JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Dr. R. C. Shrotriya is a Journalist and is a part-time correspondent of Samachar Bharti, Hindustan and other Dailies and Weeklies. He is also General Secretary of the All India Patrakar Sansad, which is an association of part-time correspondents. The Sansad is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act. Dr. Shrotriya claims to have canvassed and succeeded in getting the part-time journalists included in the definition of a working Journalist under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955. 2. Under the Press Councils Act, 1978, a statutory body called the Press Council of India was established. The procedure for enrolment of members of the Press Council is laid down in the Press Council (Procedure for Nomination of Members) Rules, 1978.- The Council is to consist of the Chairman and 28 other members. Of these members, 13 are to be nominated from amongst the Working Journalists Six of these are to be Editors of newspapers while the remaining seven are to be working journalists other than Editors. Four names, including that of Dr. Shrotriya, were recommended by the Sansad for purposes of nomination of two from amongst them as members of the Press Council. The Press Council did not communicate with Dr. Shrotriya or the Sansad and ignored the representation which led to the filing of writ petition No. 3605 of 1982 by Dr. Shrotriya and the Sansad in this Court on March 31, 1982. The petition was admitted and, after the parties had exchanged affidavits, the prayer for grant of interim relief was considered by this Court. 3. A learned single Judge (Hon'ble A. N. Varma, J.) disposed of the stay matter on May 25, 1983. He felt that no case for grant of an interim order was made out but in his opinion, the case deserved to be disposed of at the earliest. In the order passed by him, Justice Varma observed, inter alia, that, ".........The term in question of the Press Council is shortly ending being only three years. In this view, the parties or either of them may, if they are so advised, apply to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for fixation of an early date for final disposal of the writ petition.........". 4. The term of the Press Council of India is to expire in April, 1985. In this view, the parties or either of them may, if they are so advised, apply to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for fixation of an early date for final disposal of the writ petition.........". 4. The term of the Press Council of India is to expire in April, 1985. On July 27, 1983, an application with the prayer for expeditious hearing of the petition was made quoting the orders of Hon'ble A. N. Varma, J. but was rejected on September 9, 1983 by the Chief Justice. On April 9, 1984 another application was made for expeditious hearing of the petition which was rejected by the Acting Chief Justice on August 1, 1984 by an order saying, "I am not satisfied that this is a fit case which should take precedence over other cases which are older ......................" It is then that the present writ petition was filed with the prayer that the Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the Acting Chief Justice or the Chief Justice (as the case may be) to list writ petition No. 3605 of 1982 (Dr. R. C. Shrotriya and another v. Union of India) for final hearing forthwith before an appropriate Bench. The petition was filed on August 27, 1984 when, at the request of Sri R. K. Jain appearing for the petitioners, it was directed to be put up again with another petition filed by Dr. Shrotriya. In this petition, the Acting Chief Justice is the sole respondent and is represented by Sri D. S. Sinha, Additional Chief Standing Counsel. The petition was heard at some length by us at the request of the counsel for the parties who prayed that the matter be disposed of finally at the admission stage. We heard them intermittently on different dates and are now disposing of the matter finally. 5. The High Court of Allahabad has made rules in exercise of powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution and the other powers enabling it in that behalf. These are the Rules of Court, 1952. Chapter V of these rules deals with jurisdiction of Judges sitting alone or in a Division Courts. Chapter VIII contains miscellaneous provisions. Rule 2 of this Chapter mentions the powers of a single Judge and Division Court while Rule 33 of this Chapter provides for certain applications to be laid before the Chief Justice for orders. 6. Chapter V of these rules deals with jurisdiction of Judges sitting alone or in a Division Courts. Chapter VIII contains miscellaneous provisions. Rule 2 of this Chapter mentions the powers of a single Judge and Division Court while Rule 33 of this Chapter provides for certain applications to be laid before the Chief Justice for orders. 6. Beginning with Chapter V, we find Rule I providing that "Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts as may be constituted from time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions." and Rule 2 saying that "Except as provides by these Rules or other law, the following cases shall be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone, namely (omitted)." Rule 6 then says that "the Chief Justice may constitute 'a Bench of two or more Judges to decide a case or any question of law formulated by a Bench hearing the case" and other Rule 8, .......every other case (including writ petition in which Special Appeals are not barred) shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges save as otherwise provided by these Rules or other law or by any general or special order of the Chief Justice." 