion and instead some more material should have been taken into consideration. I regret my inability to appreciate this line of argument. Sufficiency of material in support of a particular conclusion is something entirely different from relevant vital material not being considered before arriving at the satisfaction in a particular way. I regret my inability to appreciate this line of argument. Sufficiency of material in support of a particular conclusion is something entirely different from relevant vital material not being considered before arriving at the satisfaction in a particular way. Accordingly all these decisions which say that as the satisfaction of the detaining authority stipulated by Section 3 of the National Security Act is subjective, it is not open to the Court to look into the sufficiency of the material on which such satisfaction is based, are not at all relevant, while considering the question as to whether the satisfaction of the detaining authority stands vitiated because relevant vital material has either been withheld or not placed before it. 37. As regards the fourth ground of detention counsel for the petitioner urged that the ground does not relate to public order instead it related to law and order. The fourth ground recites that on 6-8-1984 a single barrel 12 bore gun which was looted from Ram Chandra Dixit was recovered from the petitioner's possession along with eight live cartridges of 12 bore gun. A case under Section 25 Arms Act and under Section 411, IPC was registered against the petitioner at police station Naini, Allahabad, and after investigation charge- sheet has been filed in Court under Section 4111 IPC and case under Sec. 25 Arms Act is pending investigation. 38. The scope of public order and its distinction with law and order has been discussed in detail in the judgment of K. N. Singh, J. connected Habeas Corpus Petition No. 11151 of 1984 Ashok Dixit v. State of U. P. and I do not consider it necessary to repeat the same here. According to the allegations contained in ground No. 4 the petitioner was found to be in possession of stolen fire arm and some cartridges for which he did not possess any licence. The offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioner under Sec. 411, IPC and under Section 25, Arms Act could not possibly have had any impact on the public peace and tranquility. The said offences also did not have any potentiality to affect the even tempo of the life of the community. It is true that in a sense the fourth ground is connected with ground no. 2 but then, as already stated, the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in respect of ground no. The said offences also did not have any potentiality to affect the even tempo of the life of the community. It is true that in a sense the fourth ground is connected with ground no. 2 but then, as already stated, the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in respect of ground no. 2 stands vitiated as he had omitted to consider relevant material pertaining to the said ground. It is,, therefore, not possible to consider ground no. 4 along with ground no. 2 and by themselves the facts stated therein do not at all relate to public order. In the circumstances, petitioner's detention cannot be sustained even on ground no. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that whereas the impugned order of detention was made on 10-9-1984, the incidents pertaining to various grounds are said to have taken place on 12-6-1983, 11-2-1984, 11-5-1984 and 6-8-1984. He relied upon certain decisions of this Court wherein the time gap between the incident relied upon and the order passed by the detaining authority was less than the corresponding time lag involved in the present case, and urged that the ground for petitioner's detention had become stale and any satisfaction of the detaining authority based thereon stood vitiated. 39. While dealing with the question as to when the grounds relied upon by the detaining authority can be said to have become stale the Supreme Court, in the case of Ghulam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1974 SS 1336 observed thus :- "There must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial activity of the species specified in the statute. This credible chain is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 1264 . No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu bad done something evil. To rule otherwise is the sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months or the interval is sound. No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu bad done something evil. To rule otherwise is the sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months or the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. We have to investigate whether casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case." While quoting the aforementioned observations with approval, the Supreme Court in the case of Gora v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 473 observed that there cannot be any hard and fast rule that merely because there is a time lag of about six months between the offending act and the date of the order of detention, the causal link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the District Magistrate as sham or unreal. Whether the acts of the detenu forming the basis in arriving at a subjective satisfaction, are to remote in point of time to induce any reasonable person to reach such subjective satisfaction must be taken on the facts and circumstances of each case. The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. It is a subsidiary test evolved by courts for the purpose of determining the main question whether the past activities of the detenu is such that from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu and its utility therefore, lies only in so far as it subserves that purpose and it cannot be allowed to dominate or drown it. I do not read any of the cases of the Supreme Court cited by the petitioner as lying down anything contrary to what has been explained in Gora's case (supra). I do not read any of the cases of the Supreme Court cited by the petitioner as lying down anything contrary to what has been explained in Gora's case (supra). In case it could be said that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in respect of the four grounds did not stand vitiated for various reasons mentioned by me above and those grounds had a nexus with the disturbance of public order, would agree with Katju, J. that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate based thereon will not stand vitiated on the ground that the said grounds had by lapse of time, become stale. In my opinion, various decisions of this Court wherein it has been held that merely because there has been some time lag between the incident relied upon by the detaining authority and the passing of the dentention order the ground for detention becomes stale and the satisfaction of the detaining authority gets vitiated do not lay down correct law. In such cases what has to be seen is whether the past activities of the detenu is such that from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu. 40. In view of the above discussion I am of opinion that first three grounds on which the petitioner has been detained are vitiated as the detaining authority failed to consider the relevant material which could have affected his satisfaction and the fourth ground does not relate to public order. Thus, none of the grounds; on which the impugned order of detention has been made survive to sustain the detention order. In the result, this petition must succeed, and the petitioner deserves to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is; required to be detained in connection with some other case. 41. While the judgment in the case was being delivered, learned Deputy Government Advocate prayed that a certificate that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court may be granted. In our judgments we have merely applied the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases. In the circumstances, we do not think that in this case such a certificate should be granted. 42. The oral prayer made for a certificate under Article 134-A of the Constitution is rejected.