7. Coming to Chapter VIII we find' Rule 2 laying down that "any function which may be performed by the Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction may be performed by any Judge or by any Division Court appointed or constituted for such purpose in pursuance of Article 225 of the Constitution." Rule 33 of Chapter VIII may be quoted, for much of the argument, turns round this Rules : Chapter VIII Rule 33:- "Certain application to be laid before Chief Justice for Orders,- An application for the expediting of the hearing of a case or for listing a case out of turn or for the removal of a case to be tried and determined by the Court under Rule 4 or for the withdrawal of a case under Article 228 of the Constitution shall be laid before the Chief Justice (or any other Judge or a Bench nominated by the Chief Justice in respect of any case or class of cases) for orders." 8. Rule 4 referred to in Rule 33, relates to the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court and provides that "the Court may remove and try and determine as a Court of extraordinary original jurisdiction any suit being or falling within the jurisdiction of any Court subject to its superintendence when it. shall think proper to do so either on the agreement of the parties to that effect c,r for the purposes of justice, the reasons for so doing being recorded in the proceedings of the Court". And, Article 228 of the Constitution is in the following terms : "228. Transfer of certain cases to High Court. - If the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a Court subordinate to it involve:, a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution of which is necessary for the disposal of the case (it shall withdraw the case and may- (a) either dispose of the case itself, or (b) determine the said question of law and return the case to the Court from which the case has been so withdrawn together with a copy of its judgment on such question, and the said Court shall on receipt thereof, proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment." 9. We may revert back to that portion of Rule 2 of Chapter V of the Rules of Court, dealing with jurisdiction of a single Judge, which relates to applications. We may revert back to that portion of Rule 2 of Chapter V of the Rules of Court, dealing with jurisdiction of a single Judge, which relates to applications. sub-rule (iv) of this Rule entrusts the disposal to a single Judge of an application for the withdrawal of an areal or application, or for a consent decree or order, which is uncontested or which is made in a case which can be heard under the rule by a Judge sitting alone, while sub-rule (v) refers to an application which is not an application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 in a case which cannot be heard by a Judge sitting alone or an application, other than an application for interim orders, to which Chapter XXII of the Rules dealing with a direction, order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution other than a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus applies or an application, other than an application for an interim order, which is required to be heard by a Bench of two or more Judges or an application, other than an application for interim order, under Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Rules dealing with special appeals against the' judgment of one Judge passed in exercise of original jurisdiction. 10. The presentation of applications is also dealt with in various rules. For example, Chapter XI Rule 1 contemplates presentation of every memorandum of appeal and application, other than those which under the Rules may be filed before the Registrar or other Officer, for admission in Court while Rule 2 of this Chapter provides that, ".......the Judge or Judges before whom appeals.... or applications may be presented and mentions made in different classes of cases, shall be notified for each day by the office in accordance with the directions of the Chief Justice. "This is in regard to the civil jurisdiction of the Court. Likewise, presentation of appeals and applications for revision or other applications in criminal matters is to be made in Court except where under the Rule or by the order of the Court of the Chief Justice it is to be before the Registrar or any other Officer of the Court. Likewise, presentation of appeals and applications for revision or other applications in criminal matters is to be made in Court except where under the Rule or by the order of the Court of the Chief Justice it is to be before the Registrar or any other Officer of the Court. This is provided in Chapter XVIII Rule 1, Chapter XXII Rule 1 envisages presentation of an application for a direction or order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, other than a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus, before a Judge sitting alone or a Division Bench, appointed to receive such applications. An application under Article 226 for a writ it the nature of Habeas Corpus, if not sent by post, is to be made to the Bench appointed to receive such applications. 11. The scheme of the Rules appears clear. Judges sitting alone or in Division Benches entertain such matters as are entrusted to them by the Chief Justice and dispose them of. Their jurisdiction, as out-lined in the Rules, is confined to matters entrusted to them by or under the orders of the Chief Justice. The jurisdiction of a Judge, in matters which come up before him, is unrestricted and planery in the sense that within the ambit of law, he exercises judicial powers unfettered by any extraneous direction. The Chief Justice is but the first amongst equals in that sphere. But, in a matter which is not entrusted to a Judge by the Chief Justice or under the Rules of the Court. He cannot, as it were, usurp the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice, particularly in a matter entrusted to the Chief Justice alone under the rules and, one such matter is the disposal of the prayer for expeditious hearing of a case. He cannot, as it were, usurp the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice, particularly in a matter entrusted to the Chief Justice alone under the rules and, one such matter is the disposal of the prayer for expeditious hearing of a case. True it is not an, observation by a Judge in respect of the matter heard by him to the effect that the controversy deserved to be resolved expeditiously, out of its turn or that a case deserved to be heard out of its turn is entitled to great weight and would ordinarily not be overlooked by the Chief Justice while dealing with the prayer made by a party for expediting the hearing of a case or for listing it out of its turn, it seems difficult to sustain the plea made on behalf of the petitioner that it would bind the Chief Justice in the sense that its disregard can be viewed as amounting to disobedience by him of a judicial order. 12. Article 226 of the Constitution does vest the. High Court with a power to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of mandamus etc. and these powers are exercisable by a Judge or by Judges sitting alone or in a division Court appointed or constituted for such purpose in pursuance of Article 225 of the Constitution but it cannot be overlooked that the provisions of the Rules of Court, which have the sanction of the Constitution because of Article 225 itself, cannot be left out of consideration while deciding the question of their jurisdiction. 13. An application for expediting the hearing of a case or for hearing it out of its turn, is undoubtedly an application made in a pending case. The Chief Justice or any other Judge or a Bench nominated by the chief Justice in respect of any case or class of cases) alone is competent to pass orders on such an application. This is obvious from Rule 33 of Chapter VIII. The entrustment of disposal of an application of a particular kind to the Chief Justice does not introduce an element of novelty in procedure for we find that the rules of Court themselves contemplate disposal of applications of certain nature by particular judges. This is obvious from Rule 33 of Chapter VIII. The entrustment of disposal of an application of a particular kind to the Chief Justice does not introduce an element of novelty in procedure for we find that the rules of Court themselves contemplate disposal of applications of certain nature by particular judges. For example, we find in Chapter V of the Rules of Court provision for an application for review of a Judgment to be laid before the Judge or Judges by whom it was delivered except where such Judge or Judges are no longer attached to the Court when it is to be laid before a larger Bench of Judges to be nominated by the Chief Justice. Similarly, there is a provision in Rule 13 of that Chapter that no application to the same effect or with the same object as a previous application upon which a Bench has passed any order (other than an order of reference to another Judge or Judges) is ordinarily to be heard by any other Bench except by way of appeal Likewise, an application in a case partly heard by a Bench is to be ordinarily heard by that particular Bench. This is the provision in Rule 15 while Rule 16 contemplates that an application in a case listed before a Bench in the Cause List is ordinarily to be presented before such Bench. When we turn to Chapter VI we find that in Rule 16 it is provided that if the date of hearing in any case has been fixed by a Judge, any alteration in such date is to be made, as far as it is possible, after consulting him. The same Chapter envisages in Rules 14 and 15 making of an application to the Chief Justice for an order that a case shall not be placed in the Cause List on any particular day or days or that the case of an Advocate be postponed for such a period as he may deem proper. 14. An application with the prayer for expeditious hearing of a case is disposed of, with notice to the parties, in Court. The Counsel for the applicant as well as for the respondent or opposite party has right of hearing before the Chief Justice. The order of the Chief Justice, thus, is made in judicial proceedings, after following a judicial procedure. An application with the prayer for expeditious hearing of a case is disposed of, with notice to the parties, in Court. The Counsel for the applicant as well as for the respondent or opposite party has right of hearing before the Chief Justice. The order of the Chief Justice, thus, is made in judicial proceedings, after following a judicial procedure. The nature of the order cannot be said to be anything but judicial in character. Such an order cannot be said to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for it is trite that the Court cannot interfere with its own order on the judicial side by invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 15. The case of the petitioner is that while disposing of the prayer for expeditious hearing of a case, the Chief Justice is performing an administrative function and an order made by the Chief Justice, is, therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Some decisions have been cited in support of this plea. 16. The proposition that an administrative order made by the Chief Justice is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not in doubt. In fact, it was clearly recognised by a Division Bench of this Court in Mahesh Prasad Srivastava v. Abdul Khair AIR 1971 All 205 while affirming the judgment of a single Judge in Abdul Khair v. Hon'ble Chief Justice High Court of Judicature at Allahabad AIR 1971 All 44 . The Division Bench, after noticing several decisions, mostly of the Supreme Court, spoke through Dwivedi, J., and said, in paragraph 12 of the report, that ........ the Chief Justice or any other Judge passed an order while acting in an administrative capacity, he is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226". Another dictum of the Bench in this decision which we may notice is to the effect that "the Constitution has made a distinction between the High Court as a collective institution and the Chief Justice while' the latter is acting in his individual capacity and passing orders on the administrative side." 17. The Supreme Court. Another dictum of the Bench in this decision which we may notice is to the effect that "the Constitution has made a distinction between the High Court as a collective institution and the Chief Justice while' the latter is acting in his individual capacity and passing orders on the administrative side." 17. The Supreme Court. in Radheshyam Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1959 SC 107 , upon which great reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner, was examining the question whether the function performed by the State Government while exercising powers under section 53-A of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act enabling it to appoint an Executive Officer of its choice from amongst the servants of the Government was administrative in character or was quasi judicial in nature, making it amenable to correction by the High Court by issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari or not. A constitution Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the matter at some length and concluded, by majority opinion, that the tests making the order of the State Government quasi-judicial in character were not satisfied in the case. And, the tests laid down were that the body of persons (i) must have legal authority, (ii) to determine the questions affecting the rights of parties and (iii) must have the duty to act judicially before its action could be said to be quasi judicial. It was stressed before us by the counsel for the petitioner that this decision laid down that where there is no lis inter partes and the decision does not decide the rights of the parties and may be founded upon consideration of expediency, the order passed will be administrative in character. Thus viewed, proceeded the submission, a decision whether the hearing of a case should be expedited and the case be heard out of its turn being primarily based on expediency and not having any defect upon the rights of the parties, qualifies for being characterise as an administrative order by the Chief Justice. Thus viewed, proceeded the submission, a decision whether the hearing of a case should be expedited and the case be heard out of its turn being primarily based on expediency and not having any defect upon the rights of the parties, qualifies for being characterise as an administrative order by the Chief Justice. This line of argument overlooks the basic fact that an application with the aforesaid prayer is made by a party in a case pending before the High Court on its judicial side and the chief Justice before whom the application is laid by virtue of rule 33 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court disposes it of as a Court and not as an administrative functionary. This view of our is strengthened by the fact that the said rule envisages that an application may be laid also before any other Judge or a Bench nominated by the Chief Justice in respect of any case or class of cases for orders. While acting as a Court, the Chief Justice acts for the Court in a representative capacity. He follows the judicial procedure by affording opportunity of hearing to the parties in the case before deciding, on the basis of circumstances placed before him, whether the case merits hearing out of its turn or not. Reliance, in our opinion, upon the decision in Radheshyam's case is not apposite in such circumstances. In fact, the question whether a,unction is purely administrative or quasi-judicial in nature only arises in a case where it is being performed by an authority other than a Court. . 18. We are not impressed by the submission of the counsel appearing for the Chief Justice before us that having once disposed of the prayer for expeditious hearing, it was not competent for the Chief Justice to entertain a fresh prayer to that effect by the same party except upon intervention of some fresh facts. We find no warrant for the submission for we feel that a subsequent prayer for an expeditious hearing of a case made by a party can always be entertained and considered on its merits by the Chief Justice or any other Judge or Bench nominated by him for the purpose and there is nothing in the Rules of Court prohibiting it. A prayer once refused can later be allowed if the justice of the cause necessitates it. A prayer once refused can later be allowed if the justice of the cause necessitates it. The circumstance that the petition would become infructuous may be one of the considerations which can be taken into account. The increased availability of Benches for hearing the petition may be another valid reason for acceding to the request. The fact that the party would suffer irreparable loss may be yet another circumstance which can weigh with the Chief Justice in deciding whether the prayer for hearing his case out of turn should be allowed. The circumstances in which the prayer may be allowed are myriad. They can be enumerated in their entirety and it is always within the judicial discretion of the Chief Justice, or any offer Judge or Bench entrusted by him with the power for the purpose, to deal with the prayer for expeditious hearing of a case on merits and to accept or not to accept the prayer. Such discretion can hardly be said to be open to scrutiny by the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even in the Nawabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1976 SC 1152 where their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted in paragraph 6 of the report a passage from "Theoretical Basis of Inherent Powers Doctrine' saying that the `inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breadth is coextensive with the necessity", they were careful enough to observe that "we cannot go against any statutory prescription........." 19. 'Judges do not exercise general jurisdiction over all the cases which the High Court as a whole is competent to hear and their jurisdiction is limited to such cases as are allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his direction." (See : State v. Devi Dayal AIR 1959 All 421 ). 20. In State of U. P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi 1978 All LJ 477, a case which went to the Supreme Court from this Court, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court recognised the legal position that the Rules of Court laid down the mode of exercise of powers by the High Court for a convenient transaction of its business and it was a misnomer to describe the exercise of powers by a Judge or a smaller body of Judges of the Court on the administrative side as a delegate of the Court. In fact, he acts as an alter ego of the entire Court. The case related to the compulsory retirement of a District Judge and the argument raised before the Supreme Court was that the retirement made on the basis of the recommendation of a small body of Judges constituting the Administrative Committee was bad for it could not be said to be the opinion of the High Court as such which alone had control over the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution. We have noticed this decision only with a view to emphasise that the Rules of Court cannot be said to amount to curtailment of the powers of judicial superintendence under Article 226 of the Constitution which the Court possesses over its own administrative function. The Rules are only made for rendering the functioning of the Court, both on the administrative and judicial side, more convenient. The Chief Justice, under rule 33 of Chapter VIII, is exercising the powers of the Court in its judicial side and not as a separate entity functioning administratively. 21. We may deal with the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Paras Nath Tewari v. Bhaiya Lal 1970 All LJ 328. There, the question was whether the applicant Paras Nath Tewari should be permitted to urge that the Bench which disposed of his writ petition was not competent to do so as at the material time the work allotted to it was to receive applications under Article 226 of the Constitution, other than in the nature of habeas corpus, for admission and the work of final disposal of the applications was allotted to another Hon'ble Judge of the Court sitting singly. The Bench first found as a fact that the objection to its jurisdiction to finally dispose of the case was not taken by Paras Nath, who was represented by two counsel who were present throughout the hearing and the dictation of the judgment, and it was only after Paras Nath had lost the case that it occurred to him that the Bench had no jurisdiction to hear the case. It then proceeded to observe that once a case is before the Bench it had the jurisdiction to decide the case as any other Court after observing that the case was shown in the cause list of the Bench and was heard by it in the normal course. It then proceeded to observe that once a case is before the Bench it had the jurisdiction to decide the case as any other Court after observing that the case was shown in the cause list of the Bench and was heard by it in the normal course. It could not, therefore, be said that the Bench heard the case without its being assigned to it by the Chief Justice for the simple reason that the assignment of cases is made to the Single Judges or Division Bench by showing the same before them in the daily cause list. And, inasmuch as, the case was listed before the Bench in the cause list of various dates, referred to earlier by it, there was no substance in the submission that the case was not assigned to the Bench. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to observe that the regulation of the sittings of the judges of the Court was not a judicial 1 function that the Chief Justice performs and it is only an administrative power discharged to facilitate the performance of the judicial function of the Court by various Judges who constitute it. The observation further was that "once a case is before a Bench, it has full jurisdiction to decide it and is not only fully seized of it but has complete dominion over it to fix dates and decide it in accordance with its views and the law on the subject. The administrative powers of the Chief Justice do not destroy this inherent jurisdiction possessed by the Bench receiving a case and must be read subject to it. "These observations, on which emphasis was laid by the counsel for the petitioner, were clearly obiter and must be read in the background of the question which was actually up for determination before the Bench. On behalf of the petitioner it has been heard that irrespective of the clear provision contained in rule 33 of chapter VIII of the Rules of Court, it was not open to the Chief Justice, on the facts brought to his notice, to take the view that the case did not merit an expeditious hearing or listing out of its turn if another Judge has observed, in the course of a judicial order passed by him, that the case deserves to be heard at an early date. This argument was sought to be supported by the observations of the Division Bench in Paras Nath Tewari's case quoted by us above. We are unable to hold that the aforesaid observations lead to this result. Of course, as mentioned by us earlier in this judgment, whenever an observation is made by a Judge hearing a matter on the judicial side in this respect, it would be given its due weight and would ordinarily not be overlooked by the Chief Justice while dealing with a prayer made by a party for expeditious hearing of his case. The view that the Chief Justice would take would naturally depend upon the facts of the particular case. 22. In view of what we have said above, we are unable to hold that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought by him in respect of the circulars or that the impugned order of the Acting Chief Justice merits interference by us. 23. We dismiss the petition but leave the parties to bear own costs.